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 Abstract 
Stammaitic Activity Versus Stammaitic Chronology; Anonymity’s Impact on the 
Legal Narrative of the Babylonian Talmud 
Joshua E. Eisen 
 
 This dissertation explores the nature of the contribution of the Stammaim to the 
narrative of the Babylonian Talmud (BT).  The primary suggestion is to view the 
Stammaim as the authors, narrators, and editors who contributed the anonymous 
Stammaitic activity to the text.  The goal is not to dismiss the possibility of a Stammaitic 
period, or a period of heightened Stammaitic activity.  Rather, it is to broaden the scope 
of possible chronological provenances for Stammaitic activity.  Once broadened, it 
becomes necessary to view the notion of ‘Stammaitic’ as one defining a literary style 
regardless of whether it might also refer to a chronological period.  The idea of the style 
comes first.  After a Stammaitic style emerges, and once there is a period of time where 
the deployment of such a style becomes heightened, then – and only then – is it possible 
to define a period based upon the style.  Nevertheless, the style is hardly confined to any 
period either before or after the Stammaitic period as it is currently understood. 
 
 Once I have addressed the issue of a Stammaitic style that cuts across the periods, 
I posit that anonymity fuels the engines of three other features that are worth considering 
when reading a BT text: canonicity, multiplicity, and pluralism.  In considering 
anonymity, one must analyze the impact of anonymous elements on the narrative as a 
whole, and specifically what the anonymity does to or for the text.  When assessing what 
makes this or that text canonical, degrees of canonicity emerge for the different elements
 of a BT text.  Understanding the impact of anonymity (and attribution) assists in 
assessing those degrees – whether based upon manuscripts or the internal workings of the 
text – and how degrees of canonicity are more easily manipulated by an anonymous 
voice.  One interesting possibility also emerges that allows for anonymous actors to 
infuse canonicity into a tradition by manipulating attribution. 
 
 Regarding multiplicity, I argue that the authors and editors of the BT pursued a 
general agenda of including a greater rather than fewer number of attributed sages.  
While any one sage of great importance can infuse authority (and canonicity) into a 
tradition and the words associated with it, the inclusion of a broad range of sages from 
different places increases the potential ‘market’ for the text as a whole.  In discussing 
pluralism, I deal with the manner in which the laws and customs are laid out in the BT as 
well as the substance of the laws and customs themselves.  They are presented in such a 
way that the legal system that is the BT can easily operate within dominant, primary legal 
systems where the BT is clearly subordinate.  I also suggest the possibility that the BT 
was crafted to be subordinate.  There are many ways to read a text.  In the case of the BT, 
I argue that an analysis of the text is well served by consideration of anonymity and the 
other three features.  I approach the issue of the four features, as well as the matter of 
Stammaitic style versus Stammaitic chronology, theoretically in the first five chapters, 
after which I dedicate chapters to raw analyses of different types of texts and groups of 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to challenge aspects of the existing 
chronological paradigm through which contemporary scholarship has approached the 
Babylonian Talmud (BT).  Specifically, I address the emphasis contemporary scholarship 
has placed on dating the Stammaim, and how this pursuit is similar to trying to date the 
splitting of the Red Sea or Solomon’s Iron Age reign.  Cogent arguments can be made, 
but often there will be those who legitimately question the result.  Further, I argue that the 
separation of chronological and literary concerns creates a prism through which to read 
the text that both opens up new caverns of meaning and frees up the energy to reach those 
caverns and their crevices.  As part of this project, I also suggest alternative mechanisms 
with which meaning is extracted from the text.  This alternative centers on four features 
(variables) that can be mapped onto the text: anonymity, canonicity, pluralism, and 
multiplicity.  In no way am I seeking to dismiss historical possibilities and their relevance 
to the text.  My goal is to understand the impact that dating elements of a text have on its 
more literary understanding.  This informs how we can understand the BT and the many 
genres into which scholars have categorized it. 
 
Stammaitic Period or Stammaitic Activity 
 
An important part of my dissertation is a challenge to the over-emphasis on 
chronologies and periodization on the part of contemporary Talmud scholars.  On the one 
  2 
hand, there is an over-reliance on the traditional periodization forwarded by Sherira more 
than a millennium ago.  On the other hand, there exists a discomfort with this 
periodization because of the impact of source criticism on the field in the last fifty years.  
Central to this discomfort was the isolation of the Stam or Stammaim not only as distinct 
literary contributors, but also as a distinct period.  This forces the reader of the text to 
read what is attributable to the Stammaim as also emerging from a post-Amoraic, 
Stammaitic period. 
 
Some recent scholarship has approached the text of the BT with a lesser emphasis 
on the issue of dating, and with a greater interest in the literary.  Among them are Barry 
Wimpfheimer, Daniel Boyarin, Sergei Dogopolski, and Zvi Septimus.1 Other scholars 
include David Kraemer and to a lesser extent Shamma Friedman.2 Although it is 
impossible fully to ignore chronologies and dating, these scholars have turned their focus 
elsewhere. So long as we are still dealing with the BT as possessing historical import and 
not as a work of fiction, issues of dating and chronologies are impossible to avoid.  
Where I go beyond the state of the art in the field is in the suggestion that stammaitic 
activity is potentially datable to different times; I am not suggesting that it is absolutely 
ahistorical.  I also do not wish to dismiss the possibility of a period of heightened 
stammaitic activity.  I am still cautious in applying premises borne of the isolation of the 
                                                
1 Barry Wimpfheimer, Narrating the Law: a Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011) see especially his discussion about using the BT as a historiagraphical source: 
63-67; Daniel Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2009); Sergey Dolgopolski, What is Talmud? The Art of Disagreement (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2009). Zvi Septimus, “Trigger Words and Simultexts: The Experience of Reading the Talmud,” in 
Wisdom of Batsheva, ed. B.S. Wimpfheimer (New Jersey City: Ktav, 2009): 163-185. 
2 David Kraemer, “The Intended Reader as a Key to Interpreting the Bavli,” Prooftexts 13, 2 (1993): 125-
140; Shamma Friedman, sugyot b’heker hatalmud habavli: asufat mehkarim b’inyaney mivneh, herkev 
v’nusah, (Jewish Theological Seminary: New York and Jerusalem, 2010), 117-126. 
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Stammaim as a distinct chronological group.  While focusing on the literary is the 
direction in which I wish to go, it is still important to address dating in dealing with this 
or that sugya in light of the assumptions reagarding dating. 
 
Two types of sugyot are particularly problematic.  The first are those where the 
text must be Amoraic because of which sages are mentioned and how the attributed 
traditions in the sugya relate to one another.  Second and less problematic for scholars to 
date, but far more frequent, are the sugyot where there is no evidence in the text for a 
dating later than the first, second, third, or later generation of Amoraim; the only basis for 
dating the sugya later is the Stammaitic attribution of some of its parts, which also means 
a place within the traditional periodization of Sherira. 
 
The first type of sugya is one which demands attention because it contradicts a 
traditional periodization with the Stammaim plugged in, between the Saboraic and 
Amoraic periods.  Some scholars address these sugyot on a case-by-case basis, reaching 
conclusions such as this or that element is an ‘early stam.’3  Others have cited these types 
of sugyot as evidence for the earlier dating of the Stammaim, and even for the existence 
of Stammaim during the late Amoraic period.4  Essentially, the debate is one about how 
to date the Stammaim.  There is no questioning the existing periodization, and 
specifically the place of the Stammaim within it.  The second type of sugya does not 
demand the same sort of attention, because the content of the sugya allows for a late 
                                                
3 See for example David Halivni, mevo’ot l’mekorot u’mesorot (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2009), 9.  
 
4  Robert Brody, “stam hatalmud v’divrey ha’amoraim” in Iggud: mivhar ma’amarim b’mada’ey 
ha’yahadut – krakh aleph; ha’miqra v’olamo, sifrut hazal u’mishpat ivri u’mahshevt yisrael eds. B. 
Schwartz, A. Melamed and A. Shemesh (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2008), 213-232. 
  4 
dating.  Yet it can also allow for an early dating, although that assumption is rarely made.  
When analyzing such texts, scholars do not bother testing for an early dating of certain 
elements of the sugya; fundamental premises in the field of academic Talmud study can 
be said to be less than encouraging regarding such early dating of Stammaitic activity, 
and one can argue that they preclude it. 
 
I offer detailed discussions of Halivni’s source critical approach and the scholars 
who reacted to it in different ways.  I am accepting of his source critical methodology and 
the way it enables the reader to isolate different elements in the text.  Further, the relative 
dating of the different elements of the sugya are also useful in uncovering meaning.  
Absolute dating of the Stammaim to a post-Amoraic period is problematic.  My 
suggestion for dealing with the Stammaim is to define all that is attributable to them as 
Stammaitic activity, with no chronological implication.  Instead of reading the text of the 
BT and reacting to those instances where it is difficult to date the Stammaitic activity as 
post-Amoraic, I attempt to demonstrate that the Stammaitic activity can be dated to 
periods earlier than the post-Amoraic one and I test for as early a dating as possible based 
upon the content of the sugya.  The point is not actually and necessarily to date elements 
that early, but to demonstrate that it is possible.  Dating the Stammaitic activity in 
different ways allows for different types of meaning to emerge.  Stepping away from 
dating them altogether, and viewing them as literary elements not reflective of any one 
specific chronological milieu, further allows for a new understanding of the text.  Thus 
the groundwork is established to look for meaning and authority in the text in ways less 
reliant upon chronologies and the traditional rabbinic periodization.  This is not to 
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dismiss chronologies, but to take them away from the center of the discussion.  
Regardless of the difficulties and challenges of considering chronoliges and dating, it is 
impossible to ignore them.  Further, they complement the assessment of a literary 
perspective rather than from a source critical one. 
 
Four Features (Variables) 
 
 I dedicate four chapters to each of the four features which I map onto the text: 
anonymity, canonicity, pluralism, and multiplicity.  The chapters on pluralism and 
multiplicity are related, and I define one as the inverse of the other.  I am also most 
interested in how these four features impact our understanding of the BT as a text with 
legal import.  Related to this is my interest in how the BT may have interacted with the 
societies and communities for which it served at least in part as the basis for how lives 
were governed.  The authority of the BT could be construed as cultural as much as it can 
be legal.  However, I recognize that this is peripheral to this project, and it is something I 




What do the anonymous or Stammaitic elements do for the text of the BT, 
especially when we untangle them from the chronological demands of a traditional 
periodization?  Phrased differently, what is the impact of anonymity upon the BT?  What 
                                                
5 See Talya Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud: Oral Torah as Written Tradition in Medieval 
Jewish Cultures (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 2-3. 
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can we learn about anonymity in general from other sources unrelated to the BT, and how 
can they inform our understanding of anonymity in the BT? 
 
In understanding anonymity generally, it is valuable to look for discussions of 
anonymity in contexts unrelated to the BT, with an eye toward culling certain principles 
which can be applicable to a reading of the BT.  One important place I look to for 
discussions on anonymity are discussions and analyses of the early print era.  I also 
examine the Hong lou Meng, a Chinese literary work whose author was unknown and the 
text was treated as an anonymous one for centuries until its authorship was revealed.  
Additionally, I describe the anonymous nature of scribal cultures and their relevance to 
the culture of those who studied and transmitted the BT and the elements that ultimately 
comprise it.  I argue that anonymity is a concept which lends itself to mutual analysis 
across disciplines, and that analysis of anonymity in one discipline is relevant to another, 
and specifically to the BT.  I also argue for the possibility that anonymity can be the more 
powerful and authoritative element when juxtaposed with an attributed one.  This is 
closely related to the power or authority that the anonymous narrator exudes in the 
narration of a text, removed ‘from the action.’ 
 
Ultimately, the anonymous voice is removed from any one specific set of 
agendas.  Once anonymity is lost, the voice changes, as does the manner in which the text 
is read.  I discuss this in the context of an anonymous text written by King James in the 
projected voice of an ordinary citizen, after which King James’ authorship was 
discovered.  As a result, King James adjusted the text into the voice of the king.  Because 
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we are unaware of the true voice of the anonymous Stammaitic elements, their voices can 
blend into a single ‘anonymous’ voice.  If, however, we became aware of the true authors 
– say, Rav Pappa – then we would view the text quite differently. 
 
In the BT, the contributors of the Stammaitic elements are the anonymous 
narrators of the halachic discourse.  Often they are the driving force behind the flow of a 
sugya, as well as its resolution.  This narrative power, however, is offset by the limits of 
what they are ‘permitted’ to do to sources and traditions that they received.  Still, there 
exists the ability of the anonymous narrative to be at once respectful and charitable 
toward existing traditions, while still controlling what is included and – more importantly 
– how it is included.  Further, there are earlier anonymous (Stammaitic) elements, which 
are treated with similar charity by relatively later anonymous (Stammaitic) elements.  
This is addressed more fully in the discussions of canon and canonicity and in the 
analysis of specific sugyot. 
 
Beyond the BT, I also argue that there is a value to anonymity in rabbinic 
literature, including the Bible.  In a more ambitious pursuit, I also suggest that anonymity 
can serve to mimic both the unanimous voice as well as a divine voice.  Unanimity and 
divinity are critical features around which to build an understanding of a Talmudic text 
and of the Talmud itself.  Anonymity also serves to bolster the canonicity of traditions 
and the words used to convey them.  In the case of the BT, I also argue that there exists a 
tendency toward multiplicity in addition to a ‘legal humility’ that allows for – or even 
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In thinking about the BT in terms of canonicity, I conceptualize the BT as both a 
component of the rabbinic canon, and as a canon composed of tractates and sugyot.  
Therefore, my discussions of canon and canonicity are twofold, reflecting the two 
different ways the BT can relate to canon.  My analysis commences with a discussion of 
three different types of canons: (1) literary, (2) legal, and (3) biblical.  The analysis of 
each type of canon is centered on the purposes for creating or having a canon and on the 
features constituting a canon.  I then relate the features of these canons to the BT in two 
ways.  The first addresses how the BT as a complete work possesses some of these 
features and fits into the broader rabbinic canon.  Specifically, it is worth assessing the 
degree of the BT’s canonical value or canonicity as compared to other texts of the 
rabbinic canon.  Worth noting here is that the greater the degree of canonicity, the less we 
can adjudicate from that text; while Tannaim were still able to adjudicate from the Bible 
directly, Amoraim were precluded from this function because in their moment, the 
Bible’s relative degree of canonicity had already become too great, and the Amoraim had 
to be content with adjudicating based upon Tannaitic material. 
 
The second way I relate the features of the three types of canons deals with the 
individual sugyot and their place in the broader canon that is the BT.  I also go one step 
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further and view sugyot as canons of the different elements that are comprised therein.  
This opens the door to parsing the different degrees of canonicity of the different 




The primary purpose of incorporating legal pluralism as a feature is because part 
of the BT’s success is its ability to be a part of legally pluralistic systems.  This is a result 
of flexibilities in adjudication based upon the BT.  The BT also demonstrates that it 
recognizes the possibility that it is not always the dominant law.  Specifically, the idea of 
dina d’malkhuta dina is a very specific testament to the BT’s respect of a dominant law 
within a legally pluralistic system.  Another, broader piece of evidence is the extent to 
which the BT addresses the rituals and laws of a temple no longer in existence, yet does 
not contain tractates regarding land or agricultural laws; this could be seen as a 
concession to the fact that they had little if any control over land usage laws, but could 
maintain significant control over a now destroyed – or one day to be built – temple.  The 
BT as a law code is ‘friendly’ to a dominant law, and specifically the law of the state.  As 
part of a broader legal universe, where the BT is not the dominant legal system, I argue 
that the BT possesses many qualities which make it easier for it to be tolerated by the 
dominant law.  When I speak of the BT as a ‘law code’ or ‘legal system,’ I do so with an 
understanding that the BT cannot be pigeon-holed into such a description as a broad 
understanding of the text in all contexts and for all readers. 
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For our purposes, and in the context of understanding the application of legal 
pluralism to the BT, I deploy these terms.  Further, in many ways the BT does operate 
like a legal system.  This is softened by the fact that pragmatically the BT is a strong 
cultural guide, and for some it is just another text reflecting specific aspects of a culture.  
In discussions of canonicity and anonymity, and to an extent even in discussions 
regarding multiplicity, there are inherent difficulties in considering the BT as legal text, 
without discussions of the other genres which can also come to define the BT as a 
complete or partial text.  These difficulties are ameliorated, but are not absent, when 
discussing the BT through the prism of legal pluralism. 
 
I also address the idea that within the BT itself, there are competing legal systems, 
and that the BT in itself is reflective of legal pluralism.  There is some evidence for this, 
such as the Noahide laws.  Nevertheless, much of what is defined as competing legal 
systems – such as the houses of Hillel and Shammai – are actually a reflection of a 
multiplicity of voices expressed within the same legal system.  (The Noahide laws are 
within the legal system in that they represent very basic laws expected of everyone, even 
those outside the legal system of the BT.)  In this way, the discussions of legal pluralism 
and multiplicity are related and can be viewed as working inversely, one with respect to 
the other.  Just as the BT can be one legal voice among many in a legally pluralistic 
system (or society), so too can the BT contain many different voices within its single 
legal system.  Whether the voices reflect historical persons and statements is of little 
consequence in the analysis of the text as a legal system within itself or one among many.  
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It is the legal attributes of the BT, and reading the BT with these attributes in mind that 




In approaching multiplicity, among my primary goals is to establish that the 
authors of the sugyot, and the assemblers of the tractates and the BT as a whole, sought to 
convey a sense of vast multiplicity while at the same time presenting a cohesive and 
unified whole.  When looking at the BT as a legal text (or at the very least as a strong 
cultural guide with social consequences attached), this multiplicity has the potential to 
expand the scope of what is acceptable behavior, and thus allows the BT to be relevant to 
a greater number of people and strains within the tradition.  There appears to be an effort 
on the part of the assemblers and authors of the text to include more than the necessary 
number of positions and names of sages where it is not necessarily essential.  As I point 
out in the analysis of the sugyot, there are attributed statements which are not critical to 
the flow of the argument in the narrative, and on occasion they are entirely superfluous.  
These are the ones to which I refer when I speak of sages who are not essential to the 
text.  They are included for inclusion’s sake.  This is part of an agenda to appear inclusive 
and reflective of a multiplicity of voices and traditions, when the whole of the text is in 
fact uniform and monological.6  In the time of its formation, there is sense in this, as it 
makes the text more relevant to a greater number of people affiliated with the greater 
number of sages mentioned. 
 
                                                
6 See below p. 234.   
  12 
For later generations who received the completed (or nearly completed) BT, there 
was a greater number of halachic options from which to choose, thus giving the later 
sages more room to adjudicate in times where flexibility was necessary.  This flexibility 
was available for reasons including the demands of the laws of the state, and thus feeds 
into the ability of the BT to be the ‘friendly’ law it can be in a legally pluralistic system.  
At this conceptual point, the discussions on multiplicity and legal pluralism intersect.  In 
this context it is worth elucidating how multiplicity and legal pluralism can work within 
an understanding of the BT within both a historical and a literary framework.  On the one 
hand, one can argue that multiplicity and (a tendency toward) legal pluralism are literary 
techniques that impact the way we read the BT as a legal work.  On the other hand, the 
multiplicity and legal pluralism of the BT are a reflection of some history, skewed as it 
might be by the authors and assemblers.  We know about the interplay between the 
complete and canonical BT and ‘lived comminities’ at some level because of historical 
documents such as responsa.  We know far less, if anything, about the interaction of 
‘lived comunities’ and the BT while it was still in formation and during a period when it 
was sub- or not at all canonical.  What is totally left to speculation is the function of the 
traditions, attributed and otherwise, of the BT within lived communities at a time 
preceeding the formation of tractates and before that sugyot.  We must be cautious when 
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In order to test what I have written, above, I draw upon the following texts in the 
BT: (1) Nedarim 5b-6a, (2) Gittin 82a-82b, and (3) six v’la pligi structures, with the one 
on Berachot 38a serving as the primary one I use to define my analysis.  While I refer to 
other sugyot from other tractates, in these chapters I focus primarily on the sugyot in 
Nedarim and Gittin as well as the v’la pligi structures.  The sugyot in Nedarim and Gittin 
are rather standard and reflective of many sugyot in the BT in their structure and in how 
the anonymous narrative exerts authority over the text.  The v’la pligi sugyot are short, 
highly structured halachic ‘vignettes,’ which contain consistent and relatively precise 
layering in all manifestations. 
 
Among the goals of this close analysis of the Nedarim, Gittin, and v’la pligi 
sugyot is to demonstrate what I explain theoretically in the other chapters.  Not every 
element in every sugya demonstrates what I attempt to accomplish.  To recap, my 
analysis follows two paths.  The first is to demonstrate that ‘Stammaitic’ is an activity 
and not a period.  This is something that does manifest in all the texts I analyze.  The 
second is to apply the four features – anonymity, canonicity, pluralism, and multiplicity – 
to the different sugyot. 
 
The discussions of Stammaitic activity are closely related to the work I do in the 
chapter on anonymity.  The factors that go into how anonymity impacts a narrative or a 
text are the same as what happens when anonymous Stammaitic activity is deployed in 
the BT.  In some instances, activity that is usually anonymous and Stammaitic is 
attributed to a specific Amora.  The v’la pligi sugyot specifically bear this out.  Most 
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often, the actual words ‘v’la pligi’ are Stammaitic and anonymous.  On several occasions 
the v’la pligi is attributed to a specific Amora.  Much work can be done on differentiating 
between the impact of v’la pligi as anonymous versus as attributed.  However, this 
project highlights that Stammaitic is an activity that not only is not bound by time, it does 
not necessarily need to be anonymous. 
 
In analyzing the sugya in Gittin, I pay specific attention to peeling away that 
which is Stammaitic in style from what might necessarily be Stammaitic in chronology.  I 
do not argue for a definitive early dating for specific Stammaitic activity.  However, in 
this sugya, I do suggest the possibility of the early dating of certain essential Stammaitic 
elements.  I do so in order to expand the field of potential meaning, and the impact of that 
meaning for the anonymous Stammaitic elements.  This allows for greater variance in 
demonstrating the degree to which Stammaitic activity can pivot the direction of the text, 
and ultimately the legislation or adjudication of a specific legal (halachic) matter. 
 
 I point out aspects of the text that contribute to the BT’s ability to function as part 
of a broader pluralistic legal system.  As I discuss in the chapter on pluralism, in the 
sugyot I also parse those parts of the tradition that would have been easily workable 
within another, dominant system.  For example, in the analysis of the sugya in Nedarim, 
the adjudicators of the dominant legal system (i.e. the law of the land, in our case 
Sassanian) would not have cared much – if at all – about inexplicit abbreviated 
declarations.  In some ways, multiplicity is the inverse of pluralism, in that it is the 
mechanism through which it is tolerable to have many different traditions as well as 
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contradictory adjudication and legislation.  As I argue in my discussions of multiplicity, 
in the analysis of the text I try to highlight where the text appears to be going out of its 
way to include greater rather than fewer voices.  Further, I argue that the v’la pligi sugyot 
are reflective of a multiplicity that was muted by a later editor, yet still preserved. 
 
Where This Work Fits 
 
 As I mention above, I am reading the BT from a literary perspective while at the 
same time not ignoring the historical associations that exist around the BT.  To the most 
cynical scholar, the entirety of BT history is at best dubious.  Its creation is the work of 
masterminds who infuse the text with a deep and refined chronology which are all the 
creation of their imaginations.  I am not that cynical.  Yet.  I try to draw upon the source 
critical approach with a softer touch and without overplaying the proverbial 
chronological hand.  I therefore throw myself into the camp of those who read the text 
without the overemphasis on the historical and reliance upon the source critical approach.  
Like others in this camp, I do not feel confined or in any way limited in how to utilize the 
Stammaim and the source critical approach. 
 
Beyond seeing this work as a continuation of the work of others who focused less 
on the source critical approach and looked more to literary (and legal) theory, I also see 
(parts of) this work fitting into a more specific strain of current BT scholarship.  I come at 
these sugyot and the four features assuming that – by and large – there is a monological 
voice that brings the text into a unity.  I am not arguing for a single author or even a 
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single set of authors operating together in time and place or in close temporal and spatial 
proximity.  I am merely accepting of the idea that there is a natural way to read the text 
where this monological voice is felt on all the folios of the BT.  This is not to discount the 
possibility of untangling different voices, and certainly varying halachic opinions, from 
within the sugyot.  As I explain in my discussions on multiplicity, there is an essential 
tension in the BT.  While appearing to convey multiple voices as well as multiple sages 
conveying a range of legal opinions, the text as a whole is unified in the limits of those 
voices and opinions.  The inclusivity is actually an exclusivity.  What appears to be a 
dialogical range of voices is in fact a monological and unified whole, on both a legal and 
literary level.  In some ways, this places my work alongside Barry Wimpfheimer who – 
to the best of my knowledge – was the first to draw upon the work of Mikhail Bakhtin 
and how his categories and ideas about novels might apply to the BT.  It is also 
Wimpfheimer who first expounded on the potentials of seeing the BT, or at least parts 
thereof, as a legal narrative with both literary possibilities and legal/halachic 
implications.  Daniel Boyarin builds upon Wimpfheimer’s work, and specifically his 
work on Bakhtin, and argues that the BT is a monological work despite the juxtaposition 
between what appear to be multiple voices emanating from different (parts of the same) 
traditions.7 
 
The isolation of the tension between unity and multiplicity or between the 
monological and the dialogical is apparent in the BT in many ways and in a range of 
contexts.  Boyarin successfully parses what are two braod voices in the BT, the grotesque 
                                                
7 Daniel Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis, 147. 
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and self-critical voices versus the ‘serious’ voices.8  He then defines them not as two 
distinct voices included in the text because of tradition of some literary incoherence, but 
rather as a single monological text with an intended self-critique of itself.9  There is the 
‘serious’ and then there is the grotesque which serves as a form of self-criticism.  This 
tension permeates many different conceptual realms, some of which I address above.  
Though the discussion regarding this tension is ongoing and still expanding and defining 
itself, I see this project as participating in that conversation as well. 
  
                                                
8 Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis, 190-191. 
 
9 Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis, 193-194.  Boyarin specifically mentions Kalmin’s theory that the 
inclusion of the unusual or grotesque stories in the BT was merely an acquiescence to tradition, and almost 
done against the editors’ will. 
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Chapter I 
Stammaim versus Stammaitic Activity 
 
General Introduction to the Chapter 
Recently I leased a car that came with satellite radio.  There are hundreds of 
stations – if not a thousand.  There are stations dedicated to every decade starting with the 
1940s and ending with the 1990s; there is a country station, a classical music station, and 
a rap station; there is even a station dedicated to Elvis.  I quickly realized that the satellite 
company was aware that musical styles are defined chronologically as well as by a range 
of other descriptions, including a genre dedicated to a single artist.  I was most fascinated 
with the stations dedicated to specific decades; while it was often obvious to which 
decade certain music belongs, sometimes I would ask myself, “that’s from the 1950s?”  
To further highlight the tension, there is a daily program on the 1940s station that plays 
‘1940s style’ music (i.e. Big Band, Jazz, etc.) performed by artists who did not record in 
the 1940s, and some who only recorded their performances in the last few years.  As the 
satellite company has recognized, ‘1940s’ represents more than just the music recorded in 
the 1940s, and may also not be a correct description for some music really recorded in the 
1940s.  I feel that this story in some ways informs what I hope to accomplish in this 
chapter. 
 
 Discussing style requires us to use terms that are best suited to define the style.  
Merely to say: “this is the style” does not help the listener to understand what is meant 
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based on the words alone.  Adding a series of words or a phrase contours the listener’s 
sense of the style at hand.  Even a single word has an impact; for example, the word 
“French” limits to a degree the connotation of the word style: “French style.”  While the 
listener may not know precisely what style refers to, he has a definite sense of what it 
cannot be: anything that would negate that it is French.  Adding “1970s” to “French” as 
another adjective modifying the noun style further narrows the scope of what style can 
be. Adding “Haute Couture” injects a much greater level of precision; “it is 1970s French 
Haute Couture style.”  That is a long way from, “it is style.”  Further adding the name of 
a fashion designer and a season offers even greater clarity: “it is Pierre Cardin 1978 
Autumn season French Haute Couture style.”  The general idea is that the group of terms 
comprising the definition of a style is the essence of that style; it is the group of terms 
that brings groups of individuals together with respect to their sense of what is a 
particular style.  This applies to a broad range of elements of the general human 
condition: music, visual arts, architecture, subways and buses, libraries and zoos, and 
nearly all areas where the style of a thing (i.e. a subway or library) can be discussed in 
terms of its style.  While there are many different aspects to the definition of a style, two 
common aspects are time and geography. 
 
“1920s Chicago” evokes a specific style.  Nevertheless, “1920s Chicago” can also 
describe something that is definitively a part of 21st century New York City; for example 
a Broadway performance set in 1920s Chicago, with a set that includes obvious 
landmarks from Chicago, and music that sounds like it is from the 1920s (the music can 
actually be contemporary music written in a “1920s” style.)  Similarly, I am free to write 
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a sonnet in a “16th century” style; I am free to mimic Shakespeare, and one might even be 
fooled into thinking that the sonnet in fact dates to the 16th century and its provenance is 
London.  Similar to 1940s music recorded last year, one would be correct in stating that 
the poem is a 16th century sonnet, if my poetic and mimicry skills were that strong to 
have crafted such a poem (admittedly, I can’t even craft a 21st century poem).  A more 
seasoned reader of 16th century sonnets may recognize that the poem is not from the 16th 
century, either because of his greater sensitivity toward 16th century poetry or because he 
may possess a complete knowledge of all 16th century poetry, and would therefore know 
that my poem is an imposter.  Yet the seasoned reader may still define the poem as a 
sonnet from the 1500s even when he himself is aware that it was actually written 
yesterday; he may offer further information about its true temporal and spatial 
provenance (i.e. Josh Eisen wrote the poem yesterday), because the poem’s style takes on 
a time/space definition that has nothing to do with the true time/space origins of the 
poem.  The same can be said of pottery found on an archaeological dig that includes a 
millennium or more of finds.  For well-known ancient pottery styles, date is defined by 
features of the pot and not necessarily by its exact physical provenance within the 
chronological layering of the site. 
 
When discussing Shakespearean sonnets, one is aware of what that means because 
of our historical knowledge of the man, his time, his place, anecdotes about him, and 
much more.  Not all texts carry with them such information, and often the reader has little 
or no precise information about the text and must judge the text and define its style 
without the benefit of a good history of the text.  Generally, the older or more obscure a 
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text, the less likely it is to carry with it such historical information.  In discussing how to 
date Sukhodaya art, A.B. Griswold aptly defines his – and our dilemma – regarding 
dating and the ultimate solution: “To establish the chronology of Siamese art, there can 
be no substitute for examples inscribed with dates. In the art of Sukhodaya they proved 
very hard to find.” 10  Unlike Siamese art, the BT never inscribes its cultural artifacts – its 
words – with a firm date.  A chronology of the BT is therefore difficult to produce 
without relying on historical and literary assumptions, which are not as firm as the 
inscriptions in the art of Sukhodaya or even the styles of pottery from an archaeological 
dig. 
 
The Babylonian Talmud (BT): Style and Chronology 
 
The BT offers its readers very little in the way of extra-textual historical 
information.  Still, it is plain that the BT contains within it more than a single literary 
style; what is very difficult to accomplish is the chronological and geographical 
placement of many of these styles.  We are often left guessing; this is exactly the case 
when later authors reconstruct earlier traditions and sources and the degree of the 
reconstruction is not known to us.  Nevertheless, the manner in which the BT is studied 
both traditionally and critically requires significant reliance on the chronological period 
to which rabbinic authorities are dated.  On a broad level, when dealing with the BT, 
‘Tannaitic,’ ‘Amoraic,’ ‘Saboraic,’ and ‘Genoic’ denote periods of time that speak to the 
nature of the rabbinic authorities who lived during them and who affected the BT and/or 
                                                
10 A. B. Griswold “New Evidence for the Dating of Sukhodaya Art” in Artibus Asiae Vol. 19 No. 3/4 
(1956), pp. 240-250. 
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the way we read the BT; within those periods, there are further rules to discern the degree 
of authority associated with a particular rabbinic sage.  When speaking of rabbinic 
authorities in the BT, they are rarely discussed in terms of their literary or adjudicative 
style; rather, they are defined by the period during which they lived, and to a far lesser 
extent the location within Babylonia or the Levant where they operated.  Beyond merely 
demonstrating that the generation of a source impacts his authority, it has also been 
suggested that the BT favors an older Amora when he is opposed by a younger one from 
the same or almost the same generation; this is even the case when the younger Amora 
possesses a rank higher than the older Amora.11  The focus in this chapter centers more 
on the temporal (chronologies, relative chronologies), specifically because of the recent 
scholarly emphasis on the dating of the Stam(maim) and of new approaches that have 
emerged from the critical school of BT study which takes chronology into the strongest 
of considerations.  At times, this emphasis is greater than the analysis of pure literary 
elements and their impact on the text. 
 
It is difficult to state with certainty where, when or with whom ‘contemporary 
scholarship’ (or modern or academic, but specifically non-traditional) of the Talmud 
commenced.  Robert Brody posits that Zecharias Frankel was the first ‘modern’ scholar 
of the Talmud.12  Brody goes on to mention Isaac Halevy as the first scholar to react to 
and expand upon the work of Frankel.13  Other scholars, and many an aspiring scholar as 
                                                
11 Avinoam Cohen, “Was Age the Decisive Criterion of Subordination among the Amoraim?”  JQR 92 
(January – April 2002):279, 283.  On page 304, Cohen quotes Berakhot 30a and Rav Ashi stating that he 
would not do something that was not done by those older than him. 
 
12 Robert Brody, “stam hatalmud v’divrei ha’amoraim,” Iggud 1 (2007), 213. 
 
13 Brody, “stam hatalmud,” 213. 
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part of their dissertation, have also weighed in on the issue.  For my part, I would like to 
point to the work of David Halivni as the first to operate with independence from 
traditional constraints.  His isolation of the Stam is a recasting of older ideas into a 
coherent framework with a more robust vocabulary gleaned outside of the ‘Yeshiva.’  
This isolation of the Stam, despite the extreme to which Halivni and some of his 
followers took it, was a first step toward seeing the BT as a narrative and with the 
narrator really controlling the flow and message of the text.  While Halivni does not view 
the Stam as anything more than a faithful servant in the honest transmission of Amoraic 
traditions, many who have accepted his overall paradigm have placed much more agency 
in the Stam.  Additionally, Halivni is still perched within the traditional approach in that 
he discusses the BT as a legal text, the adjudications and legislations of which must be 
taken seriously.  Daniel Boyarin and Barry Wimpfheimer have elevated the text of the 
BT to ‘literary’ status in their works, yet still they can be considered as working within 
Halivni’s paradigm in which a Stam is operating as and is transformed into the super-
narrator of an often deep and complex narrative.14 
 
The work of Wimpfheimer and Boyarin is critical in the progression (and in some 
ways, the culmination) of reading the BT as a literary work.  While they are not alone, 
they represent well the current state of the art in BT studies with respect to a literary 
approach to the text.  The text and what the text is ‘doing’ is their focus.  As 
Wimpfheimer himself suggests in a review of Boyarin’s Socrates and the Fat Rabbis, the 
                                                
14 See Barry Wimpfheimer, Narrating the Law: a Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011) Daniel Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 143.  
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actual author does not matter for Boyarin.  Only the author’s function matters, and he 
goes further in stating that the “authors may even be one historical person.”15  This might 
seem like a clear shot over the bow to those most interested in dating and chronologies.  
Still, Wimpfheimer and Boyarin are uninterested in viewing the BT through a lens 
completely void of history.  They draw upon chronologies and make assumptions 
regarding dating. Wimpfheimer and Boyarin, like much of the state of the field of 
Talmud, do not go as far as Jacob Neusner in his dismissal of the possibility of accepting 
chronologies and subsequently dating material in the BT, both relatively and absolutely.16  
Even Neusner himself accepts that the document that is the BT reflects historical 
traditions and individuals.  He challenges the precision of attribution and strongly 
emphasizes the role of the final redactors and editors in the assembly of the document.  
Unlike Neusner, Boyarin and Wimpfheimer do not need to contradict themselves when 
relying upon historical language and in making their assumptions about relatively dating 
elements within the BT. While they are primarily interested in the literary, they are not 
dismissive of the possibility of historicity in the BT.17 
                                                
15 Barry Wimpfheimer, “The Dialogical Talmud: Daniel Boyarin and Rabbinics” JQR, Vol. 101, No. 2 
(Spring 2011), 245-254.  It is also worth noting that in the review Wimpfheimer also places Boyarin within 
a rabbinic paradigm, and Boyarin’s place within it: “This is the sort of book expected of a scholar trained 
by Saul Lieberman and Z. Dimitrovsky at the Jewish Theological Seminary in the 1060s and 1970s.  As a 
corpus, these volumes puncture the comfortable definition of the field of rabbinic literature, staking a place 
for rabbinic literature within the fields of Late Antiquity, Early Christianity, and Greco-Roman rhetoric…  
Boyarin’s work invites outsiders to the field of rabbinics to see the relevance of this material for their own 
projects.”  Speaking of ‘outsiders,’ Wimpfheimer is referring to those outside the paradigm of rabbinic 
studies and rabbis themselves.  For Wimpfheimer, it is Boyarin who makes accessible the fruits of critical 
inquiry in the field of Rabbinics to outsiders.  While Lieberman may have been looking outside the 
proverbial walls of the Yeshiva, it was Boyarin who stepped out and looked back at it with academic 
perspective. 
 
16 Jacob Neusner, The Bavli and its Sources: The Question of Tradition in the Case of Tractate Sukkah 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies, 1987).   
 
17 See for example Wimpfheimer, Narrating the Law, 66 who describes his skeptical position vis a vis the 
BT as a source of historiagraphy as “treat[ing] talmudic legal narratives as sources for historiography with 
reservations” [emphasis added], also see Dolgopolsky, What is Talmud?, 8 “…in what follows I will map 
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I am aware that the historicity of the BT cannot be ignored.  Despite the dangers 
of using the BT as a historical work, there is some history that can be culled from it, and 
the work itself does reflect a history of rabbinic ‘something’ of some period of time.  This 
is the case where one agrees with Neusner that the BT is by and large the product of the 
latest redactors and editors, since Neusner still accepts the characters of the BT and many 
of their sayings as authentic and historical.  He only argues that such history is too 
obscured by the different scribes and transmitters who came later.  This is obviously also 
the case where people agree with Halivni and his more extreme ilk in that the BT is 
reliable in terms of the attributions and proclamations of the sages.  Halivni accepts the 
historicity of the BT to the extent that the final redactors and editors – his (and our) 
Stammaim – were faithful to the traditions and attributions they received.  If they had no 
reason to manipulate the text, they would not.18  This ignores the obvious possibility that 
we no longer have an awareness of reasons they in fact may have had to manipulate 
traditions.19  The fundamental difference between Neusner and Halivni is that Neusner 
lumps the entirety of the BT into a single chronological place, which is the post amoraic 
period and Halivni only posits the Stammaim in that period.  They both agree in general 
terms with periodization as it applies to the Amoraic period.  And they agree about 
                                                                                                                                            
the Talmud typologically, rather than chronologically and rather than in terms of specific names associated 
with the question of the Talmud in its intellectual history. This is not to say that chronology is abandoned, 
but that names are only synechodes or landmarks for different views of the Talmud, views not found 
exclusively in the work of any given representative.”  
 
18 David Halivni, mev’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2009), 4 and 111. 
 
19 As I will argue in chapter II on anonymity, it is actually possible to do this and anonymity is the catalyst.  
This is also demonstrated in the sugya in Nedarim where only an anonymous narrator can pull of the stunt 
it does (Chapter VI, p. 277). 
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historicity for this period and the characters and traditions referenced in the BT regarding 
it.  Halivni and Neusner disagree about how the BT presents them and the deree to which 
the traditions and attributions are authentic.  It is also important to mention Shamma 
Friedman and his more cautious approach, which is in some ways a middle ground 
between Halivni and Neusner.  As discussed later, Friedman accepts the reasonability of 
the late dating for the Stammaitic activity, yet he is only committed to dating such 
material later than the memrot they mention and the sages to whom they attribute 
traditions.20   
 
Unlike Neusner who dismisses practical historicity in reading the BT, 
Wimpfheimer and Boyarin are not dismissive of anything.  Rather, they have turned their 
focus in a new and compelling direction.  It is this direction and milieu of BT reading that 
I wish to place my current work.  My work is distinguished from theirs in that I am more 
interested in chronologies and dating to the extent that I am still grappling with the matter 
and have not looked beyond it.  I am too aware that dating matters so long as the text is 
not a complete fiction, which is not even Neusner’s suggestion.21  I tend to agree with 
Friedman about relative dating, yet am not willing to be as accepting as he is of an 
absolute late dating unless there is a something in the sugya that demonstrates this. 
Nevertheless, I am in complete agreement with Boyarin’s suggestion that it is fair to read 
                                                
20 See below 39-41.  
 
21 Worthy would be a comprehensive analysis of the kernels of history that make up the extra-BT sources 
for Talmudic traditions, characters, stories, etc.  An argument can be made that this or that specific 
Talmudic sage is fictitious and the creation of the final editors and redactors.  This argument is viable 
whether we are dealing with Neusner’s final editors and redactors or Halivni’s Stammaim.  On the one side 
would be the historian demanding information from sources outside the BT, and on the other stand Neusner 
and Halivni, as well as Boyarin and Wimpfheimer and almost the entirety of BT studies.   
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texts as though the apparently different elements are in fact emanating from the same 
chronological period, if not the same author or group of authors.  This possibility is 
important.  I would like also to suggest that it is possible to test for different dates for the 
same element within a sugya.  This allows us to see the impact on how the text is read if 
it was generated in one amoraic generation versus how it is read if it was generated in 
another.  Dismissing historicity altogether would not allow for this.  It would also not 
allow for Boyarin’s suggestions to be as profound as they are. 
 
To be clear, I am not dismissing historicity or the value of acknowledging 
chronologies and dating.  Further, I draw upon the periodization paradigm as it is 
accepted in contemporary BT studies and use the language of that periodization (i.e. 
Amoraic, Tannaitic, Saboraic).  That language is rooted in assumptions about 
chronologies and history of the BT and its sages.  Further, like Halivni, Neusner, 
Boyarin, Wimpfheimer and the majority of BT scholars, I agree that the BT is a product 
of some or all of the time between the second and sixth centuries and from the known 
Jewish Babylonian population centers, such as Sura, Pumpedita, Mahoza, etc. I accept 
that the BT reflects actual sages and actual traditions from the entirety of the period we 
commonly refer to as the Amoraic period.  My approach allows for a flexibility in dating 
the different elements of a sugya, in that the elements are not confined to the periods with 
which their functions are associated.  For example, as is the crux of my argument in this 
chapter, there can be Stammaitic activity which dates to the Amoraic period.  There can 
be memrot which function Amoraically, yet date to a post-Amoraic or what is also called 
the Stammaitic period.  This is similar to Neusner in that it allows for the late dating of 
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elements that are presented in the narrative seemingly earlier.  It also fits within 
Boyarin’s framework, which in its extreme suggests a single author for the disparate 
elements of a sugya; and suggests that the chronological depth is all created by a single 
author or group of authors.  Nevertheless, the activity of the Stammaim is central in the 
flow of the narrative.  This is the case whether it is a chronological phenomenon, a 
literary one or some combination of both.  I therefore dig deep into the work of Halivni 
and those who buildn upon his theory of the Stammaim in order to uncover what is a 
latent literary approach and its potential in his work.  Again, this is not a dismissal of 
histories or chronologies, but it is partly a reconsideration of the assumptions surrounding 
how we might date certain elements. 
 
I devote much of this chapter to Halivni’s work (and specifically to his most 
recent introduction to Baba Batra) as a paradigm for the Halivni school – the school that 
sees most Stammaitic activity as post-Amoraic.  Inherent in my treatment of Halivni’s 
work and in my reaction to and criticism of aspects of his thesis is my belief that Halivni 
was the ‘first’ modern scholar, if one must be named.  For the purpose of setting up a foil, 
and for the purpose of elucidating the progression of how anonymous elements were 
understood, I will briefly discuss the contributions of Z. Frankel, Y.I. Halevy, and 
Avraham Weiss on this matter.22 
 
                                                
22 Robert Brody has made this task significantly easier in his article, “stam hatalmud” to which I refer 
several times and which is an excellent scholarly work on the matter of Stammaitic elements.  While he is 
not necessarily casting them as straw men, Brody respectfully treats their contributions as dated and the 
subject matter worthy of revisiting.  With Halivni, Brody deals as he is with a contemporary whose 
scholarship is still relevant nearly half a century after it first appeared. 
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Zecharias Frankel, to the best of my and David Brody’s knowledge, was the first 
scholar – modern or otherwise – to break the BT down into parts that operate outside the 
paradigm set forth by Sherira in his iggeret.23  Conceptually, a first step in this direction 
was Frankel’s pointing out that certain sugyot possess two underlying strains that feed 
into the version extant in the BT; for example, the first chapter of tractate Temurah 
contains a disproportionate use of the phrase ‘lishna ahrini’ (other language) and can thus 
be defined as possessing more than a single tradition.24  Specifically, Frankel argues that 
they should be read as Saboraic emendations.25  More interesting to this project (and 
before this project, to Brody), he also isolates Stammaitic elements in certain sugyot that 
appear to pre-date Amoraic statements that are deployed in the same context.  He does so 
by demonstrating that Amoraim are in fact responding to anonymous elements in the 
sugya, which would not be possible if the Stammaitic elements (the shaqla v’tarya to be 
specific) were crafted almost entirely in the post-Amoraic period of the traditional 
chronology.26 
 
                                                
23 Zecahrias Frankel, “Beitrage zur einer Einleitung in den Talmud,” Monatsschrift fur Geschichte und 
Wissenschaft des Judentums vol. 10 (1861), 191-192.  
 
24 In his mevo ha-yerushalmi (Introduction to the Palestinian Talmud), (Berlin, 1923), Frankel makes a 
similar argument regarding the Tosefta.  His analysis – that the Tosefta was comprised of two distinct 
traditions – can be discussed and debated; it is intellectually dubious that he attributes one to Rav Hiyya, 
per Sherira, and one to his Hiyya’s student, Rav Hoshaya.  Clearly, Frankel is still committed (possibly 
unintentionally) to a traditional chronology, and he is making his adjustments very much within that 
paradigm.  While positing two strains in the Tosefta is a useful exercise, attributing them to two Amoraim 
with no basis except for Sherira and everything based on the iggeret sherira is faulty for a linguist, let alone 
a historian.  Although not relevant to much of his scholarship, Frankel’s theology had to play a role in his 
scholarship, as he straddled the line between the the more extreme Reformers such as Hildesheimer and 
Geiger, to his ‘left,’ and the traditionalists such as Hirsch, to his ‘right.’  Less wedged theologically in his 
scholarship, Halivni breaks the paradigm much further by positing the Stammaim, and this feeds into why I 
feel more comfortable labeling Halivni the first modern scholar of the Talmud. 
 
25 Frankel, “Beitrage zur einer Einleitung,” 262. 
 
26 It is this part that is most intriguing to Brody, and his critique of the Halivni school.  It is also probably 
why he refers to him as the first modern scholar! 
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Reading Halevy, it is worth noting that he expended academic energy engaged in 
intellectual debate with Frankel – at the time the relatively ‘untraditional’ (not anti-
traditional) approach – regarding different occurrences in the BT.27  Like Frankel, Halevy 
also was a significant individual from a public theological perspective; he was the head of 
the Orthodox Agudah.  His scholarship does not disappoint his constituency.  As would 
be the focus of a traditional person critically looking at the formation of the BT, Halevy 
focuses much attention on Rav Ashi, and his role in the formation of the BT.  On the 
whole, he reaches conclusions which are in line with a traditional perspective on the text.  
Where Halevy’s contribution is most valuable for this project in his assertion that 
substantial formative activity took place throughout the Amoraic period, yet without 
dismissing a significant contribution on the part of a later editor (e.g. Rav Ashi), per 
Sherira.  Halevy divides the formation into three distinct stages: (1) with the acceptance 
of the Mishna as the primary halakhic text, an assemblage of explanations of the Mishna 
began to form, and the period culminated during the time of Abaye and Rava when much 
of the material was organized, including much of the shaqla v’tarya (the back and forth 
logical argumentation) associated with the sugyot that were assembled; 28  (2) a 
continuation of the same process during the time of Rav Ashi as well as its finalization, 
which included a broader rearrangement and mild emendation of the earlier material into 
                                                
27 An example is Halevy’s criticism of Frankel’s dating of Yosey ben Yoezer, Yosey ben Yohanan, and 
Antigonos.  Without going into detail, an examination of both their works will evidence the strong 
traditional leanings of both scholars, and their inability to look beyond ideas such as the historical chain of 
halachic transmission for periods where we have little or no history beyond the Rabbinic texts themselves.  
See Frankel’s darkhei ha’mishna v’darchei ha-sfarim hanilvim eleyha: tosefta, mekhilta, sifra, sifri (1859), 
30-31, and Yitzchak Halevy’s dorot ha’rishonim (Frankfurt, 1897) Vol. I, 198. 
 
28 Halevy, dorot ha’rishonim II, 480-482. 
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a coherent whole;29 (3) Saboraic additions and adjustments that were made to a BT whose 
overall structure was complete and which materially affected neither the whole nor any 
individual sugya.30  The most important aspect of Halevy’s work in terms of his 
discussion of anonymous Stammaitic activity is that he attempts to prove that it can be 
traced to even as early as Rav and the first generation of Amoraim.  What is also 
important for this project is that Halevy opens the door to thinking about Abaye, Rava, 
and their colleagues as operating both as the anonymous organizers and narrators of 
sugyot as well as individually and coupled sources to whom traditions are attributed.  It is 
possible for a single source to generate contributions in multiple styles; in our case both 
individual memrot and the narrative/shaqla v’tarya. 
 
Weiss does not veer that far from the position of Halevy, specifically with respect 
to the continuing process of redaction throughout the Amoraic period.31  Like Halevy, 
Weiss operates firmly within the scope of traditional chronologies; Weiss also still deals 
with the issue of Rav Ashi.  Although he diminishes the role Rav Ashi played, he was 
conceptually distant enough that he could consider dismissing Rav Ashi from the 
equation.32  He does ascribe to Rav Ashi and his period quite a bit of literary impact in 
                                                
29 Halevy, dorot ha’rishonim II, 560 and III, 116-120. 
 
30 Halevy, dorot ha’rishonim III, 11-26. 
 
31 Abraham Weiss, hithavut ha’talmud b’shlemuto (New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 
1943). 
 
32 In order to demonstrate the degree to which Weiss was ahead of his time, one need refer to a review of 
Weiss’ “hithavut”  written by J.K. Mikilszanski, “The Talmud in the Making,” JQR Vol. 35, No. 4 (April 
1945):437-444. In it, Mikilszanski zealously defends Rav Ashi’s assembly and redaction of the BT, and 
attacks Weiss’ diminished view of Rav Ashi’s role.  At his most ridiculous, Mikiliszanski states that “the 
last Amoraim and the Saboraim only completed, corrected and emended the work received orally or in 
scripts from R. Ashi…  the fact that the Talmudic literature scattered over schools throughout generations 
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terms of the language and style of a sugya.  He goes a step beyond Halevy in that he 
discusses the idea of authority associated with different layers of the BT.  For example, 
there was an early layer developed by the first generation of Amoraim, for whom only the 
Mishna itself was available for analysis; this layer then acquires an authoritative quality 
to later Amoraim who accept it as part of a broader tradition that also includes the 
Mishna.  Thereafter, a next layer develops that includes an analysis not only of the 
Mishna, but also of the attendant Amoraic traditions.  Weiss puts much stock in Rav 
Yehuda (of Pumpeditha) as operating as an early assembler and organizer of received 
traditions of Rav and Shmuel as well as others in the first and second Amoraic 
generations.  Like Halevy, Weiss views Abaye and Rava as instrumental in the creation 
of a ‘proto-talmud’ upon which the final BT is primarily based.  Prior to Abaye, Rava, 
and the fourth generation, Weiss argues that there were many strains of the Talmud 
which originated in different schools; they all included their own anonymous elements, 
and thus it is possible – as I argue – that the same individual could be anonymous in the 
context of Stammaitic activity and attributed when putting forth a halachic memra.  An 
innovative element of Weiss’ approach is that he appears to be the first scholar to suggest 
that it is not critical to ask, “who redacted the BT?”  Part of his brand of the theory of 
‘continued redaction’ is his belief that the BT was never formally redacted, and that its 
redaction took place over time in some sort of organic manner, one which Weiss does not 
fully unpack.  Nevertheless, this is a significant contribution. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
must have at one time been collected, arranged and molded into one work by some great man, is beyond 
doubt…  we know that his name was R. Ashi.  To deny it is to refuse to accept unimpeachable testimony.”   
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Regarding Frankel, Halevy, and Weiss – as well as their contemporaries who 
operated within similar rubrics – it can be said that they were still tethered to traditional 
perspectives on the BT.  As examples, they were unable to move past the significant 
influence of Rav Ashi on the formation of the BT nor do they attempt to work within a 
chronology other than the one put forth by Sherira more than a millennia prior to Frankel, 
Weiss, and Halevy.  They did, however, scrutinize closely anonymous Stammaitic 
elements in a wide range of sugyot, and in this way they contribute to the idea that 
Stammaitic elements be treated from a literary perspective rather than from a 
chronological or halachic one.  It is Halivni who takes the next step in isolating the 
Stammaim, albeit still with chronology at the forefront of the assertion, and thus isolating 
the global idea of Stammaitic activity, opening the way for reading the material as a 
narrative more than as an evolving legal document.33 
 
In summary, in addition to the traditional approach, there are – in a nutshell – 
three basic schools of thought regarding the formation of the BT and the anonymous 
elements that weave it into a coherent whole.  The first sees the BT evolving primarily 
within the Amoraic period by anonymous actors who assembled traditions and the 
sources to which they are attributed.  This approach does not negate the traditional one, 
yet it offers more texture and sophistication in how one views the BT as a text; instead of 
                                                
33 Talya Fishman, in her most recent book, Becoming the People of the Talmud: Oral Torah as Written 
Tradition in Medieval Jewish Cultures (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 2-3 asserts 
that the shadow cast by medieval commentators have so influenced the view that the Talmud is a 
halachic/legal work that even contemporary scholars have been unable to re-contextualize the BT in its 
original Amoraic milieu.  While Halivni did not articulate this, and Talya Fishman needs to be lauded for 
doing so, it was Halivni’s work that made such thinking possible in a way that the work of the scholars 
prior to Halivni did not. When discussing canonicity, I go into Fishman’s work in greater detail, and 
specifically in the parts of her work that address how it was really during the post-Geonic period that the 
BT attains the high degree of canonicity that has been prior hereto projected onto much earlier periods 
within the traditional view of how authority is perceived with respect to the BT. 
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having been put together ‘in a moment’ by Ravina and Rav Ashi, it snowballed over 
time, and by the end of the Amoraic period it was nearly complete.  The second asserts 
that the assembly of the BT started at the end of the Amoraic period and took place 
primarily after the Amoraic period.  The third school maintains that the BT was 
assembled and redacted after the Amoraic period.   
Contemporary scholarship today primarily works within the paradigm briefly 
described in the second school of thought.  Even Halivni falls into the second category 
for the purposes of my project.  And it is Halivni who strongly defends the position that 
the Stammaim function as a real and distinct category, both in the text and on a 
chronological timeline.  Yet Halivni allows that there was overlap between the end of the 
Amoraic period and the Stammaitic period; phrased differently, Halivni states that there 
were Stammaim who operated during the Amoraic period.  This is important in that it 
demonstrates Halivni’s commitment to the notion that the Stammaim were distinct, and 
that they could not be Amoraim, though they could have operated contemporaneously 
with late Amoraim.  This is also where Halivni goes well beyond Weiss, Frankel, and 
Halevy; the earlier scholars, as mentioned above, were unable to make this conceptual 
leap.34 
 
In terms of discussing the authorship of the anonymous layer of the BT, Boyarin 
wisely quotes Richard Kalmin.35  In 1989, Richard Kalmin succinctly defined three 
different options for the authorship of the BT: 
                                                
34 While not the place of this dissertation, the earliest scholars may have been operating within certain 
theological constraints.  
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“This difference of opinion concerning the redaction of the Talmud is in large part 
a dispute over who authored the stam, the anonymous layer of the Talmud. In the 
anonymous layer, the Tannaitic and Amoraic portions of the Talmud are 
analyzed, explicated, and when necessary, emended and completed. In other 
words, this Tannaitic and Amoraic material was edited by the stam. According to 
the theory of Saboraic redaction, the Saboraim authored the stam, while according 
to the theory of continuous redaction, the stam derived from all Amoraic 
generations. According to the theory of Stammaitic redaction, the bulk of the stam 
was produced by the stammaim, sages whose names have not survived within the 
Talmud itself.”36 
Kalmin’s continuous redaction corresponds to the first option I present, above.  It also 
corresponds – to a degree – to the view set forth by Abraham Weiss and Chaim Albeck in 
the mid-twentieth century.37  For different reasons they saw the anonymous Stammaitic 
elements as emerging on an ongoing basis during the Amoraic period, but not after.  
Kalmin’s theory of Saboraic redaction corresponds with my third option; while I refrain 
from using the term Saboraic, purely post-Amoraic can only mean Saboraic where there 
are no Stammaim, and even within a paradigm where there are Stammaim, they also 
operate (regardless of degree) during the Amoraic period and are thus not “purely post-
Amoraic.”  The post-Saboraic theory can be traced to Julius Kaplan, who was among the 
first to posit that it was the Saboraim – and not Rav Ashi and/or Ravina – who were the 
                                                                                                                                            
35 Daniel Boyarin, “Hellenism in Jewish Babylonia,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and 
Rabbinic Literature eds. C. Fonrobert and M. Jaffee (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 340. 
36 Richard Kalmin, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud: Amoraic or Saboraic? (Cincinnati: Hebrew 
Union College Press, 1989), 51. 
 
37 Abraham Weiss, ha’talmud ha’bavli be’hithavuto ha’sifrutit (Warsaw, 1937), Abraham Weiss, hithavut 
ha’talmud b’Shlemuto (New York, 1943), and Chaim Albeck, Mevo l’Talmudim (Tel Aviv: Devir 1969). 
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final editors of the BT and creators of the Stammaitic elements and the sugyot that were 
borne of them.38 
 
To a lesser degree than in the first two theories, Kalmin’s theory of Stammaitic 
redaction corresponds with my third option, except that here is where Kalmin and others 
from the Halivni school get caught up in the tension between chronology and literary 
activity.  Kalmin uses terminology rooted in a chronology of Rabbinic periods; the 
anonymous layer is Saboraic, Amoraic, or Stammaitic.  Nevertheless, Kalmin 
acknowledges that there is little evidence pointing to a distinct period primarily defined 
by anonymous activity.39  Clearly, Kalmin is referring to the Stammaim first isolated and 
named by David Halivni in his different introductions to meqorot u’mesorot, although his 
dating for the Stammaim has changed over time.  Nevertheless, he has remained steadfast 
in not only isolating a Stammaitic literary activity, but also in attributing this activity to 
new cast of periodized characters, the Stammaim, who are wedged between the Saboraim 
and Amoraim.  If they are not called Stammaim, this theory is not that different from 
Kaplan’s; it defines the Stammaitic contribution as primarily post-Amoraic.  Within the 
Halivni paradigm, the fundamental difference of adding a period attributed to the 
Stammaim is that it implies that there was an additional, distinct break between periods 
and therefore also a break in the nature of activities engaged in during the period.  The 
Stammaim, according to the Halivni school, are defined by the anonymous shaqla 
v’tarya.  As soon as the Stammaitic period commenced, so too did the massive work of 
                                                
38 Julius Kaplan, The Redaction of the Babylonian Talmud (New York: Bloch Pulishing Co., 1933).  
Kaplan is also overly committed to the importance of Ravina and Rav Ashi, and therefore shows this 
theological bias in his academic work. 
 
39 Kalmin, Redaction, 59.  
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the creation of the shaqla v’tarya and the formation of sugyot.  Kaplan offers a far softer 
landing in terms of when exactly the Saboraim commenced their work, and it is not as 
‘overnight’ as Halivni’s Stammaim.  For clarity’s sake, it is worth referring to Boyarin’s 
definition of the Stammaitic period, and his emphasis on the amount of work 
accomplished early in the period: 
“The term [Stammaim] is a conceit, a shorthand name for a hypothesis to the 
effect that the bulk of the crucial redactorial work, that which makes the 
Babylonian Talmud the Talmud, was actually done at the end of the period of the 
cited authorities, that is, in the immediate post-Amoraic period.”40 
As Halivni is described by Boyarin, the Stammaitic period ‘in the immediate post-
Amoraic period’ was front loaded with the heaviest lifting of Stammaitic activity.  This is 
unlike Kaplan’s Saboraic period, which covers quite a bit of time and which is not as 
broken down as Halivni’s Stammaitic period.  Halivni’s introductions to meqorot 
u’mesorot have grown increasingly more interested in the degree to which Stammaitic 
activity is broken down both in terms of their literary quality and where to place them 
within the Stammaitic period; as the period progresses, Halivni’s theory goes, the 
Stammaim impacted the text less and less until the end, when the Stammaim were 
nothing more than orkhim, arrangers, as opposed to authors or even editors.  And it is 
worth noting that it is in his latest introduction to Baba Batra (which receives significant 
treatment in this chapter), Halivni conceptually splinters Stammaitic activity from the 
Stammaitic period far more than his earlier ones. 
 
                                                
40 Boyarin, “Hellenism in Jewish Babylonia,” 340. 
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 In addition to Halivni, Shamma Friedman is also closely associated with the 
academic beginnings of the Stam/Stammaim conceptually.  While often lumped together 
with Halivni, Friedman has quite a different agenda than Halivni in that he is not 
producing a single commentary on the entire BT.  Methodologically, Friedman differs 
from Halivni in his focus on larger parts of a tractate, such as a commentary on an entire 
chapter, whereas Halivni focuses on shorter excerpts from the text in his commentary in 
meqorot u’mesorot.  They are lumped together because they were the first scholars to 
dissect the text by first isolating what was then called the Stam.  Over the years, 
Friedman has done significant work built upon this underlying approach to the text.  In 
his latest works, he has also gone beyond the current state of the art of the field of BT 
studies.  Of greatest interest to this dissertation is Friedman’s latest work sugyot b’heker 
hatalmud habavli; asufat mehkarim b’inyaney mivneh, herkev v’nusah.41  Specifically, he 
discusses the notion of a Stammaitic style separate from the chronological Stammaim.  
The best example of this is his finding the Stammaitic voice attributed to specific 
Amoraim.  He draws upon this as possible evidence for late Stammaitic manipulations of 
sources and for purposefully hijacked attributions.42  Friedman, like Halivni, maintains a 
place for the chronological Stammaim. 
 
                                                
41 Also called Talmudic Studies; Investigating the Sugya, Variant Readings and Aggada (New York and 
Jerusalem: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2010).  The book is a compilation of studies by 
Shamma Friedman which showcase not only his great aptitude for the text, but also the range of his points 
of attack on the text.  On the whole, Friedman has far less use for Ravina and Rav Ashi.  He is not 
theologically constrained.  While his books may never reach the same – if any – heights in the stacks of the 
Yeshiva, his scholarship is cutting edge and in this work he seems to have leapt ahead of the current state of 
the art of BT studies.  While he covers a range of issues, my primary focus in deploying Friedman’s newest 
work is his interesting use of the modern Hebrew word for style in discussing the Stammaim.  I am also 
specifically interested in his response to Robert Brody, as is discussed in this chapter. 
 
42 Friedman, Talmudic Studies, 118. 
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Following Halivni’s innovations regarding the anonymous shaqla v’tarya, critical 
students of the BT, for almost a half-century, have added ‘Stammaitic’ as an additional 
period during the time at which the BT became a complete and whole text.  For many 
critical students of the BT, the Stammaitic period is taken for granted.  Unlike the four 
other periods, there are no rabbis associated by name with the Stammaitic period, and 
there is no mention of it anywhere until the 1960s, or even the 1970s.43  While critical 
scholars of the BT identify what is Stammaitic (also called Stam) based upon the literary 
activity of the element in the text, they also categorize them within an updated version of 
the traditional chronology in which the authority of rabbinic sages is based primarily 
upon the time in which they lived.  The literary style of the texts in which they are 
represented is not as much a factor as the period associated with its source.  Thus, there is 
tension when two situations emerge in a text: (1) in approaching the text generally, within 
it exists a literary style that becomes associated with a later period in the chronology of 
the development of the text – in this case the anonymous narrative style of the BT with 
the Stammaitic period; and (2) the literary style associated with the later period, in a 
given text, appears to command the response of what should be an ‘earlier’ source – in 
our case, situations where an Amora is responding to the Stammaitic element. 44  
Unpacking this and related tensions can inform our understanding of the relationship 
between authority and anonymity in the BT. 
                                                
43 In “Hellenism in Jewish Babylonia,” 339, Boyarin nicely states that “it must be emphasized that there 
was not, to the best of anyone’s knowledge, any group that ever were named the Stammaim either by 
themselves or by anyone in Jewish history until the last three decades.”  This was published in 2007. 
 
44 In placing the Stammaim firmly in the Amoraic period, Brody strongly relies on instances where 
Amoraim are reacting to Stammaitic material.  He devotes quite a bit of his most recent work to this 
endeavor, and it is often also the topic of conversation in his seminars, as colleagues who have had the 
privilege of taking his courses at the Hebrew University have informed me.  Specifically, I would like to 
thank Rabbi Ari Berman for first bringing this to my attention. 
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Halivni acknowledges that there are instances where an Amora appears to be 
responding to a Stammaitic element.  However, he states that it is merely appearance, and 
that the Stammaitic authors (post-Amoraic, per Halivni) were filling in missing pieces of 
the Amoraic traditions they received.  In doing so, they give the Amoraic statements the 
appearance of responding to Stammaitic elements.  While this is possible in some cases, 
there might be others where the appearance is actually reflective of the literary evolution 
of the BT narrative.  A textual structure that reflects early Stammaitic work can be the 
work of early Amoraim, and need not be an exception or a textual 
misunderstanding.  Stepping back from the traditional periodization paradigm, and 
further, removing the Stammaim from its more contemporary manifestation, allows for 
an Amora to react to a Stammaitic element without concern for chronologies.  The 
Stammaitic material is not chronologically bound, and can be understood as a marker for 
meaning.  In a legal text like the BT, such meaning is bound with adjudicative or 
legislative authority.  Rather than asking: “how can we explain the problem of an Amora 
responding to a Stammaitic element?” we can ask: “how is the Amora responding to the 
Stammaitic element and why would such a tradition be preserved?”  Friedman takes steps 
towards answering this question.  He does so by ascribing a “loose and free” approach to 
the earlier transmissions of Amoraic statements, and only later (i.e. in the post-Amoraic 
period) does this material become fixed as part of a literary whole.45  Because of the 
fluidity of this transmission process, there was ample opportunity for sources and 
traditions to become muddled and for historical inaccuracies to develop while a literary 
                                                
45 Friedman, Talmudic Studies, 116-121. 
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accuracy evolved.  It is important to note that Friedman goes one step further, and 
suggests that the crafters of the literary work that is the BT were not beyond attributing 
this or that tradition to a specific sage in order to infuse that tradition with greater 
legitimacy.46 
Among the goals of this chapter is to explore the implications of discussing 
elements of the BT as dating to the ‘Stammaitic period’ versus discussing them as literary 
forms of ‘Stammaitic activity.’47  Since Halivni first defined the Stammaim, those who 
accepted this scholarship placed elements of the BT chronologically more so than 
literarily; any literary element in the BT, such as the language used, a specific phrase or a 
unique word, is defined as Amoraic or Stammaitic.  Dating the Stammaim was (and still 
is) a large part of critical Talmud study.48  Even Halivni, in almost every new release of 
meqorot u’mesorot, has re-adjusted the timing of the Stammaim because of the intra-
Amoraic generational inconsistencies and because of the literary problems he encounters 
in certain sugyot.  In addition to the problems that arise from wedging a literary style into 
a small chronological window, the elephant in the room is the lack of historical evidence 
for the definition of such a period prior to Halivni.  Halivni has acknowledged this is a 
                                                
46 I touch upon this concept when dealing with the manner in which anonymity can afford an author the 
opportunity to manipulate attribution.  Halivni would never go this far in his ascription of authorial freedom 
to the crafters of the text of the BT, regardless of the stage of its evolution.  Friedman does.  It can be said 
that Friedman is theologically looser than Halivni in this regard. 
 
47 While not part of the common parlance of contemporary Talmud scholars, the phrase, “Stammaitic 
activity,” was used by Jeffrey Rubenstein, “Aramaic addenda to Hebrew statements of the Amoraim are 
among the clearest signposts of Stammaitic activity.” The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 68.  While Rubenstein clearly also sees the Stammaim as 
directly related to a specific chronological period, his analysis here and elsewhere parses out a range of 
Stammaitic features which are not necessarily period-bound. 
 
48 It is important to note that there is still quite a bit of scholarship that is concerned with things other than 
dating and some scholars even state that pursuing relatively fixed dates for the Stammaim might be a nearly 
impossible task.  See Yakov Elman, “Righteousness as is Its Own Reward: An Inquiry into the Theology of 
the Stam,” Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research vol. 57 (1990-1991), 63. 
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serious challenge, specifically the absence of the Stammaim in the Iggeret Sherira, where 
Sherira discusses the Tannaim, Amoraim, and Saboraim by name.  While Sherira does 
not name the Stammaim, he does discuss actions that Halivni attributes to the Stammaim.  
Where Sherira does not offer the specifics a historian might crave regarding who 
performed which action and when, Halivni assumes something was missing and attributes 
a range of literary (and less than literary) activities to the Stammaim.  Peeling anonymous 
narrative from attributed material – or vice versa – predates Halivni and this generation of 
Talmud scholars; their contribution is the creation of the Stam/Stammaim and a 
chronological place for them.49 
 
While I do not wish to suggest that chronology is irrelevant, I would like to 
suggest that chronology is not always essential in understanding the different sugyot in 
the BT.  Robert Brody has made a similar argument, although he does not state it 
explicitly, and one may perceive an apologist tone in his discussion regarding the 
relationship between Stammaitic activity and chronology: 
“It is my wish to clarify: I do not intend to detach completely the question of 
stamot from the question of chronology.”50 
Brody is somewhat beholden to the idea that the Stammaim were people of a period as 
much as they were people who engaged in a specific type of literary activity.  It is 
interesting that Brody comes so close to suggesting that ‘Stammaitic’ is a literary feature 
                                                
49 They also succeed in creating an environment for the deep personification of the Stam and the 
Stammaim.  As I discuss, Rubenstein has recreated aspects of such a culture in his monumental trilogy on 
Babylonian Talmud and culture. 
 
50 Robert Brody, “stam hatalmud,” 226. 
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more than anything else; even his scholarship and placement of so many different types 
of Stammaitic elements so early in the Amoraic period makes such a suggestion 
reasonable.51 
 
Halivni is not particularly concerned with the culture of the Stammaim as a 
distinct group who lived in a specific time and engaged in a specific activity, yet he is 
nevertheless committed to keeping them chronologically separate even where the 
literature must be forced into his paradigm.  Separating the Amoraim from the Stammaim 
in the literature is crucial if one is to succeed in separating them chronologically.  As 
Halivni states:  
“the most productive method by which to understand the depths of the Gemara is 
first and foremost to differentiate between the words of the Stammaim and the 
words of the Amoraim.”52 
Inherent in Halivni’s language here and his approach in general – and subsequently in the 
contemporary academic study of the Talmud – is the notion that there is a chronological 
break between the Amoraim and Stammaim.  Although most Talmud scholars would 
agree that there was some overlap, the periodization is firmly part and parcel of the 
contemporary academic study of Talmud.  When reading literature – and the BT must be 
                                                
51 Brody is also theologically confined to dealing with the Stammaitic elements chronologically.  While he 
does open the possibility of a Stammaitic style, he does not abandon the Stammaim, and the neat manner in 
which they fit in between the Amoraim and the Saboraim, per the traditional chronology.  As is the case 
with many academicians of Talmud, Brody is stuck with maintaining a significance for Ravina and Rav 
Ashi.  On page 227, Brody states that “from a chronological perspective, two-thirds of the instances date to 
the time of Rav Ashi and later.”  That Rav Ashi remains some sort of ‘scientific’ beacon within the walls of 
the academy is compelling. 
 
52 David Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot; iyyunim b’hithavut hatalmud (Magnes Press, Jerusalem 
2009), 47. 
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considered a work of literature, even if it is a ‘legal literature’ – placing elements into 
periods is less essential than understanding the impact the different elements have on the 
text.  Halivni telegraphs this idea in the sentence following the one quoted above when he 
defines the methodology of, “discerning the changes in language (Hebrew or Aramaic), 
and being sensitive to the grammatical person employed (i.e. first, second, or third 
person) and the different style.”53  This can be accomplished without an awareness of the 
history behind the text or of the chronology of the different elements that comprise 
various sugyot.  Nevertheless, it is still worth noting that knowledge of the history and 
some awareness of the chronology does not hinder our understanding of the text.  One 
must be careful where such understanding is the result more of speculation and less of 
hard knowledge. 
 
Halivni succeeds in demonstrating that there was in fact a period of time where 
Stammaitic activity was heightened – and that possibly there was a golden age of 
Stammaitic activity.  Even Brody concedes that Stammaitic activity was relatively muted 
in the earliest parts of the Amoraic period.  While dealing with the extremes, Brody 
allows that he would never suggest that “similar amounts of stamot were created in the 
generation of Rav and Shmuel and in the generation of Rav Ashi.”54  Halivni does not 
succeed – nor does he strive to succeed – in demonstrating that Stammaitic activity did 
not occur during different parts of the Amoraic period.  Where he is unable to at least 
create the possibility that the Stammaitic elements are post-Amoraic, he merely dismisses 
any significance by claiming that this element is part of a very distinct minority.  Halivni 
                                                
53 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 47. 
 
54 Brody, “stam hatalmud,” 226. 
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even goes beyond this type of dismissal; he also suggests that the Stammaim could have 
attributed certain statements to Amoraim when in fact the Amora never actually uttered 
them.55  Overall, Halivni as early as 1975 needed to acknowledge this major gap between 
his desire to have as much Stammaitic material originate relatively late (i.e. the post-
Amoraic or very late Amoraic periods) and his understanding that there are cases where 
an Amora pre-dating Ravina and Rav Ashi is reacting to a Stammaitic element.  In this 
context it is worth quoting the specifics from Halivni’s introduction to meqorot u’mesorot 
for Seder Mo’ed: 
“I do not believe now that there were stamot in the periods preceding Ravina and 
Rav Ashi, or that Amoraim who preceded Ravina and Rav Ashi reacted to stamot 
in the Gemara… it was the late mosif stami (anonymous addendum creator)… 
who combined them so that it would appear as though the Amoraim are reacting 
to stamot, but it was never so.”56 
This is essential both for my project and for Brody, who quotes this as part of a much 
larger quote from Halivni.  For Brody, this is as close to the smoking gun as he is going 
to get from Halivni on the matter of Amoraim reacting to Stammaitic activity in the text; 
Halivni is point-blank dismissing any historical implication.  Both Halivni and Brody, 
however, are operating with the chronology of rabbinic generations looming ever so 
present in their analysis and subsequent debate. 
 
                                                
55 David Halivni, meqorot u’mesorot: biurim b’talmud l’seder moed m’yuma ad hagiga (Jerusalem: JTS 
Press, 1975); see the introduction. 
 
56 David Halivni, meqorot u’mesorot: biurim b’talmud l’seder moed m’yuma ad hagiga (Jerusalem, 1975), 
introduction. 
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 Shamma Friedman responds to Brody’s article, which was based upon an earlier 
presentation at a Bar-Ilan Talmud conference in Israel in 2006.  Friedman forms his 
counter-attack by focusing on Brody’s comment that Friedman never truly commits – one 
way or the other – as to the chronological provenance of the Stammaim: “We still do not 
know if Friedman believes that the words of the Stam are always later than the words of 
the Amoraim…  whether he places the stamot [Stammaitic material] in a specific period 
following the Amoraic period.  And in the end there is no firm establishment of the 
existence of a early stamot.”57  Friedman delivers a lengthy response, but he breaks it 
down into a single sentence: “In my analyses, never have I established a time or a period 
to the creation of the stam of the Talmud.  Rather, I suggested that the stam of the 
Talmud appears late relative to the memrot near to which they stand.”58 
 
For Friedman, chronology – or more aptly phrased here, dating – is useful only 
inasmuch as it allows us to date internally and only relatively the different parts of a 
sugya.  Friedman also discusses Stammaitic style separate from chronology when he 
isolates examples of a Stammaitic style put into the mouths of Amoraim.  This is part of 
Friedman’s leaving open the possibility that later contributors to the text could 
manipulate attribution, and even go so far to attribute a Stammaitic element one created 
to an older, more reputable Amora.  On the whole, Friedman is more open to the idea that 
aspects of Stammaitic activity could be early; he is merely interested in demonstrating 
this.  Where he goes further than he should is in generally assuming a late provenance for 
                                                
57 Brody, “stam hatalmud,” 221. 
 
58 Friedman, sugyot, 96. 
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the Stammaitic activity in situations where evidence is absent.  Such ambiguity – for 
better or worse – is part of how the text must be read.  We can only plug dates into the 
equation as variables whose chronological range is as broad as the internal history of the 
literature might allow; for some sugyot or parts thereof, this can be as broad as the 
entirety of the Amoraic period.  In certain instances, Friedman even suggests much later 
provenances, based upon variant manuscripts.59 
 
 Because of the nature of Halivni’s work in meqorot u’mesorot, and the 
introductions to them, he does not weigh in on this debate in a formal academic manner.  
He does not formally respond to Brody’s criticism.  Rather, he continues with his analysis 
of the text operating under the assumption of a distinct Stammaitic period.  In the 
introductions he addresses where to place the Stammaim chronologically.60  The problem 
for Halivni essentially revolves around how long to make the Stammaitic period.  He 
does not abandon the chronological paradigm and the place of the Stammaim therein.  
They will always follow the Amoraim and precede the Saboraim.61 
 
Regarding the statistics, Brody’s study does not necessarily make Halivni’s 
approach regarding the quantities of such cases appear off the mark.  In Ketubot, which is 
the tractate upon which Brody bases his hypothesis and for which he provides data, there 
                                                
59 Friedman, sugyot, 288-290. 
 
60 He does not address Brody in his last two introduction, both of which Halivni wrote well after Brody’s 
presentation and subsequent article.  Anecdotally, it should be mentioned that Halivni did respond to Brody 
at the conference.  As Friedman relayed it to me – and I quote loosely: everyone in the room knew exactly 
how the wheels were spinning in Halivni’s mind, and could predict what he was going to say.  And Halivni 
delivered, and defended the Stammaim as chronologically distinct. 
 
61 Theologically, it is interesting to note how Halivni works to present his system as fitting seamlessly into 
the traditional view regarding chronologies. 
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are sixteen instances where an Amora is reacting to Stammaitic activity.62  And the vast 
majority of them date to the latest generations of Amoraim, which poses far less of a 
problem for Halivni.  Only four date to the generation of Abaye and Rava.  However, it is 
essential to consider two factors which also work against the post-Amoraic dating of 
Stammaitic activity: (1) Brody himself concedes that his criteria for determining 
instances where an Amora is reacting to Stammaitic activity follows very rigorous criteria 
which indicate to a strong degree that the Amora is truly reacting to an earlier or 
contemporary Stammaitic element – while it is never definitive, as Brody himself allows, 
these criteria could be much looser and more examples could have been included;63 and 
(2) because nothing is definitive, there are a great many sugyot where the simple 
chronology of the sages mentioned can make it possible that the sugya and its Stammaitic 
elements are Amoraic.  Number (2) can also be seen from another perspective: using the 
most rigorous criteria, if we had to definitively determine that the Stammaitic activity 
from any given sugya is post-Amoraic, it would be nearly impossible to do so with 
certitude, with the possible exception being those that include the names of Saboraim.   
We would then be compelled to dismiss a strong connection between Stammaitic activity 
and a post-Amoraic chronology. 
 
Halivni needs the shaqla v’tarya to be stylistically Amoraic, since in his paradigm 
the Stammaim are not creating the shaqla v’tarya style, nor are they creating from scratch 
the shaqla v’tarya of a sugya; rather, they are recreating them from informally recorded 
                                                
62 Brody, “stam hatalmud,” 227. 
 
63 Brody, “stam hatalmud,” 228 n. 39. 
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traditions.64  At some level, even Halivni would have to acknowledge that shaqla v’tarya 
as a style is Amoraic and that the Stammaim sought to create a text that was Amoraic in 
its style in addition to its substantive halacha emanating from an Amoraic provenance 
and the authority related thereto.  Where diverging from Halivni’s paradigm can be useful 
is in disentangling the Stammaitic period from the traditional rabbinic periodization (and 
then overlaying it over a broader range of periods, if one still wishes to see the Stammaim 
chronologically), and reading the text as though Stam or Stammaitic is a style and not a 
period of time.  As I demonstrate, Stammaitic activity appears throughout the apparent 
different chronological periods that comprise the BT, from the earliest generation of 
Amoraim until a period after they ceased to function; further, in a primitive form, it is as 
old as the Mishna.  Many difficulties arise when positing a chronologically long-standing 
literary activity into a specific and far shorter timeframe. 
 
As I discuss in the chapter on anonymity, quite old is the idea that anonymous 
elements as conveyed by Stammaitic activity reflect a certain type of general agreement 
(haskama klalit).  A general agreement, in its essence, is more authoritative than the 
position of any one person who is a party to the general agreement.  Sherira specifically 
states this with respect to both Stammaitic activity in the BT as well as an anonymous 
Mishna (stam mishna).65  This notion is not challenged by contemporary scholars, and for 
most, the focus is more on how this might impact the chronology of the evolution of the 
BT.  What seems to go unstated is that there might have been an awareness on the part of 
some Amoraim that anonymity in the Mishna possesses a greater degree of authority than 
                                                
64 Halivni, mevo’ot l’mekorot u’mesorot, 1 and throughout the introduction to Bava Batra.   
 
65 Iggeret Rav Sherira, ed. B. Levin (Haifa, 1921), 64. 
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an individual position (da’at yahid).  If there was such awareness, even if it only emerged 
later in the Amoraic period – after the first two generations, for argument’s sake – then 
there would have been a motivating factor to operate and narrate received traditions 
anonymously.  Thus the Stammaitic activity’s anonymity should not come as a major 
surprise.  If anonymity was equated with authority in any way, there would (or at least 
should) have been an opportunity to utilize such anonymity in advancing specific 
halachic positions.66 
 
Thus, there would be reason for us to look for anonymity and its effect in periods 
such as the Amoraic period and even earlier, and further to see the need for shaqla 
v’tarya to be presented anonymously.  And because of the impact that the shaqla v’tarya 
has on the transmission of the traditions, it is reasonable to posit that the process of 
creating the sugyot would have commenced earlier than the post-Amoraic period, so that 
the transmitters could take advantage of the greater authority associated with anonymous 
narration.  This type of Stammaitic activity may not have reached its zenith during the 
Amoraic period.  It almost certainly did not do so in the earliest generations of the 
Amoraic period before the recognition of the connection between authority and 
anonymity, as first articulated by Sherira.  But as a literary tool it may have been 
employed.  It is also unlikely that Sherira was the first to notice the relationship between 
anonymity and authority as a type of general agreement.  Therefore, the Genoic and 
Saboraic emendations and adjustments to the text – even if not as a grand as a complex 
                                                
66 I am not suggesting that this was done in a sinister manner, but the tanna would more naturally have 
been drawn to anonymous transmission since it was more likely to be considered of weighty authority.  
Adding his – the tanna’s name to a transmission may have diminished the tradition, since another tanna 
may have possessed a somewhat different tradition associated with a particular source. 
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and fully formed shaqla v’tarya – could have been made anonymously with this 
recognition in mind. 
 
I am not advocating the elimination of the Stammaitic period as a distinct period 
between the Amoraic and Saboraic periods.  Nor am I attempting to dismiss the idea that 
the Stammaim contributed significantly to the formalization of the BT as whole, 
including the shaqla v’tarya.  Although they are not specified by name by Sherira, even 
within his chronology there is room for a distinct cultural world from which the 
Stammaim emerge.67  A possible way to reconcile Halivni’s approach is to reposition the 
point from (a) the Stammaim being the first to record formally the shaqla v’tarya to (b) 
the Stammaim being the first to treat shaqla v’tarya with canonical respect.  In this way, 
they treat a received shaqla v’tarya that is complete with canonical respect and leave the 
text alone; and where it is incomplete they have no choice but to reconstruct the shaqla 
v’tarya and once they are done with the reconstruction, that shaqla v’tarya commands the 
same canonical respect as shaqla v’tarya that survived intact from the Amoraic period.  
The goal in the reconstruction was not to create something anew, but to recreate that 
which had already existed.68  While the above argument regarding the first to offer 
                                                
67 This is important for critical scholars of the BT who attempt to reconstruct the culture of the Stammaim 
(or whatever one wishes to call the earliest post-Amoraic rabbis).  Scholars as intellectually distant as Jeff 
Rubenstein and Jacob Neusner attempt to reconstruct and define the redactors of the BT.  In Talmudic 
Stories: Narrative Art, Composition and Culture (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 
Rubenstein explicitly discusses “Stammaitic times” and reaches valuable conclusions about a Stammaitic 
culture based on his analyses of Stammaitic elements in the BT.  Rubenstein is definitively speaking of a 
Stammaitic culture associated with a specific time period, and not a culture of people who engage in 
Stammaitic activity.  Yakov Elman in “Righteousness as Its Own Reward: An inquiry in the theology of the 
Stam,” Proceedings - American Academy for Jewish Research 57 (1991): 35-67 engages a similar pursuit, 
yet Elman is less fixated on dating the Stammaim than is Rubenstein or Halivni. 
 
68 This is a large part of Halivni’s premise and Halivni also sees the Stammaim as not only recreating the 
text, but also as reconstructing the authority associated therewith. 
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canonical treatment to the shaqla v’tarya is made about the Stammaim, one could also 
work within the Sherira framework, and view the Saboraim as the first to offer such 
canonical treatment to the shaqla v’tarya. 
 
For the purposes of framing more clearly the notion of canonical treatment on the 
part of Halivni’s Stammaim (or the Saboraim), one can look at the way in which the 
anonymous shaqla v’tarya is juxtaposed with the attributed Amoraic elements and 
Tannaitic elements.69  The anonymous Stammaitic elements are meant to be read as the 
less authoritative – and therefore less canonically infused – components of the narrative 
of a sugya.  They set up the framework within which the weighty and authoritative 
Amoraic and Tannaitic material is presented.  This accomplishes at least the appearance 
of a relative chronology within a sugya: the latest are the shaqla v’tarya and other 
Stammaitic elements, preceded by the Amoraic material, which is preceded by the 
Tannaitic material.  This relative chronology yields a set of relative degrees of canonicity, 
both of which highlight the tension between deference to earlier Amoraic statements and 
the textual control possessed by a narrator.  This formulation was suggested decades 
before Halivni, and a half-century before Brody.70  In its more pious extreme, the 
Stammaitic elements acknowledge that the Amoraim once possessed a similar attitude to 
                                                
69 Moulie Vidas, “Tradition and the Formation of the Talmud,” (Dissertation, Princeton University, 2009), 
88-89.  In his dissertation, Moulie Vidas suggests that when discussing the anonymous versus the 
attributed, that we should really be paying attention to the cited versus the uncited.  Rightly, Vidas points 
out that many Tannaitic memrot, such as Braitot, are anonymous.  Nevertheless, nobody would ever 
confuse them for the anonymous Stammaitic activity which is our focus.  He explains that the Braitot are 
cited material in the same way that attributed, and even unattributed, Amoraic memrot are cited. 
 
70 See Hyman Klein, “Gemara Quotations in Sebara,” JQR Vol. 43, No. 4 (April 1953): 341-363; Hyman 
Klein, “Some Methods of Sebara,” JQR Vol. 50, No. 2 (October 1959): 124-146; and Hyman Klein, 
“Gemara and Sebara,” JQR Vol. 38, No. 1 (July 1947): 67-91. 
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the apodictic Tannaitic traditions that they received; thereafter, from the perspective of 
the authors of the Stammaitic elements, while not equally authoritative within the text, 
the Tannaitic and Amoraic traditions were infused with a degree of canonicity; meaning 
that the words were respected and studied with a significant degree of charity.71 
 
In order to read Stammaitic activity as it has been re-contextualized into a 
Stammaitic period, I focus much attention in this chapter on Halivni’s most recent mevo 
(introduction) to tractate bava batra.  For the appropriate juxtaposition – which is always 
lurking in the background of this and Halivni’s other introductions and works and which 
is the paradigm to which Halivni is primarily reacting – I refer to the parts of iggeret 
sherira that pertain to the formation of the Talmud.  Halivni’s mevo to tractate bava batra 
is not only his most recent, but it is also his most comprehensive introduction to a volume 
of meqorot u’mesorot.72  He offers significantly more details and examples of how he 
defines all the literary activities he attributes to the Stammaim.  He also defines the 
chronologies upon which he relies, and occasionally explains why his chronology has 
changed.73  Sherira’s work is the earliest text that discusses the formation of the BT; it is 
                                                
71 I mention this here because it shows how ideas of anonymity and canonicity might be related.  I go into 
further detail on this in Chapter II. 
 
72 It may be a stretch to call this his magnum opus.  However, if we see meqorot u’mesorot as the magnum 
opus, this should be its most comprehensive introduction, and probably the introduction to the corpus as a 
whole (and not just to Bava Batra). 
 
73 While most cotemporary Talmud scholars in the academy accept Halivni’s Stammaim, there is much 
debate about how to date them, and Halivni is not representative of a majority of scholars who don’t see the 
Stammaitic period as lasting as long as Halivni suggests here.  Specifically, Robert Brody has argued 
strongly for a much earlier dating of the Stammaim, and is more willing than Halivni to place more of their 
work within the Amoraic period; he still does not abandon the idea of ‘Stammaitic’ as a period, and has 
certainly not gone as far as to suggest that ‘Stammaitic’ is more a literary style than a chronological period. 
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not a historical work in a contemporary sense, but it provides us with the normative 
rabbinic view of the BT and its formation from a 9th and 10th century perspective. 
 
The relationship and juxtaposition of Halivni and Sherira might not be the most 
obvious way to address the issue of a Stammaitic period versus Stammaitic activity.  
However, because of Halivni’s desire both to deal with the BT critically and to stay 
faithful to some traditional tenets, specifically those related to chronology and rooted in 
iggeret sherira, it is a useful exercise.  In crafting his commentary on the BT, Halivni is 
aware of and informed by how the text is studied by traditional students of the Talmud.  
For centuries traditional readers of the BT have relied on Sherira for his chronologies and 
this reliance has certainly seeped into the consciousness of the critical world of Talmud 
study and into Halivni’s commentaries.  One of Halivni’s oft-repeated arguments against 
the traditional view that Ravina and Rav Ashi compiled the BT is Sherira’s use of the 
phrase, “sof hora’ah” when discussing the role played by Ravina and Rav Ashi in the 
compilation of the BT.74  Unlike the corresponding sugya in the BT upon which Sherira 
relies, and in the context of Rav Yossi (or Rav Ashi, depending on the version), Sherira 
not only uses the language of ‘sof hora’ah’ but he also adds ‘istayem talmuda,’ implying 
much more than the text in the BT does.  Halivni defines the phrase ‘sof hora’ah’ to 
preclude the possibility that Ravina and Rav Ashi compiled the BT.  Rather they are 
merely the ‘last to teach’ which is the literal translation but not the manner in which it is 
                                                
74 Sherira lifts this language ‘sof hora’ah’ from the BT, Bava Metziah 86a, where the sugya explains that 
the period of the formation of the Mishna was completed with Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Judah the Prince, 
and that the period of the formation of the BT ends with Ravina and Rav Ashi.  Obviously ‘end’ cannot 
mean the real end.  Otherwise this statement about ‘sof hora’ah’ could not have been included.  Whoever 
made that statement was worthy of inclusion in the text, and must have operated after Ravina and Rav 
Ashi.  In the text in Bava Metziah, the author(s) resolve this problem by deploying this statement as an 
early prophecy from ןושארה םדאד ארפס (Book of the First Adam). 
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understood traditionally; traditionally, Ravina and Rav Ashi are seen as the compilers and 
as undertaking functions Halivni attributes to the Stammaim.  Halivni tries to resolve 
literary problems while still working within the traditional paradigm; thus he still pursues 
a reconciliation of traditional chronologies with his own and he posits his Stammaim into 
the traditional chronology instead of deconstructing the periodization or at least 
discussing the Stammaim outside of it. 
 
 Separating the activity from the chronology with respect to the anonymous shaqla 
v’tarya is a first step toward utilizing this knowledge in better understanding the text.  
While it may not be possible to determine the chronological provenance of the author(s), 
it becomes easier to discern the contribution of specific Stammaitic elements, and the 
purpose they might serve.  Daniel Boyarin, in Socrates and the Fat Rabbis, breaks down 
different layers of the Stammaim, as opposed to looking at them from the more 
traditional binary approach – one where there is only the attributed and the anonymous 
layers.75  Specifically, he breaks down the sugyot of the BT into three types that he 
attributes to three different types of authors: (1) the ‘stamma of the sugya’, who is by and 
large responsible for the shaqla v’tarya; (2) a narrator of “acerbic, corrosive, bizarre 
legendary narratives;” and (3) the ‘stamma of the Talmud’ who is “responsible for 
completing the Talmud by incorporating both of the Talmud’s two accents.”76  Boyarin 
also argues that the same author could serve two different functions;77 meaning that his 
                                                
75 Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis, 174-177.  
 
76 I took this language from Barry Wimpfheimer’s review of Boyarin’s book “The Dialogical Talmud: A 
Response to Daniel Boyarin’s Socrates and the Fat Rabbis,” Jewish Quarterly Review 101, 2 (2011) JQR, 
(Spring 2011), 245 - 254. 
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stamma of the sugya can be the same person as the narrator, but operating in two 
different ways.  Boyarin, however, does not explicitly suggest that an Amora could serve 
in such a capacity, and be an attributed name at the same time.  Boyarin’s primary focus 
is inter-sugya, and not intra-sugya, and he is interested in a specific genre of narrative 
when he defines his narrator.  Boyarin’s idea that there are multiple functions that apply 
on an inter-sugya level can also be applied on an intra-sugya level.  The functions are 
obviously different, but it is valuable to be able to think about layering on both the intra- 
and inter-sugya level; especially valuable is decoupling these layers from absolute 
chronologies and understanding them in relative chronological terms and also in terms of 
the function and impact they have on the sugya.78  On an intra-sugya level, it is thus also 
possible to discern different authors who contribute different elements – possibly also at a 
different time, but not necessarily so – to the shaqla v’tarya and, when necessary, a later 
editor/author cleans it up and gives it the appearance of a single and unified sugya crafted 
by a single author.  Just as Boyarin splices different types of authors throughout different 
types of sugyot in the BT, it is possible to do the same with respect to a range of 
individual sugyot on a basis internal to that sugya alone. 
 
Transmission 
Halivni asserts a fundamental aspect of how he understands the transmission of 
traditions during the Amoraic period: during this period, only apodictic halachot are 
                                                                                                                                            
77 Boyarin even goes beyond positing that the same author can play different roles in different contexts of 
the BT; he describes a deviant, and nearly self-loathing, voice in the BT that can be expressed by the same 
author who might also be crafting the shaqla v’tarya of a straight-forward halachic sugya with no 
interesting or grotesque narrative. 
 
78 In my analyses of sugyot, I specifically parse the different layers within a sugya, and attempt to unpack 
the impact a specific element has on the manner in which the sugya is read, and ultimately in how the law 
is legislated/adjudicated. 
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included in the formal transmission of an Amora’s repertoire of adjudication and/or 
legislation of law.  The shaqla v’tarya was recorded informally and preserved within a 
particular bet midrash but not ‘memorized’ for posterity.  Over time, some of the original 
shaqla v’tarya would become lost to later generations.  It was the Stammaim, according 
to Halivni, who would infuse the shaqla v’tarya with the worthiness to be ‘memorized’ 
formally, and who ultimately set it up to be canonized as part of the BT.  Where the 
Stammaim did not possess a complete (or even any) tradition for the shaqla v’tarya of a 
given sugya, they reconstructed it.  In the introduction to Bava Batra, Halivni often 
returns to this theme; he is focused on how the Stammaim transmit and occasionally 
reconstruct the shaqla v’tarya.  He unpacks it more completely here than anywhere else 
in his writings, and spends a good part of the introduction to Bava Batra categorizing, and 
sub-categorizing, the varying activities of the different types of Stammaim. 
 
Important in Halivni’s discussions are the tannaim, the transmitters of formal (and 
possibly also informal) Amoraic traditions.  Not to be confused with the Tannaim of the 
Mishna, these transmitters recorded and transmitted the formal halachic declarations of 
the Amoraic authority for whom they were recording.  While Halivni does not explicitly 
state so here, these tannaim are almost entirely unknown to us by name; they are 
anonymous.  Halivni often refers to them and depicts them as engaged in activities 
related to the transmission of rabbinic traditions during the Amoraic period. 
 
 Evident throughout the mevo is Halivni’s premise that not every piece of shaqla 
v’tarya that was transmitted was formally memorized for posterity.  It is also reasonable 
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to assume that later transmitters would reconstruct the traditions received from older 
sources because of inconsistencies or other problems in the text. Halivni’s assumption 
that this is the work of post-Amoraic Stammaim is possible, at least for some texts.  Yet 
there are many sugyot where we simply cannot know with any certainty whether this 
Stammaitic activity was in fact post-Amoraic.  It is always possible that a 5th generation 
tanna (transmitter) engaged a 2nd generation tradition and its source in Stammaitic 
activity.  When it is clear from his analysis that a Stammaitic element is from the 
Amoraic period, Halivni is willing to accept that the Stammaitic period overlapped with 
the end of the Amoraic one.  Where I would like to go beyond Halivni is to address the 
literary activity as works of both the Amoraic and Saboraic periods (utilizing Sherira’s 
chronology).  Stammaitic activity is comprised of a literary form that has been part of 
rabbinic discourse throughout a number of periods; additionally, based upon the Halivni 
school’s work over the last several decades, this form of Stammaitic activity appears to 
have been deployed more frequently during the later Amoraic and Saboraic periods and 
even the earliest parts of the Genoic period.   
 
 Beyond the mere reconstruction of texts, as described above, Halivni further 
assumes that the Stammaim would not reconstruct halachot psukot in the same manner in 
which they might reconstruct the less formally recorded, transmitted, and received shaqla 
v’tarya.  He also assumes that the tannaim were required only to record formally the 
halachot psukot, the apodictic law.  Halivni refers to the Mishna and Braitot as a 
precedent for this tendency toward recording apodictic laws while not recording the 
arguments behind them.  However, the Mishna and Braitot contain examples where the 
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arguments behind the law are stated, and where there is even a back and forth in the 
text.79  Recording and transmitting an argument was not something that was absolutely 
avoided during the Tannaitic period.  During the formation of the BT, recording the 
shaqla v’tarya was a normative part of the formal transmission, as Halivni details all the 
post-Amoraic activities which led to the formation of the canonized BT.  It is reasonable 
to assume that between the Tannaitic period and the post-Amoraic period, the importance 
of the shaqla v’tarya increased and so did its formal transmission.  Thus, while we may 
not have the precise transmissions of the Amoraic tannaim, we can safely assume that, 
relative to their forebears who recorded Mishnayot for Tannaim, they did not abandon the 
practice of recording at least some shaqla v’tarya.  Because of the manner in which the 
trend moves toward the greater transmission of the shaqla v’tarya, we can also assume 
that the production of formal shaqla v’tarya increased as the Amoraic period progressed.  
Over time, so did its complexity and ultimately its transmission increase.  Let us consider 
some literary elements as purely Amoraic; this is in juxtaposition to the adherents of the 
Halivni school, who date as late elements because of their style and/or provenance in a 
sugya.  Regardless of the possibility that such elements can be dated much earlier, they 
are assumed by Halivni to be Stammaitic and thus chronologically post-Amoraic.  If 
Halivni accepted Stammaitic activity as a regular facet of Amoraic literary transmission, 
there would be less need for him to parse sugyot as chronologically Amoraic or 
Stammaitic.  He could then avoid the challenges associated with temporal Stammaim and 
deal only with a non-temporally infused Stammaitic style. 
 
                                                
79 See Mishan Pe’ah 6:6 and 7:7.  I cite these as these are the first two in the entire Mishna and appear in 
only the second tractate.  The Mishna is replete with examples of such logical back and forth. 
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 In discussing Braitot, it is worth noting that the inclusion of the Braitot in a 
particular sugya is not necessarily the work of the actual Amora in connection with whom 
the Braita is quoted.  Yakov Elman highlights the idea that the citation of the Braita can 
very well be the work of a later Amora who is organizing the text.80  In such a case, the 
citation is performed anonymously but is attributed to the Amora to whom it is relevant.  
This can viewed as an attempt to infuse an earlier Amoraic degree of authority into a later 
Amoraic emendation.  Moving beyond Elman, there is no reason to dismiss the idea that 
the same Amora who is manipulating the deployment of a Braita would not also deploy 
Stammaitic elements in order to infuse authority within other traditions of a sugya; a 
single Amora is impacting the text using two different voices.  By associating a Braita 
directly with an Amora, the literary affect is a conflation of authority from the linguistic 
contribution of a later Amora with the halachic authority of the earlier one.  This would 
imply that the association of the Braita with the Amora is a later creation and not part of 
the formally transmitted tradition.  Further, the question then needs to be asked 
(specifically of Halivni): Would this association be transmitted as part of the formal 
transmission by the tannaim or would this be a recreated association by a later Amora 
based upon informal transmissions related to this sugya? 
 
While central to the transmission of the BT traditions, the tannaim are rarely 
discussed in the actual context of studying the text.  They appear to play no role once the 
text is transmitted and received, especially generations later.  Yet they were the ones first 
to record a tradition as mandated by its source.  It is their transmission that survives; this 
                                                
80 Yakov Elman, Authority and Tradition: Toseftan Baraitot in Talmudic Babylonia (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav 
Publishing House, 1994), 19. 
  61 
is the case whether or not they properly recorded the original pronouncement.  Further, 
the tannaim also re-recorded earlier sources and traditions that they received from their 
rabbinic masters, or from other tannaim.  The power of the tannaim over the recording 
and transmission is evident; it may have been these tannaim who anonymously elevated 
the canonical value of the shaqla v’tarya, and not the post-Amoraic Stammaim.  Even if 
they recorded the shaqla v’tarya ‘informally,’ per Halivni, it was recorded, transmitted 
and received, only with a lesser canonical weight.  Later in the mevo, Halivni clearly 
articulates that there is a category of earlier Stammaim who actually received the shaqla 
v’tarya in some form and they reconstructed it so that it is coherent.81  The Stammaim 
must also have received full and coherent shaqla v’tarya.  In Halivni’s paradigm, there is 
Amoraic shaqla v’tarya, and it is anonymous; both are primary features of the 
Stammaitic style. 
 
Halivni does not unpack the anonymous nature of the tannaim; in a way, he 
conflates their anonymity with that of the Stammaim, but he does not articulate this in 
any way.  Apparently, he leaves for others to explore the impact of their anonymity on 
their own authority and in the transmission of traditions that are found in the BT.  
Whether recorded informally, per Halivni, or recorded formally, as suggested here, the 
shaqla v’tarya cannot be taken as a verbatim recording of actual words uttered and heard 
by the tannaim.  In both paradigms, an anonymous third party impacts the recording and 
its transmission and adjusts it so that it can be efficiently recorded (formally or not).  
Within Halivni’s method, in retransmitting the shaqla v’tarya the Stammaim would not 
                                                
81 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 20-30. 
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have known the source of the shaqla v’tarya of Amoraic provenance because it was 
recorded informally.82  This is somewhat circular logic, in that the informal recording 
precluded knowledge of the source, yet we still have traditions intact in the form of some 
sugyot – even complex ones with intricate shaqla v’tarya.  It is difficult to accept that the 
authors of the shaqla v’tarya would be lost to history in such a way while the tradition is 
not.  While I do not go into detail here, this is another example where actors in the 
evolution and creation of the BT are purposefully electing to maintain the anonymity of a 
source – either they themselves as a source for shaqla v’tarya or, as in the discussion at 
hand, of an earlier Amoraic source.  An alternative is that intrinsic to the shaqla v’tarya 
style is anonymity; there never really was a source and only a tradition, if one wishes to 
view the shaqla v’tarya as part of the tradition and not a pure narrative style.  As I 
explain in another chapter, there is apparently some value in resorting to anonymity.83 
 
Another example of the Stammaitic style, according to Halivni, is that it does not 
seek reasons for halachot, specifically for those learned from biblical verses.  The 
Tannaitic and Amoraic layers still find it within their literary (and authoritative) ability to 
pursue the reasons behind laws in the Bible.84  This can certainly be interpreted as earlier 
                                                
82 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 33. 
 
83 While my dissertation primarily revolves around authority and anonymity, this chapter is dedicated to the 
idea of Stammaitic activity versus Stammaitic period.  Where it relates to anonymity and authority, I point 
it out and attempt to parse the implications. 
 
84 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 27.  Halivni also points out the disagreement between R’ Judah 
and R’ Shimon on whether they interpret reasons for halachot from verses in the Bible.  While traditionally 
this is how the argument is understood, Halivni reads the sugya differently, and deduces that R’ Judah did 
in fact accept as permissible interpreting meaning from the verses. 
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rabbis possessing greater authority to inquire in such a way. Halivni clearly associates the 
shift with a significant passage of time: 
“A change of this sort in the thought process between the Stam and its 
predecessors points to the lateness of the Stam, since a conceptual change in 
approach of this type does not take place in a short period of time.”85 
It can also be a function of what is possible within different literary styles, and how 
different literary styles are meant to convey different degrees of authority.  While the idea 
that one cannot interpret reasons in the text may have evolved over time, the literary 
reflection of this can represent itself at any time once the idea is ‘out there.’  There is no 
reason that some Amoraim still possessed the ability to interpret the verses in this way 
and others did not; or that they were only able to do so when working within certain 
literary styles.  Meaning, that when they worked in a Stammaitic style, they refrained 
from, and when they operated in the more traditional Amoraic manner they engaged in, 
this type of interpretation. 
 
Periodization of the Stammaim and Saboraim 
Stammaim 
In the section of the mevo, entitled “zmanam shel ha’stammaim” (the time/timing 
of the Stammaim), Halivni is challenged by his commitment to a clear and separate 
Stammaitic period.  He does his best to keep the Stammaim chronologically distinct from 
the Saboraim and the Amoraim.  In order to do so, Halivni wedges two centuries into 
Sherira’s chronology by recasting as Stammaitic what Sherira defines as Saboraic.  
                                                
85 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 29. 
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Specifically, Halivni recasts Sherira’s earliest Saboraim, who are not mentioned by name 
in the BT, as Stammaim who contributed to the “stama d’gmara” (the Stammaitic literary 
element in the BT).  In this section, Halivni also addresses the transmission of the shaqla 
v’tarya:  
“And they [the Stammaim] transmitted the shaqla v’tarya in an anonymous86 
form because neither the Tannaim nor the Amoraim transmitted the shaqla 
v’tarya, and a few hundred years later, during the Stammaitic period, a large part 
of it (the shaqla v’tarya) was forgotten, and they were uncertain regarding its 
source, and they reconstructed the missing parts themselves.”87 88 
As Halivni describes it, there was only an informal transmission of the shaqla v’tarya 
during the Amoraic and Tannaitic periods.  It was the Stammaim who decided to transmit 
the shaqla v’tarya formally, since that was the impact on the tradition that was available 
to them.  They were no longer able to record formally apodictic law.  In this definition of 
the transmission, we need not change much in order to allow for Amoraic tannaim to 
engage in the Stammaitic activity of recording – however informally – the shaqla v’tarya 
that was underlying the apodictic laws they recorded formally.  Halivni does not fully 
define the distinction between formal and informal recording and transmission.  Thus, 
even in his paradigm, the shaqla v’tarya is a legitimate product of the Amoraic period; 
the amount of reconstruction invested in the received shaqla v’tarya tradition/text by the 
Stammaim dictates how truly Amoraic or post-Amoraic it is.  Still, as Halivni explains, 
                                                
86 The word Halivni uses is stammit which also means plain but is here best understood as anonymous. 
 
87 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 4. 
 
88 Here, and throughout this dissertation, I use my own translation of Halivni’s text. 
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the Stammaim try to capture the style and spirit of the original when engaged in their 
reconstruction. 
 
In terms of the text, Halivni’s definition of the Stammaim revolves more around 
the recording and transmission of the shaqla v’tarya than on its creation.  Though not in 
these specific terms, Halivni concedes that it is Amoraic as a literary style; it is 
Stammaitic only as a canonical element in the BT.  The Stammaim are not creating a new 
style; they are the first, according to Halivni, to record this style formally.  This fits in 
well with the notion that both Halivni’s and Sherira’s chronologies are defined by the 
degree of authority of the individuals who operated during the period rather than by the 
literary style that was used to record how they legislated and adjudicated. 
 
The Stammaim can be seen as co-opting the authority of the Amoraim by (re-) 
crafting shaqla v’tarya, which is not a post-Amoraic development, and may actually have 
been perceived by the Stammaim as a decidedly Amoraic style.  Per Halivni, instead of 
totally deconstructing and reconstructing the shaqla v’tarya traditions they received, they 
attempt to reconstruct them to their idea of what was their original Amoraic form.  
Further, by doing so anonymously (stammit), they keep their post-Amoraic names and 
related authority out of the text and leave the reader/listener to perceive the text as 
Amoraic and as possessing that authority.  While Halivni needs the shaqla v’tarya to be 
Stammaitic in terms of its authoritative power within the chronological paradigm, they 
also cannot be purely Stammaitic in their literary style since they must be reflective of the 
Amoraic period they are conveying.  It would be easier to discuss the creation and 
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transmission of the shaqla v’tarya as a Stammaitic literary style instead of a 
chronological one; this would also obviate the need to put all the proverbial shaqla 
v’tarya eggs in the post-Amoraic chronological basket.  Halivni can still maintain a post-
Amoraic class of contributors to the BT who reconstruct and possibly even create shaqla 
v’tarya, and do so without the temporal confinement of all such elements to the post-
Amoraic period. 
 
Yet Halivni goes even further, and states that the Stammaim consciously recorded 
the shaqla v’tarya in order to distinguish themselves from the Amoraim in the 
chronology, and to define the end of the Amoraic period: 
“they needed to find another way to signify the end of the Amoraic period and to 
distinguish it from earlier periods [i.e. the Tannaitic period] with their 
compilations of different halachot, and the way they chose was to reconstruct and 
transmit for generations the shaqla v’tarya as well [as the halachot].”89 
Halivni implies that the Stammaim were aware of their own periodization, in a manner 
similar to how the earliest Amoraim knew better than to include their own halachot in the 
Mishna, and even “the words of Rav, for example, are not quoted in the Mishna… and 
Rav occasionally argues against the Mishna.”90  Halivni also provides examples of 
Stammaim who are named in the BT, thus tempering the degree to which the Stammaim 
perceived their received corpus of Amoraic traditions as sealed.91 
                                                
89 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 4. 
 
90 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 4. 
 
91 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 7. 
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 Later in the introduction, Halivni goes into a discussion regarding tyuvta in the 
BT.  He points to the manner in which the Stammaim maintain the word tyuvta in the text 
even though they have crafted a shaqla v’tarya around it which appears to obviate it.92  
Halivni asserts that the reason for this is the lack of ability on the part of the Stammaim to 
emend existing Amoraic sources and traditions.  In this context, Halivni again succeeds 
in demonstrating layers within the sugya, yet he is unable firmly to date the varying 
layers: 
“However, the proofs for dating the end of the period are confined to sugyot 
comprised of many layers of Stammaitic material accrued over generations, yet 
the precise date is unknown.”93 
And he furthers the point later in the paragraph when he refers to the different sugyot 
from the different tractates he cited which contain Stammaitic manipulations of tyuvta: 
“All these demonstrate late layers, even though the precise date of the end of the 
Stammaitic period remains in the realm of speculation.”94 
It is true that, from a purely literary perspective, most of the examples cited by Halivni、 
here and elsewhere, contain different layers which reflect different periods.  This is 
especially true when the same or a very similar sugya appears in more than one place in 
the BT, and the differences allow us to date the two sugyot, relative to each other; these 
examples also allow for dating elements within one sugya as compared to elements in its 
                                                
92 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 31. 
 
93 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 31. 
 
94 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 31. 
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cognate sugya.95  There is little reason to dispute that the relative dating works.  And even 
though Halivni concedes that absolute dating is a murkier affair, he nevertheless posits 
the latest layers in the middle of the eighth century.  Since the latest named sources date 
from the sixth century, and many much earlier than that, the seventh century is also a 
reasonable time, as is the end of the sixth century.96  Although I am in agreement that 
some sugyot evolved primarily in the post-Amoraic period, I would like to posit some 
completed sugyot within the late and even the middle part of the Amoraic period.97   
The sugya in Makkot, 9b, is an example of this.  The sugya is short and comments 
on a Mishna which discusses who is eligible for exile (following accidental murder), and 
who is not.  Specifically, the Mishna, and thereafter the BT, focus on the blind man (אמוס) 
and the enemy of the man killed (אנוש).  I argue that this text could date to as early as the 
first or second generation of Amoraim.  It contains no Amora by name or even by 
indirect reference. It also uses more basic Stammaitic language and focuses strictly on 
Tannaitic sources and the correlating verses in the Bible.  Further, the shaqla v’tarya can 
be described as limited and not engaged in extensive back and forth. 
Halivni also isolates the phrase ‘iba’ya lehu’ (it was asked of them) as a datable 
phrase.  Halivni dates the authors of iba’ya lehu at least two hundred years after the 
                                                
95 See Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 26, where he demonstrates that the sugya in Qiddushin 3b is 
earlier than it cognates in Eruvin 16b, Sukkah 24b, and Gittin 21b and 83b. 
 
96 This position is well discussed in the contemporary scholarship.  While there are many examples, it is 
worth noting one of the earliest comprehensive ones: Richard Kalmin, The Redaction of the Babylonian 
Talmud: Amoraic or Saboraic? (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1989).  Although Kalmin is 
calling them Saboraim, he still posits their activity in the sixth century and later with some sugyot possibly 
becoming complete at that time.    
 
97 While this is not the place for a theological treatise, it is important to note that theological considerations 
– to an extent – drive the school of thought that sees the BT as evolving exclusively within the Amoraic 
period and that accepts that it was sealed by the last Amoraim (i.e. Ravina and Rav Ashi).  This is the 
traditional approach, and even many of those who are willing to adjust it to conform to contemporary 
academic thinking are still unwilling to abandon it altogether. 
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metzarfim (the couplers)98 and also places them after Ravina and Rav Ashi, and therefore 
after the Amoraic period.99  One example Halivni cites is Sanhedrin 24b, where he 
explains that the authors of the iba’ya lehu ignored the normal convention of placing first 
the halachic position which limits (rather than expands) the scope of the Mishna.100  
While not central to my analysis, Halivni is addressing why R’Yohanan would be 
mentioned after Reish Laqish if they were both limiting the scope of the Mishna; clearly 
he was expanding the scope, and the authors of the iba’ya lehu did not pick up on this.  
Within the framework of this reasonable assessment, it is still possible to date the entirety 
of this part of the sugya within the Amoraic period, and even within the first five 
generations. 
 
The sugya in Sanhedrin essentially contains three parts that could have been 
crafted, to a large extent, at different times.  Since my primary goal is to demonstrate that 
the first part of the sugya could be a product of the Amoraic period, I only present the 
first part, but I briefly describe the other two parts below.  The sugya is better understood 
with the Mishna at hand and both are presented here as follows: 
 
א ,דכ ןירדהנסוכי רמוא מ"ר רקב יעור השלש ילע םינמאנ ךיבא ילע ןמאנ אבא ילע ןמאנ ול רמא :'ינתמ : ל
 ....וב רוזחל לוכי וניא םירמוא םימכחו וב רוזחל[ב,דכ] :'מג  לבא ןיד רמג ינפל תקולחמ שיקל שיר רמא ...
                                                
98 As I discuss elsewhere, the metzarfim are the couplers who put together two related memrot and thus the 
narrative reads as though the two sources might be in conversation with one another.  I also argue that the 
actions of the metzarfim are a rudimentary form of shaqla v’tarya, and at the very least a style which makes 
the more sophisticated narrative shaqla v’tarya style possible as the BT evolved. 
99 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 38. 
 
100 In the same context Halivni also cites Avoda Zara 68a, which is another example of iba’ya lehu where 
Rabbi Yohanan seems to be mentioned out of order and where it appears that the Stammaitic layer is 
unaware of that interpretations limiting the scope of a law are presented first.  Although I don’t detail it 
here, very similar conclusions can be reached as we do with the sugya in Sanhedrin 24b. 
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 ןיד רמג רחאל והל איעביא תקולחמ ןיד רמג רחאל רמא ןנחוי 'רו וב רוזחל לוכי ןיא לכה ירבד ןיד רמג רחאל
ב אמליד וא וב רוזחל לוכי לכה ירבד ןיד רמג ינפל לבא תקולחמ לביק אבר רמאד ש"ת תקולחמ וזב ןיבו וזב ןי
וב רוזחל לוכי ןיא ןיד רמג רחאל וב רוזחל לוכי ןיד רמג ינפל לוספ וא בורק וילע  
Sanhedrin 24a: MISHNA: one (litigant) says to him (the other litigant): 
“Father is acceptable to me (to serve as a judge)” or “your father is acceptable to 
me (to serve as a judge)” or “three cowboys are acceptable to me (to serve as 
judges)”; Rabbi Meir says: he can recant (his statement regarding who will act as 
judge), and the Rabbis say: he cannot recant. 
Sanhedrin 24b: Reish Laqish says: the disagreement (between Rabbi Meir 
and the Rabbis I regarding a case) before the final verdict, but after the final 
verdict, everyone agrees that he cannot recant.  Rabbi Yohanan says: (the 
disagreement refers to recanting) after the final verdict.  It is asked of them: (Are 
we actually saying that) after the final verdict there is a disagreement (between 
Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis) but before the final verdict everyone agrees that he 
can recant; or perhaps, there is a disagreement (between Rabbi Meir and the 
Rabbis) in this case (before the final verdict) and that case (after the final verdict). 
 
The sugya then introduces a teaching of Rava, and concludes: 
“we learn from this that the disagreement (between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis 
refers to a case of recanting) after the final verdict (and there is no disagreement 
regarding cases of recanting before the final verdict).” 
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Reish Laqish and Rabbi Yohanan are both second generation Palestinian Amoraim, and 
Rava is a fourth generation Babylonian Amora.  This part of the sugya is self-contained, 
and the next part of the sugya commences with fifth generation Amoraim who are 
discussing the same law as above, and appear to be reacting to these traditions.  It is also 
important to stress that the use of Aramaic is a feature of the Stammaitic style, and a high 
level of literary Aramaic was known to the Amoraim, and there are places in the BT 
where they use it.101 
 
While the actual words iba’ya lehu are clearly the latest element in this sugya, the 
actual question that follows might have been a tradition that the authors of iba’ya lehu 
and of o dilma (or perhaps) received and narrated in this Stammaitic style, or they 
themselves crafted those words as well.  Because the latest source in this sugya is a fourth 
generation Amora, it is reasonable to date the sugya to as early as the fifth generation of 
Amoraim.  Further, the nature of the next part of the sugya, where fifth generation 
Amoraim are discussing the same law, in no way negates the possibility that the first part 
of the sugya was complete and whole by the time the elements containing the fifth 
generation of Amoraim was added to the text.  As the elements were added, those adding 
the elements continued to operate in the same Stammaitic style so as to continue the 
narrative smoothly.  This is not to discount the possibility that over time minor changes 
could be made to a text, either on account of the nature of its transmission, or because of 
purposeful literary intervention.  The sugya concludes with Rav Ashi presenting a 
different tradition that was transmitted to him regarding the same Halacha.  Similar to the 
                                                
101 Halivni even goes as far as to say that there are even Tannaitic drashot that are written in Aramaic, so 
Amoraic use of Aramaic works also within Halivni’s paradigm.  See Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 
41. 
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manner in which the second part of the sugya was added to the first, this part with Rav 
Ashi, from the last generation of Amoraim, could have also been added to the first two.  
Its authors also resorted to the same Stammaitic style because they were operating within 
the same function and employing the same literary technique as the earlier anonymous 
authors.  The authors in the case of the narrative surrounding Rav Ashi were certainly 
post-Amoraic, and were employing a typical Stammaitic style.  But is this style 
exclusively theirs in terms of its recording and transmission, or did they receive relatively 
complete elements and continued to add to it in the existing Stammaitic style?  As is 
mentioned elsewhere, it is reasonable to date elements within the sugya relatively; taking 
the next step, and attempting to achieve absolute dating, or dating relative to rabbinic 
authorities who are not mentioned in the particular sugya – such as Ravina and Rav Ashi 
– is more difficult. 
 
 Regardless of whether one approaches the texts in the BT from the traditional 
(with no post-Amoraic Stammaim) approach, the Halivni approach (with a significant 
and very late post-Amoraic Stammaitic layer), or some combination of the two 
chronological paradigms, there is little doubt that there existed an awareness of the 
impact of the Stammaitic style on the part of the authors of those elements in different 
sugyot.  From Halivni’s perspective, the Stammaim worked in the Stammaitic style in 
order to distinguish themselves from the periods that preceded them.  While not explicitly 
stated by Sherira, it is reasonable to assume, when viewing the BT through the prism of 
the traditionalists, that the authors of the Stammaitic elements operated anonymously and 
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added in the shaqla v’tarya in order to distinguish attributed pronouncements from the 
narrative that serves as the core of most sugyot. 
 
 Similar to Stammaitic reactions that appear to contradict tyuvta, contradictions 
between and among different pieces of shaqla v’tarya can also be viewed as pointing to 
earlier and later layers of Stammaitic activity.  For Halivni, and for all who date the 
Stammaim firmly in the post-Amoraic period, this serves as proof that there were earlier 
and later Stammaim, and not just Stammaitic activity, as I argue in this chapter.  Halivni 
attributes at least some of these contradictions to the informal manner in which the shaqla 
v’tarya was recorded in different batei midrashoth (houses of learning); because of its 
informal nature, the different batei midrashoth transmitted different versions of the same 
sugya, occasionally with such contradictions.102  This creates some difficulty for Halivni, 
since some of this Stammaitic activity appears to have taken place during the Amoraic 
period.  Halivni addresses this with a category called “stamot qdumim” (early stamot), 
and by allowing for the shaqla v’tarya to be purely Amoraic when there was no need for 
the post-Amoraic Stammaim to emend the text so that it makes sense both within itself 
and within the broader corpus of the BT.  He explicitly states that “in the [collective] 
memory were recorded also stamot from the Amoraic period.”103 
 
Saboraim 
 Halivni’s section in the introduction to Baba Batra that introduces the reader to 
his approach to the Saboraic period is entitled ‘tqufat hasaboraim’ (the Saboraic period).  
                                                
102 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 32-33. 
 
103 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 33. 
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It is interesting that Halivni uses the word tqufa (period) when discussing the Saboraim, 
and the more ambiguous word zman (time/timing) when discussing the Stammaim; one 
can construe it as a nod to the traditional Sherira chronology, the periods he sets forth, 
and Halivni’s avoiding the linguistic complication of using the same word for the 
periodization of the Saboraim as he does for the Stammaim. 
 
 Ironically, Halivni attempts to use the term gaon in reference to sages from the 
Amoraic, Stammaitic, and Saboraic periods.  While I attempt to do so with ‘Stammaitic’ 
as a literary – and not chronological – style, Halivni defines gaon not as necessarily from 
the Genoic period, but based upon the rabbinic authority’s role regardless of the period in 
which he lived. 
“ ‘gaon’ is a description used to describe the head of a yeshiva, while a 
Stammaitic or Saboraic person is one who contributed to the gemara – and these 
are not necessarily parallel one to the other.  Further, one who was not a head of a 
yeshiva could also have contributed to the gemara, while it is possible that a head 
of a yeshiva did not contribute.”104 
Halivni acknowledges that he is working “contrary to Sherira Gaon.” He pointedly asks 
why the earliest Geonim could not also have been counted as Saboraim as well.  Only a 
page earlier in his introduction, Halivni does not propose the same thing with respect to 
the earliest Stammaim and their potential inclusion in the Amoraic period.  In describing 
the Geonim and their relationship to the Saboraim, Halivni rightly points out that the 
                                                
104 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 5. 
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defined periodization of the Saboraim and Amoraim occurred years after they lived and 
operated.105 
 
In doing so, he also offers the possibility that the Saboraim and Stammaim not 
only overlapped in time but were also distinguished by their functions.  While the 
archives that were available to Sherira were accurate with respect to dates and places, 
they contained no information regarding the contributions made by the different sages: 
“If one were to look into these archives, he will find that they are reliable 
concerning the places and dates that the Gaonim were appointed, lived, operated 
and died, but not concerning their contribution to the Gemara; who was Stammai 
and who was Saborai.  ‘Gaon’ is a title that was given to the head of the Yeshiva, 
and with his appointment, they listed the event in writing… but the assessment of 
his functions, his contributions to the Gemara, did not occur in the generation of 
the Gaon.”106 
For Halivni, this also explains why the Stammaim were not mentioned by Sherira or by 
anyone else.  For the argument that I am making, this highlights the possibility that 
chronology and function are not necessarily interconnected.  Even in Halivni’s paradigm, 
it is possible to have a situation where, at the same time, there can be three different 
Gaonim: one who is neither a Stamma nor a Sabora; a second who is a Sabora; and a 
third who is a Stamma.  There are also Stammaim who were not the heads of a Yeshiva, 
and thus not Gaonim.  Just as the title Gaon relates to the function of the title, so too does 
                                                
105 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 44. 
 
106 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 44. 
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it become possible that Stamma relates to the function of the literary contribution.  
Sabora, however, connotes a period of time in a chronology. 
 
Halivni gets into some difficulty when attempting to define the Saboraim by their 
function as well: 
“The ones who added [simple explanations] lived at the end of this period, and are 
called Saboraim because of the work that they did.  The Stammaim, who authored 
the sugya, would not be called Saboraim; they preceded them.  The Stammaim 
created the sugya, and the Saboraim only later explained that which required 
explanation.”107 
While on the one hand Halivni is categorizing the Saboraim based on the contributions 
they made to the sugyot comprising the BT, on the other hand he has no choice but to 
place them chronologically after the Stammaim. 
 
 Because Halivni wants to keep the Stammaitic period separate, he needs to move 
the Saboraim chronologically forward which is only possible by placing them – at least in 
part – within the Genoic period and also conflating them with the Stammaim.  Halivni 
does both: 
(1) “… the Saboraim operated during the time of the first Geonim, after the 
Stammaitic period…”108 and 
                                                
107 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 44. 
 
108 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 5. 
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(2) “… for those of us [i.e. the Halivni school] who assume that after the 
Amoraim came the Stammaim, there is no reason to state that there were two 
distinct periods – the Stammaitic period and the Saboraic period; rather there 
was only one period, the Stammaitic, as the Saboraim themselves were 
Stammaim, albeit the last of the Stammaim who no longer had Amoraic 
material which required reconstruction.”109 
While the above might appear somewhat contradictory, Halivni’s primary concern is the 
formation of the BT and thus the function and contribution of the Stammaim to the BT.  
Halivni differs from Sherira in the terminology of his chronology more so than in the 
actual functions and activities that led to the formation of the BT.  Speaking of the 
functions that Sherira associates with the Saboraim, Halivni states that this “description 
fits the Stammaim better than it does the Saboraim.”110 
 
 There are instances where Stammaitic elements are attributed to the Saboraim by 
third parties, outside the text of the BT.  Specifically, Halivni cites a text in Qiddushin 3b, 
which Sherira attributes to rabanan saborai and others attribute it specifically to R’ Huna 
Gaon.111  Halivni’s purpose in citing the text is to demonstrate examples where there 
exist different layers of the sugya, one which may have been unaware of the other.  For 
my purposes here, I want to point out that Halivni does not appropriate R’ Huna Gaon as 
one of the Stammaim; instead he demonstrates that the version with R’ Huna Gaon’s 
                                                
109 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 5. 
 
110 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 8. 
 
111 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 26.  An example of the others who attribute it to R’ Huna Gaon 
(as pointed out by Halivni) is the otzar hageonim: Kiddushin.  
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position is the oldest one and that the versions that exist elsewhere in the BT are all later.  
Not only are they all later than R’ Huna Gaon, but they are the real Stammaim.  Leaving 
R’ Huna Gaon out of the main Stammaitic mix, Halivni allows, “that all this 
demonstrates the great Stammaitic activity that took place after R’ Huna Gaon.”112 
 
Halivni’s demonstration that the BT was not sealed with the end of the Amoraic 
period resonates more strongly than does his idea that Stammaitic activity, by and large, 
is the contribution of post-Amoraic Stammaim.  Also reasonable is Halivni’s assertion 
that there are layers of Stammaitic activity and what necessarily follows: “it is however 
possible to demonstrate that the Stammaitic material is comprised of different layers 
demonstrating the existence of several generations of wise-men of the Stam.”113  These 
generations, according to Halivni, are all post-Amoraic.  He fixes the commencement of 
this period with the end of the Amoraic period.  Halivni is less precise about the end of 
the Stammaitic period, but he asserts “their period ended when they began to assemble 
books and called them by name, specifically the middle of the eighth century.”114  By the 
seventh century, “the activities of the Stammaim was at its greatest.” 
 
 In an update to his position in the introduction to meqorot u’mesorot on tractate 
Bava Metzia, where the Stammaim only operate for fifty years, here Halivni has them 
operating for almost 200 years.  He posits the Saboraim in the last fifty of these 200 
years, leaving a gap of 150 years in Sherira’s chronology where the Stammaim are absent 
                                                
112 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 26. 
 
113 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 25. 
 
114 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 25. 
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and from where Halivni has removed the Saboraim.  Again, if Halivni ascribes to the 
Saboraim the ability to do all the things that the Stammaim do – to engage in Stammaitic 
activity – he would be able to work within Sherira’s chronology.  It is not at all strange 
for a literary style – or a legal writing style – to remain in use for centuries, as would be 
the case with the Stammaitic style if it were to span the Amoraic and Saboraic periods.  
Instead, Halivni limits Saboraic as a period: 
“It is not possible to speak about the Saboraic period as an independent period.  
The Saboraim signify the end of the Stammaitic period, and they (the Saboraim) 
seal the (Stammaitic) period.”115 
Referring to his earlier statement in the introduction to Bava Metzia, Halivni further 
presses the point that Sherira had it wrong: 
“Rav Sherira, we stated there [the introduction to Bava Metzia], ‘transferred the 
traditional description of the Stammaim to the Saboraim,’ he switched the 
Stammaim with the Saboraim.”116 
Halivni implies that his chronology including the Stammaim is actually the correct one 
and that Sherira muddled the chronology by leaving out the Stammaim and ascribing to 
the Saboraim the same activities that Halivni has the Stammaim undertaking. 
 
 Halivni is also troubled by the 200-year gap between the sixth and eighth 
centuries where there was little recorded rabbinic literary activity.  He believes that it is 
not possible that such a gap could exist.  Rather, he sees the gap as demonstrating that 
                                                
115 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 8. 
 
116 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 8. 
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whatever rabbinic literary activity took place occurred without attribution and initially 
was recorded anonymously.117  Where he takes the leap is in asserting that all this also 
points to the existence of a Stammaitic period, instead of asking more questions about the 
Saboraim and their activities, and why they are rarely mentioned by name or crafted 
works in an attributed fashion.  Nevertheless, Halivni still needs to work – at some level – 
within Sherira’s and the traditional chronology, and thus doesn’t rid the chronology of the 
Saboraim altogether. 
 
 Within Halivni’s definition of the Stammaim and the Saboraim, where the 
Saboraim just manage the final touches of the BT and the Stammaim handle all the 
‘heavy lifting,’ all shaqla v’tarya is recorded and transmitted anonymously.  Even the 
Saboraim, who are handling earlier, and ostensibly more authoritative, texts that they 
received from the Stammaim, do not mention by name any of those Stammaim.  The 
Saboraim are complicit in conflating the Stammaitic with the Amoraic since the final 
version of the BT weaves the Stammaitic material into the Amoraic and in no way 
exposes those who first record and transmit formally the shaqla v’tarya.  This is 
important in terms of whether we view a contribution to the text as literary or as 
substantively halachic.  An obviously halachic contribution must be associated with a 
specific rabbinic authority, whereas a literary contribution can be anonymous.  This 
becomes important when trying to parse the halachot as legislative versus adjudicative.118  
                                                
117 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 24-25. 
 
118 In my Introduction I allude to the distinction between halachot that are recorded as legislative versus 
those that are recorded as adjudicative.  After its initial recording, any subsequent transmission – even 
where it is clear that the initial recording was the adjudication of a specific halachic matter – is de facto 
perceived as legislative, since the only purpose of recording it is to legislate for future generations.  The 
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While unstated by Halivni, the contribution of the Stammaim (Sherira’s Saboraim) is 
essentially a literary one which transforms received traditions of specific adjudications 
into a corpus of halachic legislation. 
 
 In the section entitled “re’ayot l’qviat zmanam shel hastammaim” (proofs for the 
determination of the time of the Stammaim), Halivni presents briefly three proofs, which 
he details later in the introduction.  The first two proofs involve why the Stammaim often 
need to explain the Amoraic traditions in a difficult way that leaves the contemporary 
reader somewhat baffled (and is also the basis for the critical study of the BT), and why 
they simply didn’t ask the Amoraim themselves to resolve the matter if the Stammaim 
lived during the Amoraic period.119  Halivni’s query here is legitimate when discussing a 
tanna recording and transmitting halachic positions of his generation or even of the one 
preceding him, but not necessarily for a much older one.  The Amoraic period stretched a 
few centuries, and it is reasonable that an Amoraic tanna of a later Amoraic generation is 
dealing with earlier Amoraic material in a Stammaitic manner.  It is also possible that this 
is a literary matter and that contemporary tannaim operated in this Stammaitic manner for 
stylistic reasons.  Halivni’s assertions can be true for many sugyot, but are not necessarily 
true for all sugyot if we consider the Stammaitic as a function of style more than of 
chronology. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
relevance relates to how a literary contribution can transform what was originally adjudicative into 
legislative. 
 
119 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 10-11. 
  82 
 In offering his proof regarding dachuk (forced) explanations, Halivni recognizes 
that at least parts of some sugyot including its shaqla v’tarya – and possibly even entire 
sugyot – are Amoraic: 
“the forced explanations of the words of the Amoraim result from the fact that 
before [the sources reached] the creators of the stamot (anonymous material), the 
sources were either not complete or not in the correct order.”120 
Again, Halivni not only allows, but also needs the Stammaim to receive some Amoraic 
material from which they can craft the shaqla v’tarya.  Who is to say that they did not 
receive some shaqla v’tarya in a complete form?  Further, whether the Stammaim 
received it completely or even just in part, they were not the creators of the shaqla 
v’tarya as a literary style.  The style, even if just a milder version of it, must have pre-
dated Halivni’s Stammaim.  While Halivni is correct in questioning Sherira’s hard and 
fast assertion that all the shaqla v’tarya is the product of the Amoraic period, it would be 
too much for one to assert that the shaqla v’tarya is purely a Stammaitic convention.  
This is the case, unless Stammaitic refers to a literary style not necessarily rooted in a 
chronology rather than a periodic style rooted in a chronology. 
 
In concluding this section, Halivni refers to a sugya in Bezah in order to 
demonstrate instances where “a Stam presents the question of one Amora, and before he 
presents the answer of the second Amora he suggests his own answer… and only later is 
the answer of the Amora to whom the question was asked.”121  In this particular sugya, 
                                                
120 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 11. 
 
121 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 13. 
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the Stam is unaware of Rav Ashi’s position.  Halivni asserts that there are two layers of 
Stammaitic activity in this sugya, one that was not aware of Rav Ashi’s response (per 
above) and a second that was aware of it but did not possess the literary authority to 
change the sugya itself and could only add it to the end of the sugya.  It is a reasonable 
approach to layer the Stammaitic activity, and to define the differing degrees to which the 
Stammaitic activity can impact this particular sugya.  The sugya itself, however, seems to 
point to the possibility that at least part of the Stammaitic activity was created during the 
Amoraic period.  Halivni places both layers of Stammaitic activity in the post-Amoraic 
period. 
 
 Halivni then addresses why it is unlikely that the Stammaim lived during the 
Amoraic period; Halivni’s demonstration of this is based primarily on literary stylistic 
distinctions between Stammaim and Amoraim.  Halivni is relying on literary elements in 
order to create a historical chronology.  In some instances, the text certainly demonstrates 
that the Stammaitic element is post-Amoraic.  An example is found in Kiddushin 48b, 
where the text presents Abaye referring to Rav Ashi and later in the sugya to Rav 
Nahman bar Yizhaq.122  Abaye lived a couple of generations before Rav Ashi, who is 
from the last generation of Amoraim, so it is quite likely that it was a post-Amoraic 
individual who created this piece of Stammaitic material.  However, the chronology of 
styles is more dubious when not dealing with specific examples from the text, and when 
attempting to posit a generalization of what is a pure post-Amoraic, Stammaitic element 
                                                
122 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 18. 
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based on pure style.  Halivni provides three qualities that describe the work of Stammaim 
from the Stammaitic period (as opposed to Stammaim removed from a chronology): 
(1) “If the Stammaim were of the same time as the Amoraim, and if a stam 
element in the Gemara conveys a generally (agreed upon) conclusion, like a 
stam mishna (anonymous mishna) – why does the Gemara not reference the 
idiom “stama d’gmara” just as “stam mishna”?123 
(2) “Why are the Stammaim drawn to rhetoric, and solve problems whose 
answers are readily understood, a style that we do not find among the 
Amoraim?”124 
(3) “The stamma d’gmara arranges the questions in order of their complexity and 
not chronologically; stamma d’gmara sometimes commences with a weak 
question… and then moves on to the stronger question… sometimes he does 
so for literary purposes.”125 
The second and third qualities do not necessarily place the Stammaitic activity in a post-
Amoraic period.  Rhetoric is not a post-Amoraic convention nor is reordering a series of 
queries and responses within a specific text.  Unless there is a historical reason to place 
the Stammaitic element in a post-Amoraic period – as is the case above in Kiddushin – 
the understanding of the text is unaffected by a chronology of its parts.  That the BT itself 
does not refer to stamma d’gmara can be a result of how the corpus of Amoraic material 
was perceived on an intra-Amoraic basis, to which can be added earlier Stammaim.  
Within Halivni’s chronology, Amoraic memrot were not perceived as a sealed corpus 
                                                
123 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 13. 
 
124 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 14. 
 
125 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 15. 
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through the period of the earliest Stammaim – those who still possessed the authority to 
make a change within a sugya.  While the memrot were recorded formally, they were not 
assembled yet into a cohesive, canonized corpus until Halivni’s later Stammaim and 
earliest Saboraim.  This is in contrast to the Mishna; even the earliest Amoraim 
understood that the Mishna was a sealed text and therefore they could begin to discuss 
the Mishna as a complete and closed corpus.  There is no evidence that any Amoraic 
material was sealed before the end of the Amoraic period and thus an Amora would not 
have the same perspective regarding a received Amoraic tradition as he would the 
Mishna; it was still too early in the evolution of the BT as a corpus to define a stamma 
d’gmara.  As Halivni explains elsewhere, and specifically in the above-mentioned case in 
Betzah, the earliest post-Amoraic Stammaim did not view the received traditions and 
sources as sealed and they made emendations to the text that later Stammaim were not 
able to make.  Clearly at this early stage following the Amoraim, the Amoraic traditions 
were not sealed to the same degree as was the Mishna and therefore such observations as 
isolating the stamma d’gmara would have been premature. 
 
In further distinguishing between how the Stammaim and Amoraim relate to the 
Mishna, Halivni points to the language/methodology Amoraim use when disagreeing 
with a Mishna versus the language/methodology Stammaim would use: 
“There exists a difference between the Amoraim and the Stammaim with respect 
to ‘matnitin yehida’ah hi’ (it is [the opinion] of one) and ‘hasurei mahsera’ (it 
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[the Mishna] is missing [pieces]).  It follows that a difference such as this would 
not exist if the Amoraim and Stammaim operated during the same period.”126 
 
The essential difference between the two is that the Amoraim could dismiss a Mishna by 
stating that a Mishna reflects only one rabbinical opinion on a matter while the 
Stammaim could not argue with a Mishna and thus added a missing element to the text 
(since they could not make any changes to the words of the Mishna that were transmitted 
to them).  Ironically, the lack of authority to argue with the Mishna in some way creates 
the opportunity, and hence the authority, for the Stammaim to make claims about the 
completeness of the Mishna and then to present additions to the text of the Mishna.  “The 
Stammaim are forced to maintain the Mishna and they say ‘hasurei mahsera v’hakhey 
qtaney’ (it [the Mishna] is missing [pieces], and this is how it is learned).”127  There are 
no Stammaitic examples of ‘matnitin yehida’ah’ and Halivni mentions examples where 
‘hasurei mahsera’ is attributed to an Amora. 
 
Halivni provides examples of both, and I will address one example of each: 
matnitin yehida’ah hi on Shabbat 140a, and hasurei mahsera on Berakhot 15b.  The 
purpose is to consider whether the sources for hasurei mahsera are necessarily both 
Stammaitic and post-Amoraic, or are another example of Stammaitic activity.  It is 
reasonable to place matnitin yehida’ah hi within the Amoraic period, and to consider it as 
a legal textual activity undertaken by someone with greater authority than those 
                                                
126 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 17.   
 
127 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 16. 
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deploying hasurei mahsera; how related this is to the chronological placing of both 
phrases is more difficult to demonstrate. 
 
The sugya on Shabbat 140a deals with hiltit – a plant used as a spice and for its 
medicinal qualities – and whether one can soak, and subsequently dissolve it in water on 
the Sabbath; is such an activity prohibited on the Sabbath?  The sugya also addresses the 
difference between soaking the hiltit in cold and warm water. 
 
:א ,מק תבש  אלא ייבא ל"א תאטח בייח הרש ףסוי ברד הימק האשרנ אדא בר אמגרת יאמ הרש והל איעביא
 הרש התעמ אעב לוחב השוע אוהש ךרדכ השעי אלש ןנברדמ ייבא רמא אלא בייחימד ימנ יכה אימב אצמוא
 תיתלחה תא ןירוש ןיא ןנת ןנא אהו רוסא ל"א ןנוצב תיתלחה תא תורשל והמ יאני 'רמ ןנחוי יבר הינימ
חה תא ןירוש ןיא אינתד איה האדיחי ןיתינתמ ךלו יל ןיב המ כ"א ל"א רתומ ןנוצב אה ןירשופב אל תיתל
רתומ ןנוצב רוסא ןימחב רמוא יסוי יבר ןנוצב אלו ןימחב  
 
Shabbat 140a: It was asked of them [the scholars]: What if one dissolved 
[the hiltit]?  Rav Adda of Naresh explained before Rav Yosef that if one dissolves 
he is liable for a hatat [sacrificial offering].  Abbaye said to him: therefore, now 
when one soaks meat in water he is also liable [for a hatat]?  Rather, Abbaye said 
that it is a Rabbinical [prohibition] that one not act in the same way [on Shabbat] 
as he does on a weekday.  Rabbi Yohanan asked Rabbi Yannai: “what is the case 
of dissolving hiltit in cold water?”  He said to him: “forbidden.”  [Rabbi Yohanan 
followed up:] “we learned in a Mishna, ‘there is no dissolving hiltit in warm 
water’; but in cold water it is permitted.  He [Yannai] said to him [Yohanan]: “if 
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so, what is the difference between you and me?  It is the opinion of one, for we 
learned [in a Tosefta]: ‘there is no dissolving hiltit in warm nor cold [water]; 
‘Rabbi Yossey says: in warm [it is] forbidden, [and] in cold [it is] permitted.’ ’ ” 
 
Yannai dismisses the Mishna because it is – as we learn from the Tosefta – only 
the opinion of Rabbi Yossey.  Yannai and Yohanan are both first generation Palestinian 
Amoraim.  Their greater proximity to the Tannaitic period allows them the flexibility to 
dismiss a Mishna in favor of a competing Tosefta, in a way the post-Amoraic Stammaim 
would not, and neither would a fifth or sixth generation Amora.  Allowing for Yannai to 
disagree with a Mishna does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all Amoraim can 
disagree with a Mishna by deploying matnitin yehida’ah hi.  In fact, the number of 
instances where the phrase is deployed is almost insignificant and it is difficult to draw 
any conclusions.  However, once we are already looking at the examples, it is worth 
noting that all the examples of matnitin yehida’ah hi are associated with Amoraim from 
the fourth generation or earlier.  Halivni successfully demonstrates that the phrase and its 
accompanying methodology are unavailable to the authors of Stammaitic elements.  
However, because the authors of the Stammaitic elements cannot be confined only to the 
post-Amoraic period, it is more dubious to assert that such a methodology was not 
deployed by authors of Stammaitic material; rather, when operating ‘Stammaitically’ the 
authors would not deploy such language and methodology.  This is a reflection of the 
Stammaitic style and approach operating in a hyper-deferential manner with respect to 
the attributed Amoraic traditions and presumably to the Amoraim themselves.  Unlike an 
attributed statement, an anonymous, Stammaitic one cannot be as ‘disrespectful’ toward 
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the text of the Mishna and its understanding in as dramatic a way.  When working in the 
Stammaitic voice, such treatment of the Mishna is off limits because they are acting more 
like transmitters or scribes whose role is not to choose from among traditions, but only to 
record and transmit.  When they encounter a problem, they take the least disruptive path 
toward resolving it, and disregarding a Mishna is far too disruptive for it to be deployed 
by the Stammaitic voice. 
 
The sugya in Berakhot 15a-15b deals with the validity of different individuals to 
read the Megilla.  The two basic positions are (1) that everyone can read the Megilla 
except for a deaf, a fool, and a minor and (2) that all can read the Megilla except for a 
deaf, a fool, and a minor, but Rabbi Judah permits a minor to read the Megilla. 
 
 א ,וט תוכרב– :ב  הדוהי יברו ןטקו הטוש שרחמ ץוח הליגמה תא תורקל םירשכ לכה םתה ןנת
 עימשה אלו עמש תא ארוקה ןנתד איה יסוי יבר הנתמ בר רמא אל ימנ דבעיד שרח אנת ןאמ ןטקב רישכמ
אל ימנ דבעידו איה יסוי יברד יאממ אצי אל רמוא יסוי יבר הדוהי 'ר ירבד אצי ונזאל   איה הדוהי יבר אמליד
כלו אל ימנ דבעיד ןטקו הטוש המ ןטקו הטושד אימוד שרח ינתקד ד"ס אל ימד ריפש דבעיד אה אלד אוה הלחת
 אפיס ינתקדמ אהו הדוהי יברכ המקואל תיצמ ימו אתיאדכ אהו אתיאדכ אה אמלידו אל ימנ דבעיד שרח ףא
איה הדוהי 'ר הלוכ אמלידו איה הדוהי יבר ואל אשירד ללכמ ןטקב רישכמ הדוהי יבר  ירוסחו ןטק ינווג ירתו
 עיגהש ןטק לבא ךונחל עיגה אלש ןטקב א"דב ו"שחמ ץוח הליגמה תא תורקל ןירשכ לכה ינתק יכהו ארסחמ
ןטקב רישכמ הדוהי יברש הדוהי יבר ירבד רשכ הלחתכל וליפא ךונחל.  
 
Berakhot 15a-15b: We learned there: “all are kosher to read the Megilla except 
for a deaf, a fool and a minor, but Rabbi Judah permits the minor.”  Who is the 
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Tanna who states that the act of a deaf man is invalid [even] if [the act] already 
occurred?  Rav Matanah states: “it is Rabbi Yossey, for we learn, ‘one who reads 
shema but did not hear [it] with his own ears, fulfilled [his obligation] according 
to Rabbi Judah; Rabbi Yossey says: ‘he did not fulfill [his obligation].’ ’ ”  How 
do we know that this [position] is Rabbi Yossey and that the completed act [of a 
deaf man] is invalid?  Perhaps it is [according] to Rabbi Judah, and initially it is 
not [valid], but if it is done already, then it is valid.  This should not enter your 
mind!  For we learned that a deaf is similar to a fool and a minor.  Just as with a 
fool and a minor if the act is completed it is not [valid], so too with a deaf, if the 
act is completed it is not [valid].  And perhaps this [ruling for a deaf] is as it 
appears, and this [ruling for a fool and a minor] is as it appears?  Can it be 
understood as following Rabbi Judah‘s [position]?  Since we learned in the final 
clause [of the Mishna]: “Rabbi Judah validates with [respect to] a minor,” then the 
first clause [of the Mishna] is not according to Rabbi Judah.  Perhaps the whole 
thing [both clauses of the Mishna] is according to Rabbi Judah?  And there are 
two types of minors, and it [the Mishna] is missing [an element] and this is how 
it [the first clause] is learned: “all are kosher to read the Megilla except for a deaf, 
a fool, and a minor.  But to what case is this referring?  To a minor who has not 
reached the age of education; but a minor who reached the age of education is 
valid in the first place.”  These are the words of Rabbi Judah, since Rabbi Judah 
validates with a minor. 
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Unlike the sugya on Shabbat 140a where it is an Amora disagreeing with the 
Mishna, in this sugya it is the stamma d’gmara (i.e. the Stammaitic actor(s)) that is 
disagreeing with the Mishna.  In an effort to reconcile both clauses of the Mishna with 
the position of Rabbi Judah, the Stammaitic actor presents the reader with the possibility 
that there is a lacuna in the Mishna.  The sugya then offers the ‘missing’ element which 
allows for the desired reconciliation.  The Stammaitic actor, unlike Rabbi Yannai the 
early Amora, was not going to dismiss the Mishna, and instead worked the Mishna into 
his understanding of the halacha.  For Halivni this is demonstrative of both the 
Stammaitic nature and the chronologically late nature of the hasurei mehsera.128  While 
the literary quality of the element at hand makes it Stammaitic, there is nothing in the text 
that points to it being post-Amoraic.  All we know for certain is that the basic formation 
of the sugya took place after Rav Matana, who was a second/third generation Amora.  
How the tanna recorded Rav Matana’s statements, and the degree to which it is similar to 
the final form of the sugya is difficult to know.  The understanding of the sugya is not 
impacted by the dating of either the final form of the sugya or of a proto-sugya which 
evolved into the one that is extant.  Our understanding is impacted by the literary activity, 
separate from the time at which it took place. 
 
This is another example where Halivni must straddle the line between that which 
is formally recorded – the apodictic statements of the Amoraim – and that which was 
informally recorded – the shaqla v’tarya.  On the one hand, Halivni needs the shaqla 
v’tarya not to be reflective of a purely post-Amoraic, Stammaitic milieu; on the other 
                                                
128 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 17-18.  
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hand, he wants to dilute the ‘Amoraicness’ of the shaqla v’tarya so that he can maintain 
the Stammaim and their contributions as something that can only be post-Amoraic.  Once 
Halivni concedes that the shaqla v’tarya was recorded in any fashion, it becomes difficult 
to posit the shaqla v’tarya as purely post-Amoraic.129  As I attempt to point out, the 
reader is better served reading the Stammaitic elements as a form of literary activity 
rather than as always reflective of a post-Amoraic weltanschauung.  This is not to say that 
the history within the sugya never allows for a concrete dating of elements within it; 
rather, the Stammaitic style should not always be viewed as reflective of post-Amoraic 
dating. 
 
Halivni explicitly states that only the raw memrot of the Amoraim were 
assembled during the Amoraic period; the weaving of the memrot into the shaqla v’tarya 
narrative came later in the post-Amoraic period (i.e. the Stammaitic period): 
“Only the memrot and limited commentary of named Amoraim were assembled 
by the Amoraim themselves.”130 
Within Halivni’s paradigm, the assembly of memrot, which essentially is the ordering of 
sugyot in the BT as a whole, would have been the only thing of interest to an Amora 
interested in assembling received traditions.  He would not have been interested in 
dealing with or assembling the shaqla v’tarya because he would not have perceived it as 
being part of the formal transmission of halachic traditions.  It is in large part for this 
                                                
129 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 18-19.  Here, Halivni has a difficult time with instances of 
hasurei mahsera where it is attributed to an Amoraic source, since it undermines the idea that a style is 
reflective of a literary activity rather than a period of time. 
 
130 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 48. 
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reason that such Amoraic assembly was almost exclusively done in Hebrew.  Aramaic 
shaqla v’tarya would have been perceived as informal, and not as worthy of inclusion in 
an assembly of received traditions. 
  
It is also important for my argument that, despite my attempt to peel Stammaitic 
activity from the chronology, there exists a post-Amoraic Stammaitic contribution to the 
shaqla v’tarya and also to some of the apodictic Amoraic material the post-Amoraic 
actors received.  I argue that the Stammaitic activity’s anonymity allowed it to seamlessly 
fit into a sugya without being detected as not possessing Amoraic authority.  Some actors 
during the Amoraic period did not possess the same authority as others, and therefore 
their influence could only be felt in their anonymous contribution through their recording, 
interpreting, and then transmitting the less formally recorded shaqla v’tarya; yet, per 
Halivni and the broader world of contemporary critical BT scholarship, there were post-
Amoraic actors (i.e. the Stammaim) who also engaged in Stammaitic activity 
anonymously and thus also avoided detection and the subsequent scrutiny of any 
attributed sources for the shaqla v’tarya traditions. 
 
Halivni, Sherira, and the Difference 
 In defining the differences between his and Sherira’s approaches, Halivni entitles 
the section that deals with it: “ben hashqafato shel r’ sherira lehashqfateinu” (between 
the view of R’ Sherira and our view).  Halivni briefly presents Sherira’s view – also the 
traditional view and the one that dominated BT study until the 20th century – which sees 
all elements of the BT as creations of the Amoraic period; the exceptions are minor 
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adjustments made by the Saboraim, whom Sherira places immediately following the 
Amoraim.131  Halivni contrasts this with his own view: 
“However, according to our view, the Stammaim, who authored the stamot 
(anonymous [elements]), were not from the same time as the Amoraim, but rather 
they followed them; and they presented their material anonymously and they did 
not combine it with the Amoraic material – as their period already ended – in 
order to distinguish between the teachings of the Amoraim, which were primarily 
memrot and precise halachot, and the teachings of the Stammaim, which were 
primarily shaqla v’tarya.”132 
The above quote captures the essence of how Halivni views the Stammaim and also how 
he sets apart his approach from the traditional one.  Halivni extends the period of 
authoritative creation of shaqla v’tarya past the Amoraic period; Sherira maintains that 
the authority to craft sugyot, including shaqla v’tarya and halachot psuqot, ended with 
Ravina and Rav Ashi.  Halivni rightly concludes that there exist sugyot where certain 
factors, such as the internal history of the Amoraim mentioned in a sugya, suggests that 
the shaqla v’tarya is post-Amoraic.  Instead of expanding the role of Sherira’s Saboraim, 
Halivni assumes a Stammaitic period, where the Stammaim set themselves apart from the 
Amoraim who preceded them by contributing shaqla v’tarya to the formal transmission 
of halacha.  Yet the BT is constructed so that the Stammaitic activity is part and parcel of 
the work as a whole; once the BT is absolutely sealed, the Stammaitic material – the 
stamma d’gmara – is equally canonical.  Thus, Sherira (and the traditional view) and 
                                                
131 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 19-20. 
 
132 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 20. 
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Halivni both agree that – regardless of who first formally transmitted a sugya with its 
shaqla v’tarya – the authority infused in the shaqla v’tarya is on par with Amoraic 
authority.  Where Sherira actually places the creation and formal transmission of them 
within the Amoraic period, Halivni separates the creation from the reconstruction and 
formal transmission. 
 
 Halivni and most contemporary scholars of the BT allow for post-Amoraic 
emendations to and redrafting of received traditions (and even to their sources).  Such 
emendation and redrafting is necessarily the result of a judgment made by Stammaim.  
Again, I agree that such judgment must be that of the final editor or author of the text, but 
in the case of the BT, it does not always have to be bound to a specific chronology.  
Sherira’s view is that nearly all parts of the creation of the BT took place during the 
Amoraic period.  Halivni, on the other hand, places ‘arrangement’ (‘aricha) within the 
Amoraic period, and almost every other part of the creation of sugyot and the BT as a 
whole in the period(s) that follow. 
 
Within both the traditional approach (i.e. Sherira’s) and Halivni’s approach, there 
is a Bakhtinian quality whereby the same individuals are crafting different types of voices 
during the very same period; voices which have since been seen as reflecting a 
chronology and not something else, such as the level of authority or canonicity that the 
author wishes to infuse into the text.  Bakhtin describes different types of linguistic 
stratification, what he calls the “professional stratification of language… the language of 
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the doctor, the businessman, the politician, the public education teacher, and so forth.”133  
Bakhtin also allows for individual authors to utilize different voices in the creation of 
dialogues and the novels comprised by them.  While Halivni places the formal 
transmission of the shaqla v’tarya in the Stammaitic period, Sherira does not.  Within 
Sherira’s almost sealed BT of the late Amoraic period, there are multiple types of voices; 
instead of Bakhtin’s businessman and politician, the BT contains the voices of the 
rabbinic authorities who make proclamations, the tanna who records them for posterity, 
and the authors of the shaqla v’tarya.  For all we know, the same individual could have 
been responsible for all three voices at different times.  Instead of reflecting different 
times, they reflect different literary voices with differing impacts on understanding and 
responding to that understanding. 
 
While Halivni is correct in placing more creative authority over the shaqla v’tarya 
in the post-Amoraic period, it is still reasonable to accept the part of the Sherira view that 
has the Amoraim creating and transmitting shaqla v’tarya as part of completed and 
almost sealed sugyot.  For Halivni there is also a deployment of varying voices by the 
same individuals, as Halivni puts the onus of creating the literary sugya, with its narrative 
nuance, on the Stammaim.  These Stammaim, regardless of how much they were 
reconstructing the shaqla v’tarya, were aware of the different literary styles that convey 
different levels of authority; and they placed them in the sugyot they crafted.  At some 
level, this was happening since the Tannaitic period.  It is also possible to understand the 
                                                
133 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination; Four Essays, edited by Michael Holquist and translated by 
Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 289.  While the original 
date of Bakhtin’s authorship of the essays is not accurate, they are known to have been written in the 1930s. 
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crafting of the shaqla v’tarya by deploying Bakhtin’s dialogical methodology.  This 
works for the most disparate types of narratives as well as those that are absolutely 
contradictory.  It also leaves open the possibility to view the text as Boyarin might view 
it.  Boyarin would have his ‘stamma of the Talmud’ purposefully “include seemingly 
contradictory texts as the bizarre narratives are a deliberate corrective to, or apology for, 
the authoritarian voice of the ‘stamma of the sugya.’ ”134 
 
All the while, the Stamma is a single monological – and not dialogical – force 
operating in the text.  As I will discuss in the chapter on multiplicity, there exists a 
tension between the text possessing a veneer of dialogism while maintaining a strong 
monological set of values as well as legal (and cultural) positions as conveyed in its 
variety of narratives and styles.135  The discussion of the v’la pligi structures also address 
this specific issue of conveying a multiplicity of voices on a given issue, and using the 
perception of multiplicity to cover up what is actually a uniform and controlled 
monological message. 
 
 Halivni specifically insinuates that one goal of the literary activity of the authors 
of the Stammaitic elements was to infuse their work with an Amoraic authority.136  In 
some way, Halivni (and much of contemporary BT scholarship) view such an infusion as 
an honest attempt to recreate original Amoraic shaqla v’tarya traditions from the 
                                                
134 Language taken from Wimpfheimer, “Dialogical Talmud,” 249. 
 
135 Boyarin, Socartes and the Fat Rabbis, 145-154.   
 
136 Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 46. 
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informal transmissions they received.  I argue that there is room to see the Stammaitic 
activity as more purposefully attempting to coopt Amoraic authority for their own 
purposes and to advance their own agendas regarding specific halachic positions.  While I 
am not advocating for Neusnerian cynicism regarding all Stammaitic activity,137 I merely 
raise the possibility that not all Stammaitic activity is pure in its attempt to reconstruct 
existing Amoraic traditions – both the formally recorded memrot, and the informally 
recorded shaqla v’tarya.  Further, some may not at all be a reconstruction of existing 
shaqla v’tarya, but are newly created shaqla v’tarya.  This would apply to both the 
Stammaitic activity/shaqla v’tarya which originates during the Amoraic and that which is 
crafted after the Amoraic period ends. 
                                                
137 See Jacob Neusner, The Bavli and its Sources: The Question of Tradition in the Case of Tractate Sukkah 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies, 1987); idem. Rabbinic Narrative. A Documentary 
Perspective. Volume Four. The Precedent and the Parable in Diachronic View (Leiden: E. J. Brill. The 
Brill Reference Library of Judaism, 2003); idem. The Bavli’s One Voice: Types and Forms of Analytical 
Discourse and their Fixed Order of Appearance. (Atlanta: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the 
History of Judaism, 1991). 
 




Anonymity as Literary Feature 
Anonymity as a developed and studied concept is a 19th century phenomenon; the 
word ‘anonymity’ first appears then and the word ‘anonymous’ did not come into use in 
the English language until the 15th century.1  “Today authorship and authority have 
become inextricably linked, and literature without a responsible agent identified is like an 
artifact that turns up in the saleroom lacking a decent provenance.  Both anonymity and 
pseudonymity have become suspect behavior.”2  Before and during the early part of the 
print era, and before the isolation of anonymity as a concept, this was not the case.  Once 
it is established as a style of authorial attribution, when anonymity is deployed 
intentionally there must be a reason.  Prior to anonymity’s emergence as a form of 
attribution, it is difficult to project an intentional anonymity upon a text.  This would be 
true for pre-medieval authors, compilers, editors, lawmakers, et alia.    At best, theirs is a 
casual anonymity; more likely, it was unintended. 
 
One can also argue that “there was an intermediate stage in literary history when 
anonymity was neither routine nor eccentric.”3  While anonymity existed, it was not fully 
recognized nor given serious academic treatment.  Nonetheless, the impact that 
                                                
1Anne Ferry, “Anonymity: The Literary History of a Word,” New Literary History 33.2 (Spring 2002): 
193-214.  
 
2 Pat Rogers, “Pope, Curll and the Uses of Anonymity,” New Literary History 33.2 (Spring 2002): 233-245.  
 
3 Rogers, “Uses of Anonymity,” 243.
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anonymity has upon the reader (or listener) of a text can be similar, if not the same, 
whether routine or eccentric, regardless of the degree of intent associated with the 
authorial anonymity of the text at hand.  For example, the authorial intent of parts of 
Leviticus does not impact how an adherent might read the text.  For the adherent, the 
actual intent of the author of Leviticus has faded into the background; the text transcends 
historical circumstance.  The adherent is processing passages of Leviticus through the 
prism of centuries of different forms of interpretation.  It is the anonymity of the text that 
makes this possible.  By having forgotten the author, and his/her nature, divine or mosaic 
attribution is now possible. 
 
While anonymous intent is something to consider, the goal is to explore 
anonymity and its impacts and to understand the intended or received textual aspiration 
of an anonymous text, specifically an anonymous text created for or within a sacred, legal 
system.  How a text became anonymous is only one variable in the equation.  Because it 
is relatively new as a studied concept, one must be careful when overlaying notions 
regarding anonymity from one era upon another.  Still, if proper consideration is given to 
the problematic elements, then there is value in attempting to overlay what we find about 
anonymity regarding one text upon a text from another era, culture, and/or subject matter.  
I will pay specific attention to Pat Roger’s idea that “anonymity is in some measure 
textualized; that is, the author uses the absence of an acknowledged identity to produce 
meaning within the ongoing discourse.”  Anonymity is not only the absence of the author, 
it is also the addition of a certain ‘something.’  In a similar vein, Marcy North aptly 
states, “Anonymity proved to be a complex convention that invited numerous competing 
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interpretations and justifications.”4  Just as the BT can be discussed as having “neither 
routine nor eccentric” anonymity, simply because we can never know the specifics of 
how the transmitters operated, it can be said to fall squarely within this notion of 
textualization.  In using Rogers’ idea of textualization, I am ascribing a ‘something’ to 
the anonymity of the BT, and not just the absence of something.  In the case of the BT, 
the anonymity can be said to be adding a divine quality, similar to the one of the Bible, 
upon which the laws of the BT are based. 
 
Anonymity can also be viewed as creating the image of the multiplicity of 
authorship.  Once there is attribution to a named author or set of authors, there is the de 
facto dis-attribution of the text to everyone else.5  The author can also be said to be 
assuming “a variety of outlooks.”6  This perception is important in the BT in that it 
moves the text from the authority of a single sage or set of sages to the realm of the 
‘every-sage.’  Beyond perception, the traditions cited in the BT are clearly attributed to 
multiple sources.  It is reasonable to posit that the crafters of the shaqla v’tarya were 
many and this created the need for anonymity.  It also allows for the authorities, who 
might be acting both as anonymous redactors as well as sources to which traditions are 
attributed, to speak of themselves in the third person.7  Further, beyond these potentially 
                                                
4 Marcy North, “Anonymity’s Subject: James I and the Debate over the Oath of Allegiance,” New Literary 
History 33.2 (Spring 2002): 223. 
 
5 Mark Robson, “The Ethics of Anonymity,” The Modern Language Review Vol. 103 No. 2 (April 2008), 
356.  Here, Robson makes the point that “this remains true even when the ‘original’ author is ‘anonymous.’  
One can argue that for some the idea of the Stam becomes the author of the BT. 
 
6 Han Baltussen, “From Polemic to Exegesis: The Ancient Philosophical Commentary,” Poetics Today 28:2 
(Summer 2007), 260. 
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conflicting roles, redactors and editors were likely to have been also adjudicators of 
halacha in their own day.  They, therefore, had an interest in “choos[ing] anonymity if 
they felt that their authorial persona conflicted with their daily one.”8  Additionally, in the 
time when the BT was firmly canonized and accepted by the Genoic authorities, the 
reader/listener would be undistracted by the knowledge of the author and any ‘baggage’ 
they might carry.9  This was quite common in the 17th and 18th centuries; Rogers 
describes Pope as balancing his anonymity with his attributed works.10  This is also 
apparent in the case of King James I, and his anonymous work attributed to a ‘loyal 
subject.’  By operating as a loyal subject and not as the king, James I relieved his readers 
of considering the baggage of reading the work of a king.  The BT narrators can be 
thought of as balancing attribution to themselves (albeit in the third person) using the 
anonymous shaqla v’tarya who puts it all together.  The BT narrator(s) could have 
themselves been players in the halachic text they were crafting and were thus narrating 
their own positions.  
 
In the 16th century, as the word ‘anonymous’ first appeared, it emerged as a 
distinct concept.  Anonymity was first isolated as a feature in the sphere of literature, and 
from there spread to other disciplines, such as sociology and law.11  To the faithful 
                                                                                                                                            
7 David Kronick, “Anonymity and Identity: Editorial Policy in the Early Scientific Journal,” The Library 
Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 3, (July 1988), 227. 
 
8 Robert J. Griffin, The Faces of Anonymity: Anonymous and Pseudonymous Publication from the Sixteenth 
to the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  2003), 885. 
 
9 Kronick,“Anonymity and Identity,” 229.  
 
10 Rogers, “Uses of Anonymity,” 238. 
 
11 Ferry,“Anonymity,” 200. 
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reader, the BT is a book of law, in many ways no different than the Constitution is to an 
American jurist.12  Anonymous, third-person narration – even where the author is known 
– exists in different forms of literature and comes off as natural in many instances; this is 
true for the reader of the BT.  Anonymity in the BT is a phenomenon which is so 
ubiquitous that it does not stand out and does not normally attract attention to the degree 
to which anonymity is deployed – knowingly or unknowingly – in the BT.  This is 
particularly interesting considering that attributing traditions to sources is an important 
activity of the redactors of the BT.  And, in fact, in later periods, per the Encyclopedie’s 
entry on anonymity, “the author’s name is the most important consideration; given this, 
they agree with everything unquestionably.”13  This is in juxtaposition to the earliest 
readers of the BT (i.e. the Geonim), who accepted the anonymous narrator’s attribution 
without serious consideration of the narrative’s attribution.  While anonymity is obvious 
to the student of the BT, as a literary element in itself, it does not receive significant 
attention from the reader of the text.  It is taken for granted that the redaction of the BT 
was performed anonymously, or at least no effort was made to preserve the names of the 
editors and redactors.  This could have been the result of how the editors and redactors 
conducted their work or of how the later transmitters transmitted the received texts.  The 
result is the same: the text is read as an anonymous work. The impact of anonymity on 
                                                
12 While it may appear dissonant to leap forward to the US Constitution, I do so only to make a conceptual 
point regarding how the authority of a text can become disentangled from its author(s) and take on an 
authoritative life of its own.  Following its initial production, the Constitution unfolds over time in the form 
of both amendments, such as the Bill of Rights, adjudication in Federal courts, and legislation in Congress.  
Specifically, many amendments take on the deep authority of the initial text, as the Bill of Rights or the 
Emancipation Proclamation are seen as equally authoritative as the Constitution itself and not subject to 
debate.  The fact that there are amendments, such as Prohibition, which have been overturned demonstrate 
that an amendment can be overturned, yet no legal scholar would ever challenge the Bill of Rights or 
Emancipation.   
 
13 Encyclopedie on dictionnaire raìsonné des arts et des sciences, ‘Anonyme’. (translation in Richard 
Wrigley, “Censorship and Anonymity in Eighteenth-Century French Art Criticism,” Oxford Art Journal 
Vol. 6 No. 2 (1983): 23). 
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how scholars read the BT – traditionally, but even in ‘academic’ circles – deserves 
treatment. In this chapter my goal is to discuss anonymity as a concept in general, and to 
explore how scholars in other disciplines might deal with anonymity and its impact.  This 
will open up the concept of anonymity in such a way as to determine the degree to which 
we can establish consistent attributes of anonymity.  These attributes can then inform 
how one can understand the different forms of anonymity in the BT. 
 
In this chapter, I first discuss anonymity in general terms, and then move on to a 
discussion of the deployment of anonymity in two specific contexts.  I discuss two 
contexts related to anonymity: (1) authorial attribution and anonymity during the period 
following the advent of the printing press (the print era); and (2) the Hong lou Meng, a 
Chinese novel whose authorship was unknown for over two centuries, and was treated as 
a compiled, anonymous work.  Within the above-described discussions, I also apply the 
features of anonymity that I define in those contexts to the BT.  
 
Anonymity as Authority 
 One of the earliest attributes of anonymity is the perceived ancientness with 
which such texts are perceived.  Ancientness can provide authority to a text.  Along with 
ancientness, anonymity can reflect “a common wisdom and shared truth.”14  In fact, many 
anonymous texts are ancient, and many ancient texts are transmitted anonymously.  
Ancientness combined with anonymity can be even more authoritative.  As Michel 
Foucault put it, “their [ancient texts’] anonymity caused no difficulties since their 
                                                
14 North, “Anonymity’s Subject,” 227. 
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ancientness, whether real or imagined, was regarded as a sufficient guarantee of their 
status;”15 specifically, ‘more’ ancient texts (i.e. the Bible or even the Mishna) for ‘less’ 
ancient readers (i.e. Amoraic authorities).  One need not look further than the Bible, also 
narrated anonymously, to find a text that fits the ‘ancientness + anonymity = authority’ 
paradigm.  The ancientness and anonymity of the Bible are what drive the authority of the 
text.  These two features, ancientness and anonymity, are what create the textual climate 
for the text to evolve into a divinely inspired one.  The authority of the Bible is closely 
connected to its divine attribution.  It is the divinity of the Bible that moves it from being 
a great epic to being a source of authority.  However, before the Bible – and the laws 
learned from it – was divinely attributed, it had to be anonymous; the actual authors were 
forgotten.  Parts of the Bible – and specifically the Pentateuch whence most BT laws 
originate – were not attributed to any individual author, or group of authors; a cultural 
recollection of any such author would have precluded the possibility of divine attribution.  
Before acquiring divine attribution, a text and its readers must forget its human 
attribution, its actual authors. 
 
 In the BT, the anonymous elements are clearly meant to appear as functioning as 
a later literary feature used to frame various memrot that are meant to appear earlier.  
They can be said to be ‘ancient’ which does not necessarily mean old in absolute terms, 
or older than other elements or texts with which it is contextually juxtaposed.16  Whether 
                                                
15  Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?", in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism, eds. Harari, Josué V.,  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979). 
 
16 For example, Mormon texts, such as the Book of Mormon are created and distributed in a way that gives 
them an ‘ancient’ vibe, when in fact they were written alongside works like The Adventures of Tom 
Sawyer.  This can be done by contextualizing the Book of Mormon in the way the Bible is contextualized.  
Examples include leaving the book in a hotel room drawer or requesting to swear an oath over it. 
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they are older than the memrot or not, it is not inward toward the text that the narrative 
possesses an ancient feel.  It is outward toward the readers who are exposed to a more 
complete and robust BT, years and centuries after both the sages and the narrators 
operated.  The ancientness is not one relative to the other elements within the text, but 
relative to anything that is not necessarily ‘ancient’ outside of the text.  It is to those 
readers who come along years and centuries later that the anonymity of the text produces 
a feeling of ancientness.  Anonymity is only possible at a time when the names of those 
who crafted the text had already been forgotten, as is the case with the Bible.  This 
elapsed time was enough to generate a feeling of ancientness for the BT.  The anonymous 
elements are not necessarily authoritative within the text because they are intrinsically 
authoritative as a narrative.  They are authoritative to the extent that they are in control of 
the attributed elements.  This results from their functioning in the text as a later 
production, perceived or real.  Yet, in the perception of the text as a whole to the later 
readers who are exposed to the more complete BT, the anonymity of the narrative is what 
offers the entirety of the project the necessary degree of ancientness that also comes with 
the potential for an infusion of authority. 
 
 The notion of anonymity yielding authority aptly fits in with the anonymity of the 
BT’s narrative.  By not associating with any one sage or rabbinic institution, the 
Stammaitic elements of the BT operate ‘above the fray.’  Further, the anonymity of the 
Stammaitic elements lends them a greater authority than the actual attributed halachic 
positions.  While a specific halachic position can be dismissed by the Stammaitic 
elements, there is no arbiter in the text to dismiss the Stammaitic elements.  This is 
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somewhat exemplified by the manner in which commentators (and even modern readers) 
discuss the BT: “the gemara says…”  The fact alone that the BT says something infuses 
that something with authority.  While its authors may not have intended to project a 
divine quality from the text, later readers did ascribe such a divinity to it.  The perceived 
quality of divinity evolves, and is attached to the text over a period of years and centuries.  
The BT is the kind of text capable of acquiring such a quality in a way most texts, ancient 
or not, are unable.  To the traditional student of the BT, there is no question that the BT is 
a divinely inspired text.  This divinity is the authority of the BT. 
 
Anonymity as Narrative 
In the BT, anonymity ultimately allows for the narration, which is often a 
commentary, to be integrated into the existing texts.  This is especially the case where the 
anonymous elements seek to cloak themselves in the language of the text they are dealing 
with; as if there is no authorship and only attributed sources to traditions.  While it comes 
off as narration, it is also a form of interpretation.  This is true for any type of working or 
re-working of a text.  The idea that anonymous editors can serve as interpreters has even 
been argued with respect to the Bible.  “The anonymous, transdenominational scholars 
who flourished working from 300 BCE to 200 BCE, who Kugel called the ‘early 
interpreters,’ truly created the Bible.  Kugel admits that the evolutionary chain of 
interpreting the Bible began in the Bible itself, and admits that selected biblical texts go 
back to 100 BCE, if not further.”17  This phenomenon is apparent in the Midrash, where 
                                                
17 Alan Levenson, The Making of the Modern Jewish Bible: How Scholars in Germany, Israel and America 
Transformed an Ancient Text, 203. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). See James L. 
Kugel and Rowan A. Greer, Early Biblical Interpretation (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 17-19.  
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the stories are delivered as definitively more full descriptions of biblical tales.18  This is 
also seen in the Hong lou Meng, where the original text and the emendations meld into a 
unified work of literature whose layers are not meant to be felt by the reader. 
 
In a scribal culture, the scribe who is merely a transmitter of manuscripts may feel 
that an emendation is in order, or some sort of commentary is necessary in order to 
elucidate the text.  When the scribe passes on the manuscript, the next generation scribe 
may not be able to discern between the actual text received by the first scribe and the 
emendations made by him.  As far as reading law into the narrative, later halachic 
authorities read the shaqla v’tarya and the traditions and sources it transmits as the same.  
It can be said that the shaqla v’tarya had become sacralized and was perceived as 
authoritative to the same degree as the sources and traditions it was transmitting; a theo-
politics of reality so to speak.  Because of the narrative’s anonymity and the way it 
distances itself from any one particular sage, it possesses an authority separate from those 
sages.  In time, the narrative also absorbs the authority it ascribes to the sages within it.  
As discussed, often people speak of the gemara and not the sages.  The narrator and the 
narrated ultimately become one.   
 
This oneness that emerges in the BT allows for later readers and students of the 
text to include the BT as part of their overall narrative of halacha.  For example, a 
commentator such as Rashi discusses the Stammaitic elements with the same reverence 
                                                
18 It needs to be mentioned in this context that in the Midrash, despite the existence of attribution, the 
phenomenon is quite similar.  Similarly, the Hekhalot texts, whose authorship is unknown (and parts of 
which appear almost verbatim in the BT), there exist attribution but lost to us are the attributors.  While 
Rabbi Ishmael is the clear protagonist and person to whom the stories are attributed, scholars have been 
unable to determine the authorship, and the dating of the text is also in dispute.   
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with which he discusses attributed traditions.  Within the BT, it is the anonymity of the 
narrative that affords it the ability to offer a ‘complete’ picture of the evolution of this or 
that tradition.  The absence of any attribution to the Stammaitic elements is what makes it 
possible for the reader to assume that they are getting the ‘complete’ story, so to speak.  
If we were to know that a specific sugya was crafted by, say, Abaye or Rava, it would 
impact how we read the sugya.  A narrator is de facto anonymous with respect to the 
situation he is narrating; the exception is where the narrator places himself in the story or 
is somehow otherwise narrating from within the situation, in which case he is not a pure 
narrator and is part of the story.19  One cannot effectively narrate a ‘complete’ picture of 
oneself.  Anonymity can also be achieved by adopting a “variety of literary and anecdotal 
devices by means of which the authorial voice was transposed to situations or substituted 
by characters which had their own raison d’etre.”20  In the BT this is achieved through 
the shaqla v’tarya and in a different way by the manner in which unknown voices are 
framed, such as ‘ta shma” and “amar mar.” 
 
Anonymity as Corporative 
 Anonymity affords a text the opportunity to act as a representative of the society 
or organization the anonymous author(s) purport to represent.21  As early as 1862, in an 
article published anonymously in the British Medical Journal, the idea is presented that 
                                                
19 For example, if we didn’t know that Mark Twain/Samuel Clemens was the author of The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn, the text would give us no clue, as opposed to a story written from a first person 
perspective where at some point the name of the author is betrayed.  And even then, this name could simply 
be invented.   
 
20 Wrigley, “Censorship and Anonymity,” 17-28.  
 
21 Kronick, “Anonymity and Identity,” 222-224.  
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an editor of a journal “is by theory the impersonation of the honor and dignity of the class 
which he represents” and “speaks as the mouthpiece of a collective body.”22  Similarly, in 
the BT, transmitters of traditions and sources who left their own names off the 
transmission – and who were then themselves retransmitted without attribution – were 
speaking on behalf of the institution that was the sage whose tradition they were 
conveying.  Institutional anonymity is a phenomenon which appears in early scientific 
journals where the weight of the journal far exceeds the authority of the individual.23  
Interestingly, Haym Soloveitchik makes a similar point regarding the authority – or lack 
thereof – infused into the tractates of the Talmud copied and transmitted by Rabbi 
Gershom, a noted tenth century Talmudist.  It is the text that possesses intrinsic authority 
and not the transmitter (or scribe) that infuses authority into it.  Specifically, he states that 
the works copied by Gershom “had canonical authority is Ashkenaz on their intrinsic 
merit, not because of the prestige of their scribe.”24 
 
On a literary level, one can argue that anonymity creates the illusion of “an 
omniscient corporate authority.”25  The treatment of the Bible by Tannaitic authorities, 
and later the Mishna by Amoraic authorities, demonstrate this type of treatment in other 
                                                
22 H. Dayman, “The Anonymous in Journalism,” British Medical Journal vol. 1 issue 61(1862). 
 
23 William Hargreaves, Is the anonymous system a security for the purity and independence of the press?:  
a question for the Times newspaper, (William Ridgway, 1864).  
 
24 Haym Soloveitchik, “Halakhah, Hermeneutics, and Martyrdom in Medieval Ashkenaz (Part II of II),” 
The Jewish Quarterly Review New Series, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Spring 2004), 281.  It is worth noting that 
Soloveitchik here and elsewhere ignores the possibility of personal-agenda driven motives on the part of a 
scribe, anonymous or not, when choosing which text to transmit and how.  In this case, Soloveitchik 
acknowledges that Gershom recorded only some, and not all, of the tractates of the BT.  While there is no 
way to speculate as to why this tractate is copied and that one is not, it is reasonable to assume that it is not 
always random. 
 
25  Rachel Sagner Buurma, “Anonymity, Corporate Authority, and the Archive: The Production of 
Authorship in Late-Victorian England,” Victorian Studies 50, 1  (2007). 
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contexts.  The text itself, however, can still read like a single narrated work if the final 
editing and glossing follow consistent rules.  Readers will ultimately come to refer to the 
text by some name, and in a way will give a face to the faceless.26  This is the case with 
the Hong lou Meng.  When speaking of it, students of the novel would speak in terms 
such as “the Hong lou Meng says…”27  Similarly, students of the BT throughout the 
centuries have given such a face to the faceless: “the gemara says.”  Ironically, 
contemporary scholars for decades referred to the final anonymous layer in the BT as the 
‘Stam,’ singular, masculine and in the third person: “What is the Stam attempting…”  
‘Stammaim’ has now fallen into broad use among scholars, thus acknowledging that the 
redaction of the BT was not the work of a single person (or even institution).  In many 
ways, when using the word ‘Stam,’ scholars engaging in the art of attribution to what 
Tucker refers to as an imagined source.28 
 
Corporate anonymity is a practice “that metaphorically produces both the book 
and the author whose name is attached.”29  In the case of the BT, it is the narrator who 
produces the work and potentially some of the sources in whose name traditions are 
attributed.  While we cannot know in any certain terms, the authors and narrators of the 
BT had available to them a plethora of traditions and sources to whom to attribute those 
traditions.  Part of their text is a reflection of a selection process.  This selection may also 
                                                
 
26 Buurma, “Corporate Authority,” 37. 
 
27 Hann Saussy, “The Age of Attribution: Or, How the ‘Honglou meng’ Finally Acquired an Author,” 
Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews (CLEAR) 25 (Dec. 2003). 
 
28 Herbert Tucker, “Introduction” to New Literary History 32.2 (Spring 2002). 
 
29 Buurma, “Corporate Authority,” 25. 
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have included an effort to consolidate opinions and unify the the multitude of opinions 
into a more unified voice.  In describing the French salon, Richard Wrigley states that the 
number of critics involved created a “cacophony of opinion.”30  Before moving forward, 
it is worth unpacking the notion of a ‘cacophony of opinion’ as it is relevant to the BT.  
An effective manner of conveying this is by imagining ten rooms, where each room 
contains 50 individuals; further, all 500 individuals care about one single matter.  That 
matter is whether or not they should speak.  In the first room, nobody says a word, and in 
the tenth room 25 individuals argue loudly that they should speak, and 25 do the same 
advocating for silence.  For clarity, one can imagine the first room as absolutely silent; 
the second room has one individual speaking, advocating for people to speak.  In the third 
room there are two people speaking: the advocate for speech and the dissenter.  And so 
on.  The tenth room is the space where no opinion can be heard, and if one were to enter 
only the tenth room, they would not know what the issue even is.  They would be 
exposed to a ‘cacophony of opinion’ where all opinions and ideas blur into an 
indiscernible noise.  Our primary concern is the tenth room where the cacophony exists; I 
mention the first ten rooms in the analogy in order to point out the manner in which 
positions on the law – and in our case Jewish law or halacha – can commence with a 
single unanimous voice, and evolve into the cacophony described in the tenth room. 
 
Out of this cacophony, anonymity is the ideal mechanism through which the 
voices as a collective can be understood.  It is the anonymous voice – the anonymous 
narrator who is not in the story, who is merely narrating the ‘facts’ – that is somehow 
                                                
 
30 Wrigley, “Censorship and Anonymity,” 23. 
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empowered to fashion the noise into a discernible set of opinions.  In some instances, this 
process must involve the omission of certain opinions.  The irony of the deployment of 
anonymity in this context of the cacophony of voices is that it both defines the cacophony 
and ultimately operates as its solution and simplifier.  It is neutral.  Again, imagining 
oneself in the tenth room where all there is to hear is the loud hum of 50 voices speaking 
(and presumably not listening), one also cannot put a name to that hum; that noise is 
anonymity.  As one who wishes to actually understand what is happening in the tenth 
room, one must approach each individual, and listen specifically to what they are saying.  
After hearing the positions of all 50 individuals, the narrator can transmit those opinions, 
and is best served doing so anonymously in order to avoid the appearance of having this 
or that agenda.  He is also best served mentioning specific and influential critics by name 
in order to advance the narrative and its conclusions. 
 
The idea of the French salon was that all those operating therein were entitled to 
an opinion on the art within their purview.  And everyone had an opinion, to the extent 
that all the voices merged into the type of cacophony described above.  Nevertheless, at a 
certain point, the salon itself becomes a single voice reflecting its many individual 
voices.31  There is a discernible voice and message, but no individual name can be 
attached to either.  While in the salon, the cacophony was both real and reflected in the 
various texts of the day, in the BT we have just the texts and not the history.  Whether 
invented or ‘honestly’ received and transmitted, the narrative in the BT seems eager to 
                                                
31 Realistically, only a limited number of artists can succeed and receive the ‘seal of approval’ from the 
salon.  While a majority of salon participants may contribute to the rise a specific artist, it is also possible 
that individual voice within the salon were stronger and influenced what the ultimate “voice of the salon” 
would be. 
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present a similar cacophony of opinion.  The result in the BT is a range of potential 
halachic options available to a future rabbinic adjudicator, with the range of options 
dictated by the Stam. 
 
Anonymity as Representative 
When dealing with journals or other forms of institutional anonymity, the editors 
give the impression that they, “despite their multi-authorship and distinct fragmentation, 
present themselves as a whole.”32  The authoritative Encyclopedie defined itself as 
having been produced “par une societe de gens letters” (by a society of men of letters).  
During the early print era, the publishers of the journals often possessed greater 
prominence than professional writers; it was their name which appeared on the title 
page.33  While the BT doesn’t generally define itself in any terms, certainly those who 
read it traditionally34 see it as having been produced by men of stature and authority.  The 
BT is quite similar to the journal in being an amalgam of authoritative voices presented 
as a unified whole.  Where in defining the cacophony of voices the impression is that 
there is a loud, dissonant sort of noise, we can think of such a multitude of voices as a 
choir when found in a venue such as a journal, where multiple voices are presented.  If all 
the voices are centrally organized and controlled by an anonymous conductor with no 
participatory voice of his/her own, they can coalesce into a larger harmonious single 
voice; one with no single name attached thereto.  While each individual voice on its own 
                                                
 
32 Laurel Brake, Print in Transition, 1850-1910: Studies in Media and Book History (New York: Palgrave, 
2001). 
 
33 Rogers, “Uses of Anonymity,” 242. 
 
34 By ‘traditionally’ I mean those who read it as authoritative and from within the tradition.  More 
specifically, those who see at least an element of divinity therein. 
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may not be discernible, the organized and selected assemblage of voices conveys a single 
institutional message.  In his Introduction to the New Literary History: Anonymity, a 
volume containing several articles on anonymity, Herbert Tucker moves the idea of 
institutional anonymity one step further to representing not only the journal but 
potentially everyone: “Most texts, written as well as oral come, if not out of nowhere, 
then certainly from nobody, which is to say that cultural everybody we dub anon.”35  
Quite simply, ‘anonymity = everybody.’ 
 
Thinking of anonymity in this way – that ‘anonymity = everybody’ – allows us to 
plug two new variables into the equation:  ‘anonymity/x = everybody/y’.  Phrased as a 
word problem, an example could be: ‘Does the Bible’s anonymity cause it to belong to 
everybody from the Episcopal Church?’  Accepting that Homer is nothing more than a 
name, and that attributing the Iliad to a historical figure named Homer is quite a dubious 
assertion, we can also plug Homer into the equation similarly: ‘Does the anonymity of 
Homer cause it to belong to everybody of 5th century Athens?’  While I have set it up in 
binary terms in order to parallel more closely the equation as it is, we can be more 
nuanced and discuss the degrees to which such texts might ‘belong to everybody;’ 
meaning everybody who received it in 5th century Athens.  The Bible and Homer are 
texts that did – and still do – belong to everybody.  Everybody is free to quote, 
manipulate, interpolate, and even rewrite them.  The myths contained within those works, 
one can argue, do in fact belong to everybody.  The author of the text – even if he were 
known – would be of no consequence to how the text is read.  It is read as an anonymous 
text in the sense that it belongs to everybody.  To be clear, just as there is no evidence for 
                                                
35 Tucker, “Introduction,” iv. 
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a Homer, there is no evidence for a divine being who crafted or to a lesser extent inspired 
the Bible or parts thereof. 
 
Another facet of corporate anonymity is the space it creates for censorship.  Let us 
first look at academic and scientific journals of the last several centuries.  In the earliest 
times, anonymity was the norm for contributors of scientific journals.  The editors of a 
journal selected articles for inclusion, and in the process, de facto, were censoring others.  
Such censorship was accepted because of the authority and, partly, the institutional 
anonymity of the journal.  There was not a person censoring, but something larger – more 
authoritative – than an individual person, such as ‘science’ or ‘medicine’ or the like; 
something so beyond the individual that it could not possess the name of any specific 
individual. 
 
Pseudonymity and fictitious authorship are also discussed by Griffin as part of the 
broader discussion on anonymity.36  In the BT there are instances where the attribution of 
a position is clearly incorrect, and even later authorities will point this out in their 
commentaries.  Some have even argued that certain rabbinic authorities in the BT often 
are the subject of incorrect attribution; but their authority is great enough that there is a 
payoff in this fictitious attribution.  This allows for a “relation of filiation,” per Foucault, 
even where the author is not real. 
 
                                                
36 Griffin, Faces of Anonymity, 880. 
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Griffin goes a step further and suggests that filiation can exist even where the 
author remains unknown.37  He discusses this in terms of books which were anonymous 
to the extent that the cover page of the book attributes the work as being written “by the 
author of…”  The way the BT is set up, and especially the manner in which it is 
juxtaposed to the Mishna, the notion of “by the author of…” applies to each sugya as it 
relates to any other sugya; meaning that different sugyot could have been crafted by a 
different author or set of authors, and that traditional authorial attribution a la the 19th 
century novel is not applicable to the BT and the sugyot therein.  In its final form, the BT 
appears as though it is to be treated as a unified whole, and the narrative is constructed in 
this way; it is constructed so that one would be hard pressed to begin to offer a 
documentary-type hypothesis for what is known as the ‘Stam;’ isolating different voices 
within the text based upon linguistic and grammatical cues.  Is it a stretch to suggest that 
the anonymous redactors are purposefully manipulating sources in order to promote one 
tradition over another?38  Only recent modern scholarship of the BT has begun to look at 
the BT in this way.39  Essentially, it is not any one particular sugya or halachic position 
                                                
 
37 Griffin, Faces of Anonymity, 882. 
38 Aside from Jacob Neusner and his students, this type of questioning has taken time to penetrate the 
academic study of Talmud.  While far beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation, there are many 
explanations for why modern scholars of the Talmud would shy away from such queries.  The most 
obvious one is the fact that the field of Talmud study in the academy was set up with linguistic prowess as 
critical for entry into the circle of modern Talmud scholars.  The effect was the virtual elimination of 
potential scholars with no background in Talmud study; background in Talmud study can easily be read as 
code for ‘religious, Jewish and respectful of basic assumptions of traditional (i.e. Yeshiva) students of the 
BT.’  David Halivni, despite the progress he made in his analysis of the BT, assumes that unless we can 
somehow demonstrate it through the Sugya itself, that we must assume that attribution in the BT is correct 
because “they had no reason to create false attributions.” See David Halivni, mev’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot 
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2009), 4 and 111.  
 
39 See Jacob Neusner, The Bavli’s One Voice: Types and Forms of Analytical Discourse and their Fixed 
Order of Appearance. (Atlanta: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. 1991).   
  118 
that possesses the supreme authority conveyed by the text as a whole, it is the collective 
of all the sugyot and the positions contained therein that creates that authority. 
 
 
The Hong lou Meng 
 The Hong lou Meng is a text whose authorship was unknown for over two 
centuries.  Eventually, in the early part of the 20th century, it became known that Cao 
Xueqin, one of the compilers of the text, was in fact the primary author of the work.  
There is a school of thought that does not accept this attribution to Cao Xuequin, but this 
does not diminish the value of an analysis of those who do, as that position is the more 
accepted one.  Prior to the novel being attributed to Cao Xueqin, he himself was 
described as someone who “compiled… added to and trimmed” the text of the novel.40  
This has allowed scholars to examine the difference between how the text was read and 
perceived both prior to the discovery of the author, when the text was still anonymous, 
and also afterwards.  While Cao Xueqin is now known to be the author of the novel, later 
commentaries pre-dating the discovery of Cao Xueqin’s authorship did not just comment 
but also put their pens to the text itself, and had some leeway in making emendations and 
adjustments to the text.  Thus, before Cao Xueqin was identified as the author of the 
Hong lou Meng, the text itself made no secret that the text was not ‘closed’ and that 
interpolations and commentary were acceptable.  This relates to the notion of weaving 
such interpolations into the existing novel in a style so as not to be recognized as such.41  
                                                
40 Saussy, “The Age of Attribution,” 119.  
 
41 This also true of the Bible and the Zohar as well as other Jewish texts.  The goal here is to relate this to 
the narrative in the BT. 
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We can therefore look to the Hong lou Meng as a text that can inform our reading of the 
BT in two ways: (a) as an anonymous work, including the impact that anonymity has on 
the readers of a text before and after attribution is determined, and (b) as a text that 
allowed for interpolations and emendations but where such activity was limited both in 
the nature of changes allowed and the nature of the person who could engage the text in 
such a manner.  It is important to note that while anonymity is a factor in finding meaning 
in the text, and a significant one, it is not the only one. 
 
 In terms of the open nature of the Hong lou Meng, Saussy is informative in 
describing a “circle of intimates who each added their touches to the novelist’s ongoing 
project.”42  The novel was known to many, but few had license to impact the text and to 
adjudicate acceptable from unacceptable emendations.  The Hong lou Meng itself offers 
an idea of what type of person can engage in such activity when it comments that “now 
and again comes an observant reader who can tell the difference [between] the hidden 
side of the book [and the] apparent side.”43  This is also a clear allusion to the idea that 
the text possesses some inner meaning, and that each word could possess value in such a 
way that a reader can manipulate the plain meaning of the text in exchange for something 
‘hidden.’  The novel itself states that there is not “a line of redundant writing” in the 
text.44  “The novel becomes the property of its readers, in the sense that they are its 
discoverers and can claim finder’s rights.”45  And to the observant reader are available “a 
                                                
42 Saussy, “The Age of Attribution,”121. 
 
43 Hong lou Meng, Chapter 12.  This is akin to a scribal culture. 
 
44 Saussy, “The Age of Attribution,” 124. 
 
45 Saussy,“The Age of Attribution,” 125. 
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million undiscovered meanings [that] are scattered throughout it.” 46   Thus, the 
emendations and interpolations are not to be perceived as such, and are not even to be 
looked for, but are rather part of the text itself; the incorporation of hidden meaning into 
the actual surface of the text is a legitimate activity.  Similarly, the incorporation of the 
hidden meaning of the legal elements of the Bible into the Mishna, the BT, and even later 
rabbinic authorities is, to the traditional reader of these texts, a true and legitimate 
incorporation of hidden aspects of the Bible into halacha.47  While the texts of the Bible 
and the Mishna were not open to change or emendation on the part of the Amoraic and 
post-Amoraic authors and editors of the BT, the sugyot of the BT itself were still a work 
in progress for them.  Like the Hong lou Meng, there was a period of time when the text 
was still more fluid and open to changes.  Further, just as the Hong lou Meng is no longer 
open to such emendations, so too did the BT become closed to emendations at a certain 
point.  What made such emendation possible was the anonymity of the texts, and the idea 
that the text was categorically not associated with any one particular author or sage. 
 
 In contrast to promoting the notion that numerous interpretive possibilities are 
available and might be the only way to read the text, especially for the ‘initiated,’ Hu Shi, 
in an inter-linear commentary on the Hong lou Meng, is interested in showing “how 
subjective, arbitrary, unsteady, and profitless these forced interpretations are.”  He goes 
on, “now I want to announce to all those who love to read the Honglou Meng, ‘if we 
really want to understand the Honglou Meng, we must first destroy all the forced 
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allegorizing of Honglou Meng riddle lore.”  Hu Shi goes further in sounding much like a 
critical reader of an ‘ancient’ text: “All we need to do is to base ourselves on reliable 
editions and reliable information, to determine who exactly is the author of this book, to 
uncover the history of the author and his circle with the time in which the book was 
composed and investigate the various editions and publishers of the work.”  He finishes 
by defining the above questions – and not what he perceived to be overly interpolative 
readings of the novel – as making up “the proper sphere of Honglou Meng research.”48  
Much of Hu Shi’s approach to commentary has parallels in how modern scholars read the 
BT, and their perspective on BT commentaries that are more forceful in their 
interpretation of the text.  Even the BT, and to a larger extent the Mishna before it, 
allowed for flexible readings of the Bible; this is highlighted by literal readers of the 
Bible, such as the Samaritans and Karaites, who were also critical of the highly 
interpretive style of rabbinic authorities.  Like the Samaritans, Tannaitic, Amoraic, and 
later rabbinic authorities see halacha as a form of natural law when in fact, quite similarly 
to the Hong lou Meng, it is quite positivist in its inclination.  While the Hong lou Meng 
makes little effort to appear positivist, which is hardly the agenda of literature (as 
opposed to law), it does operate with this positivist inclination while at the same time it 
discusses those with the power to interpolate as possessing some sort of natural gift with 
respect to an ability to understand hidden meanings. 
 
 Exploring the anonymity of the novel in its earlier phases does not minimize the 
authorship of Cao Xueqin, nor its impact.  Per Saussy: “I am not proposing that we 
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should forget all we have learned about Cao Xueqin, only that we not lose sight of the 
quite different textual horizon that obtained before his discovery.”49  In a time after 
attributions are acknowledged, and at which attribution is no longer weaved into the 
narrative (i.e. the Stam), the degree to which anonymity was needed becomes more 
concrete.  Because of political, nationalist, and other factors affecting the situation, 
Saussy argues that the 19th century was more in need of anonymity that the 20th century.  
Saussy sums up his discussion by asserting that “neither authorship nor anonymity goes 
without explanation as a fact in the life of texts; both conditions participate in a larger 
story about how texts become meaningful to their audiences.”50  Thus, in the 19th century, 
as the text was still acquiring necessary meaning among its readers and still ‘striving’ for 
a canonical form, anonymity served the text in that it left the text more open to 
emendations and interpolations, as opposed to extra-textual commentary.  This resonates 
with students of the BT.  The manner in which anonymity and its absence impact the 
reading of a text is evidenced in the Hong lou Meng.  Like Hong lou Meng scholars 
predating attribution, BT scholars read the text as an anonymous compiled work which, 
for a time, was a work in progress and open to manipulation.  
 
The Printing Age: Anonymity and Attribution 
 I have selected the early printing age as a focus for this chapter because of the 
extensive work on anonymity (relative to work done on anonymity in general) completed 
by Marcy North.  She sums up much of the essence of her project in the following 
statement: “one must assume that anonymity had some power even if it was imposed on 
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attribution ‘after the fact’ or set side by side with attribution.”51  The manipulation of a 
text, whether by means of anonymity or otherwise, is reflective of a certain power and 
therefore also some degree of authority over the text, and in the case of the BT, the laws 
it conveys.  Our interest is obviously the attributes of anonymity.  North successfully 
extrapolated broad attributes of anonymity and its deployment from the Early Modern 
English texts she examined.  The easiest way to convey her conclusions is to list them 
sequentially.  The degree of relevance to the study of the BT in some cases will require 
little, if any discussion. 
• The potential for the manipulation of anonymity is an outcome of the invention of 
the printing press.  While the printing press could (should) have caused 
anonymity to go out of use, it actually gave anonymity a new life outside the 
ancient world of the quiet scribes.52  Conversely, authorial attribution took time to 
settle in as something necessary or even common.53  In a way, the printing press 
created the environment within which anonymity was ‘discovered,’ and once 
discovered, also manipulated.  Specifically, the printing press allowed for a much 
broader range of texts to be mass-published.  This allowed for financial gain to 
exist for both the publisher and author, thus creating an environment where 
authorial attribution had a real value; this also put into starker relief a text 
published anonymously.  Much of what is listed below relates in some way to the 
manipulation of anonymity and its exploration; nonetheless, I would like to 
highlight upfront the simple idea that anonymity can be a form of manipulation, 
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and phrased in a milder way, can cause the manipulation of how a text and its 
attribution are accepted by later readers.  In relating this to the BT, we need to 
move a step beyond what North accomplishes in determining the manipulative 
effects as being the result of the printing press, and to see if these effects apply in 
cases pre-dating the printing press.  It is not in the scope of North’s project to 
address this matter, but she has left the door open for us to do so. 
• When the printing press was invented it did not in any way immediately 
disassemble the existing scribal culture.  If anything, the scribal culture may have 
reinforced itself and adjusted its own traditions in the face of the threat posed by 
the printing press.  Further, scribal traditions, and specifically scribal traditions 
operating anonymously, retained much of their force during the early printing age.  
In reacting to Elizabeth Eisenstein, who demonstrates that there isn’t a strict 
dividing line delineating before and after print, North states that “although 
Eisenstein does not discuss anonymity in this context, her work suggests that 
author anonymity… of the scribal culture might have been disseminated in the 
16th century along with the book and ideas from the scribal period.”  Essentially, 
North is taking Eisenstein one step further by suggesting that the anonymity of the 
early printing age is a relic of scribal cultures which controlled the production of 
texts until that time. 
• There existed resentment, both weak and strong, toward authorial attribution.  In 
describing the coterie of writers, North asserts that “they pretended to disdain 
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print because of its connections with industry.”54  Hence they demurred from 
putting their names to their projects. 
• Anonymity served “many book writers and book producers [who] held on to and 
cultivated anonymity as a tool that could help them negotiate their own complex 
environments.” 55   As anonymous operators, they did not have to concern 
themselves, nor their texts, with how the reader might read their texts in the way 
they would have had to if they had had to consider the authors’ backgrounds and 
potential personal agendas.  As North notes herself, this echoes the work of 
Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault, who contend that the author-function is in 
its essence an anonymous one; hence they can articulate a position defining the 
‘death of the author.’56  Specifically, knowledge of the author muddles the 
reader’s ability to process the text, as once the text is created, it no longer belongs 
to the author.57  Because of the speed with which the BT becomes accepted and 
canonical (less than two centuries), there is clearly no need for attribution in the 
author function of the shaqla v’tarya.  The goal of its authors was broad 
acceptance and that was definitively achieved.  The reader did not care or need for 
the shaqla v’tarya to be attributed.  I argue that the lack of any significant attempt 
at attributing the shaqla v’tarya to an author or a group of redactors demonstrates 
the value of anonymity within that function for the BT as a literary work, legal or 
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otherwise.  At the time of its ‘publication’ the text must have been connected in 
some way with one authority or another – as is discussed below – but the 
attribution was lost over time.  At that time – presumably at or close to its initial 
recording and transmission – authority associated with an institution or an 
individual was required before the text could be read as purely anonymous and 
still authoritative.  Before this time, the transmitter (or scribes) who preserved 
sources and their traditions must be perceived as both reliable and authoritative.  
North suggests that “it is common to find publications that are anonymous for one 
audience but not for another.58  To readers of the BT since Maimonides, and 
possibly earlier, the text is anonymous – there is no name or institution associated 
with its publication.  In its time however, while it was actually still in production, 
the provenance of the authority of the positions contained within the BT was 
known because for that audience such an association was still required.  It is 
difficult to imagine a situation where those who recorded the positions of the 
Amoraim – and later those individuals who weaved them together in the shaqla 
v’tarya as part of their transmission – were working in secret and preserved their 
anonymity.  The transmitters (scribes) preserved their own anonymity as well as 
that of transmitters who preceded them, but not of the actual source associated 
with a specific tradition.  An example of this is the manner in which the Stam 
does not tell us who was (were) the metzaref (metzarfim). 
• During the early printing age, achieving anonymity is not the work of any specific 
individual.  Printers, compilers, and authors all play a role in the construction of 
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attribution.59  For example, an author can try to opt for anonymity, only to be 
betrayed by the printer; or an author can attach his name to a text, only to have a 
later compiler quote him without attribution.  North discusses the possibility of a 
publisher reestablishing anonymity.60  In the BT, instances where attribution is 
reestablished are clear when conflicting halachic positions are attributed to the 
same rabbinic authority; later compilers within the BT then need to go out of their 
way to reconcile this tension.61  This is often the function of the shaqla v’tarya.  
Its authors operated not only as compilers/transmitters in the tradition of the first 
or second generation Amoraim, but as heavy-handed redactors who had great 
leeway in how traditions were conveyed and attributed to sources.  In describing 
authors, printers, and publishers during the early printing age, North allows that 
“in [creating journals or other publications], they participated in the authoring of 
texts, an act which was more dependent on a group of producers than modern 
ideas of authorship allow.” 62   In a scribal period authoring, printing, and 
‘publishing’ (to the extent such a thing is similar to its modern equivalent) are all 
controlled by the same group of scribes operating within a tradition.  This is true 
of the transmitters of the traditions which ultimately comprise the BT.  The 
crafters of the Stammaitic elements, the shaqla v’tarya, can be said to parallel all 
three functions, since in the pre-printing age printers and publishers did not yet 
exist in any real sense.  Publication in a scribal culture means that a text will be 
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written and then preserved.  In the ‘oral’ culture of the BT, publication is scribal 
in the sense that a qualified group (Halivni’s tannaim) 63  would make a 
determination that a tradition and its source were worth recording – only that they 
were recorded orally.64  In many ways an ‘oral publication’ requires much more 
on the part of the community of transmitters, since texts must be memorized. 
• In setting up the category of institutional anonymity, North successfully 
demonstrates how the authority of an institution closely tied with a specific 
individual can produce a work that operates anonymously to the extent that it 
behaves anonymously even if the authority behind the publication is well known.  
“Anonymity marks texts composed over time through a command process of text 
production or texts claimed by an institution but not by an individual member of 
that institution.”65  In her discussion of King James I and his anonymous response 
to the Papal condemnation of his proposed oath of allegiance to the King of 
England, who obviously was King James I himself, North points out that even 
while authored by a ‘loyal subject,’ it still bore the royal coat of arms;66 it still 
carried the authority of the royal palace.  Ironically, North almost goes as far as 
categorizing royal authorship as something that is inherently institutional in its 
behavior and the anonymity of its authors: “Anonymity already seems to be an 
important part of the definition of royal authorship, for the collaborators behind a 
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royal document often went unacknowledged.”67  Attribution of the document is to 
the king, and its authority stems from his authority; the coat of arms is the 
identifying symbol.  In the BT, it is not known to the modern reader what 
constituted “the royal coat of arms” in terms of identifying the author of the 
shaqla v’tarya of any given sugya.  The authors seem to want the reader to 
believe that there is a divine element to their authority, thus further moving the 
perception of the law from a positivist one to a naturalist one.  At the time of its 
‘publication’ as a comprehensive BT, the provenance of the sugyot comprised 
therein were still known to the reader of that time.  Those contemporary with the 
Stam probably knew which schools preserved which traditions as well as the 
sources associated with them, since each school possessed its own transmitters 
and therefore a library specific to that school.  Further, their authority was in some 
way related to that provenance.  The provenance was most likely rooted in the 
institutions associated with prominent Amoraim of the 6th generation.  It is 
difficult to imagine the redaction taking place separately from the authorities to 
whom traditions are attributed and at the same time that they were still active.  
This is highlighted by traditions where two or more attributions are suggested.68  
We can deduce that the sugyot were published more institutionally (even an 
institution as a basic scribal institution), and thus a ‘pure’ name was never 
associated with them, and the manner in which they were composed further 
conceals any authorship.  Unlike James, the redactors of the BT did not apologize 
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for their anonymity,69 and the anonymity became part of the text and how it is 
read. 
• There exist degrees of anonymity, and anonymity “need not be absolute to serve a 
purpose.”70  Pseudonymity is a most blatant example, in which case the reader can 
at least have a relative sense of the author when the author has produced works 
under the same pseudonym.  Where authorship is truly ambiguous, the reader 
might still be left wondering who wrote the text and he might even be asking 
himself ‘why.’  Thus the BT avoids this problem by associating traditions with 
specific sources, but not by associating transmission with specific sources.  As I 
discuss in the context of my analysis of sugyot and of the phrase v’la pligi, while 
we know that, for example, Rav took this or that position on an issue, the BT does 
not offer to us the name of (or any information about) who transmitted the source 
and tradition. 
• When an author of rank concealed himself under the cloak of anonymity, he did 
so in order to distance his textual position from his rank; a position accepted on its 
merit, the reasoning goes, is of greater value than one accepted merely because of 
its inherent authority.  In the case of King James I, he used anonymity because it 
was a convention which allowed one “to see the text as part of a theological 
conversation in which author’s logic could be as persuasive as his social 
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standing.”71  This echoes the BT with respect to the place svara holds within its 
value structure. 
• When operating anonymously, an author is free to speak in any voice and from 
any perspective.  One is even free to speak about oneself in the third position from 
the perspective of another person; this is precisely what James was doing when 
“he created a speaker who could scrutinize the Oath from the position of someone 
who might take it.”72  Beyond just speaking of himself in the third person, there is 
a royal voice which James needed to avoid when crafting language for the ‘loyal 
subject.’  This is evidenced by the emendations made to the text by James after he 
took authorial responsibility for the text.  Not only did he change pronouns, he 
“creatively reworked the meaning to accommodate his royal voice.”73  In the BT, 
the authors of the shaqla v’tarya were speaking in a voice that was not the voice 
of a halachic authority, but rather the voice of a transmitter of traditions and their 
sources.  While they may have been acting in two capacities – as transmitter and 
as a source to whom a tradition is attributed – they use a very consistent neutral 
voice when crafting the Stammaitic elements and putting together the shaqla 
v’tarya.  The neutrality of the transmitter or scribe is reflected in the shaqla 
v’tarya.  The narrative makes an effort to be seen as merely transmitting rather 
than actually legislating.  When a transmitter was actually transmitting his own 
position in the third person, he was similar to King James in that he had to find a 
voice which neutralized the fact that the halachic position being transmitted was 
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actually vested in a position because it was his own.  James realized that the 
authority of a king is of no use when trying to convince someone to accept the 
idea – without force – that an oath to the king is a good idea.  James was 
specifically “not using his authority” as a king; he was speaking specifically in 
another voice.  The authority of the king was actually a limiting factor for 
James.74  “James seeks in anonymity a kind of ideal authority, one without 
limitations or compromise.”75  The BT transmitters who created the shaqla 
v’tarya were specifically not putting their authority into the language of the BT, 
and instead limited their use of any personal halachic authority and relied more on 
a scribal authority.  If it was worth recording by a transmitter or scribe or scribal 
school, then it possessed some intrinsic value.  If, as Halivni has suggested, Rav 
Pappa’s school and his students were major players in the formation of the 
Stam,76 why not say so and come clean about it?  It is because then the authority 
and subsequently the legal tradition would be limited to Rav Pappa and his school 
and not ‘the cacophony’ of all sources and schools of which Rav Pappa was a 
part.  Rav Pappa – or someone from his school – would want to maintain the 
appearance of merely being a part of the whole, as opposed to its primary crafter; 
this would further legitimate the entirety of the project as it is representative of the 
entire tradition and not only of Rav Pappa’s place within and perspective on the 
overall tradition.  They needed to take themselves out of the debate – at least on a 
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literary level.  This is not different from James, who could not be in the debate 
and the subject of the debate at the same time.77 
 
Building on the last point above and moving beyond the scope of North’s work, I 
posit that the authors of the Stammaitic elements spoke in a scribal voice.  A fundamental 
attribute of the scribe is his neutrality and ability to preserve and to transmit intact texts 
and manuscripts passed to him from the previous generation of scribes.  The scribe 
specifically does not wish to put his name to a text.  The authors of the shaqla v’tarya 
saw themselves more as scribes than authors, as preservers of traditions and their sources.  
The shaqla v’tarya, unlike the work of a traditional scribe, is far more than a simple 
transmission of traditions.  It is a literary narrative that impacts how halacha is 
understood and legislated.  The scribe does not inform us of his logic nor of the degree to 
which he is emending or interpolating what he received and is then retransmitting; the 
shaqla v’tarya does.  (In some ways, we can see the shaqla v’tarya as a glimpse into the 
inner workings of Amoraic scribal culture.  In the text – and quite possibly if we were 
able to talk to him - the scribe cannot concede that he is, in fact, making decisions about 
the texts and impacting them in some way.  Even mere copying can never just be copying 
before the printing press (and one could argue after the printing press too).  The scribes 
are trusted because of this feeling people have about them and the scribal culture; they 
are perceived as faithful and neutral preservers of a specific aspect of any given culture.  
Similarly, the shaqla v’tarya is attempting to convey a similar neutrality.  This neutrality 
is closely tied to the anonymity with which it is presented. 
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Like the scribe, the shaqla v’tarya remains nameless in an effort to demonstrate that it 
has no impact on how traditions are constructed and received.  It operates in a scribal 
manner not only outward from the text, but also inward.  It is operating in a scribal 
manner outward from the text because the text as a whole strives for a level of neutrality 
among available texts and cultural options.  Within the text, the scribal aspect of the 
anonymous elements positions the narrative as the neutral arbiter among and between the 
sages and the memrot attributed to them.  Neutrality conveyed through anonymity in this 
way can be seen as implying a greater degree of impersonality than can ever be the case 
for any text, since a person or persons must have written all texts at some time.  Scribes 
or transmitters or narrators are also caught in the conundrum of having to manipulate 
pronouns; like James I, they need to avoid the first person, and cannot make claims in this 
way even if they avoid attribution through anonymity. 
 
Scribal Anonymity 
Regarding the neutrality of a scribe and the scribal culture, it is worth pointing to the 
hypographeus, a type of scribe who operated in Graeco-Roman Egypt after the conquest 
in 30 B.C.  In a nutshell, he served as the literate representative of an illiterate party to a 
contract or as the literate arbiter in the creation and consummation of contracts between 
and among illiterates.78  His job was not only to draft the document on behalf of the 
illiterate(s), but also to serve in a trustworthy capacity.79  In his article on the matter, 
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Herbert Youtie suggests that initially we might expect the hypographeus to be part of a 
“shadowy and largely anonymous group.”80  Yet he goes on to state that “it was common 
practice for professional scribes to remain anonymous, but the hypographeis, whose basic 
function is not different from that of ordinary scribes, are never anonymous…  It is easy 
to see that the hypographeus served as any scribe might, writing what someone asked him 
to write.  On the other hand, since it was obligatory that he give his name, his function 
was different from that of the usual anonymous scribe, and more significant.”81  The 
more important role played by these scribes, and expectations upon them based upon 
their role, required that they be not only not anonymous, but easily identified in case they 
are needed in connection with the contract or document they drafted.  While this 
highlights that the ancient scribe was quite capable of being not anonymous 
(nonymous?), it also demonstrates that anonymity was not necessarily a given among 
scribes and that they may have purposefully elected anonymity at certain times and in 
certain functions.  There is an awareness of the impact of non-anonymity, and therefore 
there is also an awareness of the impact of anonymity.  In the case of the contract, the 
impact is practical and in the moment.  In the case of a scribe scribing scribbles in a royal 
court, the impact of anonymity can be historical. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I am more concerned with addressing “what does anonymity do 
for the text, its transmission, and how it is read” rather than asking “why did the author 
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choose to remain anonymous?”  Still, in looking at anonymity in the BT, it is worthwhile 
to address why they might have remained anonymous.  The most basic answer, which is 
discussed above, revolves around the scribal nature of those who handled the 
transmission of the text; they did not perceive themselves as authors in any way and 
functioned as transmitters, even when they manipulated some language for the purposes 
of easier transmission.  It could be unintended anonymity.  This is not that different from 
David Halivni’s view that his Stammaim subjugated their expressed authority in the text 
out of respect for the previous generations and because of their personal humility.82  This 
type of reverence on the part of the anonymous Stammaim toward the Amoraim who 
preceded them is evident in much of how Halivni reads the BT; it is also inherent as well 
in much of the contemporary world of Talmud study.  The flaw, in a nutshell, is that this 
requires us to accept a type of reverence on the part of people who lived in such close 
temporal proximity to those they revered.  This subsequently presumes a degree of self-
awareness on the part of the Stammaim regarding their own position within the 
periodization of rabbinic authorities.83  There is also a view which is the polar opposite to 
this charitable one suggested by Halivni and accepted by many: that the authors 
deliberately chose to operate anonymously in order to further their agendas and so that 
they could more easily coopt the authority of relatively earlier Rabbis.  This would not 
have required any awareness of periodization. 
 
                                                
82 David Halivni, Meqorot u’Mesorot; Bava Batra (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2007), see Introduction. 
83 Much of Halivni’s work operates under this assumption, and it is never fully unpacked within his work as 
his agenda does not revolve around periodizing rabbinic authorities. 
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This is particularly true within a paradigm where such ‘manipulative’ anonymity 
is deployed much earlier than the Stammaim, and is a feature of even second and third 
generation Amoraic traditions.  Appreciating the cynicism in his voice, Boyarin expresses 
the other extreme:  
“There is, to be sure, another historical approach to the ‘anonymous’ voice in the 
Talmud, which would see this voice as constantly developing throughout the 
Amoraic period itself, with each Stamma representing the contemporaneous view 
of the ‘Amora’ in question, rendered anonymously because all agreed!”84 
 
For those who are unsure, the exclamation point gives away the tone of Boyarin’s 
comment.  Clearly, the implication is that there is no way that they all agreed.  The 
deployment of the anonymous voice is what makes this possible; therefore, the 
anonymous voice is purposefully utilized in order to give the appearance that there is this 
type of broad consensus, even when such consensus is unreasonable.85  While Boyarin is 
not explicit in expressing the most extreme degree of possible manipulation of anonymity 
on the part of the anonymous authors, his language and appropriation of Halivni are quite 
suggestive. 
 
                                                
84 Daniel Boyarin, “Hellenism in Jewish Babylonia,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and 
Rabbinic Literature, ed. C. Fonrobert and M. Jaffee (Cambridge University Press, 2007): 336-363. 
85 If we wish to give even more credit to the manipulative powers of the anonymous editors, one can 
assume that they were also aware that they were crafting a text for the ages.  They were less concerned with 
how it might be perceived or accepted in their moment, and were more concerned with how it would stand 
the test of time.  Even if there exist voices of dissent, over time they grow muffled and ultimately muted.  
This is especially true in a world where transmission of traditions is limited and where it is controlled by a 
scribal culture generally loyal to the most conservative elements in society. 
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Having discussed anonymity in the broader literature and how it relates to the BT 
more generally, it is important to look at examples from the BT and assess the impact 
anonymity has on a specific sugya.  Specifically, attention is paid to the degree of 
authority the Stammaitic elements pay to the other elements in the sugya and the degree 
of authority they seek to impose on the halachic outcome.  There are a great many 
features of the Stammaitic style, but the feature that is most relevant here is the control 
over the different sages that the shaqla v’tarya possesses as the narrator of the BT.  In the 
sugyot I analyze, I focus on the nature in which the narrator narrates the different sages 
contained in the sugyot. 
 
 With most works, even anonymous ones, the assumption is generally that there 
existed a single narrator or author in a single time and place who either constructed or 
provided a final edit to a text.  In the case of the BT, “the author is rarely an individual or 
original creator, but rather unknown or barely recognized.”86  While there may have been 
a last editor or narrator or author (or any other title one wishes to utilize here), he was not 
‘final’ in the sense that he had the final impact on the work as a whole.  Rather, at most, 
he had the final impact on a specific sugya, and possibly its position within a given 
tractate. 
                                                
86 Jean-François Botrel, “The Popular Canon,” The Modern Language Review 97.4 (Oct. 2002): xxxi. 





Canonicity, a Definition 
Before discussing pluralism, canonicity, and their relationship to anonymity and 
authority, I would like to define canonicity as I use it in this and other chapters of the 
dissertation.  Later, regarding the v’la pligi structures, and elsewhere in the dissertation, I 
point out where degrees of canonicity increase.  I also try to pinpoint when and where 
any degree of canonicity is associated with words, concepts, and the halachic positions 
they convey.  Yet the word canonicity is not nearly as common as the words canon or 
canonical, and is more nuanced in its meaning depending on the context in which it is 
deployed. 
 
The simple definition of the word in the Oxford dictionary is “the fact or status of 
being canonical.”  The etymology of the word has its roots in the Latin canon, and before 
that in the Greek word kavwv (kanawn), which means measuring rod or standard; it is 
also related to the Greek word kavva (kanna), which means reed.  Supposedly a 
measuring rod was made from a reed. Additionally, there are those who argue that its 
origins prior to its Greek usage might be related to the Hebrew word for reed, qaneh.  
Succinctly, it can be said that a canon is “a collection of standards and works, which are 
accepted as legitimate by a dominant social group in a culture and are protected by the 
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community as part of its historic heritage.”1 
Frank Kermode defines canon quite differently; he would not agree that a canon 
consists of a definitively limited group of texts whose authority is unquestioned and 
legitimate.  For Kermode, a canon is part of an ongoing conversation, whereby all 
participants in that conversation are versed in the works that are included in that canon in 
that particular time and space.2  Kermode also asserts that a text becomes canonical once 
it enters the space of a text worthy of interpretation by ‘licensed practitioners.’3  These 
licensed practitioners, according to Kermode, can also be grouped together in a formal 
institution, such as a Yeshiva, a court, or a university.  Beyond this assertion, Kermode 
states that, “the institution must validate texts before they are licensed for professional 
exegesis.”4  He calls this “the seal we place upon our canonical works.”5  For a student of 
the BT – and much of Rabbinical and pre-Rabbinical texts that are relevant such as the 
Bible – the idea of licensed practitioners interpreting licensed texts is natural.  Licensed 
practitioners are the Rabbis of a certain milieu, and licensed texts are the ones that they 
study and pontificate over.  The licensed practitioners and their conversation about the 
canon are just as much a part of it as the texts themselves. 
 
Before getting into a detailed definition of canonicity as it pertains to the BT, it is 
worth exploring how the word canon is deployed in different contexts.  Three contexts 
                                                
1 Jean-Francois Botrel, “The Popular Canon” The Modern Language Review, Volume 97, No. 4 (Oct 2002): 
xxix-xxxix. 
 
2 Frank Kermode, “Institutional Control of Interpretation” Salmagundi No. 43 (Winter 1979): 72-86. 
 
3 Kermode, “Institutional Control,” 73. 
 
4 Kermode “Institutional Control,” page 83. 
 
5 Kermode “Institutional Control,” page 84. 
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within which the word is used are: (1) Canon of Law; (2) Canon of Literature; and (3) 
Biblical Canon.  In each of these, a canon represents texts that are suitable to be included 
in an accepted group of texts that comprise and are also representative of the whole in 
some manner.  By exploring what is meant by canon when used with respect to Law, 
Literature and the Bible, the task of defining what it means to be part of the Canon of the 
Babylonian Talmud becomes easier.  We can then explore what infuses canonicity into 
different sugyot, and further we can explore what canonicity means in terms of the 
different elements that make up an individual sugya. 
 
Legal Canon 
Different legal structures can possess their own canons of law.  There are canons 
of case law for any legal system wherein a compilation of cases is necessary in order to 
teach law.  While an entire legal corpus can be considered the canon of that particular 
legal system, there are legal systems where the number of cases is too enormous, and 
where the number of cases that are no longer relevant is also quite large.  Thus, while all 
cases can be part of the history of a legal system, they are not all necessarily equal in 
their degree of canonicity nor in their place within the canon.  For the purpose of 
simplicity, one need only look at the United States federal legal system; there are 
hundreds of years of cases from multiple courts at different levels (e.g. district, appeals, 
supreme), with a whole range of cases that were overturned and many which have merely 
grown irrelevant over time.  In order to outline some features (and hardly an all-inclusive 
list) of canonicity in legal canons, I have chosen to focus on US Constitutional Law, and 
some literature, for a potential legal canon of constitutional cases. 
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In the United States, Constitutional Law is considered the most ubiquitous (and 
important) in the sense that federal law is unavoidable in any jurisdiction.  While in 
Alabama, cases from the Supreme Court of Alabama might be important and relevant to 
students of law who will practice in Alabama, these cases are not necessarily relevant 
outside of the state.  Constitutional Law is different, and is better suited to the analysis of 
the idea of a canon of law.6   In exploring canon as it is used when discussing 
Constitutional Law, I refer to an article, “The Canons of Constitutional Law” by J.M. 
Balkin and Sanford Levinson.7  In the article, the authors’ goal is to explain how the 
canon of Constitutional Law used in law schools in order to educate generations of 
lawyers differs from similar canons in the liberal arts, such as a canon of literature.  The 
primary difference is that those who are assembling a canon of constitutional cases 
possess less agency than their counterparts in the liberal arts.  A canon of law is impacted 
by many more external factors, such as actual cases selected and then adjudicated by the 
Supreme Court and what is pedagogically useful in educating a future lawyer.  
Specifically, they state that, “legal materials can be canonical because they are important 
for educating students because they ensure a necessary cultural literacy for citizens in a 
democracy, or because they serve as benchmarks for testing academic theories about the 
law.”8  On the other hand, professors in the liberal arts and others who are assembling 
different pieces of literature when constructing a canon are freer to choose what they feel 
                                                
6 Because this is a dissertation prepared for an American university, it is reasonable to look to Federal US 
law as an example of a legal system and the canons that it spawns. 
 
7 Harvard Law Review Vol. 111, No. 4 (February 1998): 963-1024. 
  
8 Balkin and Levinson, “The Canons of Constitutional Law,” 970. 
  143 
should belong in that particular canon.  The liberal arts canon creator possesses greater 
agency, and is free from the constraints imposed by pedagogical concerns or the realities 
of which cases courts are actually adjudicating.9 
 
The article addresses different cases that are included in the varying casebooks 
used in different law schools in the United States.  There are only ten cases that are 
included in virtually every single casebook used in American law schools.  One specific 
case they cite is McCulloch vs. Maryland.  They point out that despite the fact that law 
professors no longer write about this case in law reviews, and despite the fact that it is not 
generally referenced in actual legal contexts, it is still included in the casebooks.  The 
opinion written by John Marshall in this case argues for an expansive view of the powers 
of the federal government in relation to the state governments.  This expansive view is 
the earliest such opinion expressed on the topic, and paves the way for the federal 
Supreme Court’s power in the future.  It also sets the groundwork for the other nine cases 
that are unanimously included in casebooks, as they are all Supreme Court cases and 
must rely on the relatively expanded powers of federal law, the precedent of which is set 
in this case.  The case is not included because it is relevant in any case that a law student 
might encounter upon graduation from law school and their personal practice of law and 
appearance before any court, or even the Supreme Court.  It is part of the canon because 
it is conceptually essential to the project of Constitutional Law and the powers wielded 
by the Supreme Court. 
 
                                                
9 Balkin and Levinson, “The Canons of Constitutional Law,” 964. 
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To varying degrees, the other cases included in the canon of constitutional law are 
also included because of their conceptual relevance to authority inherent in the Supreme 
Court and in the idea of federal power.  At the other extreme are the cases that are 
included in very few casebooks, and which are included because of their pragmatic value 
in terms of actually understanding the current processes of the Supreme Court and the 
ever-evolving sensibilities of the law professors who are selecting cases to be taught in 
their Constitutional Law classes.  Those cases would be viewed as far less canonical than 
McCulloch vs. Maryland or Plessy vs. Ferguson or the other eight cases cited by Balkin 
and Levinson.  Yet, those are the cases that would be far more helpful to the student of 
law who may actually have to stand before a judge someday.  Thus in a canon of 
Constitutional Law, the primary considerations can be reduced to two main factors: (1) 
what is necessary for a future lawyer; and (2) what is necessary for a future professor of 
law or other academic in the legal field. 
 
Ultimately, after accounting for the primary considerations mentioned above, 
what really constitutes a canon of Constitutional Law – and perhaps of any type of law 
canon – is what those in the field include in their casebooks.  A casebook can be viewed 
as the personal canon of the person creating it.   The overlap among all the different 
personal canons is the space where a more ‘ratified’ and global canon emerges, and those 
cases that are referred to unanimously can be considered The Canon.  Once in The 
Canon, certain conservatisms take over, which maintains older and potentially less useful 
cases in the canon.10  Phrased differently, such a canon essentially can be defined as those 
legal works and cases with which a legal scholar would expect all other legal scholars to 
                                                
10 Balkin and Levinson, “The Canons of Constitutional Law,” 976-977. 
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be familiar.  For example, if a lawyer claims to be unfamiliar with McCulloch or another 
such prominent case – whether he does so as a lawyer before a judge or as an aspiring 
legal scholar in conversation with his professor – he is also a person unfamiliar with the 
canon of Constitutional Law; this is damaging to his credibility. 
The reasons for why a precedent case is important is understandable: it is oft-
quoted in other cases, it contains a fundamental principle because it is the first case to 
address a specific issue, or it is a substantial reinterpretation of a law relative to how the 
law was perceived prior to the case.  As discussed, even after ceasing to be quoted, and 
falling to the margins of practical case law, some cases still maintain their positions in the 
canon of Constitutional Law.  As with works of literature, where there is a certain 
informal human unanimity about what appeals to people, with legal cases there is a 
similar unanimity which pervades among scholars.  This unanimity is essential in the 
formation of canons. 
 
 In terms of a canon of law, the degrees of canonicity are by and large defined by 
which cases are considered essential in a casebook by the greatest number of scholars 
who include them.  The greater the number of casebooks that include a case, the more the 
canonicity of the case increases.  Unanimous inclusion offers the highest degree of 
canonicity.  Substantively, one can then ask what is it about those cases that make them 
includable?  In the case of a canon of law, the answer is the pedagogical value to the 
student and the theoretical value to the scholar; and many cases overlap in that regard, 
and it is those cases that possess the highest degree of canonicity, and are therefore most 
canonical.  Beyond this, one can further inquire as to what makes a case pedagogically 
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valuable to a student and pedagogically valuable to an academic in the field of law.  
While this can be a dissertation topic in itself, considerations with respect to pedagogical 
and theoretical value are not the same.  In terms of the legal theorist, some obvious 
considerations include the social importance of a case, the specific Supreme Court that 
adjudicated the case, the specific judge who wrote the opinion, and the degree to which 
the case impacts cases that follow it.  Pedagogical value might be informed by the above 
reasons, but could be informed by more mundane factors such as the writing style of the 
opinion or current social issues to which a case might be relevant and thus interesting to 
the professor of law teaching a constitutional law class; and therefore valuable to the 
student. 
 
Canon of Literature  
In thinking about canons of literature, there is much more leeway given than there 
is when compared to a canon of Constitutional Law.  The assembler of a canon of 
literature is not concerned with the practical adjudications of a court, nor is the assembler 
concerned with trying to convey any fundamental principle about the law that is inherent 
and thus unavoidable in the actual practice of the law.  These do not apply to literature in 
the manner in which they apply to the law. 
 
As with canons of law, there are many different types of canons of literature.  
There can be a comprehensive literature comprising all great works, such as a canon of 
all literature.  There can also be canons that are far narrower in their scope, such as a 
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canon of 20th century American poetry, or a canon of Romantic English novels.11  There 
are also anthologies of literature from specific regions that can be perceived as canons; 
ironically, from the Western perspective, and the one that prevails at American 
universities, there can be an attempt to create a canon of East Asian Literature.12 
 
Similar to the assembler of a casebook of constitutional law cases, the assembler 
of a canon of Western literature might be concerned with the pedagogical value of the 
literature that they are including in their canon; he might also be concerned with 
assembling a list of works which he believes are worthy.  In pre-medieval times, before 
the printing press and when the amount of literature that could be preserved was limited, 
the decision to record something in a canonical manner was almost the same as deciding 
to preserve it for the broad cultural good and for posterity.  In terms of ‘worthiness,’ its 
importance to the transmission and survival of a text (or a law or tradition) has 
significantly decreased since the advent of the printing press.  Where the modern 
assembler of law cases or texts might be concerned with the worthiness of the case of the 
text, the case or text will survive whether or not it is included in the casebook or 
anthology.  Therefore, for the modern assembler, the pedagogical concerns can more 
                                                
11 Balkin and Levinson list a range of canons in the form of anthologies: The Norton Anthology of 
American Literature (Nina Baym, Wayne Franklin, Ronald Gottesman, Laurence B. Holland, David 
Kalstone, Arnold Krupat, Francis Murphy, Hershel Parker, William H. Pritchard & Patricia B. Wallace 
eds., 4th ed.) 1994; The Norton Anthology of Short Fiction (R.V. Cassill ed., 3d ed.) 1986; The Norton 
Anthology of English Literature (M.H. Abrams 5th ed.) 1986; The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces 
(Maynard Mack ed. 5th ed.) 1985; The Norton Anthology of  Modern Poetry (Richard Ellman and Robert 
O”Claire) 1973; The Norton Anthology of Literature by Women: The Tradition in English, Sandra M. 
Gilbert & Susan Gubar eds. 1st ed.) 1985; The Norton Anthology of African American Literature (H. L. 
Gates, Jr. & N.Y. McKay eds.) 1977. 
12 When discussing canons of Asian Literature, it is important to note the colonial connotation of such an 
enterprise.  An example of such an anthology where the colonial and post-colonial arguments are ignored is 
William McNaughton’s Light from the East: An Anthology of Asian Literature – China, Japan, Korea, 
Vietnam, and India (New York: Dell Laurel Printing, 1978). McNaughton, as late as 1978, is conflating 
cultures and texts as disparate as Indian and Vietnamese. 
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greatly inform the creation of anthologies (and hence canons) than in a scribal culture.  
This is the case because for the scribe, the preservation and transmission of texts (legal, 
historical, religious, political, etc.) was his raison d’etre; pedagogy was important only to 
the extent that it produced a future generation of scribes. 
 
While there is likely to be overlap, some works may not make it to both lists; the 
pedagogical and the worthy.  For example, a comprehensive anthology might be too long 
for it to be pedagogically practical.  Pragmatically, a canon of western literature would 
manifest in the form of an anthology of great works, or a list of great books (such as that 
for a course), or something of that nature.  Therefore, one could look at the works of 
literature included among the Penguin Classics as a type of canon of western literature; 
other, similar types of collections would also qualify as such.  The curriculum of ‘core’ or 
‘required’ courses such as Great Books or Western Literature would also be a place from 
which to draw data if one were to conduct a survey with the goal of finding unanimity 
among different types of canons.  This is evidenced by the fact that most American 
universities did not even offer an English major until the second decade of the twentieth 
century and “great books” really meant classical (i.e. Ancient Greek and Latin) works.13  
By only requiring students to study the classics, the corpus of texts available for study 
was not only finite and not massive, it was also one to which nothing new could be 
added.  It was forever finite.  Once English and other texts could be included, the number 
                                                
13 Wendell V. Harris, “Canonicity” PMLA Vol. 106, No. 1 (January 1991): 113-114.  Harris also describes 
the four-year “course of study” at Dartmouth for 1852-1853, which includes Livy, Homer’s Iliad, 
Coleridge’s Introduction to the Greek Classic Poets, Ovid, Horace, Felton’s Selections from the Greek 
Historians, Aeschylus, Tacitus, Sophocles, Demosthenes, Cicero, Plato’s Gorgias, Juvenal and Terence’s 
Andria.  While Harris does not pick up on the irony, Coleridge himself ultimately becomes part of the 
canon – at least in some iterations, and at least in a canon of English poetry – for his actual creative work 
and not tangentially as one describing ancient works in a secondary work. 
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of texts available became infinite and disparities between and among the required core 
reading increased.  Where the 19th century student at a university would be studying 
Homer, Plato, Virgil, and Cicero, the 21st century student could be studying almost 
anything, depending on those making the decisions and the agendas and ideologies that 
drive them. 
 
The idea is almost intuitive that the age of a work is related to its potential 
suitability to be included in canon of literature, western or otherwise.  Works from a past 
can serve to glorify both the work itself as well as the period from which it comes.  
Conversely, a work from a ‘great’ or shall I say ‘classical’ period of time in many ways 
carries with it the greatness or ‘classicalness’ of its time.  Hence the dramatic emphasis 
on Ancient Greek and Roman literature, which was simply defined as ‘Classical 
Literature,’ per the discussion above.  One can argue that the overreach into a period two 
millennia earlier is a way to reconstruct a pristine world whose flaws are no longer 
discernible in the face of its greatest literature, art, and architecture as a remnant left for 
examination.  As in the case of English literature entering the canon – at least in terms of 
what was considered pedagogically valuable – it can take hundreds of years for genres 
and languages to become regarded as worthwhile of preserving in a canonical manner. 
 
One important work seeking to examine a canon that is more concerned with the 
literary value (or contribution) of a work, and one that goes beyond the scope of what can 
be accomplished in a university course – or even in four years of university study – is 
Harold Bloom’s The Western Canon.  Bloom specifically defines his criteria for inclusion 
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in his rather exhaustive list of works included in his canon: "Since the literary canon is at 
issue here, I include only those religious, philosophical, historical, and scientific writings 
that are themselves of great aesthetic interest.”14  Bloom uses the phrase ‘great aesthetic 
interest’ as a primary feature of what ought be included in his canon.  He even goes 
beyond the scope of what is traditionally perceived as ‘western’ so long as the work has 
significant influence on western literature and is thus of ‘great interest’ even if it might 
not be great with respect to its aesthetics, as Bloom defines them.  Obviously, even to one 
less than absolutely cynical, Bloom is relying heavily on his own perspectives and may 
not in fact reflect a common or popular perception in his creation of a canon.  Jean 
Francois Botrel expresses this cynicism in his discussion of popular canons when he 
articulates that a group possessing a mass of literature but not a formal canon “have 
simply not yet produced a Harold Bloom to draw up their canon.”15  For the purposes of 
trying to make more precise our definition of canon and canonicity, Bloom is useful, and 
it is worthwhile looking at his list in order to get a sense of what canonicity might be.  
But it is hardly the definitive canon of western literature. 
 
Like the McCulloch and Plessy vs. Ferguson cases, there are works of literature 
which are unanimously included in any canon of western literature.  (While defining 
‘western literature’ might be a murky endeavor, for our purposes I will operate under the 
basic assumption that anything written in a European language or in the English language 
qualifies.)  For example, Homer and Shakespeare would be included almost unanimously 
in any ‘legitimate’ anthology of western literature, and can thus be viewed as canonical 
                                                
14 Harold Bloom, The Western Canon (London: Macmillan 1995), 84. 
 
15 Jean-François Botrel, “The Popular Canon,” The Modern Language Review 97.4 (Oct. 2002): xxix. 
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works.  There are other works which also fall into this category.  Beyond the obvious 
ones, there would be a range of works of literature which might also be canonical, but 
might not be included because of the assembler’s personal opinions about them.  The 
Bible, while a great work that heavily influences and informs a great deal of post-Roman 
western literature, might be considered pre-western and therefore excluded from this or 
that specific list of great western works. 
 
Biblical Canon 
The third type of canon I mention is the Biblical Canon – specifically the Old and 
New Testament canons, although my focus here is on the Old Testament, as that is the 
one relevant to a discourse on rabbinic law.  Before delving into the details of the 
formation of a Biblical Canon, and the features that books of such a canon might have in 
common, it is worth noting the context in which such a canon was formed.  The Biblical 
Canon is ancient, and has been transmitted alongside other (great) western works for 
centuries.  It is fully formed, and there is little room for contemporary scholars to adjust 
the canon; contemporary scholars are empowered only to ask why this book or that book 
was – or was not – included by the ancients in the Biblical Canon.  The fundamental 
difference between the Biblical Canon and the other two is that the Biblical Canon was 
formed in a time when recording texts was essential to a text’s survival, and therefore 
was a more meaningful designation.  Because of simple pragmatics, per Kermode, few 
individuals can be designated as licensed practitioners with respect to the text, and only 
very few were able to assemble groups of texts, whether they were as short as a memra in 
a Mishna or as long as Psalms or as redundant as the Gospels.  And only these few 
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licensed practitioners would have been able to set the groundwork for what is ultimately 
canonical and thus worthy of inclusion in a final canon.  During the formation of the 
Biblical Canons, it was impossible to record an unlimited number of texts and to transmit 
them, as we are able to do today.  I mention the possibilities of today to highlight that 
during the period of the formation and sealing of the Biblical Canons the possibilities 
were severely curtailed when compared to the relatively ‘unlimited’ possibilities afforded 
by more sophisticated scribal cultures and later by the seemingly infinite reach of the 
printing press.16  In some ways, the biblical canon can be seen as a literary canon formed 
in a time when the recording and transmission of texts was immutably entangled with 
many aspects of people’s lives, and especially with what we today call religion. 
 
In part, the reason I discuss the very different world in which the Biblical Canon 
formed was in order to highlight the finite and fixed nature of the Biblical Canon versus 
the malleable and organic nature of literary and legal canons.  The Bible contains a 
rudimentary legal system and is also seen as a source for the authority of certain legal 
systems; it is, however, also a work of literature.  Unlike the criteria of contemporary 
assemblers of texts into canons, who explain to us the criteria based upon which they 
reached the final group of texts, the record for the biblical canons is far more murky.  
This is also true of publishers who include some works in this “Great Works of…” or the 
other, and exclude others; they tell us why, and we can do what we wish with that 
information.  As far as the Bible is concerned, we have far less information about the 
                                                
16 In chapter 2, I discuss the impact of the printing press primarily in the context of anonymous publication, 
but I also address the issue of the power of the printing press relative to what existed prior to its invention.  
As was the case with the scribal culture, there was a keen attempt to sanction and also control printing 
presses; unlike the scribal cultures who stayed true to their lords 
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formation of the canon.  This is specifically the case with respect to its earliest parts, the 
parts which were already put together and received by relatively later scribes and 
transmitters.  Like the BT, there are layers within the Bible as a whole such as this book, 
Judges, preceded that one, Jeremiah. 
 
Beyond the level of the books, there are layers within the books of the Bible 
themselves, sometimes even on a chapter and verse level.  For example, we are able to 
discern different layers within the book of Genesis, and this is the essence of the 
documentary hypothesis.17  Yet we do not have in our possession the texts which we call 
J or E; we have a theory about them and a text in Genesis that as far as history records 
was a whole, complete text. The different parts of Genesis may have been fully canonical 
to some person or group prior to their inclusion in it; as part of the text of Genesis they 
carry its full canonical weight in a manner in which a discovered or a reconstructed ‘book 
of J’ would not be.18  One can argue that this is because the Book of J is only canonical 
on account of its inclusion in the version of the book of Genesis that became part of the 
Biblical Canon.  Yet, one can also argue that those verses, which some scholars define as 
J, as well as any verse included in Genesis, possess a degree of canonicity on their own.  
It is this degree of canonicity which then makes it possible for this small piece of text to 
become part of the Biblical Canon.  Separate from whether a verse is included in a 
theoretical or reconstructed proto-book that ultimately becomes part of Genesis, its 
canonicity is not necessarily tied to its inclusion in such a proto-book, such as the Book 
                                                
17 See for example Joseph E. Carpenter, The Composition of the Hexateuch, (London: 1902), 44-59; 
Richard E. Friedman, Who Wrote the Bible? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985), 22-23.  
 
18 A reconstruction of such a book was attempted by David Rosenberg and Harold Bloom, Book Of J 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1951).  
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of J.  The verse can possess some degree of canonicity in its own right, and this is borne 
out by those verses whose provenance vis-à-vis this or that proto-book is not easily 
detectable. 
 
The focus here is on the Biblical Canon as a whole, and the different and equally 
whole books that comprise the Bible.  Further, the Biblical canon I deal with specifically 
is the Rabbinic Old Testament (as opposed to Christian versions). Because this is not a 
dissertation on the formation of the Rabbinic Biblical Canon, my focus is on 
demonstrating different types of canons and juxtaposing the Biblical Canon with legal 
and literary canons.  Unlike the other two canons above, the Biblical Canon is quite 
distant from us chronologically, and it is much more difficult – and some argue, 
impossible – to determine the formative stages of the canon’s development.  To quote 
Jack Lightstone, “Let me forewarn the reader where we shall end up, for it is not where 
one might have expected or wanted.  Simply put, we have not sufficient, reliable 
evidence to determine with any precision or confidence the ‘how,’ ‘when,’ ‘where,’ 
‘who,’ or ‘why’ of the fixing of the Rabbis’ Bible.”19 
 
The traditional view on the canonization of the Rabbinic Bible, which was 
uniformly accepted well into the 20th century, was that a council of rabbinic sages 
convened at Yavneh (Jamnia) at the end of the first century AD and put together the 
corpus that comprises the Rabbinic Bible.  In putting it together, they did it all in one fell 
                                                
19 Jack N. Lightstone, “The Rabbis’ Bible: The Canon of the Hebrew Bible and the Early Rabbinic Guild” 
in The Canon Debate ed. Lee McDonald and James A. Sanders (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers: 
2002), 164. 
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swoop, including the three different parts of the Bible, the Pentateuch, the Prophets, and 
the Writings.20  As bizarre as it might seem, this ancient and simplistic view went 
unquestioned until the 1960s, when scholars began to suggest that the Rabbinic Bible 
took form in stages.21  Later, this was broken down more specifically, and it was asserted 
that the books of the Rabbinic Bible were canonized around the three different parts.  
When a single part was closed, nothing could be added to it, and any subsequent text of 
canonical worth would be included in the next part that was still ‘open’ until the close of 
the Scriptures when the entirety of the Bible was closed and possessing of a final 
canonicity.22  Over the years, a range of different perspectives on the canonization of the 
Rabbinic Bible emerged from schools of thought that fully reject the canonization at 
Yavneh by a council of rabbinic sages.  While hardly an exhaustive representation of the 
vast scholarship on the matter, many divergent opinions on the matter have been put 
forth; some focus on the parallel Christian versions of the Old Testament, others focus on 
                                                
20 Heinrich Graetz, “Der alttestamentliche Kanon und sein Abschluss” in Koehelet oder der Solomonische 
Prediger, Ahnang I (Leipzig, 1871): 147-173.  This is the first ‘modern’ construction of the canonization of 
the Rabbinic Bible that affirms the centrality of the convention of rabbinic sages at Yavneh at around 90 
AD. 
 
21 The first scholar to truly question the Yavneh theory was Jack P. Lewis in his article “What Do We Mean 
By Jabneh” Journal of Bible and Religion, Vol. 32, No.2 (April 1964): 125-132.  Lewis does mention H. H. 
Rowley’s 1950 work, The Growth of the Old Testament (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1950) in 
which Rowley makes a very similar claim, but comes just short of Lewis’ final conclusion, which is “to 
allow the question to remain as vague as the sources are,” and almost to assume that beyond a gathering, 
we can know nothing else.  Rowley’s discussion of the matter still assumes that something significant took 
place at Yavneh, even if it was informal and not absolutely binding.  Lewis is establishing a different 
framework where Yavneh may have been inconsequential. 
 
22 In discussing this, Lightstone, in “The Rabbis’ Bible”, cites several scholars who have advanced this or a 
related idea.  The primary scholar to whom Lightstone refers, and with whose work I am most familiar, is 
Sid Leiman and his book The Canonization of the Hebrew Scriptures: The Talmudic and Midrashic 
Evidence (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1976).  He also mentions Albert C. Sundberg, The Old Testament and the 
Early Church (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); Roger T. Beckwith “Formation of the 
Hebrew Bible” in Mikra: Text Translation, Reading and Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Ancient and 
Early Christianity ed. M.J. Mulder and H. Sysling (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1988): 39-86, and Edward 
E. Ellis “The Old Testament Canon in the Early Church” op. cit. 653-690.  
 
  156 
the texts from the Dead Sea Scrolls, and still others look at the specifics of the language 
in order to determine divergent strains within the Rabbinic Bible. 
 
While my main focus is the general pattern of how the Rabbinic Biblical Canon 
formed may potentially inform our notion of canon/canonicity in the BT, it is worth 
unpacking certain aspects related to the idea of divergent strains in the evolution of the 
canonization of the Rabbinic Bible.  A first step in doing so is referencing the Mishna 
Yadayim 3:5, which is discussing purity laws and which objects cause one who touches 
them to become impure.  Beneath the surface is the projection of different philosophies 
within – what is in the Mishna – a normative rabbinic weltanschauung, followed by a 
whole chapter dedicated to matters that were legislated in Yavneh at the same time that 
certain aspects of their canon debate were resolved on the day Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya 
was installed as the nasi.  The first part of the Mishna discusses the purity law regarding 
books and scrolls and is then followed by a back and forth discussion regarding the 
canon: 
“All holy books cause hands to be impure.  Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes cause 
the hands to be impure.  Rabbi Judah says: Song of Songs causes the hands to be 
impure, and there is a dispute regarding Ecclesiastes.  Rabbi Yose says: 
Ecclesiastes does not cause the hands to be impure, and there is a dispute 
regarding Song of Songs.  Rabbi Simon says: Ecclesiastes is from among the 
leniencies of the House of Shammai and from among the stringencies of the 
House of Hillel.  Rabbi Simon, son of Azzai said: I have a tradition from the 
mouths of the seventy-two elders from the day that they installed Rabbi Elazar, 
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son of Azarya in the Yeshiva that Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes cause the hands 
to be impure.  Rabbi Akiba said: Mercy and Peace! [has v’shalom which more 
loosely translates as ‘heavens, no’ or ‘heaven forbid’] No man of Israel disputes 
regarding Song of Songs, [and states] that it does not cause the hands to be 
impure, since the entire world is not worthy like the day on which Song of Songs 
was given to Israel; all the Writings are holy, but Song of Songs is the holiest of 
the holies; and if there were a dispute, they did not dispute anything except for 
Ecclesiastes.  Rabbi Yohanan, son of Joshua, son of Rabbi Akiba’s father-in-law: 
they disputed according to the words of Ben Azzai, and they legislated [in 
accordance with them].23 
Before even getting to modern conceptions regarding different strains in the formation of 
the Rabbinic Biblical Canon, the Mishna in Yadayim is telegraphing at least some 
element of divergence in the traditions.  It is rare for a Mishna to include this number of 
halachic options, and this many voices associated with those options.  In the rest of the 
first three chapters of Yadayim,24 there is only one Mishna where three sages are 
mentioned, one where two are mentioned, and a few where only Rabbi Yose is 
mentioned; a vast number contain no named sage.  This Mishna alone contains nine 
different named sages with a saying or halachic opinion on the matter of purity and holy 
scrolls.25  While not reflective of nine distinct positions, the Mishna is certainly trying to 
                                                
23 The translation is my own. 
 
24 I am not considering the fourth chapter because it is a continuation of the theme of laws that were 
legislated in Yavneh on the day Rabbi Elazar, son Azarya was installed in the Yeshiva.  While none 
possess nine distinct sages, there is certainly the appearance of a purposeful inclusion of a range of rabbinic 
sages, possibly for the same or similar reasons for doing so in the verse that we are discussing. 
 
25 While I do not wish to get into a tangential discussion here regarding the value of Plurality in a legal text, 
and the manner in which Plurality is deployed in this Mishna.  However, I do discuss Plurality in Chapter 5, 
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fit in as many voices as possible.  In this case, the voices also reflect lived positions, and 
the reality of the canon possessed by certain groups within the ‘normative rabbinic’ world 
of the Mishna.  Beyond what is reflected in this Mishna, there existed other groups who 
might have been considered not part of the ‘normative rabbinic’ world of the Mishna and 
whose canons and sages are not mentioned in this dispute. 
 
Because of the important nature of something like the Biblical Canon to the 
rabbinic class of the Mishna and the fact that it is the text based upon which halacha 
acquires its authority, it is not surprising to see the ‘participation’ of so many sages in this 
rather arcane dispute regarding purity.  It becomes anything but arcane once it becomes 
clear that the discussion at hand is really about the canon, and the purity law is only a 
mechanism for getting to it.  Even the tractate of Yadayim flows in such a way: this 
Mishna precedes the fourth chapter, which includes those that deal with matters not 
related to purity.26  Our Mishna is a suitable segue as it is both related to the purity laws 
discussed in the Mishna Yadayim, and it conveys among the most important pieces of 
legislation to emerge from the council at Yavneh.  Such legislation is better served with 
greater rather than fewer sages associated with the dispute and its resolution; and the 
Mishna takes the tact of ‘the more, the merrier.’  Yet despite the great plurality of opinion 
conveyed, the Mishna at the same time is marching toward a conclusion, one which 
seemingly exudes a certain consensus; the Mishna ends with Yohanan, Joshua, Akiba, 
                                                                                                                                            
and there attention is also paid to Plurality in the Mishna, and this Mishna is demonstrative of a tendency – 
however great or small – toward Plurality in the Mishna and this tendency then flourished during the 
amoraic period and during the formation of the BT. 
 
26 It is not unusual for a tractate of the Mishna to ‘go off topic’ and shift focus based upon a linguistic or 
conceptual matter that is introduced. 
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and, for good measure, Akiba’s father-in-law, introducing Ben-Azzai’s position regarding 
the dispute and its resolution.  Ben-Azzai’s position is that the council at Yavneh 
considered hands impure by contact with Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes, and thus they 
are ‘holy’ and part of the canon.  While conveying consensus in resolution, the dispute 
indicates that the reality on the ground could have been quite different and the resolution 
is idealized.  Specifically, the reality on the ground may have been that there were 
different strains regarding the canonicity of Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes as well as 
other books of the Bible and what became the Apocrypha.27 
 
It is noticeable in the language of this Mishna, specifically in the words of Rabbi 
Akiba, that there exists a certain ‘above-the-fray’ type of quality to the canonization 
process of the rabbinic Bible, and not only to the works that it contains.  This is contrary 
to the canons of literature and law, where the assemblers of canons seek out special 
works or cases worthy of inclusion, but in no way is their selection process seen as 
something as special as the works which are part of the process.  A great poem that is 
universally loved and a centuries-old precedent-setting case that is still relevant are both 
special and ‘meta-’ in a way that the process of assembling such poems and cases is not.  
While the objects of the process (i.e. the texts) are special (or holy or divinely inspired), 
                                                
27 The Dead Sea Scrolls evidence this to the extent that we can assume that at least some of them were 
canonical to someone.  Unfortunately, much of the history surrounding the Dead Sea Scrolls is lost, and we 
cannot even know the degree to which the texts might even be representative of the ‘normative rabbinic’ 
world of the Mishna.  There is much scholarship that gets into the issue of canon and the Dead Sea Scrolls.  
Among them: Moshe Bernstein, “Pentateuchal Interpretation at Qumran” in The Dead Sea Scrolls after 
Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment eds. P. Flint and James C. VanderKam (Leiden: Brill, 
1999),128-159; Eugene Ulrich, “The Paleo-Hebrew Biblical Manuscripts from Qumran Cave 4” in Time to 
Prepare for the Way in the Wilderness: Papers on the Qumran Scrolls by Fellows of the Institute for 
Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1989-1990 eds. D. Dimant and L. Schiffman 
(Leiden: Brill, 1995), 103-129; James C. VanderKam, “Authoritative Literature in the Dead Sea Scrolls” 
DSD 5,3 (1998): 382-402; and Dwight D. Swanson, The Temple Scroll and the Bible: The Methodology of 
11QT (Leiden: Brill, 1995). 
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the process itself is not.  This is unlike Yavneh, where – at least over time – the process 
itself of selecting the books of the canon came to be perceived as special or divinely 
inspired.  In time, the entirety of the Rabbinic corpus also comes to be regarded as 
divinely inspired – hence the moniker, torah sh’b’al peh, a reference to its being on par 
with the ‘original’ written one.  
 
In discussing the Rabbinic Biblical Canon, as Lightstone points out, there is even 
a theological residue in the works of modern scholars which causes their perspective on 
canons to be tainted by the idea that the process of canonization carries with it a special 
or meta-quality that is also inherent in the works comprising the Rabbinic Bible.  It is this 
theological residue which precluded questioning the idea of Yavneh as the primary 
source of the Biblical Canon.  While certainly a moment in the canonization process of 
the Bible upon which generations of sages would operate, it is hard to attribute to that 
moment and its associated process anything more than a discussion regarding what books 
were to be included in the canon.  It happens that, within the rabbinic tradition, it is the 
last discussion, after which there appears to be no dispute.28 
 
By the time of the convention at Yavneh, the canon was by and large agreed 
upon,29 and the sages all generally adjudicated and legislated based upon the same set of 
texts.  The dispute in Mishna Yadayim reflects a discussion or a negotiation where all 
                                                
28 Moshe Halbertal, People of the Book, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 16; Sid Z. 
Leiman, “Inspiration and Canonicity,” in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition Vol. 2: Aspects of Judaism in 
the Graeco-Roman period  eds. E.P. Sanders, A.I. Baumgarten, and  A. Mendelson, (London: SCM Press, 
1981), 59-62.  
 
29 Halbertal, People of the Book, 16-17. 
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contenders for inclusion in the Biblical Canon seem to have been included.  The Mishna 
only references Tannaim who opposed including books that ultimately were included.  A 
corresponding Tosefta actually does mention the book of Ben Sira by name as one that 
does not cause the hands to be impure, and thus is not part of the canon.30  The Tosefta 
also demarcates Ben Sira as the first book not to be included, and that all books written 
thereafter cannot be included in the text.  The Tosefta is implying that chronology plays a 
significant role in which books are and are not included in the Biblical Canon.  And this 
idea that age is associated with authority weighs heavily in rabbinic discourse, including 
its view of its Biblical Canon.  Much of the debate regarding the Biblical Canon for the 
culture and tradition from which the sages emerged, who actually participated at Yavneh 
was therefore sorted out well before any of them were alive.  It is unlikely that the 
participants at Yavneh thought of their task regarding the canon creation to be anything 
more than an affirmation of the status quo.  They probably saw legislation as their 
primary task. 
 
While there is little extra-Rabbinic information regarding the formation of the 
Bible as they – the Amoraic and Tannaitic sages (and those who followed them) – believe 
that it was created, there is little reason to consider significantly different canons between 
and among different Tannaitic strains of halacha.  Rather, they all operated within a very 
narrow range of what was acceptable, since they had to not only agree on which book 
was or was not included in the canon, they also had to agree on which book was ‘holy.’31  
Inclusion in the canon was not merely a legal matter, it was a deeply theological one 
                                                
30 Tosefta Yadayim 2:5.  
 
31 Halbertal, People of the Book, 17-18.  
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where ‘holiness’ actually played a role.  It’s almost as if the excluded books were agreed 
upon before Yavneh – not necessarily explicitly, but implicitly, as a simple matter of how 
the texts were treated by the time of Yavneh.  This is a projection of something almost 
metaphysically authoritative upon the goings-on at Yavneh and the sages associated with 
it.  The manner in which the Mishna, here in Yadayim as well as elsewhere, references 
legislations from Yavneh is a reflection of the same type of projection of authority.  This 
projection of authority upon earlier sages becomes the bedrock principle guiding the 
development of halacha. 
 
The BT Canon  
Now that we have highlighted the different features that the various above-
discussed canons possess, I would like to lift them from those contexts and discuss them 
in the abstract in an effort to extract their relevance to the idea of the BT as a canon of 
halachic statements.  The BT bears similarities to the above types of canons, yet also is 
different enough that it cannot be categorized in the same away as the others.  Before 
providing some detail, I want to paint the similarities with the broadest strokes: the BT is 
similar to a literary canon in that what is included in the BT canon possesses many of the 
qualities of works included in a literary canon, such as a narrative which weaves 
statements in legal contexts, and interesting stories (i.e. the aggadic material), which are 
often loaded with an underlying message or theme; it is similar to a legal canon because 
its primary function – at least prima facie – is to present the laws of the rabbinic halachic 
system; and it is similar to the Biblical Canon in the manner in which it needs ‘divine’ 
authority to give legitimacy to the legal and aggadic material it presents and ultimately to 
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be legitimate as a canon itself.  Regarding the Rabbinic Biblical Canon, it is also 
important to note that over time the important canon in the normative rabbinic circles 
evolved to include first the Mishna; later the BT, as a complete work, becomes part of a 
broad canon of rabbinic material that includes the Bible and the Mishna.32 
 
All the different canons discussed contain elements which possess different 
degrees of canonicity, regardless of how one might wish to construct the canonicity.  
What they share in common is that they all operate on a progressive scale of degrees of 
canonicity.  This is the most essential aspect of being part of a canon, or being a text, 
which evolves into a something possessing canonical status and the attendant degree of 
canonicity.  The BT is quite the same in that it too is associated with degrees of 
canonicity.  It itself, as a complete work, possesses a certain degree of canonicity within 
the broader rabbinic canon.  As a complete work it includes the many sugyot, which 
include many different elements with their own degrees of canonicity.  The different 
elements within a sugya include a memra, its introduction, and introductions of Tannaitic 
material or Stammaitic elements. On a relative scale, it might be possible to assign 
degrees of canonicity to the different elements. 
 
All three types of canons are, to some extent, created with inherent pedagogical 
value.  While in literary and legal anthologies and canons this is often stated and not up 
for debate, with the Biblical Canon, it is more difficult to parse the pedagogical than it is 
                                                
32 The question of biblical authority very much informs the issue of authority in the BT because it is a 
biblical authority that the BT wishes to convey.  One can even argue that it seeks an even higher degree of 
authority than the Bible because it does reinterpret very clear biblical statements dramatically.  For example 
an ‘eye for an eye’ becoming an ‘eye for financial damages.’ 
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other features that contribute to a canonical text.  With a legal canon, there is the 
adjudicative value of a case to a judge on a bench in addition to the pedagogical value to 
the student and the professor in the classroom.  While a case can be extremely important 
to a student because of its place in legal history and the deep precedent it imprints on 
many subsequent cases, it may be unimportant to a judge who is seeking to adjudicate a 
matter before him.  With a literary canon, there is the cultural worth of a literary work in 
addition to its pedagogical value in the classroom.  While a specific piece of literature 
may be very important from a cultural perspective, it may not lend itself to being part of 
the standardized collection or canon of works which are included in core curricula at 
colleges and similar academic outlets.  Unlike the literary and legal canons, the Biblical 
Canon’s pedagogical agenda is generally unknown to us.  (This may be why it is the least 
permeable of the canons we discuss.)  Further, the cultural and adjudicative features of 
the Bible are also less prone to being isolated in the text in the way they are in legal and 
literary canons.  It can be argued that the BT contains all of the features described above: 
the adjudicative, the cultural, and the pedagogical, which are part and parcel of the 
canonicity of the corpus as a whole in its place among the rabbinic corpus.  In a similar 
vein, each sugya also contains at least one of the above three, if not more of these 
features, and they inform the canonicity on the more micro level of defining degrees of 
canonicity within individual sugyot and the elements comprising them. 
 
The adjudicative canonicity of the BT is the most obvious as compared to the 
others, although there are some areas where the adjudicative appears to be the driving 
feature, but in fact it is more cultural or pedagogical than it is adjudicative.  As I mention 
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on more than one occasion, the laws discussing Temple practices could not have really 
been assembled and crafted for any pragmatic purpose of adjudication, especially the 
purely Amoraic ones; rather, it is of deep cultural importance to the project of the BT to 
include such information for a range of reasons, such as the co-opting of the Temple’s 
authoritative stature for the rabbinic world, which includes the BT.  Within the confines 
of the rabbinic legal system, the canonicity of the BT is secure by the end of the Genoic 
period, and post-Genoic rabbinic literature treats both the substance of the sugya and the 
actual language of the sugya with great charity and a high degree of canonicity.33  For the 
purposes of adjudication in the period after the Geonim, the BT becomes possibly the 
most canonical work in that it is the primary halachic work upon which post-Genoic 
authorities base their adjudications. 
 
When looking at the BT as a compilation of canonical elements, it can be argued 
that many of the sugyot included in the BT possess a degree of adjudicative relevance 
both in the moment of their construction and their inclusion in the BT, and thereafter, 
when the BT is already constructed at some level.  Similar to the overwhelmingly large 
corpus of cases that comprise the history of federal cases in United States, not every case 
                                                
33 As I discuss later in this chapter, the greater the charity offered to the language of the text, the higher the 
degree of canonicity.  As I also explain later, Halivni explains in Peshat and Derash (Oxford  
London: University Press, 1991), 47-48, that the Bible is the sort of text that can only be ‘read into’ and 
problems on the surface of the text cannot be fixed by making changes to the text.  Discrepancies in the text 
can only be fixed through interpretation.  Similarly, the BT eventually becomes a similarly closed text 
where much of the substance and language can require reinterpretation before any adjustment to the text.  
When exactly the BT ceased to be a text that can absorb and adjust to the language – as it is now within 
traditional Yeshiva circles – is debatable, but one can firmly assert that by the post-Geonic periods such 
adjustments were due to available variant texts and not to the thought process and decision making of a 
scribe.  See Talya Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2011), 34-36. While Fishman argues for a late date for a full acceptance of the BT, she does not 
argue for a relatively later formulation of the BT as text, she is most concerned with the authority of the 
text wields among its readers in the 11th -12th centuries.   
 
  166 
can be included in a canon.  While it is difficult to prove something is absent, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that there existed memrot and even entire sugyot which did not 
make it into the final canon of the BT.  Even some sugyot and memrot, which may have 
been actively included by this or that rabbinic circle, may have fallen out of the 
transmission.  Because of their lack of adjudicative relevance they did not possess any 
significant degree of a canonical quality. 
 
Certain texts are included in the BT strictly for their cultural or moral resonance.  
The criteria by which such texts appear to be included are similar to those isolated with 
respect to a literary canon.  These would include all the non-legal sugyot, those without 
adjudicative quality for the sage with a real case he must judge.  Examples of this are the 
aggadic stories which convey different moral messages, some of which are apparent, and 
others which require more knowledge of the tradition.  Other examples of sugyot and 
entire tractates that have little or no adjudicative value are those related to Temple ritual.  
While the individual aggadic stories convey some more immediate moral – or other – 
meaning, the sugyot discussing Temple ritual are often bland and lacking in anything 
beyond the pure technical discussion of the matter at hand.  They were created to legislate 
what is supposed to happen in the Temple in Jerusalem; regardless of whether the 
legislation speaks to the Temple of history which was destroyed or to a future Temple, it 
is not addressing any real contemporary matter.  Similar to a literary canon that as a 
whole conveys certain messages because of a theme or idea that reappears throughout, 
this is also occurring in those sugyot dealing with Temple ritual.  And just as the literary 
canon is also comprised of individual works with their own nuanced moral messages, so 
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too does the BT as a whole contain shorter stories with their own nuanced cultural value.  
Thus, it becomes possible to look at the criteria by which a work can be included in a 
literary canon, and deploy them in the context of the BT, precisely because of its literary 
(and non-legal) elements.  
 
Within the pedagogical sphere, as mentioned above, there is an aspect to it which 
centers on the vastness of the knowledge required to have been considered a ‘licensed’ 
student.  While even stating that there was some amount of required knowledge is in the 
realm of speculation – however reasonable it seems – it is difficult to speculate on the 
different ranges of knowledge which would offer a student greater cultural capital as a 
scholar in the rabbinic institution of the time.34  Such knowledge can be some sort of 
compendium of memrot and sugyot; one can argue that such a compendium in a given 
rabbinic institution was both the canon of the institution and the material which the ideal 
all-knowing student of the text should know.  Beyond the knowledge of actual traditions 
regarding specific laws and the sugyot in which they are conveyed, there are also certain 
cases which are grouped together for different reasons which are relevant to how 
different parts of the text can be studied.  An example is ם"גק ל"עי, which is an acronym 
for the six cases where, from among the many disputes between Abaye and Rava, the 
ruling follows Abaye and not Rava.  The letters are broken down as follows35:  י–  שואי
תעדמ אלש, unconscious abandonment;  ע– םמוז דע , false witness;  ל– וילאמ דמועה יחל , a post 
                                                
34 Barry Wimpfheimer, “Legal Narratives in the Babylonian Talmud,” (Dissertation, Columbia University 
2005). Wimpfheimer dedicates Chapter  2 to the idea of “knowledge as cultural capital” and he is the first 
to develop it in this way in the context of understanding the BT. 
 
35 The translations of the Hebrew, I have taken from Louis Jacobs’ The Talmudic Argument: A Study in 
Talmudic Reasoning and Methodology (Cambridge and New York: University Press, 1994) page 47-48. 
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put up accidentally;  ק– האיבל ורסמנ אלש ןישודיק , betrothal which cannot lead to 
cohabitation;  ג– ןיטיגב תעד יולג , revealing one’s attitude indirectly in divorce; and  מ -  רמומ
סיעכהל תולבנ לכוא, an apostate who eats forbidden food out of spite.36  The acronym in 
itself is proof of the mnemonic quality of these cases and how they are grouped together.  
A student would have memorized this, its implications, as well as other similar acronyms 
and rules about the tradition of certain disputants.  Therefore, while these cases possess 
real adjudicative value, they can also serve a pedagogical purpose in terms of what a 
student in a rabbinic institution might be required to know. 
 
Unanimity  
The degree of unanimity between and among ‘proto-canons’ such as anthologies 
or casebooks is what informs the creator(s) of an actual canon.37  In the cases of literary 
and legal canons, unanimity is routinely part of the conversation when thinking about a 
canon of this legal system or that literary genre.  When compiling a ‘new’ anthology, one 
will look to anthologies published prior thereto, and at least in part will seek works that 
appear in many, if not all, of the anthologies.  While not necessarily achieving works of 
unanimous selection, a compiler can still be engaged in pursuing unanimity, knowing full 
well that pure unanimity cannot be achieved.  With respect to the Rabbinic Biblical 
Canon, the evidence seems to point to a pursuit of unanimity, similar to the anthological 
                                                
36 While these are the cases as the medieval Rashi describes them, there is little doubt that the acronym is 
ancient, and dates to a period – quite possibly Amoraic and certainly not definitively post-Amoraic – post-
dating Rava and Abaye.  While the BT itself accounts for some of the letters, others are left to guesswork, 
which Rashi does, and upon which I am relying here.  Nevertheless, there are six cases which would have 
fallen into this category of cases where the ruling follows Abaye, and which would have been ‘required 
knowledge’ for a student in a Babylonian rabbinic institution. 
 
37 In the end, even this ‘actual’ canon itself – as we discuss above – is but another anthology.  It is this 
pursuit of canon, and what goes into the pursuit that defines what the idea is around creating a canon.  This 
can be a way of getting as close as possible to essence of canon itself. 
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form of a canon in that a pure unanimity was unlikely.  This is certainly the case for the 
groups whose biblical canons were not considered normatively rabbinic, and there would 
be no mirage of a pursuit of unanimity if they too are considered.  Within the normative 
rabbinical circles at the time of the council at Yavneh, regardless of how definitive the 
events at Yavneh were in the formation of the final canon, it was unlikely and maybe 
impossible to assemble a Biblical Canon that could be called truly unanimous.  The 
Mishna in Yadayim conveys the feeling that there was a certain spirit of compromise and 
that the inclusion of Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes was not a reflection of pure 
unanimity in the way the books of Genesis and Judges were unanimous.  Like the legal 
casebooks and the literary anthologies, based upon which one can conjecture a canon, the 
Rabbinic Biblical Canon contains elements that were unanimously agreed upon, and 
others which were still not yet included. 
 
Although unanimity is nearly impossible to achieve, for practical purposes, the 
Tannaitic sages needed an agreed-upon canon in order to be able to refer to a single 
primary text based upon which they created their laws and ultimately the Mishna.  This 
canon, intact, was picked up by the Amoraic sages.  For the different editors and authors 
who contributed to the formation of the BT, there was a single Biblical text upon which 
they relied.  This is in contrast to the general difficulty in seeking unanimity of selection 
in different canons.  Pursuing such unanimity over time requires each new assembler of a 
canon to create a new one.  Once he does so, then he has fallen into the trap of creating a 
canon, which cannot possibly be definitive, such as is the case with Harold Bloom.  Even 
more ironic would be the temptation to pursue a populist or popular notion of what a 
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canon might be, and thus to purposefully look away from the more intellectualized 
canons that exist; and thus also to minimize them and pursue a notion of canon that might 
break down such paradigms.38  Even without getting into the psychology of an assembler 
of a canon or anthology, there is certainly a school of thought “that there are no canons 
and never have been.”39  And this more easily applies to the contemporary literary and 
legal canons, where there is no need to create such a definitive and final and unanimously 
agreed-upon canon.  The rabbinic tradition appears to avoid this problem with the story 
about the counsel at Yavneh.  With religious canons, including the Rabbinic Biblical 
Canon, things are quite different; we have books called “The Bible.”  Even though there 
are different versions, certain groups such as the Rabbis of the Babylonian milieu all 
worked within a purely unanimously agreed-upon Biblical Canon. 
 
Similarly, a final version of the BT emerges at some point, which is unanimous in 
the make-up of its tractates, and to a lesser degree, the sugyot within those tractates.  
Variances in versions40 make it clear that there was not the purest of unanimities during 
the earliest periods after the formation of its general structure and the sugyot comprised 
therein.  By the time several centuries had passed, and the printing press came into play, 
the text of the BT evolved into a final, fixed status.  I would like to speculate based upon 
notions of unanimity’s relationship with canon in the BT on two levels: the first concerns 
                                                
38 Botrel,“Popular Canon,” xxix. Botrel uses the language of “contempt for oneself” in describing such 
scholars who would rather pursue a popular case, but are mired in the intellectualism of their own pursuits 
(and acquired skill). 
 
39 Harris, “Canonicity,” 120.  
 
40 It is important to note that nearly all variances occur on the ‘micro’ level of the word or the phrase within 
a sugya and not the entirety of the sugya itself.  Certainly, there is little debate, if any, regarding which 
tractates are to be included as there is with books in the Bible. 
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the unanimity of individual sugyot and their inclusion in the final work, and the second 
concerns the inclusion of memrot within the sugyot.   
 
At some point, the BT itself becomes a unanimous and cohesive whole where 
there is absolute agreement on what is part of the canon.  The precise moment at which 
this occurs cannot be known, but by the time of the Geonim, the general consensus is that 
there was significant unanimity regarding much of the BT.41  As Halivni and others have 
suggested,42 there were different traditions from different rabbinic institutions.   The BT 
can be described as a canon that grew out of an anthology.  There is a canonical character 
to the creation of an anthology, especially as it relates to the BT.43 
 
For the purposes of clarity, I further define two different levels: one is on the level 
(micro, in this context) at which memrot are included in traditions surrounding specific 
Mishnayot and the other is on the level (macro, in this context) of the larger sugyot (in 
which those memrot were positioned) and their place in the BT as a whole.  The line 
between what is a grouping or pairing of memrot and what is a fully formed sugya might 
be blurred at certain junctures.  At those junctures, one possible way of handling the 
matter is by viewing the micro level as being more directly connected to the content of 
the Mishna, and by viewing the macro level as deviating from the content of the Mishna 
and moving on to tangential issues that arise in the context of the primary discussion.  In 
                                                
41 Even Talya Fishman, who argues for a late “canonization” of the BT as a whole, does not argue against 
its achieving its near final textual form by the time of the Geonim. Fishman, People of the Talmud, passim.  
 
42 David Halivni, mevo’ot l’Mekorot u’Mesorot, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2009), 32.  
 
43 See Eliezer Segal, “Anthological Dimensions of the Babylonian Talmud,” Prooftexts 17,1 (January 
1997), 35-36.  
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thinking about the micro level, it is worth imagining the goings-on in a rabbinic 
institution during the second, third, fourth or even fifth Amoraic generation as they pass 
on and formalize Amoraic traditions that they are going to associate with specific parts of 
the already fully-canonized Mishna. 
 
In order to discuss how one might wish to imagine the second, third, fourth or 
fifth generation rabbinic institution, I would like to point out (again) that I assume here 
and everywhere in my dissertation that there were more positions on many halachic 
matters discussed in the BT than are recorded in the BT.44  Here, I would like further to 
posit that it was in the context of the rabbinic institutions of the middle Amoraic 
generations that some were formally recorded and others were not – to be clear, not in the 
final version of the BT, but in the formal transmission of the specific institution, as it is 
ultimately these local traditions which come to comprise the BT as a whole.  Further, 
more than likely and reasonable to assume, the one(s) who served as arbiter(s) at different 
rabbinic institutions might have chosen different sages with whom to associate specific 
traditions; some tradition-to-sage associations may simply have been known and 
available to one institution but not another.  This is often reflected in the BT, where 
multiple sages are associated with one tradition; one is a reflection of this local canon, 
and the other is a reflection of that one.  This can also be informative in terms of 
                                                
44 Halivni explicitly offers that there were heads of academies who were excluded from the text of the BT.  
He bases this on the listing of rabbinic heads mentioned in Iggeret Sherira.  While one can argue that they 
had nothing to contribute, the idea of “nothing to contribute” can also be a form of “excluded from the 
text.”  See David Halivni, “Criteria of Stammaitic Intervention in Aggadata,” in Creation and Composition: 
the Contribution of the Bavli Redactors (Stammaim) to the Aggada ed. J. Rubenstein, (Tübingen : Mohr 
Siebeck, 2005), 342. Hyman Klein (“Gemara Quotations in Sebara,” JQR 43: 342-343) makes a similar 
point that Amoraim (and Savoraim) are taking part in a selective process when deciding which Amoraic 
material to in include in the corpus.   
 
  173 
understanding what happens when more localized canons of halachic positions must be 
combined together in the process of creating a comprehensive – more global – canon; 
instead of selecting the sage and tradition of one rabbinic institution, the later 
editors/authors of the evolving BT associated multiple sages with specific traditions.45   
 
While speculative, the above arguments regarding the micro level of an evolving 
BT canon are far more reasonable when dealing strictly with variables, which include 
simple memrot and the sages with whom they are associated.  However, once we take 
into account the shaqla v’tarya and other Stammaitic elements, the argument takes on a 
whole different dimension, since in the final form of the BT there can only be a single 
narrative weaving all the different memrot together.  Inclusivity with respect to 
apodictically presented sources and traditions is difficult but manageable; inclusivity with 
respect to a narrative, the shaqla v’tarya, and other Stammaitic elements is a far more 
complex proposition, although not absolutely impossible.  One solution to the possible 
issue of inclusivity regarding the shaqla v’tarya is simply to have used different shaqla 
v’tarya from different institutions in crafting the final corpus of the BT. 
 
In this context, it is worth mentioning the possibility that within the rabbinic 
institution, their shaqla v’tarya with all its nuance and verbiage was canonical to them, 
but not outside their walls.  This is to say that each rabbinic institution would have had its 
own evolving conversation around canonical rabbinic positions, such as those coming 
from the Mishna or from other Tannaitic sources, and as time progressed, from the earlier 
                                                
45 I discuss possible reasons for why this is the case in my chapter on multiplicity (Chapter V). There, I 
argue that multiple voices create greater acceptance since there would be a greater number of people who 
would be able to identify with the work as a whole because of their identification with a specific sage. 
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Amoraic sources.  That evolving conversation becomes the formal shaqla v’tarya only of 
that particular institution.  This would fall in line with Halivni’s contrast between the 
informal shaqla v’tarya that was transmitted, but not as part of the formal tradition, and 
the raw, apodictic halachic positions.  As opposed to pure halachic traditions where the 
substance of the position might have been canonical across different rabbinic institutions 
but not its verbiage, the shaqla v’tarya is defined by the language it deploys as much as it 
is by the ideas it attempts to convey. 
 
In thinking about the macro level of the BT as a canon, there are the sugyot which 
comprise the material that becomes – over time – canonically associated with specific 
Mishnayot.  The Mishnayot are already part of the Mishnaic canon, which can be broken 
down into orders, which include tractates; the tractates include chapters which are 
comprised of Mishnayot.  The Mishnayot themselves are broken down into different 
apodictic halachic statements that were pieced together in the creation of the Mishna.46  
Once whole, and in the tractate, the Mishnayot were then in the position of being the 
canonical centerpiece around which the sugyot clustered.  The starting point in the 
canonicity of the BT is the earliest association of post-Tannaitic, Amoraic halachic 
traditions with the formal, highly canonized, and firmly fixed Tannaitic Mishna.  The end 
point is where the sugyot of the BT and the Amoraic traditions they contain are entirely 
textualized in fixed language and also firmly associated with a specific Mishna (or 
                                                
46 The creation of the Mishna presents its own set of questions, which I do not address here.  I understand 
that when discussing the assembly of the Mishna, that it operates in different ways.  There is an assumption 
that Rabbi Judah assembled the entirety of the Mishna in a relatively short period of time, and included the 
compendium of Mishnayot of individual tannaitic sages; while the details of the who and where is 
important, more important is the question of the speed with which it became the text that became sealed as 
the Mishna.  Thus, it is very difficult to address in such a cursory manner the issue of whether to look at 
chapters, individual Mishnayot, or entire tractates. 
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Mishnayot); moreover, a defining quality of the endpoint is where the BT and the Mishna 
are treated with the same degree of charity, and can thus be described as possessing very 
similar – if not the same – degree of canonicity. 
 
This association between a Mishna and formally transmitted Amoraic traditions is 
the basis for the ‘macro-’ level canonicity of the BT.  When looking at a sugya, one can 
ask – as we did earlier – about how the different traditions, sources, and Stammaitic 
elements came together to form the sugya; one can also ask about the manner in which a 
sugya is incorporated in association with a specific Mishna.47  There is room to view the 
sugya as a canon of the traditions and Stammaitic elements that are included within it, 
and at the same time to view the BT as a canon of a multitude of sugyot.  Conceptually, 
this would not be that different from a canon of western literature including the works of 
Plato, and for the idea of Plato’s works to be a canon of Plato’s dialogues.  Essentially, 
within the broader rabbinic canon, this type of hyper-macro to hyper-micro scale exists: 
just as tractates are part of the BT canon, so too is the BT part of the rabbinic canon; and 
conversely, as described above, the tractates can be broken down into ever smaller parts, 
almost including the level of the individual word.48 
The goal in defining canon was to set up the idea that degrees of canonicity exist 
on different levels and in different ways in the BT.  By understanding these, we are better 
positioned to establish what goes into the highest degree of canonicity: the canonicity of 
                                                
47 This is especially critical when looking at sugyot, or parts thereof, that appear at multiple points in the 
BT.  So called “תופלחומ תויגוס” (cognate sugyas) are an example.  See Y.N. Epstein, mevo’ot  l’Sifrut 
ha’amoraim (Tel Aviv: Magnes Press, 1962), 99 – 101.  
 
48 When I analyze texts, it is partly for this reason that I begin with the word, and provide my analysis with 
the word as the springboard. 
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the sealed text which reflects a sealed tradition, and in the case of the BT, its source as 
well.  I have drawn upon definitions of canons of literature, law, and the Rabbinic Bible 
in order to create a framework from which it is possible to glean an understanding of 
what canon and the BT might mean.  While the Rabbinic Bible offers insights into what 
defines an absolutely fixed canon, the contemporary literary and legal canons allow us to 
think in more flexible terms about evolving canons, and canons which have not yet been 
fixed substantively or linguistically.  While I leave the primary discussion regarding 
plurality to the next chapter, in closing this chapter, it is worth noting that all three canons 
possess a certain quality of plurality.  I have hinted to this, above, and feel that it is the 
appropriate point of departure before embarking on a discussion of plurality in the BT. 
 
The highest degrees of canonicity emanate from the plurality of voices that are 
included within the final version of the canon.  The idea is that there are not only a 
plurality of voices contained within the narrative of the BT, but also many voices that 
remain equally authoritative regarding the same traditions because of a lack of dispute 
resolution in many sugyot.  This comfort with unresolved dispute is in a way at odds with 
the common notion that the pursuit of canon is also the pursuit of something resolved.49  
                                                
49 Sergey Dolgopolski, What is Talmud? The Art of Disagreement (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2009), 16-20. It is also worth noting that Dolgopolski (Dolgo) also argues for an analysis of the text 
removed from a chronology.  Instead of focusing on chronologies, Dolgo’s goal is to read the text as also 
expressing a philosophy, and that a certain rationalism can be found therein that elevates it to this status.  
This type of reading is precisely the sort of reading that becomes possible when looking at texts without the 
obsession over chronology and layers and “original sources.”  I attempt to find a different type of meaning 
which in no way is an attack on Dolgo’s project, which must be expanded upon.  Rather, different types of 
readings are all valuable and add to how we view meaning and how we understand the text of the BT.  
Dolgo, because of his background in Philosophy, approaches the text naturally and without the 
preconceptions with which more traditional students of the BT are occupied, without an obsession with 
chronology and periodization.  While this is not the place to go further into this matter, it is worth looking 
at Dolgo’s book for a discussion on the broader idea of Talmud and chronologies of sages who commented 
on it in the millennia after the Amoraic period.  As one example (page 134) Dolgo analyzes a specific 
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This is an area not discussed above and that applies to the BT in a way which it does not 
to the above three canon types.  As discussed above, when viewing the BT as a canon of 
sugyot (and not necessarily as a completed work within the broader rabbinic canon), one 
will find that they are unresolved in two ways: (1) within themselves; and (2) in relation 
to other sugyot.  Within many sugyot, there are multiple halachic positions that are not 
only mentioned, but that are also left standing at the end of the sugya.  Among sugyot in 
the BT, there are sugyot that contradict one another not only in the substance of the 
‘bottom-line’ halacha, but also in the source associated with the particular halacha – 
meaning that in one sugya a particular Amora will argue one position on a given halachic 
matter, and in another he will appear to argue the opposite position.  These types of un-
resolutions are canonical in terms of their place in the BT, and are part of the fabric of the 
text.  Without allowing for a plurality of voices to become canonical, the BT is quite a 
different enterprise. 
                                                                                                                                            
sugya regarding Shmuel, and seamlessly drifts between the medieval commentaries and the text, and pays 
no attention to chronology in his pursuit of meaning. 




 As I do when I am otherwise unsure of how to begin to define a term or 
commence a chapter, I resort to the Oxford Dictionary for a definition.  It defines 
pluralism as “a condition or system in which two or more states, groups, principles, 
sources of authority, etc., coexist.”1  While this Oxford definition can apply in a range of 
different arenas such as politics, culture, and philosophy, the focus of our attempt to 
understand pluralism in the BT is on legal pluralism and to a lesser extent on religious 
pluralism.  The BT was crafted at a time when the idea of halacha as the dominant law 
(of a land or state) was far from the minds of its creators; this is outside of the theoretical 
world in which halacha is dominant.  The BT therefore can be viewed as an example of a 
legal system that is easily absorbed into a dominant law in a state where legal pluralism is 
possible.  It is structured in such a way that it readily can conform to the demands of a 
broader, more dominant legal system.  Additionally, an essential quality of the BT is the 
multiplicity and plurality of voices that permeate its pages.  This plurality refers to the 
actual legal positions and sources, traditions, and disputes associated therewith.  When 
discussing multiplicity or plurality, it is also a reference to the plurality of sources of 
authority in the text of the BT.  Such sources include not only the named authorities but 
also the anonymous Stammaitic elements.  The goal of this chapter is to offer a general 
description of pluralism, its manifestation in the BT, and the manner in which it impacts 
how a reader approaches the text. 
 
                                                
1 http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/pluralism?region=us&q=pluralism, retrieved 2/27/12.   
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 In establishing a definition, I break down pluralism into two very general types in 
such a way as to best shed light on the phenomenon in the BT.  Within these two general 
types, I will be able to plug in relevant scholarship so as to give greater texture to my 
deployment of the word (and concept) plurality.  The two types can be described as 
follows: (1) the first is ‘inter-’ in the sense that it is about a pluralism of different – and 
possibly competing – systems co-existing in the same time and space; and (2) the second 
is ‘intra-’ because it revolves around the pluralism of legal (or other) positions co-
existing within what is seemingly the same legal (or other) system.  Similar to how the 
BT relates to canonicity and is canonical in two ways – it is both part of a broader 
rabbinic canon and itself a canon of sugyot – the same is true for how the BT can be 
defined in terms of its legal pluralism.  It is part of a broad pluralism outside the walls of 
the institutions that create and transmit them, and thus an ‘inter-’ pluralism.  The BT is a 
system capable of operating alongside other systems,2 and in its way carrying and 
asserting authority as well.  It might be said that it possesses an ‘intra-’ pluralism because 
of both the number of sources that are almost forced into different sugyot as well as the 
number whose positions are still acceptable at the resolution of the sugya’s 
argumentation.  Having asserted the above, my overall conclusion is that the evidence 
does not really point to multiple legal systems between and among the different Amoraic 
(and Tannaitic) sages; rather, there is confirmation that the text purposefully puts forth a 
                                                
2 In their recent studies, Secunda and Elman have certainly demonstrated that the BT was not standing 
alone as a legal system in its time and place.  See for example Yaakov Elman, “Returnable Gifts in 
Rabbinic and Sassanian Law,” Irano-Judaica VI (2008): 139-184; Idem., “Toward an intellectual history of 
Sasanian law : an intergenerational dispute in ‘Herbedestan’ 9 and its rabbinic and Roman parallels,”in The 
Talmud in Its Iranian Context ed. by Carol Bakhos and M. Rahim Shayegan (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2010), 21-57; Shai Secunda, “Reading the Bavli in Iran,” Jewish Quarterly Review 100,2 (2010): 310-342; 
Idem., “Talmudic text and Iranian context : on the Development of Two Talmudic Narratives,” AJS 
Review 33,1 (2009): 45-69.  This list is not meant to demonstrate whether or not or the degree to which the 
BT actually operated alongside other systems.  It is meant to demonstrate that it can.   
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multiplicity of options regarding most halachic issues that come up.  This multiplicity of 
options is still operating within a single legal system, one which is tolerant (or even 
encouraging) of a range of positions regarding a given halachic matter. 
 
 When exploring pluralism while looking for meaning in the BT and its sugyot the 
emphasis should be on the multiplicity of voices and the possible intra- pluralism, which 
more often than not is merely a reflection of a multiplicity of voices in the sugya and not 
a reflection of intra-pluralism.  This is almost a dismissal of the idea of there existing an 
intra-pluralism within the BT in favor of the simpler and more useful multiplicity of 
voices.3  Many of the ideas and concepts that are relevant to pluralism from the inter- 
perspective can be reframed and applied to the intra- pluralism of the BT.  The most 
easily accessible material that deals with pluralism generally comes at it from the inter- 
point of view, and this is primarily how pluralism has been framed.  Further, because this 
type of pluralism is easier to define, I focus first on pluralism from this vantage point, of 
the inter- in law broadly.  Obviously, as in my discussion of canonicity, there is a 
‘western’ bias in my discussion and the materials from which I try to draw conclusions 
regarding a description of legal pluralism, and how those descriptions are relevant to the 
BT and the nature of its pluralism and multiplicity of voice. 
 
 
                                                
3 I maintain the category (and do not dismiss) intra-pluralism because of Suzanne Stone’s arguments 
regarding halacha (and the BT) being a form of legal pluralism.  Clearly, she is not referring to my inter-
pluralism when she discusses pluralism, and she must be discussing intra-pluralism.  As I discuss, she 
points to the Noahide laws and to references to non-Rabbinic courts as demonstrative of legal pluralism in 
the BT.  She claims that these are evidence of different legal systems existing side by side.  This is legal 
pluralism of the inter- sort, if it is to exist in the BT.  Multiplicity is a reference to multiple legitimate 
positions on any given halachic matter. See Suzanne L. Stone, “Sinaitic and Noahide law: legal pluralism in 
Jewish law,” Cardozo Law Review 12 (1990-1991): 1157-1214. 
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Inter- 
My approach to defining the BT as a legal system which can fit into a world 
where there exists legal pluralism requires several smaller discussions whose end goal is 
to posit that the BT fits into the world of legal pluralism in a dual way: (1) that it is a 
legal system capable of being – and at times actually is – a law that operates side-by-side 
with formal state law; and (2) that it also sees itself as being – or as having the potential 
of being – a supreme law that allows for legal pluralism even where it is the dominant 
law, similar to Stone’s idea of legal pluralism in the BT.4  To that end, I attempt to 
discuss some contemporary notions of what is legal pluralism.  While such a discussion 
can mean many different things, I try to unpack the definition of what law is and the 
breadth of what systems of governance or even lesser human controls can also be 
construed as law.  My goal in doing so is to determine whether a legal system is legally 
pluralistic or capable of legal pluralism.5  The definitions of law I draw upon include 
those written by scholars dealing with contemporary law and modern legal systems.  
Nevertheless, some of the principles gleaned from looking at contemporary theories of 
legal pluralism and law as well as the relatively different ways scholars in those fields 
have of articulating law serve to shed light on the BT and its relationship to legal 
pluralism as a concept, specifically on the inter- level.  I also look at some of the 
                                                
4 Stone, “Noahide Law”. 
 
5 When I speak of the capacity or capability of a law, legal system, the BT, et alia for legal pluralism, I refer 
to its potential more so than its actual state in any particular moment.  For example, even Rabbinic Law can 
be considered capable of legal pluralism, but in a world without non-Jews, such legal pluralism would be 
unnecessary and only the capacity would be left.  This can also be said for strains of Islamic and Christian 
law. 
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scholarship from within Jewish studies, and specifically from legal theorists who work in 
the worlds of both rabbinic law and general legal theory. 
 
Generally speaking, theory speaks to ideas that emanate from the best evidence 
available to us.  Often, that includes a combination of different types of evidence; the 
literary, the historical, and the legal are the ones that come to mind when approaching the 
BT.  With respect to the BT, those three types of evidence have all emerged from the BT 
itself for scholars who are trying to understand and analyze the BT outside (as much as is 
possible) the more traditional paradigms through which the BT is often viewed.6  Beyond 
that, there is very little in the way of extra-BT evidence to speak of, and we need to look 
to the text for clues, since the overt message of the text carries with it only one point of 
view of its place and context within its formative time and space.  For the purposes of this 
chapter, the focus will primarily be on the more conceptual aspects of the BT and its 
place within a legally pluralistic state. 
 
There is little known about the actual history during the formative years of the 
BT, but even without the full history, some application of legal theory can inform our 
understanding of the matter.  Beyond the fact that little is known about the history of the 
BT, little attempt has been made to unearth actual historical evidence that could inform 
our understanding of the BT’s place in the relatively legally pluralistic Zoroastrian world.  
The most promising is the work on parallels with Zoroastrian law recently undertaken in 
                                                
6 A dissertation can be written on the topic of why modern scholars of the BT still rely upon the 
periodization created by Sherira, who operated firmly within the tradition and specified the halachic 
importance of each period.  When discussing Stammaitic activity, I discuss this matter at some length, 
questioning why Halivni insisted on plugging his Stammaim into the existing periodization paradigm.  
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a meaningful way and inspired by Yaakov Elman.7  Very little has been written about the 
BT as a system among others, although Elman comes the closest to addressing this matter 
in his work on the BT and its legal parallels in contemporary Zoroastrian law.  What we 
do know is that the BT was in no way authoritative beyond the Jewish communities in 
Babylonia who studied it, and even in that context, its level of authority among the 
community is something that can only be speculated.  Even asserting that the BT 
‘competed’ with any truly authoritative legal system might be a stretch.  It is, however, 
likely that the BT and the traditions contained therein did possess some amount of 
authority for at least some members of the different Jewish Babylonian communities.  
Laws regarding the Temple would be nearly irrelevant, and laws regarding land sales 
might be subject to non-Talmudic local laws.  Yet laws regarding the Sabbath, 
circumcision, and even marriage and divorce might have fallen within the purview of a 
Rabbi and the BT traditions to which he referred in order to adjudicate a particular 
halachic matter.  Within the sugyot of the BT, such a parsing of the text’s (or the Rabbi’s) 
authority is in no way hinted.  Betrothal, Sabbath, contract, and Temple laws are all 
delivered with the same authoritative voice and in the same narrative style.8 
 
Legal Pluralism 
In discussing legal pluralism beyond the pure conceptual realm of the BT, the past 
20 years have seen a significant rise in the number of deployments of the concept and the 
                                                
7 See above note 2.  
 
8 It is worth noting some examples of texts dealing with these matters and trying to demonstrate how the 
language and style of resolution are indistinguishable.  To my knowledge, there is no scholarship 
attempting to discern among the different types of authority that would have existed regarding the different 
laws ranging from those the rabbis most certainly controlled (Sabbath and circumcision) and those they 
certainly did not (contracts, land ownership, capital cases).   
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degree to which it is part of the general discourse regarding law.  In his article seeking to 
demonstrate the value of a non-essentialist view of legal pluralism, Brian Tamanaha 
points to several statements regarding legal pluralism made by contemporary scholars.9  
He discusses how it is “a central theme in the reconceptualization of the law/society 
relation,”10 and “capable of identifying authentic legal phenomena operating on a global 
level,”11 and how “this pluralism is so commonly accepted that it can be assumed,”12 and, 
most powerfully, stated that, “anyone who does not [accept legal pluralism as a concept] 
is simply out of date and can safely be ignored.”13  Tamanaha goes on to provide another 
observation that is uncanny in its relevance to students of the BT: “The core credo of 
legal pluralists is that there are all sorts of normative orders not attached to the state 
which are nevertheless ‘law.’  These non-state legal orders range from pockets within the 
state legal systems where indigenous norms and institutions continue to exert social 
control, to the rule-making and enforcing power of corporations and universities, to the 
normative order which exists within small social groups.”14 
 
                                                
9 Brian Z. Tamanaha, “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism,” Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 
27, No.2 (June 2000): 296-297. 
 
10 S.E. Merry, “Legal Pluralism” Law and Society Review (1988), 869.  
 
11 Gunther Teubner, “Legal Pluralism in World Society” in Global Law Without a State, ed. G. Teubner 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co. 1996): 3-28.  
 
12 A. Riles, “Representing the In-Between: Law, Anthropology and the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity” in 
the Illinois Law Review (1994):  597- 641.  
 
13 John Griffiths, “Legal Pluralism and the Theory of Legislation – With Special Reference to the 
Regulation of Euthanasia” in Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law eds. H. Petersen and 
H. Zahle (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995), 201. 
 
14 Tamanaha, “Non-Essentialist,” 298. 
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Addressing legal pluralism is difficult while avoiding modern political 
terminology inextricably connected to discussions of law.  Tamanaha uses the word 
‘state’ to define the apparatus which is in control of the law, and conversely to which the 
law and its guardians are beholden.  While imperfect, the state can successfully represent 
the idea of the dominant law.  The strength/weakness of the state in relation to the 
strength/weakness of communities with other ‘legal’ or cultural obligations represents the 
degree of dominance. I am aware of the tension of using terms such as the ‘state’ in 
discussing cultures which predate the formulation of such terminology.15  Nevertheless, 
there is little choice when discussing the relationship of Rome to Roman Law; in the 
most basic abstract terms, Rome is the state. Roman Law is dominant in Rome.16  
Similarly, in a legal context, the Sassanid Empire and its law is best understood as the 
‘state’ and its apparatus, respectively. 
 
Tamanaha is approaching the task of defining law from a path that is acutely non-
essentialist and therefore he still needs to find features and a shared ‘language’ that is 
common to all forms of regulations. Tamanaha best defines his form of rejecting 
essentialism in stating that it “assumes that law consists of a singular phenomenon which 
can be defined, and it assumes that law is by nature functional.  This essentialist approach 
to law gives rise to unresolvable analytical and instrumental difficulties that inhibit the 
                                                
15 One need not look past Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Karl Marx’s Kapital for basic use of the 
term. 
 
16 Emilio Biagini, “Roman Law and Political Control -from a Primitive Society to the Dawn of the Modern 
World” in GeoJournal , Vol. 33, No. 4, (August 1994), 331-340. 
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development of the idea of legal pluralism.”17  This non-essentialist approach supports 
the removal of obstacles that might slow down the application of legal pluralism.   
 
Specifically, for the scholars of the BT who see themselves also as legal theorists, 
this legitimizes the idea that the BT can be law and part of a pluralistic legal system.  The 
first step, however is establishing the legitimacy of legal pluralism itself.  In this process, 
Tamanaha’s words resonate with the BT scholar, and at times it seems as if Tamanaha is 
speaking of the BT (which he is obviously not).  Even the traditional scholar of the BT – 
or one can say especially the traditional scholar of the BT – would sense the applicability 
of Tamanaha’s broad definition that “Law is whatever people identify and treat through 
their social practices.”18  Even more relevant to our discussion is Tamanaha’s reference to 
religious law as an example of what he is conveying in the above quote: “and people refer 
to religious law (or specifically, to Islamic Law, or the Sharia, or the Talmud, or canon 
law).”19 
 
                                                
17 Brian Z. Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 171.  This book is a significant expansion on the article quoted above. 
 
18 Tamanaha, General Jurisprudence, 194.  This quote came to my attention where it is quoted by Simon 
Roberts.  Further, it is worth noting that Tamanaha is primarily responding to Teubner in his attack on legal 
essentialism.  While some essentialists can easily consider the BT a legal text, and ‘law’ per se, I have left 
out a discussion of the debate between the to, and point the reader to Roberts’ article, which succinctly 
summarizes the essence of that debate.  Our goal is to discuss the BT as a work that has the potential for 
inclusion within a legally pluralistic system, and how this may have manifest over time. 
 
19 Tamanaha, “Non-Essentialist,” 314. It is worth noting that Tamanaha draws upon the Talmud as an 
example side-by-side with Islamic law, but he does not offer any detail in terms of the distinctions between 
the two, specifically that the Talmud was never the official law of any state or government.  This is unlike 
Islamic law, which is designed to be a dominant and singular, and which is also less able to become part of 
a legally pluralistic society.  I argue that the BT is distinct from Islamic law in the sense that it is ‘able’ 
seamlessly almost to fit into the legally pluralistic systems that will have it. 
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The above discussion primarily revolves around an analysis of pluralism on the 
inter- level, and legal pluralism as it is discussed in today’s academy is primarily viewing 
legal pluralism in this way.  Yet it is also possible to view all the different types of 
systems which govern life that are listed above as part of one much larger legal system 
which comprises all those different elements, and also includes within it the actual legal 
system of the state – the legal system as understood in normal conversation.  I only make 
the point in order to demonstrate the ease with which the inter-/intra- paradigm can be 
deconstructed.  Legal pluralists are primarily concerned with contemporary law and its 
relation to social structures which possess many of the features of a legal system, but are 
not ‘the law’ in the sense of having a structure that emanates from the state and being 
enforced by the state or an entity closely associated with it.  Also, beyond the categories 
above, in terms of the legal system in the United States there is the duality of nearly all 
jurisdictions operating at least under federal and state laws and a great many further 
operating under the jurisdiction of municipal, county, and/or other set of local laws. 
 
The BT as a text, and as the source for a lived experience, is more than a mere 
part of a larger social fabric; it too is an organized legal system with an element of 
enforcement connected to it.  We can only speculate on the nature of enforcement during 
the Amoraic period and the periods that followed during which the BT was still evolving 
as a comprehensive text.  We can, however, safely assume that in some areas of religious 
life there would have been at the very least an informal enforcement resulting from the 
social realities within the community, which was not tolerant of certain types of 
violations and would have reacted to them in some way.  In many ways, the BT is 
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designed to operate as the ideal non-primary legal system in a world where a dominant 
legal system – one affiliated with and enforced by the state – allows for the promulgation 
of legal pluralism within its realm.  Because of the manner in which the traditions are 
submitted so relatively humbly and without force – nearly always adjacent to an opposing 
position – the text of the BT does not comes off as harsh or as demanding of its place 
within any society nor within a legal pluralism that might be associated with it. 
 
The BT does not pose any threat of usurping the dominance or primacy of the 
state’s legal system.  This is true both in the moments of its creation, and through the 
ages.20  It might offer situations in which adherents to its traditions would have to eschew 
this or that specific law if it is contradictory to its laws.21  Rabbis who looked to the BT, 
both in its formative states and in its final form, did not have the authority – even from 
the text itself – to challenge existing state law as a natural, day-to-day course of action.  
The acknowledgement of the impact of the law of the state upon rabbinic authority is 
evidenced in the BT.  An example is found in Bava Qamma 117a, where Rav Kahana 
slaughters a man who was about to turn in his fellow Jew to the dominant non-Jewish 
authorities (i.e. to the State as I use the term in this dissertation).  Rav, who is present in 
the story, urges Rav Kahana to leave town and go to Israel because the authorities now 
care about murder where in the past they might not have.22  Rav Kahana then goes to 
                                                
20 As mentioned earlier, the BT reads as almost purposefully malleable and can thus read as a legal system 
that can easily co-exist in a society where legal pluralism is the order of the day. 
 
21 Examples might include where the state mandates that citizens must engage in idol worship, which is 
considered a sin that one should be killed for per Sanhedrin 74a.  
 
22 The text actually states that the new authorities who care about murder are the Greeks, and the ones who 
did not care about murder were Persians.  As the commentators on the BT have pointed, and as Boyarin has 
elucidated (Socrates and the Fat Rabbis, 186-188), there is very little historical sense in the notion of 
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Israel to study with Rabbi Yohanan.  The story highlights the degree to which the authors 
of the text – and possibly the historical players in the story to the extent the story reflects 
history at all – acknowledged the power of the state and the reach of its laws.  Under one 
regime murder was an offense, but one with which one could get away.  Under the other 
regime, as Rav states, murder is considered an offense worthy of the interest (and 
prosecution) of the state.  Conversely, the one who was murdered was killed because of 
his desire to be overly complicit with state law.  It appears from the text that the sages 
represented therein would be willing to allow a man to get away with murder if that 
murder was only a violation of state law and not halacha.  At the same time, the murder 
in the story is in response to a Jewish individual acting in a manner that is complicit with 
state law by turning in his fellow Jew to the authorities of state. 
 
In a world of legal pluralism there can exist systems such as those of ‘domestic 
law’ which are juxtaposed with those of ‘state law’ where the authorities might clash in 
more dramatic fashion, and where each ‘law’ and its proponents will attach themselves 
with full fervor.  This contemporary example regarding the tension between domestic law 
and state law has served as a paradigm within the community of legal pluralists.  As 
opposed to ‘state law’ which is easy to identify and whose accoutrements are often 
obvious, ‘domestic law’ – if it can even be categorized as law – is murky and not as 
readily identifiable.  In general terms, ‘domestic law’ can be defined as that part of a 
                                                                                                                                            
Greeks assuming such authority from the Persians at this time.  If anything, as Boyarin points out, it would 
have been the other way around.  The Persians assumed authority from the Greeks.  Further, the entire 
history of this story is shrouded in dubiousness.  Yet looking at the story as a legal narrative allows for a 
literary reading while still maintaining a significant legal consideration.  As I mentioned earlier, the legal 
considerations are primary in this chapter, but in no way do they diminish (or even usurp) the potential 
primacy of the literary when operating in other contexts. 
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familial culture that governs itself through an intuited web of informal and unwritten 
codes for conduct and even thought.23 
 
There are and have been societies where domestic law is absolutely separate from 
state law, and they exist side by side, in pluralistic fashion, without any tension; this is 
obviously made easier where the state respects domestic law and makes little attempt to 
govern in the areas of the domestic or familial.24  Specifically, an oft-cited case in this 
context is that of domestic abuse;25 there is the authority of domestic law where the abuse 
of a spouse is acceptable, on the one hand, and on the other hand the authority of state 
law where physical abuse of any kind is unacceptable and prosecutable under the law, 
and this enforcement in the form of legal prosecution is financed and supported by the 
government.  De Sousa Santos’ definition of law – which allows for some vicious 
behavior under domestic law to be defined as law – gives a certain credibility to those 
who value their immediate domestic law by giving it the title of law and not classifying it 
in some other way.26  The laws in the BT, and more importantly the degree of authority it 
exudes vis-à-vis the law of the state and the manner in which it mutes it, are in no way as 
                                                
23 While the description is my own, it is my ‘nutshell’ definition based upon my reading of de Sousa 
Santos’ work regarding legal pluralism, and specifically his general theory that significantly broadens the 
spectrum of what can be considered law.  See Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common 
Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (London: Routledge, 1995). 
 
24 In one of the defenses written by Lysias, Euphiletus defends himself in the murder of Eratosthenes, 
claiming that he cannot be found guilty of murder under Solon’s laws because the man he killed had an 
adulterous relationship with his wife.  Solon’s laws do not recommend (nor can we know if they condone) 
the murder of an adulterer; they simply don’t find the murdered guilty of murder because of the 
circumstance.  Athenian law is structured to dismiss charges against citizens whose domestic law demands 
this type of murder.  For the defenses of Lysias see Kathleen Freeman, The Murder of Herodes and Other 
Trials from the Athenian Courts (New York: Norton, 1963), 43-53. 
 
25 De Sousa Santos, New Legal Common Sense, 428-430. 
 
26 Tamanaha, “Non-Essentialist,” 304. 
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threatening as certain domestic laws might be.  It also has little in it that would allow for 
a reader to construe the BT as inspiring its students and adherents to take action harmful 
to the state under normal circumstances. 
 
Thus, as alluded to above, there was little danger to the legal systems of some 
states in allowing the BT to develop and evolve as a self-contained legal system, and not 
just as a compilation of customs.  While I can only speculate, it is likely that during the 
process of its creation, the BT was not under any pressure to classify itself as something 
other than law.  I attribute this to the ease with which it can be a safe system within a 
legally pluralistic society.  This is especially the case for legal pluralists of the de Sousa 
Santos ilk, who freely label almost any set of behavioral codes as law and as part of the 
broader societal legal pluralism.  Within the paradigm of de Sousa Santos, the BT need 
not undergo any analysis in order to be deemed a legal system, especially where there are 
actual people who still rely upon it as authoritative for guidance in their lived lives. 
 
A legal pluralism that views virtually every behavioral structure as law clearly has 
its critics, who will work toward limiting the scope of the definition of law while still 
maintaining their place as legal pluralists.  One school of thought regarding limiting the 
scope of law, yet still remaining within the realm of legal pluralism, limits law to that 
which is articulated.  The boundaries of law are far vaster than what a purely essentialist 
view would allow, and is inclusive of anything that is binary in the legal/illegal sense.27  
                                                
27 Gunther Teubner, “The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism,” Cardozo Law Review (1992), 
1443-1451; Gunther Teubner, Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin and New 
York: W. de Gruyter, 1988). 
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It is the language surrounding those things that control human behavior that defines 
whether those controls can be defined as law or not.  While such limits may preclude 
things such as domestic law from the realm of law, it still firmly leaves the BT as a legal 
system.  Regardless of its actual authority in lived lives, the BT conducts all its dialogue 
very much as a piece of legal work.  It discusses behavioral suggestions as much more – 
it discusses them as law even when there might not have been available to the text (and 
its authors) the enforcement that it might require.  The BT possesses that unique feature 
in that its discourses and narratives are loaded with legal implications and consequences, 
yet it is still a valuable cultural and halachic document often operating without any 
formal enforceability regarding those suggestions.  Even where law’s definition starts to 
become limited in a world where legal pluralism reigns, the BT still remains 
unthreatening and is able to maintain its place in the orbit of legal systems acceptable 
within a state where other laws are more dominant and primary. 
 
The scope of the definition of law is impacted by attempts at expanding the idea 
of what can be considered law within a state where legal pluralism can be said to appear 
to exist.  On the inter- level, the more broadly one defines law, the easier it is to posit the 
legal system of the BT as part of the legally pluralistic world.  One method which can be 
utilized in determining the degree to which law is broadly defined is by applying theories 
of law that seek to detach law from the state.  This first requires a definition of law that 
can work without drawing upon the language that conjures images of, or requires 
references to, the state.  Such an extreme view certainly – after moving past such radical 
definitions and conceptually returning to the reconsideration of the state and its law as 
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actors in the most broadly defined notion of law – would have room to include a text such 
as the BT that carries many accoutrements of a formal legal system.   To get at the most 
extreme of these notions of law separate from the state or government, one can look at 
how they seek to uncover what law might have been like in a time before the existence of 
the state as a formal arbiter and enforcer of the law.  In a world without a state, there are 
still laws – even if they are informal, unwritten, and enforced in a less than highly 
consistent manner.  This is the position promoted by Rodolfo Sacco, who explicitly states 
that it is necessary to “trace the origins of the basic structures of law from beyond the 
recent past covered by conventional legal history.”28  He continues by arguing that, “law 
preceded any individual design… and lived, even without a lawgiver.”29 
 
Such an approach certainly sets a very clear path for a scholar to argue for the BT 
to be considered law in any society, and especially in one defined by legal pluralism.  For 
many a legal theorist interested in the BT’s place among legal systems operating within a 
legally pluralistic society, such a broad-based conclusion is not sufficient.  This type of 
conclusion, because it nearly totally deconstructs the meaning of law, is essentially 
lumping the BT together with things like domestic law and the rules that might have 
governed a community of prehistoric homo-sapiens or even the caves where 
Neanderthals or homo-erectus conducted their affairs and practiced whatever social rules 
they had – social rules that are now a form of law on par with that of the state and of the 
                                                
28 Rodolfo Sacco, “Mute Law” The American Journal of Comparative Law, No. 43 (1995), 455.  
 
29 Sacco, “Mute Law,” 458.  These two quotes are taken from Simon Roberts, “After Government? On 
Representing Law Without the State” The Modern Law Review, Volume 68, No. 1, (January 2005), 6-7 
who will ultimately argue against this perspective on the nature of law and the scope of its definition. 
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BT.  The scholar of the BT, and especially the traditional scholar of the BT, would prefer 
the narrower definition of law, and would still like to maintain the conceptual viability of 
legal pluralism.  They would also like to see the BT defined as a part of that legal 
pluralism.  This is their preference regardless of whether we are discussing different 
situations such as the following: the contemporary western milieu in which we think 
about and express our theories about the law; the historical medieval places where Jewish 
courts relied on the BT as central to the adjudication of religious matters and disputes; or 
in a more ‘imagined’ world in which the BT is dominant and was created and evolved 
into the authoritative text it ultimately becomes. 
 
Roberts, in his article “After Government? On Representing Law Without the 
State,” offers a perspective on the law that explores such a detachment of law from the 
state.30  Nevertheless, in the end he concludes that, “it is very difficult to specify in a 
convincing way a secure grounding for ‘law’ if we try to shake it free from particular 
forms historically associated with the state.”31  Roberts’ fundamental fear is that “we risk 
losing all sense of what it [law] is” if we broaden the scope of its definition and “extend 
the space claimed by jural discourse and institutional forms.”32  Because such broad 
definitions allow for interlopers into the legal system who can claim as legitimate a part 
of it as possessed by the state and its instruments, there is greater concern for Roberts and 
contemporary scholars than for those interested in non-contemporary legal systems.  Yet 
this concern sheds light on the way in which we can perceive a corpus like the BT.  As 
                                                
30 Roberts, “After Government,” 1-24.  
 
31 Roberts, “After Government,” 24. 
 
32 Roberts, “After Government,” 24. 
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alluded to above, the BT was able to find its way into the legally pluralistic world – and 
possibly to have contributed to its legally pluralistic quality – because in certain specific 
periods and places it did not pose problems of this or that type of law being so 
incongruous with state law that it created a conflict.  It posed no real threat at those times 
and places regarding certain sets of laws so that there was no need for the state to attack 
the legitimacy of calling halacha, and specifically the BT, a legal work and ultimately 
being referred to as law. 
 
In analyzing the BT within Roberts’ paradigm or any other that requires that the 
state be part of the definition of law, it is possible to draw a distinction between how 
those other non-state laws are or are not operating within the state’s legal system.  A set 
of laws that is not explicitly part of the state’s official and formal law can still be 
considered as operating within the state’s legal system; this happens all the while it is 
operating outside of the state’s formal law.  This hinges on whether the state is 
sanctioning specific aspects of the law to other courts or if the state is merely ignoring 
certain aspects of life and at least some ‘other’ social orders in its midst.  It is the 
difference between the following: (1) a state which is actively authorizing certain 
institutions, which are outside the purview of the state or its formal instruments with 
state-sanctioned legal powers; and (2) a state which is not authorizing any institution 
formally, and quite possibly is leaving certain aspects of the governance of life to custom 
and regulatory bodies not sanctioned nor recognized officially by the state.  In (2), those 
customs, rules, regulations, etc. cannot be defined as law because they are specifically not 
a state-related affair; at best the relationship between the state and this ‘other’ law is one 
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of some degree of tolerance on the part of the state and its instruments.  In (1), the state is 
bringing the laws of the ‘other’ – in our case, the BT – and its adjudicative structure 
within the orbit of its more general legal system.  The BT is more likely than not to be 
tolerable enough to a dominant legal system for at least parts of it to be sanctioned by the 
state, and for rabbinic authorities to be authorized to adjudicate matters related to those 
parts.  Even if the state is not calling it or recognizing it as law in the sense that the 
official law of the state is law, it is still within the sphere of the legal system of the state, 
and therefore it can still be defined as law. 
 
While the BT clearly survives as and is a text for the ages, during the time of its 
creation and early transmission it was meant to carry a certain authority regarding some 
practical day-to-day issues directly related to its time.  It also was not created to be a state 
-sanctioned set of laws during this time, since those who created the elements of the 
evolving BT were not in control of the state and had no misconceptions about this 
matter.33  It is reasonable to posit that the BT is a continuation of the Mishna in the sense 
that its text was created in the spirit of the Mishna with respect to the notion of an ideal 
state where rabbinic law would be the law of the state; a state which would include a 
Temple and fields in the land of Israel, and priests to whom pure tithes could be given.  
But there is also recognition of the limits of the powers of the text and of those who 
crafted it and also those whose traditions and halachic positions are included therein.  
Those limits, as suggested above, revolved around purely religious matters where the 
state would have little or no interest in getting involved, such as betrothal and 
                                                
33 Again, I refer to Elman, Secunda and their fraternity of Irano-Talmudists who are undertaking, 
sometimes unknowingly, the task of teaching us about the primary state sanctioned legal system to which 
the BT can be juxtaposed, thus setting up a paradigm of pluralism, in the inter- sense. 
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circumcision.  It was created – perhaps not for the purpose of being part of a greater 
pluralism – in such a way that it seamlessly fits into a plurality of legal systems that can 
be defined as tolerating legal pluralism. 
 
It also is textually and substantively equipped to be able to control as many legal 
matters as were available to be controlled; generally, these were situations where such 
control outside the purview of the state posed little or no threat to the state.  Essentially, 
regarding religious matters, the sages were free to rely on a different set of laws, while at 
the same time looking to the state regarding matters such as taxes owed to the state, land 
ownership, and capital cases.  While the BT addresses how such laws of the state must be 
observed, the tendency of the BT is not to dismiss state law.  An ideal example of this is 
the concept of dina d’malkhuta dina (state law is law).34  There are also periods and 
places where the Jews were left to their own devices to legislate and adjudicate a range of 
cases that extended beyond the purely religious and into matters that might otherwise fall 
under a state’s civil law.  This was true for a number of medieval Jewish communities 
where they were permitted by local authorities to adjudicate according to their own legal 
system, and thus they adjudicated according to halacha, with the BT serving as the 
centerpiece among the legislative works of the Rabbinic Canon.35 
 
                                                
34 This concept, attributed to the Amora Shmuel, appears several times in the BT see for example Bava 
Batra 54b, Gittin 10b and Bava Kama 113a.   
 
35 Suzanne Stone discusses this in a footnote in her article “Sinaitic and Noahide Law,” 1164. Additionally, 
Talia Fishman in Becoming the People of the Talmud (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2011), 122-154 goes into greater detail about this phenomenon in her attempts to define the BT as 
becoming as authoritative as would because of its treatment on the part of medieval rabbis who, she argues, 
were the first to treat the text with the degree of charity until then reserved for the Bible and the Mishna. 
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It is also from this type of thinking that problems emerge for those who wish to 
discuss the BT as an example of legal pluralism, and apply that type of language to the 
study of its text, per Suzanne Stone.36  Within this paradigm, inherent to the BT and 
rabbinic law in general is the fact that most halacha applies only to Jews (Israelites, 
Judeans, etc.).  As far as rabbinic law is concerned, non-Jews are only obligated to obey 
the seven Noahide laws.  Within the system itself, there is an acceptance of the fact that 
there exist parallel legal systems.  While the Noahide laws might be an indication that 
another legal system can be tolerated provided that certain basic laws are observed, it is 
clearly the case that a society needs more than just seven laws by which it is to be 
governed.  The BT is accepting of non-rabbinic systems provided that the state is one 
whose citizens conduct themselves within a nearly universal set of laws.  Within the 
pages of the text of the BT and the institutions in which it was formed and studied, it 
would appear that the dominant law is the rabbinic one, and that the Noahide laws are 
simply a guide for how the non-Jew must conduct himself if he is living in a rabbinic 
state governed by rabbinic law.37  As mentioned above, the idea of dina d’malkhuta dina, 
is in itself a sufficient acknowledgement of the potential primacy of the ‘other’ law that is 
an instrument of the state, where the law of the state is not rabbinic.  The lack of any 
textual Babylonian traditions regarding the Mishnaic order of Zeraim is testament to a 
certain lack of interest in the subject.  This lack of textual interest can also be seen as a 
lack of authority on matters related to land ownership.  Further, the laws do not apply 
                                                
36 Stone, “Sinaitic and Noahide Law”. 
 
37 There are different theories regarding the introduction of the concept of Noahide laws within the rabbinic 
legal system.  One theory, mentioned by Stone in “Sinaitic and Noahide Law,” 1164, has the Noahide laws 
forming during the Hasmonean period when the Jews were in control of the state and the law, and had to do 
something about non-Jews in their midst.  She also cites Saul Lieberman’s theory that the laws came about 
as a reaction to the schism created by Christianity, and the need for defining who exactly fit into the 
category of “fearers of heaven.” 
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outside the land of Israel, thus further cementing its lack of usefulness to the Babylonian 
sage of the Amoraic period. 
 
On the face of it, and in the manner in which Noahide laws are often conveyed in 
some contemporary scholarship, the non-Jew appears to have a simple mandate of 
observing seven (and in one place of the BT, thirty38) Noahide laws.  Further, except for 
the prohibition against worshipping other gods, for many, these seven laws are quite 
reasonable.  Beneath the surface of the BT is a far more arrogant look at the role and 
place of the non-Jew in the theoretical rabbinic world of the BT where rabbinic law is the 
formal and only law of the state.  The legal pluralism implied by Noahide laws for the 
non-Jew is actually a requirement for the non-Jew to practice many laws applicable only 
to Jews.39  There is also a limitation on certain due processes mandated for Jews that are 
specifically not required when prosecuting a gentile.  An example is the opinion that a 
non-Jew does not have the benefit of a warning before being prosecuted and tried for a 
violation of the law.40  There are also civil and monetary laws where the treatment and 
                                                
38 Hullin 92a.  
 
39 An example of this is the attitude of the BT regarding a non-Jew (goy) who keeps the Sabbath and 
according to some any halachot he is not commanded to keep.   Sanhedrin, 58b, reads as follows:  יוג ל"ראו
 תבשב ינש וליפא אניבר רמא ןתתימ איה וז ןהלש הרהזא רמ רמאו ותובשי אל הלילו םויו (ח תישארב) 'אנש התימ בייח תבשש; 
the translations is “and Resh Laqish states: a goy who rests [colloquially: keeps the Sabbath] is required to 
die, as it says ‘and day and night they shall not rest.’  And Mar stated: their warning [for transgressing] is 
their death.  Ravina stated: even if [they keep the Sabbath] on a Monday.”  Resh Laqish keeps the death 
penalty to the keeping of the Sabbath and Ravina (rather peculiarly) expands this to keeping the Sabbath on 
any day.  Mar, however goes much further in broadens this completely in order to include all laws 
applicable to non-Jews.  When he says their warning is their death, he means that unlike a Jew who gets the 
benefit of warning before he can be prosecuted for a violation, the non-Jew gets the death penalty both in 
this case of the Sabbath, and also if they transgress one of the Noahide laws.  It should be noted that this 
statement attributed here to Mar is attributed to Rav Nahman bar Yitzhaq on 57a.  On 57a the statement is 
juxtaposed with a Braita that implies that a non-Jew does in fact receive a warning for a transgression such 
as the worship of foreign gods, which is the rule for all violations for which the Jew, if convicted, receives 
a death penalty. 
 
40 Sanhedrin 58b, see note 37.  
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obligations to the non-Jew are less than they are when a Jew is dealing with Jew.  
Examples of this include laws such as interest on a loan, the handling of a lost object, 
obligations regarding relations with betrothed women, and others.41 
 
It is difficult to avoid the manner in which the BT in many instances does have a 
double standard for the non-Jew and even prescribes how the law is different whether the 
situation is between a Jew and a Jew, a Jew and a non-Jew, and a non-Jew and a non-
Jew.42  One such strange double standard is the role of Jewish and non-Jewish midwives 
and nursemaids in the births and nursing of non-Jewish babies and Jewish babies, 
respectively.  Specifically, a Jewish nursemaid or midwife cannot nurse or birth a non-
Jew, and vice versa.43    One might think that the choice of a midwife falls outside the 
purview of law, but the Mishna and then the BT after it address the matter as a legal one, 
and not one of custom.  Intuitively, one might also think that such laws apply only in the 
                                                
41 See Bava Metzia 24a regarding lost objects belonging to a Gentile which a Jew finds, and the discussion 
in Bava Metzia 70b-71a regarding interest on loans.   
 
42 As tempted as I am to write a long footnote about the role of the slave, and the different sets of laws for 
the slave, I refrain from doing so.  Within the internal legal system of the BT, the slave is essentially a 
variable in the law, albeit one that can become more human through redemption.  Nevertheless, the 
standards expected of the slave fail to include some basic dignities demanded of all non-slaves, Jew and 
non-Jew.  A prominent example, and one worth referencing as paradigmatic of this more extreme view of 
slaves is from Sanhedrin 58b: “ אב אל לארשי ללכלו ירכנ ללכמ אצי ותבב רתומו ומאב רתומ דבע אדסח בר רמא”  
translation: “Stated Rav Hisda: a slave is permitted (to have sexual relations) with his mother, and he is 
permitted (to have sexual relations) with his daughter.  He is outside the category of nohri and is not 
included in the category of Jew.”  The fine print can read – if one wishes to read it that way – that the 
reason he is permitted to engage in sexual activity that is considered anathema even for the non-Jew is 
because those familial relation ceased to exist once he became an eved ivri, the slave of a Jew; the act of 
becoming a slave removed him from the category of non-Jew, and thus those familial relations could not 
exist since a non-Jew can only be related to a non-Jew, and not to a slave or a Jew.  This is especially 
notable since the same sugya deals in detail with all the sexual prohibitions that are prohibited to both Jews 
and non-Jews alike. 
 
43 Avodah Zara 26a:  ר"ת "ינפמ לארשי תב תא דליית אל היוגו [הז הדובעל] ןב תדלימש ינפמ [היוגה] תא דליית אל לארשי תב
םימד תוכיפש לע ןידושחש".  Here, the BT offers additional tannaitic sources beyond the Mishna regarding the 
prohibition of a Jew birthing a non-Jew.  The text then shifts into the typical Aramaic Stammaitic narration 
that goes beyond the basic prohibitions, and explains how terrible things will befall the woman who 
engages in such a practice. 
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theoretical rabbinic state.  However, the reasons offered by the BT for the prohibition for 
Jews revolves around the fear of birthing and nursing a child who will come to engage in 
foreign worship.  In the ideal Rabbinic state, such people would not exist, since the 
prohibition for the non-Jew’s transgression of this law is death (without warning, 
according to some).  The reasoning of this law can only apply in a world where rabbinic 
law is not actually the law of the state but where it is imagined to be.  Further, in a later 
part of the sugya, the BT offers a position that would allow for the birthing of a non-Jew 
where it is done professionally and the midwife is paid for her labor.44  The reasoning 
given there is to avoid eyvah with the nohrim; eyvah is understood as creating ill.45  This 
reasoning is distinct from the first – where the concern is assisting in the creation of a 
child who will engage in foreign worship – in that the first one still does not even concern 
itself with the pragmatics of stoking the ire of non-Jews, and especially those non-Jews 
who control the law of the state.  The milieu of the Tannaitic one can be described as 
both still legislating with the arrogance of state control, and understanding the reality that 
there is no rabbinic control over state law and that de facto many facets of life are outside 
rabbinic control – even ones as serious as allowing a foreign worshipper to avoid the 
death penalty. 
 
The type of reasoning that allows for the consideration of non-Jews without a 
state-mandated control over them can be perceived as betraying the aspirations of 
applying these laws in a rabbinic state.  Conversely, it can also be seen as recognizing the 
                                                
44 Avodah Zara 26a. 
 
45 This is the definition offered by Marcus Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Babli, 
Yerushalmi and Midrashic Literature (New York: J.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1903), s.v.  הביא.  
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practical limitations of the BT’s influence as a code of law both during the time of its 
evolution and in periods thereafter when the code served precisely as a non-state law.  
This highlights for the traditional student of the BT its place as a code that, in almost the 
best scenario, can be applied only to Jews, and even then only to the degree to which it 
does not interfere with the legal system of the state.  For example, the BT and any legal 
authority it might have had were cast aside by the state at times when simply identifying 
as a Jew and not as a Christian was a violation of state law.46   
 
Although it is not my interest in this dissertation to unpack this further, it is worth 
noting that the idea of Noahide laws is only one element in how the non-Jew is treated in 
the theoretical rabbinic world.  More pragmatically, the Noahide laws can serve as a 
barometer by which to judge non-Jews, and by extension the states that are run by them; 
the purpose being to determine things such as the degree to which dina d’malkhuta dina 
might be relevant to that state and the Jews who live in it. The Noahide laws get more 
attention because of how they are more relevant to the real world in which the BT 
operated historically, especially in the legally pluralistic states in which it was able 
actually to exert some influence over the Jewish community within those states.  And this 
may – in part – explain the emphasis on the Noahide laws to the relative exclusion of 
those laws which would have no practical value outside of a theoretical rabbinic state 
with rabbinic laws along with the BT at its center. 
                                                
46 See Amos Funkenstein, “ha’temurot b’vikuach ha’dat she’bein yehudim l’notzrim b’meah ha’y”b”’ 
Zion, 33, 3-4 (1968/5728), 137-144.  (The article was translated into English as “Changes in Christian anti-
Jewish polemics in the twelfth century,” Perceptions of Jewish History (1993): 172-201.) Funkenstein 
offers some discussion regarding the attack on the BT that went hand in hand with forced conversions and 
expulsions in the Christian world since the medieval period.  He also offers some information regarding 
how at times not of expulsions and forced conversions. the BT was able to operate with some degree of 
authority. 
  203 
 
These two facets of the BT – first, elements such as its discussion of Noahide 
laws and second, its deployment of dina d’malkhuta dina as well as its omission of 
transmitting (and possibly also creating) traditions regarding certain Mishnaic orders 
dealing with land matters where the sages had minimal if any authority – can be 
perceived as speaking to the duality of how the BT operates on the inter-level of 
pluralism.  On the one hand, there are many indications from discussions on matters such 
as dina d’makhuta dina that the BT acknowledges the limitations of its actual authority as 
compared to the state and its formal laws.  It is also from this point of view that the BT 
appears aware of the nature of the authority of which the text is capable when speaking of 
it as a halachic work written in such a way that it can maintain an authoritative position 
within a legally pluralistic society.  (And this is separate from whether this was part of 
the authorial intent of the BT.)  On the other hand, when engaged in debate and halachic 
expression regarding the Noahide laws, the BT is fancying itself as a text written for a 
world where halacha reigns, and where the rabbis adjudicate accordingly. 
 
In this world where rabbinic law is also the law of the state, there must be a place 
for the non-Jew, and there must be a way for halacha to extend to him.  In this way, the 
BT seems almost ignorant of its actual authority.  One way to explain this is to posit that 
the authors and editors of the BT were totally unaware of the authoritative limits of the 
text, or did not care; they were creating a legal system for an imaginary world, which was 
not only gone and somewhat forgotten, but also one which they fully expected to return.  
It is this duality of self-reverence as a supreme law coupled with a self-awareness 
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regarding authoritative limits that infuses the BT with its ancient authority, its 
contemporary47 relevance, and at the same time the aspiration it has to once again 
become a supreme rabbinic law where it is the also the governing law of the state.  When 
reading the texts of the sugyot in the BT, it is worth noting where the debate is about 
something that is relevant to a stateless law, and where it is not.  Often, it is not clear, as 
is the case with monetary laws and any laws that fall under the principle of dina 
d’malkhuta dina. 
 
As discussed, above, there were places and times when Jews were given the 
latitude to adjudicate monetary matters and where the state would actually refer Jews to 
their own courts; conversely, there are situations such as ours today in the United States 
where the law of the state trumps Jewish law in monetary matters.  Monetary matters, as 
well as a host of others, are “take it or leave it” from the perspective of the text.  The “it” 
in “take it or leave it” refers to enforceable authority.  The BT seems ready to “not be 
taken seriously” as part of its essence; extensive debate about matters over which the BT 
cannot have any practical authority are testament to the BT’s willingness to pursue the 
“law” without pursuing the law.48  It seems perfectly content to control the Sabbath and 
circumcision, and betrothal laws, and is “take it or leave it” with respect to the vast 
majority of other laws.  The BT also telegraphs which laws are important and which are 
                                                
47 In any period, and quite possibly more so in the periods that post-date the Amoraic period by several 
centuries.   
 
48 Examples include temple sacrifice, land laws, etc.   
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non-negotiable in terms of whether it can still maintain its place in a legally pluralistic 
society.49 
 
It does so on two levels: (1) the laws that are absolute and non-negotiable, such as 
foreign worship, murder, and illicit relations; (2) those that are critical to the maintenance 
of society, but which are not ones which would require the rabbis to abandon the 
particular state in which they are living.50  Rather, within (2), they would simply operate 
surreptitiously and not respect other aspects of the state’s legal system.  There are then 
the laws that the text does not purport to mandate beyond the pages of the text.  There is 
value in attempting to look for where different halachic matters from the BT fall on the 
spectrum of pragmatic legal plausibility; the value is in realizing how difficult it might be 
for the legal theoretician while at the same time seeing how simple it would be for the 
pragmatic traditional adjudicator of halacha (i.e. the rabbi).  The traditional student or 
adjudicator would be able to tell you that the Sabbath is definitively governed by the BT 
and its antecedent halachic works, and that laws regarding the betrothal of multiple wives 
are theoretical and no longer applicable.  He might also be able to explain how monetary 
law applies, for example, but that in this country or that one, they must rely upon the laws 
of the land because of dina d’malkhuta dina.  They may also offer some reasoning such 
as the law of the land is reasonable as it allows religious freedom – or they can provide 
some other logic.  Thus, the greater freedom offered to the authoritative viability of the 
                                                
 
49 As I discuss, such laws definitively include the three cardinal sins of  תוירע יוליגו םימד תוכיפש ,הרז הדובע
(foreign worship, murder, and illicit relations), Sanhedrin 74a.   
50 Examples of this are rabbinic adjudications that allow soldiers in foreign armies to engage in ‘sinful’ 
behavior, such as consuming non-kosher food.  While food is construed as a critical component of 
communal or societal life, it is one where the Rabbis were lax in certain situations.  This is unlike the three 
laws mentioned earlier.  
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BT in areas not of interest to the state, the more likely a traditional adherent and 
adjudicator of the BT and its antecedent halacha would be to accept other aspects of the 
law governed by the state.  For the legal theoretician, it is nearly impossible to 
definitively say anything about where a specific halachic matter stands on the spectrum 
of pragmatic legal plausibility.  How is it possible to know when the text is ‘serious’ and 
when it is just engaged in the theoretical gymnastic of defining laws for a rabbinic state to 
be built, or for one long gone (or simply longed for)? 
 
Intra- 
While the text of the BT can be said to be flaunting the multiplicity of voices, and 
thus a potential intra-pluralism, it rarely is explicit in offering any information about the 
inter- side of its pluralism.  There is little in the way of a true acknowledgement of a 
dominant legal system to which the halachic one is subordinate.  There is no discussion 
of how to absorb a foreign law within a rabbinic state; as discussed above, there is only 
discussion about the foreigner or non-Jew and the fact that they may or even should have 
their own system of courts.  There is no discussion of what such a court and its broader 
system might look like.  At best, there are mandates primarily directed at the individual – 
and not at the broader community – that would make life easier (and probably also safer) 
by directing that the laws of the land be observed where they are reasonable.  However, 
this is couched in the broader thrust of the BT weltanschauung where the BT’s is the 
dominant legal system, and this mandate is but a part of the much larger legal project.  In 
much of its narrative, the BT reads as though it is not only a law for the theoretical 
rabbinic state discussed above, but also the only law.  There is no acknowledgement of 
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the law of the other in almost all contexts where the BT appears to be speaking to the 
theoretical rabbinic state and not to the ‘real’ world.51  Yet internally, the BT often 
appears to be reflecting a range of different schools of thought, and also leaves multiple 
options available to the practitioner of halacha.  It is for this reason that when one thinks 
of the internal pluralism of the BT, one is really addressing the matter of the multiplicity 
of halachic voices that appear within and across different sugyot.  Although the different 
halachic positions taken by the various sages regarding a specific matter may reflect what 
might once have been a truly pluralistic state of affairs in terms of BT study and halachic 
adjudication, the narrative of the BT presents the different positions as all operating 
within the same general legal system. 
 
Ultimately, discussions of legal pluralism lead us to a discussion regarding the 
multiplicity of voices within the BT.52  Before doing so, and abandoning the discussion of 
intra-pluralism within the BT in favor of a more grounded discussion of a legal 
multiplicity, several points are worth addressing.  Firstly, it is worth explaining how legal 
pluralism is different from legal multiplicity in the way I use the phrases: legal pluralism 
is the allowance for completely different legal systems to operate side-by-side, even if 
one is dominant and restrains (significant) parts of the other(s); multiplicity refers to the 
allowance of many voices asserting different opinions on specific legal issues, and doing 
so all within a single legal system.  It is this definition that precludes me from simply 
                                                
51 The only possible exception is a basic acknowledgement of state courts and adjudicative processes.  
 
52 It is for this reason that I give shorter treatment to the intra-pluralism here, and pay more attention to 
multiplicity in a separate chapter.  Additionally, the manner in which multiplicity is closely intertwined 
with the canonicity of the different elements that comprise the BT. 
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putting forth Suzanne Stone’s ideas about legal pluralism with Jewish law in place of 
anything else I might assert here.53 
 
Building on Robert Cover’s earlier work,54 Stone discusses pluralism as not only 
a system wherein divergent legal outcomes are possible and worth recording, but also as 
reflective of divergent “behavioral and divergent pluralism.”55  Speaking of Jewish law’s 
relationship to American law, Stone offers the following: “These scholars depict the 
Jewish legal system as having successfully confronted – and resolved – several central 
dilemmas currently facing American law by maintaining a coherent legal system while 
accepting behavioral and interpretive pluralism.”56  The idea of “behavioral pluralism” 
existing within a culture does not necessarily imply that there exists a legal pluralism of 
which it is reflective.  Even Stone herself states that “diverse opinions leading to 
behavioral pluralism are due to the fact that halacha has not been finally determined.  
Indeed, only on rare occasions does one find cases of true legal pluralism in which the 
Talmud explicitly regards two contradictory behavior-regulating norms as equally valid, 
final resolutions of a legal problem.”57 (Italics are mine.)  Stone is acknowledging that we 
                                                
53 Suzanne Stone, “In Pursuit of the Counter-Text; the Turn to the Jewish Legal Modern in Contemporary 
American Legal Theory,” Harvard Law Review 106, 4 (1993): 836-839. 
 
54 Robert Cover, “Obligation: A Jewish Jursipudence of the Social Order,” Journal of Law and Religion 5,1 
(1987) 65-74; and Robert Cover, “Supreme Court 1982 Term Forward: Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard 
Law Review 97 (1983): 4-68.  
 
55 Stone, “In Pursuit of Counter Text,” 813 and 839. 
 
56 Stone, “In Pursuit of Counter-text,” 813 - I offer the full quote to highlight how Stone – and Cover before 
her – are discussing different legal systems from different times and places in an effort to shed light on both 
of them.  This type of analysis removed from the traditional temporal and spatial constraints is relatively 
new to the study of religion and still seen as controversial by many and cutting edge by all. 
 
57 Stone, “In Pursuit of Counter-text,” 838-839. 
 
  209 
are not dealing with two legal systems, but rather a system that records and respects 
dissent.  One can go further, as Stone does, and define some legal systems as possessing 
the ability to “recognize a plurality of conflicting norms or truth claims at the level of 
discourse, each a valid formulation of the law.”58  However, it can be argued that this 
does not necessarily point to the existence of two distinct legal systems operating 
simultaneously within what appears to be a single legal system.  In the case of the BT, 
there is little if any evidence pointing to the sages representing separate legal systems as 
opposed to representing different positions on specific legal matters. 
 
Behavioral pluralism can run quite deep and broad within a cultural community 
and the individuals who comprise it.  For our purposes, I define a cultural community as 
one where all individuals adhere to the same legal system.  The adjudicative processes 
associated with the legal system can be disparate as long as they are operating within 
certain bounds acceptable to the ‘legal system.’59  Thus, while Stone’s use of the houses 
of Shammai and Hillel are effective in conveying a sense of behavioral pluralism, it 
would be difficult to demonstrate that Hillel and Shammai were actually operating within 
different legal systems.  Nevertheless, to anyone familiar with how the houses of Hillel 
and Shammai positioned themselves within the halachic system, it is not difficult to 
imagine that the behavior of the two groups would be different and predictable; 
specifically, the adherents of the house of Shammai would have been very exacting and 
                                                
58 Stone, “In Pursuit of Counter-text,” 836. 
 
59 I am aware of the problem of personifying the system as opposed to referring to specific individuals who 
would have to carry out actions in order to enforce the boundaries of how the law/halacha is adjudicated.  
Whether the boundaries are correctly enforced, some enforcement always occurs.  In legal systems without 
the power to impose the law as prescribed by its code, some form of exclusion from the adjudicative realm 
is an effective consequence. 
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strict in terms of the observance of the law, and conversely the adherents of the house of 
Hillel would have been less exacting and next to Shammai relatively lenient.  Yet the 
Mishnah famously declares that daughters from one house would marry sons from the 
other.60  The implication being that a daughter of any sage within the tradition can marry 
the son of any other sage who also adheres to halacha within certain boundaries of legal 
positions as well as actual behavior.  Therefore, one might better refer to Stone’s 
“behavioral pluralism” as “behavioral multiplicity.”  It is reasonable to assume that there 
were certain groups whose children were off-limits for marriage.  Further, for those 
operating within the milieu of the BT, such exclusion was based upon not only behavior, 
but also the method of adjudicating halacha. By declaring in an inclusive manner what is 
permitted in terms of betrothal, the BT is also confirming the existence of an “other.” 
 
An example of the “other” – and possibly the “other” lurking in the minds of the 
earliest readers of the BT, specifically those reading it when it was first a complete and 
cohesive text – are the Karaites, who ignore the rabbinic tradition and glean law directly 
from the Bible, and who are perceived from within the rabbinic tradition as operating 
firmly outside of it.61  For the rabbinic reader of the BT, the Karaites are not only part of 
                                                
60 Mishnah Yevamot 1:4. It is worth noting that the actual history of the houses of Hillel and Shammai is 
less pleasant than the fact that their children would marry and that its members would eat in one another’s 
homes.  There is the story of members of the House of Hillel being killed in discussions with member of 
the House of Shammai, and the survivors accepting Shammai’s adjudications (18 articles). See Yerushalmi 
Shabbat 1:4.  
 
61 Sources regarding the Karaites in Maori and S. Schechter’s Documents of Jewish sectaries 2: Fragments 
of the Book of Commandments by Anan, (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1910). It is important to note that Anan 
may or may not have been a Karaite, but from what is extant, it can be said that he is operating within a 
legal system other than the rabbinic one conveyed in the BT, and one that is similar to if not the same as the 
Karaite legal system.  While not necessarily directly related to sugyot in the BT, the Karaites and 
specifically their treatment in later rabbinic literature sheds lights on how those outside the normative range 
of halacha were handled.  Additionally, the BT’s treatment of the Kuthites, also a class of quasi-Jews who 
interpreted the Bible literally and who ignored rabbinic hermeneutics, can be somewhat reflective of how 
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another group, but their law and method of legislation and adjudication are not the same 
as the rabbinic tradition as the authors of the BT convey it.  It is the legal system of the 
Karaites that most distinguishes them from the rabbinic sages.  The rabbinic sages 
accepted an oral law which in many ways supersedes the Bible as an authoritative legal 
corpus; the Karaites practiced Judaism based strictly on the verses in the Bible.  As the 
BT is constructed, for its traditional reader, a fundamental aspect of eligibility for a 
halachic position within the BT (and to the Mishna and broader Tannaitic corpus) is an 
acceptance of the idea that the Bible requires the interpretations of the rabbinic tradition, 
without which the Bible cannot be understood properly and from which law can be 
gleaned legitimately.62  There is an oral law that effectively is the authoritative legal 
arbiter of halachic behavior.  The Bible cannot stand on its own and offer the complete or 
correct picture of halacha.  For the Karaite, the Bible was not only sufficient, but also 
complete in its offerings and rabbinic tradition or oral law was but another factor that 
might inform adjudication but was hardly the driving force.63 
 
Redemption of the first born of an ass or unclean beast is an example of a law 
where there can be a position that is operating outside the bounds, and which is also 
reflective, of another legal system entirely.  There are three verses in the Bible that deal 
                                                                                                                                            
the earliest readers of the complete BT viewed the growing ‘threat’ of the Karaites.  While not the place for 
a full discussion of the matter, it is worth noting that the heightened acceptance of the BT may be related to 
the growing influence of Karaism at the time. 
 
62 Elsewhere, in Chapter 3, I discuss this issue in further detail.  In that context, I discuss degrees of charity 
available to a text, and how these degrees of charity actually reflect a degree of canonicity within the texts 
– or parts thereof.  This notion applies to all the generation and periods within the rabbinic chronological 
rubric. 
 
63 See David Henschke, “A Non-Rabbinic Law Rejected by the Tannaim” JQR Vol. 92 1-2 (2001): 79-103. 
While Henchke only briefly mentions the Karaites, he thoroughly unpacks the logic behind the position that 
the Bible is only speaking of an ass and not all unclean animals. 
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with this matter, two in Exodus (13:13 and 34:20) and one in Numbers (18:15).  The 
verses in Exodus limit the commandment to the ass alone, while the verse in Numbers 
applies the law to all unclean animals.  Without any interpretation or deep analysis, it 
would be obvious that because of the verse in Numbers, all unclean animals would be 
subject to redemption.  Nevertheless, the interpretive style of the rabbinic oral law reads 
the verses in Exodus as limiting the scope of the verse in Numbers.  The Karaites’ legal 
tradition mandates that all unclean animals must be redeemed.64  The Karaites would not 
be the first to interpret the law closer to the text; Philo also interprets the verses in this 
way.  What makes this case compelling is that throughout almost all Tannaitic literature, 
and all Amoraic literature, no sage takes the position that all unclean animals are subject 
to redemption. 
 
 The Karaites, however, can be the “other” legal system tolerated and also defined 
by the earliest readers of the BT.  It may be the “outsider” legal system that in fact points 
to the legitimate multiplicity of voices that is extant within the legal system of the BT.  
While adherents to the legal tradition give the impression that there was little, if any, 
interaction with the Karaites, there is a history between the two groups which proves to 
be more amicable and mutually tolerant than the impression offered by the rabbinic 
tradition.  Nevertheless, to the outsider – and here I mean an outsider with respect to the 
overall BT, including the rift between the Karaites and the ‘normative’ rabbinic sages – 
the two groups can be defined as still operating within a single legal system with different 
positions regarding different legal (can we call it halachic?) matters.  This might be 
                                                
64 Henschke, “A Non-Rabbinic Law,” 81.  
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similar to the manner in which a Roman lawmaker may have perceived Christians and 
Jews during the second century AD.65 
 
 The multiplicity of voices in the BT – regardless of whether it is contrived or 
naturally evolved into its extant form – establishes the boundaries of acceptable choices 
regarding the halachic matters that are raised within it.66  Such a multiplicity of voice is 
not necessarily reflective of intra-pluralism.  The text of the BT can be said to be 
embracing a multiplicity of voices; pluralism – and here I refer to intra-pluralism – is 
difficult to find in the BT, and therefore multiplicity cannot be said to be an extension of 
a vast, legally pluralistic system.  Rather, the pluralism is muted and multiplicity is 
embraced.  Further, beyond a lack of true pluralism, the authors of the narrative even 
confine multiplicity to a set of boundaries.  Without any fanfare, it is the anonymous 
Stammaitic activity that seems to be determining, on a textual level, the extent to which 
the multiplicity of the text is exhaustive or selective.  However, we can safely assume 
that there are instances where certain positions are not included in the text; there are 
probably also entire issues that might have been left out.  Such speculation aside, all the 
halachic traditions and sources are part of a multiplicity of voices – and the potential 
legal pluralism that may extend therefrom – only to the extent that they can still safely 
operate within the rabbinic halachic system and its rules of exegesis and are expressed in 
the formal language of the text.                                                
                                                
65 Lee I. Levine, The Rabbinic Class of Roman Palestine in Late Antiquity, (New York: Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America, 1989), 87.  
 
66 This idea that multiplicity can reinforce certain larger commonalities while allowing for disputes in less 
important areas is alluded to regarding aggadic material in rabbinic literature by Judith R. Baskin in her 
book Midrashic Women: Formations of the Feminine in Rabbinic Literature (Hannover : University Press 
of New England, 2002), 11: “I find that certain dominant themes emerge out of the multiplicity of opinions 
preserved in aggadic literature…”.  
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Origins of Pluralism in Roman Law’s Empire 
Because of the vastness of the Roman Empire, and the distinct legal systems of 
the peoples they added to a growing empire, the Romans understood that allowance for 
local – yet at the same time definitively subordinated – laws strengthened rather than 
weakened the Roman military’s hold on a particular place upon which it wished to 
impose dominion.  By not imposing the fullness of Roman law upon occupied peoples, 
the Romans accomplished two things: (1) they did not create a situation where they had 
to fully enforce what would be a foreign and often misunderstood set of laws; and (2) 
they alienated their ‘hosts’ far less than they might have otherwise.  A cultural 
compromise – if it can be called that – was made in order to preserve the empire.  It 
seems that a larger and less ‘Roman’ empire was preferred to a smaller and more 
culturally Roman empire with a fixed and immutable Roman legal system governing all 
personal and state affairs.  While not formulated as legal pluralism to the Roman 
lawmakers and powers-that-be that managed and refined the Roman legal system, it was 
a legal pluralism that the Romans were achieving, or at least approaching, in their 
management of the integration of local law with the dominant Roman law. 
 
It is for this reason that when looking for the origin of the tendency toward 
pluralism in the BT, it is worth looking at Roman law.  It is also during the Roman 
period, and specifically during the third century, when “Homeland and Diaspora were 
thus increasingly faced with the same challenge: sustaining Jewish specificity in a non-
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Jewish society.67  The expanding Roman Empire as well as the increasing opportunity for 
attaining Roman citizenship prompted this challenge.  While there were periods when the 
pursuit of a pure Roman law and cultural milieu throughout the Empire were pursued, 
“on the whole the history of the Jews under the Roman Empire can be described as one of 
practical compromise, interaction, and ambiguity, not inflexibility.”68  This is the same 
time at which halacha was undergoing – and had to undergo – fundamental shifts 
resulting from the destruction of the Temple, and of the evolving decentralization away 
from Jerusalem – and eventually the Levant – of Jewish law and culture.  It is from this 
environment from which the Mishna emerges and upon which the BT builds.  It is an 
environment where Jewish law is subordinate and where “the subordination of the Jewish 
law is even more pronounced: unless explicitly authorized and recognized as a 
constitutive element of the Common law, it functions on sufferance only, unsupported by 
the judiciary and penal institutions.  It was, so to speak, on parole, always liable to be 
overruled and invalidated by the two superior laws.”69 
 
When speaking of pluralism, I speak of the tendency towards operating as a 
subordinate law within a broader legal system accommodating of halacha.  In mentioning 
Roman law, I refer to both the pagan and Christian periods.  Roman law through the 
centuries was aware of, and accommodating of, not only other persons outside the Roman 
                                                
67 Linder, Amnon, “The Legal Status of the Jews in the Roman Empire” in Cambridge History of Judaism: 
The Late Roman Rabbinic Period, ed. Steven T. Katz (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006), 
130. 
 
68 Linder, “The Legal Status”, 129.  
 
69 Linder, “The Legal Status,” 132.  The two laws Linder refers to are the common law and Jewry law.  For 
our purposes they both constitute the dominant legal system to which the halacha was subordinated.  Linder 
defines the whole situation as one of a three tiered hierarchical legal system, with common law at the top, 
followed by Jewry law, and lastly and least there is halacha. 
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legal system, but also of other legal systems.  Where there was “no skin off the Roman’s 
back,” often Roman law tolerated – and occasionally officially sanctioned – elements of 
other legal systems, such as halacha.70  The Romans also had something called ‘Jewry 
Law’ which addressed the laws within the Roman law codes pertaining to Jews.  An 
example of Jewry Law is the Roman prohibition of circumcision, which was eliminated 
for the Jews, who were allowed to be circumcised.71  Another example is how under the 
reign of Septimius Severus, the Hadrianic prohibitions were lifted, and a path was charted 
whereby Jewish institutions, such as the “Sanhedrin and the Patriarchate were not only 
restored but significantly reinforced.”72  Jewry Law allowed for Jews to “live according 
to their custom,” and “to follow their particular ordinances according to their ancestral 
law,” and to “practice their particular customs and law.”73  Included was the right “to 
observe the Sabbath and the other rites according to their ancestral laws,”74 and “to pay to 
                                                
 
70 Aharon Oppenheimer, “Jewish Penal Authority in Roman Judea” in Jews in a Graeco-Roman World ed. 
Goodman, 181-191; Linder, “The Legal Status,” 136, where he refers to Oppenheimer. 
 
71 Linder, “The Legal Status,” 138.  The flip side of this is that it gave cover for Jews who chose not 
circumcise their children.  The default in the Roman empire and under Roman Law is to avoid 
circumcision.  The Jew can opt out of the prohibition, and he does so by circumcising his son.  That is not a 
necessary act that must be taken by Jews; it is merely tolerated under Jewry – and essentially – Roman 
Law. 
 
72 Linder, “The Legal Status,” 139, where he refers to Naphtali Lewis, “The Humane Legislation of 
Septimius Severus,” Historia 45 (1996), 104-113. 
 
73 Miriam Pucci Ben Zeev, Jewish Rights in the Roman World: The Greek and Roman Documents Quoted 
by Josephus Flavius (Tubingen, 1998) (henceforth JRRW).  Linder quotes the same on p. 140. 
 
74 JRRW no. 17, Ant. 14.10.20, as referenced by Linder, “Legal Status,” 141.  Later in the article, Linder 
describes how the Sabbath was even further ‘consecrated’ by Christian emperors such as Justinian, pp. 152-
155.  While the chronology and history point to a new time, if not place, the attitude is quite similar and 
intentionally hearkens back to an age where respect for Jewish custom was – at least perceived to be – the 
correct approach. 
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god their ancestral prayers and sacrifices… according to the customs incorporated in 
laws.”75 
 
There was a rooted understanding and recognition of Jewish autonomy in certain 
social and cultural spheres.  This is further highlighted in Sardis, “where this principle 
was invoked to sanction the right of Jews who were also Roman citizens to have their 
own court with jurisdiction over Jews.”76 
 
While I argue that the BT is very much a product of the rabbinic attitudes taken 
toward halacha as a result of Roman Law and proclivities, it is the Palestinian Talmud 
which was formulated completely under Roman legal jurisdiction.  Not in a vacuum did 
this occur.  Prior thereto, the Mishna and its related Tannaitic literature were also crafted 
under the influence of – and more precisely, in reaction to – Roman behavior, both 
cultural and legal.  The PT “gives direct and detailed evidence regarding those domains 
regulated by the halachah, and testifies indirectly on domains resigned to the other two 
laws.”77  Among the realities unleashed following the Bar Kochba Revolt was the fact 
that the “Jewish population in the land of Israel retained its law, not only because this 
was the easiest practical expedient, but also for the simple reason that no other legal set 
was applicable to them in entirety, that is as a comprehensive body of law reflecting their 
                                                
75 JRRW no. 20, Ant. 14.10.24. 
 
76 Linder, “The Legal Status,” 140 where he references JRRW no. 14, Ant. 14.10.17. 
 
77 Linder, “The Legal Status,”133.  While Linder is interested in the status of Jews and the individual Jew 
under Roman dominion, and while he concedes the importance of the PT as testimony for the relationship 
between Roman Law and halachah, he sees “a problem about the direct relevance of its sources to the legal 
status of the Jews.”  In terms of attitude, and specifically how Roman law may have accommodated 
halachah, Linder does find the PT useful. 
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social mores and cultural uniqueness.  Some law had to be applied to them and by right as 
well as contingency it was usually their own.”78  Lindner also discusses their “impressive 
achievements of the legislative and codificatory activities in the Mishna and subsequently 
in the Palestinian Talmud provide the best evidence of their restored vitality.”79 
 
 I argue that it is in this milieu that the pluralistic tendency of halacha develops 
and evolves.  By the time the BT had begun to be recorded during the earliest Amoraic 
generations, the pluralistic tendency was a firm part of the pragmatics of halacha.  The 
Mishna, as Lindner argues, emerges from the evolving perspective taken toward Roman 
law.  The BT develops after the evolution is complete, and when pluralistic tendencies 
are an essential part of the pragmatic halachic project.  The recording and transmission of 
traditions and their sources was a precise and conservative affair.  The forces that drove 
the actual pronouncements of those traditions – the original halachic statements – were 
filtered through this conservative prism as managed by the rabbinic class.  They were 
filtered in such a way that they could legitimize their control over “a range of social 
activities and institutions.”80 
 
 Although he lived after the last Amoraim died, Gregory the Great articulates the 
balance a subordinate legal system might find with a dominant one: “Just as the Jews 
should not have the freedom to presume anything in their synagogues beyond what is 
                                                
78 Linder, “The Legal Status,” 134. 
 
79 Linder, “The Legal Status,” 134. 
 
80 Linder, “The Legal Status,” 140. 
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permitted by law, in the same way, they should not suffer any prejudice in those matters 
that were granted them.”81 
 
                                                
81 Linder, “Legal Status,” 169.  





 Because of the difficulty in establishing the raison d’etre for any literary work 
from the perspective of the author (or editor or redactor, etc.), there is value in 
establishing it from the perspective of the reader.  It is also much easier since readers can 
always be contemporary, while authors can be dead, anonymous and both.  Both is the 
situation with the BT.  It has been this way for as long as there has been a record of the 
BT and its antecedent works.1  When looking at anonymity, I addressed the question of 
what anonymity does for the text and the manner in which it is read.  This is different 
from asking what is the intent of the author in remaining anonymous.  The first question 
may seem like a possible answer to the second and it is.  But it is not possible to consider 
the second question in any real way, especially when an author is both dead and 
anonymous.  We therefore speculate based upon the first question what it is that the 
author may have had in mind.  Similarly with multiplicity, it is difficult to ascertain why 
the authors and editors of the BT deployed such a significant degree of multiplicity of 
voices.  We can, however, determine the impact of multiplicity on the reader, especially 
when there are many recorded reactions and commentaries to the BT spanning over a 
millennium.  From these reactions and commentaries, it might be possible to glean a 
sense of the purpose of multiplicity and the possible motive of the author, although the 
                                                
1 This is not a summary dismissal Sherira and his assertions.  I am viewing these assertions from the 
appropriate perspective.  Considering that he is the primary source for the recording and transmission of BT 
traditions and attributions, and even he is not certain or clear about what really took place, it is not a stretch 
to think of the BT as crafted by the dead and anonymous. 
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motive of the author is of limited interest.  The impact of multiplicity, or the veneer 
thereof, on the text and ultimately on the reader is of interest in this chapter. 
 
 There are two general types of multiplicity when dealing with halachic/legal 
sugyot in the BT.  The first is where the text apodictically presents two or more positions 
on a specific halachic matter.  The second is where the text presents an attributed 
tradition not as a primary part of the sugya, but as part of the argument that grew out of 
the apodictic presentation of those traditions.  An example of this is Berakhot 38a from 
among the v’la pligi structures, which are the most basic: before eating farina, Rav states 
that one blesses a sh’hakol nihiyah bidvaro while Shmuel states that one blesses a borei 
minei mezonot, to which Rav Hisda adds that there is no dispute between the two 
positions since one is referring to a thick farina and the other to a thin one.  In this case 
Rav and Shmuel are the primary apodictic traditions and Hisda is secondary to the 
primary dispute.  In the text in Nedarim 5b-6a, the references to Rabbi Judah’s opinion 
on divorce are secondary to the primary apodictic traditions attributed to specific sages 
regarding abbreviated inexplicit declarations, which is the main focus of that particular 
sugya.  This secondary layer of voices more than the primary voices demonstrate a 
propensity for multiplicity.  To put it in perspective, the Mishna usually does not offer a 
third primary opinion, and rarely does it offer an opinion or a tradition in the way Hisda 
and Judah are deployed in Berakhot and Nedarim, respectively.  In a basic way, this also 
highlights how multiplicity in the Mishna is different from the BT.  Multiplicity in the BT 
has the potential to be more expansive.  Rhetoric and dialogue allow for that in a way that 
raw apodictic proclamations do not. 
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 Both types of multiplicity serve to create an image that the text is inclusive.  The 
greater the number of sages mentioned, the more inclusive.  Or so it seems.  As Daniel 
Boyarin has recently argued, the rhetoric and dialogue give the BT a dialogical texture 
when the text is in fact monological.2  Similarly, multiplicity may be a duplicity 
disguising high unity.  On Berakhot 38a, one can view Rav and Shmuel as dialogically 
opposed in a most simple sense, and one not necessarily intended by Bakhtin when he 
conceived of his theories.  Boyarin is certainly looking at the text through a more 
sophisticated lens than to assert with respect to a sugya like our v’la pligi structure from 
Berakhot 38a that Rav and Shmuel represent dialogism.  However, the voice of Hisda 
introducing v’la pligi serves a distinct enough role when compared to those of Rav and 
Shmuel.  This is not a simple multiplicity of opinion but a textured multiplicity of voice 
within a highly structured – almost poetic – halachic vignette.  The high form should 
immediately give away the deeper unity behind all the voices and opinions.  Additionally, 
the manner in which Hisda’s voice breaks down the dispute is conceptually distinct.  
Where the presentation of Rav and Shmuel, and the underlying tradition behind it are 
comfortable with dispute in a way that the voice attributed to Hisda is not.  This tension is 
at the core of the v’la pligi structures. 
 
 The focus in the chapters on multiplicity and legal pluralism center more on 
Halacha.  Therefore, when I discuss multiplicity in this chapter, I am generally referring 
                                                
2 Boyarin, Socrates and the Fat Rabbis, 175.  Boyarin’s focus in this context is on the dialogism between 
the Stamma and the Grotesque.  I ‘dumb it down’ for my purposes, and look at the presentation of the 
multiplicity of voices as an authorial attempt at dialogism, more in line with Bakhtin’s discussions 
regarding novels and the authors efforts in creating different voices, and subjugating his own into those 
while never putting himself in a position where his own are revealed. 
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to a multiplicity of halachic opinion, rather than the multiplicity of textured voices.  As 
the phrase implies, legal pluralism is about the law and what is legal; in our context it is 
about the interplay between the BT (Halacha) and other legal systems with which it 
comes into contact.  In defining the two types of multiplicity, primary and secondary, it is 
worth briefly noting that ‘multiplicity of voice’ might also be used (and how it may come 
to be used in future work) where the focus is purely on the literary. 
 
Multiplicity of Voice 
The goal of this chapter is to study the multiplicity of halachic opinions within the 
BT.  Where relevant, I will also explore this multiplicity’s relationship with the 
narrative’s anonymity and canonicity, which have been explored in previous chapters.  
This chapter is focused on the manner in which the BT and its anonymous narrative allow 
for a multiplicity of halachic outcomes.  As I tried to demonstrate in earlier chapters, 
anonymous transmissions of memrot infuse authority into the earlier Amoraic sources 
associated therewith; these transmissions along with later anonymous edits further enable 
the anonymous actors to inject their own understandings and agendas into the narrative.  
Nevertheless, this hinges on how attribution is handled in the context of a multiplicity of 
opinion, if not voices.  While working on the relationship between anonymity and 
multiplicity in the BT, I have become aware that there is much work I need to do before I 
can fully integrate discussions on multiplicity into the discussions on anonymity and 
canonicity, both in talmudic and halachic scholarship as well as scholarship outside of 
halacha, such as legal and literary theory.  This is particularly the case when much of BT 
scholarship today is based upon David Halivni’s analysis of the text, which results in a 
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distinct Stammaitic period.  This conclusion is rooted in a style of reading the texts and a 
specific understanding of them and their evolution; the historical evidence is not as 
strong. 
 
Stylistically unique, the BT is that rare legal corpus that reads more like a 
narrative than an apodictic set of law and custom.  The narrative is alive, and guides its 
reader to the idea that there is an organic element in the evolution of the customs, laws, 
and law codes.  The narrative has as its most explicit agenda the delivery of custom and 
law; as discussed in Chapter Two, I posit that the authors of the Stammaitic elements 
implemented an anonymous narrative as an effective style and mechanism through which 
to transmit law and custom.  Through the literary application of a narrative, various 
authoritative Rabbinic voices – sometimes from different generations – are presented in 
an interactive legal dialogue.  What is often overlooked is the degree to which the 
narrative actually drives the legal arguments, and the manner in which the narrative 
presents legal positions attributed to rabbinic sources, some of whose traditions were 
centuries old during the latest redactions of the BT.  The narrative appears to exert great 
energy on the inclusion of positions within the progressive logic of the legal argument 
such as premises, assumptions, references, or even mere declarations; this as opposed to 
their exclusion.  Beyond their mere inclusion, often multiple positions are still legitimate 
at the end of the sugya.  Maintaining a multiplicity of voices is important to the different 
authors of Stammaitic activity.  It is, I suggest, an agenda of those authors and editors to 
appear to be inclusive, at least to some degree.  By allowing for this vast multiplicity of 
halachic positions, the narrative can be said to be “federalizing” behavioral norms related 
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to halachic tradition for all those who might accept this corpus as canonical.  Unlike any 
individual rabbinic authority, who must ultimately select from a number of halachic 
options so that a real-life halachic matter can be resolved, the editors of the narrative 
were not constricted by the realities of adjudication.  The editors and authors can be 
defined both as interpreting the rabbinic material they received (which at some point 
becomes the BT) and as establishing a halachic guideline.3  At a certain point in the 
evolution of the BT, the authors do so by interpreting not individual memrot, but rather 
groupings of memrot and other sources and traditions that have been weaved together, at 
least to some extent.  It appears as though the authors of the Stammaitic elements operate 
under the assumption that multiplicity is essential for acceptance and ultimate canonicity, 
and therefore one could view the narrative as both presenting an existing multiplicity of 
tradition and also interpreting such multiplicity in such a way as to ameliorate the 
complications associated therewith.  Because a significant energy in my research has 
revolved around this issue of multiplicity of voice in the anonymous narrative of the BT, 
in this chapter I attempt to spell out how the editors utilized the sources and traditions 
available to them. 
At a certain point, multiplicity is an outgrowth of disputes within the halachic 
corpus.4  At the outset it is important to emphasize that I do not believe that the 
contributors to the BT saw a multiplicity of halachic positions as a negative, per se.  
Rather, the differences in tradition – conveyed in the BT as disputes – were already part 
                                                
3 This echoes the Fish-Fiss debate, where Fish would have us believe that establishing law is the same as 
interpreting law. See Stanley Fish, “Fish v. Fiss” Stanford Law Review Vol. 36, No. 6 (July 1984), 1325-
1347.  
 
4 This is further developed later in the chapter. 
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of the corpus of existing Amoraic sources and traditions a tanna would transmit (and add 
to).  For the tanna, as well as his audience, there already exists a heightened degree of 
canonicity in such traditions; not only for the individual memrot, but also for how they 
are grouped and conveyed.  The Tannaim and later the authors of newer Stammaitic 
elements accepted them with little doubt, and thus had little issue in deploying them as 
disputes in the text of the BT.  Though they may have addressed the issue of how 
disputes may have arisen, the editors did not seem particularly bothered by the mere 
existence of disputes.  Further, I would like to suggest that the editors were not overly 
concerned with the ‘problem’ of dispute and saw multiplicity as essential to the halachic 
process.  This is evidenced by the numerous instances in the BT where the narrative 
either does not resolve a dispute or ameliorates it in a less than satisfactory manner.5  
Ironically, they were doing this while still crafting a narrative which is styled to give the 
impression of a certain type of wholeness in any specific sugya.  One might even refer to 
controversy as a “major component” in Halacha.6  Roth takes this to a further extreme: 
“Controversy is inherent in the nature of Jewish law; neither the personal deficiencies of 
the sages nor the external circumstances of the nations cause it to occur.”7  How dissent 
and controversy first become essential to halacha is less interesting to this project than the 
fact that they are part of the process of all those authors from the different Amoraic and 
post-Amoraic generations who engaged in an anonymous narrative. 
There are numerous advantages to allowing the multiplicity of voices to be 
                                                
5 Specific examples are pointed out later in the chapter and elsewhere in the dissertation. 
 
6 Jeffrey Roth, “The Justification for Controversy under Jewish Law” California Law Review 76 (March 
1988), 368. 
 
7 Jeffrey Roth, “The Justification for Controversy” California Law Review 76 (March 1988), 376. 
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preserved.  It is reasonable to discuss the BT’s multiplicity of voices in terms similar to 
the manner in which dissent is discussed in legal theory circles.  Specifically, emergency 
situations, unforeseen situations, and the general rule that as time moves forward what 
were once emergency situations might become the norm; when this occurs with regard to 
a specific halacha, the normative law must change as well.  The tools for doing so must 
be canonized along with traditions which vary from a future rabbinic authority’s own 
position.8  These future authorities must be “as conversant with dissenting positions as 
they are with authoritative rules, because in an unforeseen emergency, they may need to 
implement a temporary solution based on a dissent to meet the needs of the hour.9”  
Those needs of the hour may evolve into the norm, and the multiplicity of voices makes 
the corpus relevant even when times are dramatically different from when the narrative 
was initially composed.  The emphasis on the emergent halachic situation is useful in that 
such a situation would first occur several times before a serious re-interpretation of the 
text might be required.  Further, by operating inclusively to such a degree, the different 
authors and editors of the BT through the generations insulate the narrative from being 
marginalized by those represented therein regardless of the context within which their 
position might be conveyed.10  In conducting this analysis, there emerges a powerful 
purpose that multiplicity plays: it is the halachic diversity reflected in the narrative, and 
more than likely reflective of the varied behavior of the Amoraic authorities whose 
                                                
8 This echoes the Mishna in Eduyot 1:5, where the logic for preserving the minority or individual position 
is so that future courts of Jewish law (bet din) can draw upon it to support a change.  The Mishna also 
delineates certain pre-requisites: that the future court be greater in wisdom and number. 
 
9 Jeffrey Roth, “Justification for Controversy,” 382. 
 
10 To elucidate drawing upon a contemporary halachic matter, one need not look further than the dispute 
regarding eating qitniyot on Passover.  Abiding by one position does not preclude one, and in fact still 
requires one, to accept the ‘dissenting’ position as equally authoritative, just not relevant to oneself. 
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traditions are transmitted. 
 
This acknowledgment of diversity can also be viewed as a federalization of the 
halacha.  In using the term federalization, I wish to convey a sense of centrality of 
authority; yet, while central, the text still allows for variance in behavior and practice 
within a certain framework and range.  Following the publication of the Mishna, Jews 
began to live in many more places, and under a range of new realities.  The rabbinic 
authorities responded to those situations as well as to the more mundane halachic 
questions with great variety.11  Unable to confirm everything in Jerusalem, as they had 
during the Temple period, or in central locations such as Yavneh and Sepphoris during 
much of the post-temple Tannaitic period, and operating more on a community-by-
community basis than their Tannaitic forebears, the Amoraic authorities generated not 
only a variety of actual lived traditions, but also a variety of interpretations of the existing 
Tannaitic corpus.  Legislation such as the one that occurred at Yavneh, and which is 
reflected in the Mishna, reflects multiple positions, but has a methodology for 
determining the correct one, the one to be observed.  The BT, however, often does not 
have such a methodology that applies throughout.  In this way, the BT can be described 
as more definitively defining boundaries for different matters and as leaving adjudication 
for future authorities.  The Mishna is more suggestive, although it too includes dissent 
which ultimately is used as a potential adjudicative tool for future sages. 
                                                
11 David Kraemer, Responses to Suffering in Classical Rabbinic Literature (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 221.  In this context, it is notable that Kraemer argues that the rabbis were not only 
widespread but also possessed little if any true authority.  While not fundamentally connected to this 
project at this time, in the dissertation this matter will be discussed. 
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The BT not only allows for variance in opinions, but also injects nuance or the 
potential for nuance in both the accepted position (where a position is firmly accepted) as 
well as in the dissent.  Often, this is done by presenting the underlying arguments of a 
halachic position.  Where the Mishna generally presents only a primary and a dissenting 
opinion, the BT makes use of myriad positions within its halachic dialectic.  Often, these 
positions are attributed to specific rabbinic authorities; however, there is always an 
anonymous aspect to the attributor and what I generally refer to as “the narrative.”  
Within the broader narrative, I will argue that there are sub-narratives, as they can be 
called, which were canonical enough in their form and substance that they were included 
in the narrative by later editors.  These sub-narratives correspond to an extent with sub-
canonical elements from which the editors drew the material they ultimately incorporate 
into the narrative.  The editors – both of the macro-narrative which comprises the entirety 
of the BT and of the sub-narratives included therein – are always anonymous, and one 
can only speculate as to who they might be.  This too is unlike the Mishna, where the 
reader always is aware that it was assembled by Rabbi Judah the Prince.12  While the 
editors are certainly anonymous in the text, it is unclear that they were purposefully 
employing anonymity.  Rather, operating anonymously, as I argue, is a mechanism 
through which a later editor or author could deal with earlier halachic material, yet not 
appear to be unfaithful to the text.  It is not the place of the transmitter, in this line of 
                                                
12 While I am not going into detail in this chapter regarding anonymity in later halachic works, I would like 
to point out that the Mishnas of various Tannaim were attributed to named Rabbinic authorities, as is the 
case with the extant and authoritative Mishna of Judah the Prince.  This is unlike halachic works of the last 
few centuries, where the author is known as – and/or referred to – by a moniker and not his real name; an 
obvious example is the Mishna Brurah, known within halachic circles to have been written by the ‘Chafetz 
Chaim.’ 
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thinking, to put his stamp on halacha, even if he is actually doing so.  What takes hold in 
the end is a narrative full of canonical structures which reflect an earlier – and then 
canonically fixed – tradition of multiplicity in halacha.  This resonates further as we 
discuss redactional layering in the BT. 
 
Disparagement and Reconciliation – How the Narrative Facilitates Multiplicity 
An example of how the narrative might promote multiplicity is the manner in 
which Amoraic disparagements of one another are included within the narrative.13  It is 
unreasonable to posit that the author(s) of the narrative crafted such remarks totally on 
their own.  Richard Kalmin, a scholar firmly within the Halivni School, suggests that 
such disparaging remarks may have been the result of the school of one Amoraic 
authority recording or affirming such a tradition in order to weaken the authority of a 
rival Amoraic school; this occurring not during the life of the Amoraic authority, but after 
a generation or two following his death.14  Kalmin later clarifies that the disparaging 
remarks in their essence were not the product of the author(s) of the narrative or even a 
later Amoraic authority or editor such as the rival school mentioned above, but simply 
traditions they received and which they included as part of the canon;15 the actual 
disparaging comment, Kalmin argues, was made by an Amoraic authority contemporary 
                                                
13 Richard Kalmin, “Talmudic Portrayals of Amoraic Relationships: Amoraic or Pseudepgraphic” AJS 
Review 17 (1992), 169-170.  Here, Kalmin briefly discusses the matter of disparagement and remarks in 
general, including positive ones. 
 
14 Kalmin,“Amoraic Relationships”, 170. 
 
15 As I later argue, any and all recordings of memrot serve to infuse further those memrot with canonical 
weight; without a position being recorded in the first place, it is lost, and if not reaffirmed and reworded for 
‘the ages’ then its chances of canonicity are severely impaired. 
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with the disparaged rabbinic figure.16  He cites a similar phenomenon with respect to the 
ancient Greek philosophical schools, such as the Socratic School.17  By the time the 
narrative was being authored, these disparaging remarks were already firmly a part of the 
tradition and were included in the sources from which the authors were able to choose for 
inclusion in the narrative.  They can be defined as already canonical.  This is how the 
narrative can be defined as “a discourse composed of multiple voices in which the 
Multiplicity of those voices is not lost.”18 
 
What I argue the narrative is really accomplishing, and what is at the heart of its 
agenda, is the inclusion, and subsequent authorization, of even the ‘disparaged’ Amoraic 
figure.  By reaffirming the inclusion of the story in the canon, the narrative is also 
reaffirming, and in this case for ‘the ages,’ the authority of that particular Amoraic figure.  
The narrative avoids entangling itself within the internal politics by attributing such 
statements firmly to authorities, and not leaving them as anonymous elements in the text.  
As mentioned, the narrative is careful with regard to who is disparaging whom; the 
greatest chronological gap will be one Amoraic generation; an example is Rav Sheshet’s 
criticisms of Rav, even as Rav operated a generation prior to Rav Sheshet.19  Essentially, 
the narrative is trying to stay above the fray and is creating the appearance of impartial 
                                                
16 Kalmin,“Amoraic Relationships,” 173. 
 
17 He references Patricia Cox, Biography in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 
9-12, where she posits that attacks on Socrates’ character were really attacks on the Socratic school. 
 
18 Kraemer, Responses to Suffering, 220. 
 
19 Yevamot 24b and 91a; Bava Kamma 47b, 65a, and 67b; Bekhorot 23b; and Niddah 60a; as cited by 
Kalmin.  Kalmin also refers to other examples of where a generation separates the disparager from the 
disparaged, such as Rav Yosef’s and Abaye’s curses of statements made by Rav. 
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inclusiveness vis-à-vis the sources and traditions available to its authors; it appears not to 
prejudice one school over another (except, of course, the schools we don’t know about 
because they were marginalized and not included in the narrative at all).  On a literary 
level, this ability to operate impartially can only work when the narrative is either divine 
or anonymous.  The narrative is not at liberty to create a disparaging tradition about an 
Amoraic authority, even a contemporary one, at least within the constructed anonymous 
narrative.  The authors of the Stammaitic material, when crafting that material, must have 
perceived themselves as distinct from the Amoraic authorities about and around whom 
they were creating their halachic narrative; or similarly with respect to Amoraic 
authorities, when engaged in Stammaitic activity, they would have perceived their 
engagement in such activity as distinct from their legislative or adjudicative functions.  
But if such a tradition were already a hardened source, meaning that it had achieved a 
degree of canonicity that the source and tradition had been circulating and had gained 
canonical currency, then the authors of the narrative may have felt obliged to leave it 
alone, or to specifically include it where it might further their halachic or other agenda. 
Thus, they respected existing canonical memrot, especially those of the earliest Amoraic 
sages, as mentioned, and re-infused such authority by their inclusion or lack thereof.  The 
narrative therefore is preserving “identifiable sources which were not fully homogenized 
by later editors.”20  A canonized multiplicity is discernible in earlier layers.  Disparaging 
remarks, which are not dateable to the narrative itself, reflect such a canonized 
multiplicity. 
 
                                                
20 Richard Kalmin, Sages, Stories, Authors, and Editors in Rabbinic Babylonia (1994), see introduction.  I 
also wish to point out that Kalmin takes this one step further by also stating that we can therefore glean 
“usable historical information” but I am skeptical about this conceptual leap. 
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To the extent that the anonymous narrative is assuming the charity it expects its 
readers to offer the multiplicity of sources and traditions it presents, the narrative will 
appear contradictory if one does not read these sources and traditions as capable of 
possessing contradiction within the seemingly seamless narrative.  This is exemplified by 
the relationship between Rav and Shmuel as presented in the narrative.  In some places, 
the narrative presents sources and traditions where there is a clear hostility between the 
two; in others, the narrative will present a source where they appear to be reconciled.  
More cleverly, if the narrative can pull it off, it attempts to create the appearance that 
there was no difference in tradition in the first place!  An example of respect between 
them is a case where Rav requires that Shmuel enter the door of a building ahead of him, 
a timeless gesture of respect;21 Rav cursing the sons of Shmuel to death is an example of 
the opposite.22  I would argue that the inclusion of the reconciliation is essential in order 
for the narrative to create the backdrop into which it can plug two figures who must be 
equally authoritative.  Otherwise the coupling of the two would be problematic and 
would make little sense.  Stories like this can be unpacked with the result being a 
narrative explicitly conveying the following: “Rav and Shmuel may have had their issues, 
but in the end they respected each another’s authority, and we as later readers have no 
right to question this position taken by these two titans of the halachic process.”23  Such a 
statement can only be made by an impartial arbiter or a narrative which appears impartial.  
                                                
21 Bava Kama 80a. 
 
22 Shabbat 108a 
 
23 In order to clarify this point, one can look at contemporary students of the BT who operate within the 
tradition.  They would certainly see themselves as ill-equipped to understand why Rav and Shmuel are 
occasionally presented with such enmity one toward the other.  They would discuss even some 19th and 20th 
century disputes with equal charity. 
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An anonymous voice can be this arbiter and anonymity offers the subsequent impartiality 
and therefore the promotion of multiplicity. 
 
Authorship and the Narrative 
The narrative rarely clues the reader into the lived positions of its authors.  Rather, 
it presents two or more halachic positions, treats them as possessing the authority to have 
been included in the recorded text, and presents one as the halacha – or as a highly 
preferred but not exclusive halachic option; nevertheless, the narrative does not close the 
door on the other recorded positions.24  The inclusiveness, and hence the multiplicity, of 
the narrative is striking for something put forward as a legal text.  The irony is that with 
all the narrated attribution, the identity of the narrator is not known and the narrative’s 
agenda is not explicitly revealed; it is unclear if there even is an agenda.   
 
Multiplicity of Halachic Voices 
Central to this chapter is the notion that the multiplicity of halachic voices in the 
narrative creates the opening through which the BT becomes a charitably treated text and 
subsequently highly canonized.  By allowing for such multiplicity, the editors appear to 
have been placating as many traditions as they could without allowing too diverse a range 
of theological styles to contradict so much so that they may infringe on the viability of 
the text.  While the BT does discuss groups whose philosophy of halacha is not worthy of 
inclusion in the BT (i.e. the Sadducees), it is always difficult to guess which more 
normative positions were excluded if they are no longer extant.  As is often the case, the 
                                                
24 This is evidenced by instances where later halachic authorities rely upon the ‘losing’ legal option. 
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editors included varying Amoraic interpretations of Tannaitic material, and they appear to 
include on occasion more than one interpretation of an Amoraic memra.  All the memrot 
and interpretations thereof are legitimate and possess the authority to be included in the 
narrative.  Their inclusion in the narrative and juxtaposition with one another further 
validate the narrative’s inclusiveness and further infuse the recorded sources, as well as 
the narrative within which they are woven, with authority and later with canonicity.  
Without elucidating clearly the multiplicity behind this legislative work, one could posit 
that later authorities may have been less likely to accept the work as canonical.  By 
operating inclusively, the BT allows for a broader range of rabbinic schools to ultimately 
validate the text, since they were more likely to see at least strains of their own traditions 
within the BT.  The BT on several occasions presents information which also validates 
the possibility that two rabbinic authorities might be at odds, but that they are still both 
legitimate.  The narrative draws upon the verse, “these and these are both the word of the 
living Gd,” in order to do so.25  Modern legal scholars have also defined Jewish law, and 
therefore the project of the BT narrative’s editors, as being “controversy among 
authorities.”26 
 
By allowing for this multiplicity of voices, the editors of the narrative avoid a 
large component of the decision making conundrum as described by Bleich: 
“[A rabbinic authority must choose] between conflicting precedents and opinion 
that the consummate expertise of the decisor becomes apparent… He must 
carefully weigh and balance opinion and decisions, assigning weight not merely 
                                                
25 Eruvin 13b. 
 
26 Jeffrey Roth, “The Justification for Controversy under Jewish Law,” California Law Review 76 (March 
1988), 339. 
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on the basis of sheer number but also on the relative stature of the scholars whose 
opinions are under consideration, and must at the same time assess the 
complexities and relative importance of any number of component factors.”27 
 
While the narrative does not appear to act as an arbiter of halacha, and need not 
implement any expertise in order to determine the halacha, it does determine which 
Amoraic authorities possess enough stature to be referenced.  It is not the agenda of the 
narrative to provide the adjudicator with a black-and-white halachic legislation; the goal 
is to provide general guidance as to what acceptable options might be, as the BT 
generally offers more than one acceptable outcome.  The editors of the BT affirmed the 
stature of halachic positions, and presumably, in their time and in their reality, they also 
divided normative (that which is ultimately included in the text) from non-normative 
behavior (that which was excluded).  This is something about which we can only 
speculate.  But the restatement of the law is also noteworthy.  Jewish law codes, such as 
the Mishneh Torah and Shulkhan Arukh, can be viewed as restatements of law.28  What 
separates the narrative of the BT is its multiplicity within a single compendium of law 
and how this multiplicity is available and utilized by those later authorities who were 




                                                
27 David J. Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems (New York : Ktav, 1977), xvii.  
 
28 Aaron Kirschenbaum, “Towards a Restatement of Jewish Law” in Jewish Law in Legal History and the 
Modern World ed. B. S. Jackson (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 115-116.  The principle of restatement of law is 
something that I plan to delve further into. 
 
29 Ultimately, this fate does befall Maimonides and Caro, as their positions are viewed as authoritative and 
worth following, but they are not viewed as definitive norms in halacha.  They are but a single voice among 
the Multiplicity of voices in the ever-expanding halachic canon. 
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The manner in which the narrative creates the dialogue has also been parsed as 
being part dialogue and part commentary.30  Here an attempt is made to demonstrate that 
when the narrative states that one rabbinic authority actually addresses another, that it is 
not necessarily always the case that they were, historically speaking, at one point engaged 
in a real, face-to-face conversation.  In the narrative “the scribes (were) transforming 
dialogue into commentary because of their assumptions that the rabbis involved were not 
speaking in each other’s presence.”31  The implication is that the narrative was free to 
create and un-create dialogue as it saw fit.  Further, it is possible to discern when the 
narrative is generating the dialogue and where it is historical, the argument goes.  I will 
not argue that it is never possible to determine where a tradition is reasonably reflecting a 
real face-to-face encounter.  I argue that the narrative preserves such encounters where it 
perpetuates multiplicity within halacha.  Further, juxtaposing a ‘lesser’ rabbinic authority 
with a greater one can infuse greater authority into a specific rabbinic figure.  Literarily 
creating such encounters serves the same purpose.   
 
To use a boxing analogy: when Ali met Frazier, it enhanced Frazier more than 
Ali, as great as Frazier might have been; nevertheless it was also a big part of what made 
Ali into Ali.  In retrospect, both the Ali camp and Frazier camp will claim their man as 
‘the champ’ and because both were at some point in fact the champ (since they both 
defeated the other to win the championship at least once), there is a case to be made that 
                                                
30 Richard Kalmin, “Amoraic Relationships,” 167. 
 
31 Kalmin, “Amoraic Relationships,” 167. In his footnote there, Kalmin references Eliezer Rosenthal, 
Shimshon “Rav Ben-Ahi R. Hiyya gam ben Ahoto?” in Hanokh Yalon Jubilee Volume ed. Saul Lieberman,; 
E. Y Kutscher, and Shaul Esh, (1963), 284-285; David Halivni, Meqorot U’Mesorot: Nashim, 17; and 
Shamma Friedman, Perek ha-Isha Rabba ba-BT, mechkarim v’mekorot: ma’asaf l’madei ha’yahadut, New 
York, 1977, 346.  
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there is a multiplicity of champions when discussing boxers of similar stature and 
pugilistic skill.  Similarly, juxtaposing one rabbinic figure with another of equal or 
greater stature serves to enhance that specific rabbinic figure’s authority and the 
traditions associated with that particular rabbinic authority.  This serves the agenda of the 
narrative by legitimizing further both authorities not only by means of inclusion, which is 
essential (as is noted and emphasized), but also by means of the method and style of 
inclusion, such as how the dialogue is portrayed, etc.  I might also assume that if there 
was no reason to change the existing tradition of attribution and/or the method in which it 
is delivered, that the narrative would leave it as is.  An example of this is the way the 
narrative deals with traditions of coupled sources – those crafted by a metzaref.32  Some 
are no doubt changed, but by and large there is no need to doubt the core attribution of a 
position to a specific rabbinic authority.  Beyond the rawest attribution of a tradition, the 
narrative certainly took the liberty to create a dialogue and/or commentary into which 
such sources were plugged.  This can include situations where Amoraic or post-Amoraic 
editors might present two sources as having been coupled in a much earlier generation to 
make it appear as though an early metzaref’s hand was actually involved, where an early 
metzaref actually was not.  Those contemporary with the narrative may have been 
sensitive toward knowing what is historical and what is staged.  But for those of us who 
are operating one, two, or fifteen centuries after the narrative came to be, there is no way 
to know with certainty what is staged and what is not.  Attempting to parse commentary 
from dialogue is reading the narrative without consideration that the narrative is 
controlling the entirety of the dialogue – and therefore its multiplicity of voices – and 
                                                
32  David Halivni, meqorot u’mesorot: Shabbat, (Jerusalem: hotza’at beit ha’midrash la’rabanim 
b’amerika, 1982), 24.  
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preserved strictly that which was essential to its own agenda.  Therein lies a certain 
brilliance of the narrative: that it knows how and when to employ specific styles, word 
usages, language, dialogue, and other literary techniques available to it, thereby making 
its embrace of multiplicity seamless and undetectable. 
 
The editors of the narrative viewed the collection of sources and traditions as a 
whole single piece, or at least that is how it is presented in the narrative.  Unlike the 
manner in which the Rabbis view Moses in the context of Jewish (i.e. Mosaic) law – that 
he was a utopian positivist source from whom law was proffered – they viewed 
individual rabbinic authorities as not possessing such a legislative power.33  The BT 
narrative successfully leads the reader to believe that it is, in its entirety, the definitive 
rabbinic law code of its time; that within the range of positions offered within its pages, 
there the proper adherent will find all the answers to any particular halachic issue.  It is 
the ‘last word’ in legislation, and again will commence a period of adjudication.  The 
multiplicity of voices, what one might call the federalization of the halachic universe of 
the time, is a strong factor in how the narrative came to be perceived and subsequently 
canonized.  This is a legitimization of multiple voices and traditions (and behavior) in the 
narrative.  Often, the halachic positions are not parsed as either accepted or dissenting.  
The idea of dissent is, in many instances, the result of later commentators, and usually the 
codifiers (i.e. Maimonides, Caro), selecting one position, thus labeling the other(s) as 
dissenting.  The editors of the BT purposefully played down the idea that one particular 
position was in a full mode of dissent when juxtaposed to another regarding a specific 
                                                
33 In the biblical case of Moses, as viewed by the rabbis, he legislates through adjudication.  The Torah is 
said to come from Sinai by way of Moses.  The divinity and anonymity of the Bible is also tied up in the 
idea of Moses and Mosaic Law.  One can view Moses as anonymous and Mosaic law as divine. 
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halachic matter.  At a base level, they provide multiplicity for multiplicity’s sake; 
subsequently, this multiplicity allows for greater inclusivity. 
 
Rabbinic Views On Multiplicity 
There have been various schools of thought regarding the multiplicity of sources 
and traditions in the BT.  How did they proliferate?  Why were the controversies recorded 
in the first place, thus allowing later editors to embellish the burgeoning multiplicity of 
voices by the second Amoraic generation?  Essentially, the question that begs to be 
asked, and often is: What went wrong that so many sources and traditions were able to 
gain so much canonical currency?34  At a basic level, one could argue, as the traditional 
adherent might, that the destruction of the Temple and the dispersal of the high court in 
Jerusalem, the one with final and the most far-reaching authority, created a peculiar 
circumstance in which local authorities acquired far greater power than was possible 
when many matters might have been referred to the high court in Jerusalem.35  Others – 
minimizers, as they are called – might suggest that while it might appear that there exists 
multiplicity and controversy, it is really minimal and not representative of the vast 
majority of matters upon which all the Amoraic figures in the BT agreed, specifically the 
major theological issues.36  The later editors were in a position to control the range of 
non-halachic theological activity within the narrative, as is evidenced by the statistics of 
BT attribution where some sages are under-represented, some are over-represented, and 
                                                
34 Traditionally, the idea is that from the time of Moses it became increasingly difficult to remember all the 
laws and thus they needed to be recorded, even in the relatively imperfect form that is the BT as a purely 
legal document. 
 
35 Maimonides, mishneh torah, hiclhot mamrim 1:7.  
 
36 Abraham Ibn Daud, sefer haqabala.  
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still others are unknown to us.  Nevertheless, the minimizers do not deny that breakdowns 
in the transmission of traditions can yield discrepancies among different rabbinic 
authorities within the halachic process. 
 
Within the BT itself, the topic of dispute among sages is also broached, 
specifically with regard to how two great rabbinical figures such as Hillel and Shammai 
might have disagreed.  The conclusion revolved around the erudition of the students who 
functioned in the schools of Shammai and Hillel after their deaths.37  Mishna Hagiga, 
clearly working within the tradition, makes a claim that at one point there was only one 
halachic dispute!38  This dispute then flowered into many disputes.  This project can 
accept the above or variations of the above as long as it is still possible to posit that the 
narrative is not being inclusive because of some flaw in the halachic process.  Rather this 
is the halachic process.  Within the tradition, as exemplified by the text in Hagiga, there 
is a yearning for a golden age where there was only one – or even no – dispute(s).  
Ultimately, Hillel and Shammai and subsequently the schools named after them 
possessed differing traditions regarding a range of halachic issues.  Their disputes more 
than likely reflected two poles on the Pharisaic halachic (and one might argue, political) 
spectrum, one which might have predated Hillel and Shammai.39 Although not all 
Tannaitic authorities are explicitly connected to one school or another, it is also apparent 
that as the Tannaitic period progresses, Tannaitic authorities certainly tend toward one or 
                                                
37 Sanhedrin 88b; two ‘torot’ is the language in the text there. 
 
38 Hagigah 2:2. 
 
39 Louis Ginzberg, mekoma shel hahalacha bhochmat yisrael (Jerusalem, 1931). 
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the other. 40 While the text in Hagiga attempts to look back to a time of no dispute, we 
see that multiplicity is attributed even to the earliest rabbinic periods. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a tension that emerges from the acknowledgment of dispute 
in the BT.  There is also indication of a very early tradition for embracing multiplicity in 
the BT. 
 
                                                
40 Louis Finkelstein, Akiba (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 299. 
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Chapter VI 




 An analysis of any sugya in Nedarim requires at least a short discussion of 
scholarship related to the tractate as a whole, how it might be editorially distinct from 
other tractates,1 and the manner in which this distinction is relevant to the broader 
arguments put forth in this dissertation, and specifically the value of reading Stammaitic 
material stylistically instead of chronologically.  In a nutshell, a generally accepted theory 
regarding Nedarim (as well as several other tractates such as Nazir) is that it was 
compiled relatively late because of the ‘thin’ nature of the narrative surrounding the 
attributed Amoraic and Tannaitic material.  Therefore, little editorial and authorial work 
impacted the tractate until very late, and hence the dearth of Stammaitic activity.  In 
looking at the sugya at hand, I will try to demonstrate that certain anonymous, 
Stammaitic elements and activity must be early.  The ‘thin’ nature of the narrative or 
Stammaitic activity eases the process of peeling away those elements from the attributed 
Tannaitic and Amoraic material. 
 
                                                
1 Yaakov Nahum Epstein, mevo’ot  l’sifrut ha’amoraim (Tel Aviv: Magnes Press, 1962), 54-55.  See also 
Christine Hayes, Between the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds: Accounting for Halakhic Difference in 
Selected Sugyot from Tractate Avodah Zarah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 22, note 42.  
Medieval commentators on the text also commented on the unique nature of the language in Nedarim; see 
Rosh on Nedarim 2b and Tosfot on Nedarim 7a and 20a. 
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 As I discuss in Chapter 1, it is difficult to find the balance between focusing on 
the literary while at the same time not losing sight of the historical.  I am interested in 
demonstrating the flexibility of potential in dating the various literary elements of the 
sugya.  At the same time, I am not looking to eliminate the chronological texture that 
informs a literary approach.  This is a delicate balance, since arguments for considering 
chronologies less can be understood as arguments for not considering chronologies 
altogether. 
 
Although he made his arguments in the middle of the last century, Y. N. Epstein’s 
view on Nedarim – that it is late – is still accepted by many of those for whom such 
dating is critical to their reading of the text.  It also leaves us with Epstein when looking 
to review such a chronologically-infused perspective on the tractate.  Epstein commences 
his treatment of Nedarim by highlighting grammatical and terminological differences 
between Nedarim and other tractates.2  He points out that the tractate of Nedarim sat on 
the shelf for over a century, as it was not studied in certain yeshivot for that time.3  The 
implication is that while other tractates were being treated and moving closer to being 
edited in a more final form, Nedarim was relatively ignored during this time and only 
later – after it was ‘rediscovered’ – was it edited in the way of the other tractates, 
although with its own distinct grammatical and terminological nuances.  This somewhat 
ignores the idea that the core of the text – the parts around which narrative is crafted and 
based upon which one can think about editing a text – was of a similar chronological 
                                                
2 Epstein, mevo’ot, 54. 
 
3 Epstein, mevo’ot, 55-56.  Specifically, he refers to the geonim Neturnai as well as to Yehudai who stated 
that “we do not study Nedarim and do not know how to adjudicate from it regarding oaths and swears.”  
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provenance as the cores of other tractates.  It belies the notion that even such early 
material contains Stammaitic elements which hold the memrot together, however 
rudimentary.  And that such Stammaitic activity also impacts the legal trajectory of the 
narrative. 
 
 Epstein provides several examples of where the editors of Nedarim were clearly 
working from, and were obviously aware of, narratives from other tractates.  He 
specifically points out that Nedarim is further distinct from the other few tractates that are 
distinct from the general population of tractates and is therefore from another yeshiva, 
and possibly later as it also draws from them.4  He does not dismiss the literary style that 
is Stammaitic activity, nor does this preclude the potential earlier dating for these sugyot.  
Epstein is primarily addressing the issue of assemblage more than the issue of authorship 
or the crafting of different parts of the text, separate from the tractate as a whole.  Epstein 
even sets up a strong argument for an earlier ‘proto’ sugya existing as part of an earlier 
‘proto’ tractate.  He does so by establishing that the ‘other’ yeshiva from which Nedarim 
comes from Mehoza.5  Part of his evidence is the significant number of references to 
Rava in the tractate.  He also mentions other Amoraim, Rav Yehuda and Shmuel, who are 
frequently mentioned in Nedarim, as whose attributed traditions were arranged as part of 
an “earlier, general Talmud.”6  An “earlier, general Talmud” is essentially a proto-
Talmud.  Regardless of nomenclature, Epstein acknowledges the existence of literary 
elements the chronological provenance of which include memrot attributed to Rav 
                                                
4 Epstein, mevo’ot, 69.  Earlier (pp. 65-66), he points to a sugya in Nedarim that drew upon one in Shavuot. 
 
5 Epstein, mevo’ot, 68-70. 
   
6 Epstein, mevo’ot,  69. 
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Yehuda and Shmuel, and some Stammaitic activity so that the memrot can be transmitted 
in a relatively fixed form.  Epstein’s Mehozan style is a form of Stammaitic style and 
activity. 
 
 Epstein’s chronology regarding Nedarim has its purpose, and specifically with 
respect to a late commencement of the assemblage of material into (and from) tractate 
Nedarim.  In terms of the style, chronology becomes more difficult to pin down, even as 
geography seems to play some role in the Epstein model.  This is especially the case 
when analyzing snippets of Stammaitic activity whose conceptual chronological 
provenance needs to be early, if not its language.  In most cases, it is hard to dismiss the 
possible early dating for the leap from the canonical concept to the canonical language in 
certain elements of the transmitted text.  Epstein does not address this possibility, and he 
does not categorically dismiss such inquiry of relatively small elements of a sugya.7 
 
Our Sugya 
In presenting the sugya on Nedarim 5b-6a, it is worth introducing the sugya in the 
terms I have been using throughout the first several chapters of my dissertation.  In the 
next few paragraphs, I will be going through more general analyses of the concepts I 
deployed earlier.  My goal in analyzing any specific text in the BT is to be able to view 
the words of the text individually and their specific impacts, while at the same time 
keeping in mind the more theoretical frameworks I have tried to establish in the first five 
chapters.  Additionally, I address the arguments I make in my first chapter regarding 
                                                
7 As I discuss later, there are phrases in this sugya which I argue are Stammaitic in style and impact, and 
which are necessarily early.  Epstein does not address them as such. 
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chronologizing the manner in which one reads the text: the pursuit of peeling away layers 
in the text in a consideration of chronology ahead of the literary and/or legal analysis.8 
 
In addressing the issue of chronology in the sugya in Nedarim, my goal here and 
later in my analysis of the words of the sugya is to demonstrate that at least parts of the 
sugya are not necessarily of a post-Amoraic milieu.  Further, in doing so, it becomes 
clearer that earlier transmitters could have deployed the type of anonymous Stammaitic 
activity attributed only to post-Amoraic Stammaim (and only under duress to the latest 
Amoraim).  Specifically, the broader sugya, of which the text I analyze is one component, 
there are three chronologically – nearly self-contained – elements that only need to be 
dated to a period following closely the time of the sage who serves as the protagonist in 
that part of the sugya.  As I allude to later in the context of my word analysis, the three 
components are the following: (1) the first element is the earliest and commences with 
‘ורבחל רמואה’ on 4b and ends with ‘תוחיכומ םידי ןניעב,’ preceding רמתא on 5b; the 
protagonist is Shmuel, and the narrative revolves around his reaction to a Tannaitic 
halachic statement; (2) the section I analyze here, and which follows the first part and 
ends at the end of 6a; the central Amoraic sages are Abaye and Rava; (3) the final part 
revolves around Rav Pappa’s extrapolation of the first two parts as they might pertain to 
other halachic situations where certain types of explicit declarations might be necessary. 
 
                                                
8 To reiterate what has been discussed Chapter I, in arguing against putting chronologies of rabbinic 
generations at the center of how one reads the BT, I am not asserting that chronologies are unimportant.  
Nor am I putting forth my matrix of pluralism, anonymity, canonicity and multiplicity as the only way to 
read the text.  These are all different prisms through which the text can be read, and different approaches 
that can inform how one reads a sugya. 
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The part of the sugya where Rav Pappa is primary and first mentioned can also be 
read as self-contained.  Interestingly, in this part of the sugya, on 6b, the narrative puts 
Rav Pappa on par with Abaye when it states, “from what Rav Pappa said to Abaye,” ( אהו
ייבאל אפפ בר היל רמאדמ).  Abaye and Rav Pappa are chronologically similar, if not the 
same, when juxtaposed with Shmuel in this context.  Evidence that the different 
components can stand alone as self-contained is the manner in which the Tannaitic 
position of Rabbi Judah is quoted nearly as fully in both the first part and the second part 
of the sugya.9  The second component makes no assumption that a reader would be any 
more familiar with the immediately preceding component of this sugya than with any 
random sugya in the rest of Nedarim, or even the entire BT.  Such self-containment can 
be attributed to late, post-Amoraic editors purposefully writing in such fullness for 
reasons such as formulating texts so that they are more readable and less cryptic.  While 
this is possible, it is also possible that the different components were formed, by and 
large, during different Amoraic generations, and not necessarily at the same time by a 
group of Stammaitic operators, chronologically bound to a single generation or two.  
Specifically, there would have been a second or third generation Stammaitic operator 
who put together the first part of the sugya involving only Shmuel and Tannaitic sages. 
 
In terms of the anonymous elements of the text – the ones to which we can also 
refer as the Stammaitic elements – it is rather self-evident within the sugya that the 
narrator and its Stammaitic and anonymous formulations is one which remains on the 
sidelines and which possesses the respect of both parties in the halachic debate.  It is this 
element that is indisputable; the narrator is neutral.  Within the text, all parties ‘give in,’ 
                                                
9 Both appear on 5b. 
  249 
so to speak, to the narrator whose name is never mentioned within the sugya.  It is the 
ultimate arbiter within the text.  In this sugya, it is hard to argue with the idea that the 
anonymous narrator and the Stammaitic elements it deploys are the most neutral and yet 
possibly the driving force within the text of the sugya.  In this particular sugya, there are 
no apparent contradictions within the Stammaitic elements.  On the whole, the narrator of 
this particular sugya succeeds in conveying a sense of gravity both in the presentation of 
the narrator’s own words, and in the manner in which the sages are portrayed as the 
definitive rabbinic voices on this particular halachic issue of inexplicit abbreviated 
declarations.  As in most sugyot, the narrator almost appears to be speaking on behalf of 
the entirety of the rabbinic tradition, offering the appropriate sages and range of 
acceptable positions in a case. 
 
Regarding the notion of legal pluralism, there is little in this sugya that would 
pose a threat to an existing legal system within which Jews were operating while still 
trying to uphold some semblance of the legitimacy of the laws of the BT.  It is worth 
pointing out that pragmatically the only aspect of this law that might be relevant is its 
association with marriage vows and divorce declarations.  Vows in general, and Nazarite 
vows in particular, are not as relevant because of their association with sacrificial 
offerings never available to any Amora, from Rav onward.  There is also little in this text 
that would lead us to attempt to unpack further the notion that some strain of legal 
pluralism exists within the BT itself.  Rather, this sugya is typical in its presentation of a 
multiplicity of voices expressing a range of positions on a given halachic matter.  The 
range of positions may appear critical within the theoretical rabbinic world where 
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offerings are brought and everyone is mindful of every word they utter.  Practically, they 
very much represent a rather single overall rabbinic weltanschauung, with only the 
appearance of significant multiplicity. 
 
Clearly, when dealing with a sugya in the BT we are dealing with a text 
possessing the necessary degree of canonicity to be included.  In this sugya, there are 
certain markers, which can be construed as possessing significant degrees of canonicity 
when considered as elements alone and decontextualized from this sugya.  Most 
significant are the primary players in the sugya, Abaye and Rava.  One need not be a 
scholar of the BT to know that Abaye and Rava lend significant credence to any halachic 
position.  Halachic issues framed around the coupled positions of Abaye and Rava must 
have been highly regarded by those sages who post-dated Abaye and Rava and who 
received them.  Further, Abaye and Rava themselves must have been perceived as 
embodying the canon of rabbinic literature to those who initially recorded their positions, 
and specifically to the couplers, metzarfim, who put their positions together.  Notable is 
the manner in which the later sages are presented as themselves dealing with the positions 
of Tannaitic and earlier Amoraic sages with great charity, and hence with a heightened 
degree of canonicity.  In the sugya, Shmuel treats Tannaitic elements as canonical and by 
Abaye and Rava treat Shmuel as similarly canonical.  The sugya can be said to be 
demanding a similar charity by those who follow and read it.  And, in fact, the next part 
of the sugya with Rav Pappa at the center seems to offer proof of this to some extent.10 
                                                
10 As I mention, above, a later narrator who narrated the Rav Pappa component conflates Abaye and Rav 
Pappa chronologically, and appears to offer Shmuel alone the heightened degree of charity.  Because Rav 
Pappa was a student of Abaye (and Rava for that matter) and because they overlapped, it would not be 
unreasonable for one to narrate Rav Pappa and Abaye in one way, but the long-gone and highly venerated 
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When analyzing the sugya in Nedarim 5b-6a, I pay specific attention to the text 
and how it relates to the proliferation of multiplicity and the pursuit of (a perfected) 
canonicity.  I point out how the anonymous elements in the text drive the multiplicity and 
the canonicity.  What emerges is the degree to which the anonymous Stammaitic 
elements – and more specifically, the authors who crafted them – are able to maneuver 
the authority associated with different opinions raised in the sugya.  This is particularly 
felt in the manner in which the narrator (in the form of the shaqla v’tarya)11 blurs the line 
between actually quoting Amoraic sages and presenting theoretical assertions on their 
behalf.12  In discussing the anonymous Stammaitic elements, I raise awareness about how 
they are not necessarily post-Amoraic, and some of them could have been created within 
a generation of Abaye and Rava. 
 
This sugya discusses how explicitly a declaration must be articulated in order for 
it to be valid.  Specifically, the sugya addresses the explicitness of laws where a 
declaration is necessary in order to perform the obligations related to that law.  The sugya 
explores whether there exists a general rule regarding the explicitness of abbreviated 
declarations, and halachot from which it might be able to infer this principle.  The sugya 
incorporates halachic matters where the explicitness of language is closely connected to 
whether that particular language is sufficient, and therefore results in a valid halachic act.  
                                                                                                                                            
Shmuel would be in another category with respect to his treatment in a narrative that post-dates him by 
several generations. 
 
11  As I mention several times, I use ‘narrative’, ‘author(s)’, ‘authors of the stammaitic elements’, 
‘narrator(s)’ and forms of them, interchangeably. 
 
12 While I translate the texts myself, in my analysis I will discuss other translations in order to demonstrate 
that the ambiguity is deep and still reflected in how the text is read today. 
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Examples include the language associated with sacrificial offerings, divorce, general 
vows, Nazarite vows, marriage, peah, among others.  I focus on the part of the sugya 
dealing with the Nazarite vows and divorce agreements. 
 
The part of the sugya I analyze is a fuller discussion of the dispute regarding 
yadayim sh’eyn mokhihot, inexplicit abbreviated declarations.  The part of the sugya 
immediately preceding our fuller discussion of inexplicit declarations, and from which 
ours flows, centers on Shmuel’s position regarding inexplicit abbreviated declarations, 
and is one of only three other places in the BT where the phrase and concept of yadayim 
sh’eyn mokhihot are mentioned.  The part including Shmuel might well be the most 
archaic, since Shmuel is a first generation Amora, and the words and concept are not 
mentioned in any Tannaitic literature or traditions.  This part of the sugya also seems to 
be the first to infer a position on inexplicit abbreviated declarations from divorce 
agreements, and this is picked up in the part of the sugya I analyze.  The inference, in all 
the different parts of the sugya, is the creation of an anonymous author of Stammaitic 
elements; it is not clear if the same author(s) who crafted the language and shaqla v’tarya 
surrounding Shmuel’s position are the same as the one(s) who does so for Abaye later in 
the sugya.  What is clear is that they must post-date the sage to whom they are referring, 
yet are not necessarily post-Amoraic; no sage who operated after the fourth generation is 
mentioned. 
 
Below are the texts of the two more essential components of the sugya in terms of 
my analysis.  As mentioned, they revolve around the relevance of Nazarite vows and 
  253 
divorce agreements.  First I present the text as whole.  When translating it I bracket 
additional English words which are useful in understanding the text, and without which 
the cryptic text is not comprehensible in translation.  
 
 ב"ע ה םירדנ   םידי רמתיא יבר אבר רמא םידי ןייווה אל רמא אברו םידי ןייווה רמא ייבא תוחיכומ ןיאש
 תוריזנ המ תוריזנל תוריזנ תודי שיקמ י"יל ריזהל ריזנ (ו רבדמב) ארק רמא יל הרבסא ידיא
 לש ופוג ןנתד יגלפימק ןנברו הדוהי 'רד אתגולפב אמיל האלפהב תוריזנ תודי ףא האלפהב
 םדא לכל תרתומ תא ירה טג ןירוטפ טגו ןיכורית רפס יאנימ יכיל יוהיד ןידו רמוא הדוהי 'ר
 'יפא ירמאד אנא ייבא ךל רמא הדוהי יברכ רמאד אברו ןנברכ רמאד ייבא ןיקובש תרגיאו
 תותירכ ןניעבד טג יבג אלא תוחיכומ םידי ןניעב הדוהי יבר רמאק אל ןאכ דע הדוהי 'רל
אנא רמא אברו היל תעמש ימ אמלעב לבא אכילו  ןנבר ירמאק אל כ"ע ןנברל 'יפא ירמאד
טג יבג אלא תוחיכומ םידי ןניעב אלד  
 
Nedarim 5b13: It is stated [that there is a dispute] regarding abbreviated 
declarations (yadayim) that are not explicit: Abaye states: they are [valid] 
abbreviated declarations, and Rava states [that they are] not [valid] 
abbreviated declarations.  States Rava:  Rabbi Idi explained to me:  “The 
Bible states, ‘[if a man or a woman explicitly utters a vow of] the Nazarite, 
to become a Nazarite to G-d’; he compares abbreviated declarations of 
Nazarite vows to Nazarite vows.  Just as a Nazarite vow must be [made] 
explicitly, so too must abbreviated declarations of the Nazarite vow be 
[made] explicitly.  Shall we say that [Abaye and Rava] are disputing [the 
same] dispute of Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis?  We learned in a Mishna: 
the essence of a divorce document (get) is [the phrase]: “thus you are 
permitted to every man.”  Rabbi Judah states [the following must be 
added]: “and, from me to you, this will be a book of divorce and a 
declaration of freedom and a decree of release.”  [Does it not appear that] 
Abaye [whose position is that inexplicit abbreviated declarations are valid] 
states like the Rabbis and Rava [whose position is that inexplicit 
declarations are invalid] states like Rabbi Judah?  Abaye could say to you: 
“That which I stated can even follow Rabbi Judah[‘s position].  Until now 
Rabbi Judah did not speak of inexplicit abbreviated declarations, but 
                                                
13 The translation of the texts are my own. 
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rather [he speaks] about a divorce document, where a strong separation [of 
the couple is required].  Here [a strong separation] is not [required].”  But, 
in general, who heard him (Rabbi Judah) [state that inexplicit abbreviated 
declarations are invalid]?  And Rava could say: “that which I stated can 
even follow the Rabbis.  Until now the Rabbis did not speak of inexplicit 
abbreviated declarations; but rather about a divorce document, where a 
man does not chase away (divorce) the wife of his friend [and therefore 
explicitness is not required].  But, in general, who heard them (the Rabbis) 
[state that inexplicit abbreviated declarations are valid]?” 
  
 The next part of the sugya I present is on Nedarim 6a.  The middle part of the 
sugya is a related discussion about how language is used when bringing an offering to the 
Temple, and the degree of specificity that is required when doing so.  In this section it is 
assumed that the need for explicitness in bringing a sacrifice is sufficient to infer a 
position regarding inexplicit abbreviated declarations.  The shaqla v’tarya refutes Abaye 
once, and he responds, and the next section commences with another refutation of Abaye 
because the previous segment appears to conclude that inexplicit abbreviated declarations 
are invalid.  These two parts of the sugya parallel one another in some ways, and their 
closeness is also reflected in the identical word choice in conveying the progression of 
the argument.  The following is a continuation of the sugya on 6a: 
 
 אוה ירה ילע רמא אלו אוה ירה רמא לבא רוסאד אוה ילע רמאד אמעט ייבא ךל רמא ייבאד אתבוית
 אוה ירה רקפהד רוסא אוה ילע רמאד אמעט אמיא אלא ינתק ןברקל די אוהש ינפמ אהו רמאק הקדצד
 תאטח וז ירה יביתימ רמאק שדקה אוה ירה אמלדד ןירוסא ןהינש אוה ירה רמא לבא רתומ וריבחו
 ביוחמ היה םא ימשא וז ירה יתאטח וז ירה םולכ רמא אל םשאו תאטח בייח אוהש פ"עא םשא וז ירה
ית ןימייק וירבד ירמאד אנא רמאד אוה ייבא אהו איה הדוהי 'ר ינמ אה ייבא ךל רמא ייבאד אתבו
 וליפא ירמאד אנא אבר ךל רמא הדוהי יברכ רמאד אבר אמיל אלא היב רדה הדוהי יברל וליפא
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 וריבח תשא תא שרגמ םדא ןיאד טג יבג אלא תוחיכומ םידי ןניעב אלד ןנבר ירמאק אל ןאכ דע ןנברל
 ןניעב אמלעב לבאתוחיכומ םידי  
 
Nedarim 6a: It is a refutation of Abaye [since it appears that inexplicit abbreviated 
declarations are invalid].  But Abaye could say to you: “according to 
whom [is this Beraita]?  It is [according to] Rabbi Judah.”  And was it not 
Abaye who stated: “that which I stated can even [follow] Rabbi Judah[‘s 
position].”  He (Abaye) recanted [and agreed that his position is unlike 
Rabbi Judah’s].  Rather, can we say that Rava stated according to Rabbi 
Judah[‘s position and not the Rabbis’ position]?  Rava could say to you: 
“that which I stated can even [follow] the [position of] the Rabbis.  Until 
now the Rabbis did not state that we do not need [for] abbreviated 
declarations [to be] explicit; rather [the Rabbis allowed for inexplicitness] 
with respect to a divorce document, where a man does not chase away his 
friends wife; but in general, we do need [for] abbreviated declarations [to 
be] explicit.” 
 
 Before offering commentary on the sugya, and overlaying a literary approach to 
Stammaitic activity, a brief explanation of the sugya and the terminology used therein is 
in order.  The tractate of Nedarim deals with vows, and generally with vows which 
prohibit specified actions.  If one were to translate the Hebrew word nedarim into 
English, ‘vows’ would be as good a choice as any.  ‘Vow’ is a broad English word that 
encompasses a range of Hebrew verbal actions referenced in Nedarim.  An extreme 
example of this is the vow of the Nazarite, to which a separate tractate is dedicated.  The 
tractate emphasizes which words are considered valid in terms of infusing a vow with 
validity.  Beyond the basic word used to indicate that one is undertaking a vow, there are 
also word formulations which comprise a vow.  Vows can be hinted.  They can be 
implied and they can also be precise and explicit.  These formulations can be abbreviated.  
These are called yadayim.14  And they can also be inexplicit.  These are referred to as eyn 
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mokhihot.  Our sugya is dealing with the inexplicit abbreviated declarations, yadayin 
sh’eyn mokhihot, and their validity as vows.  In the course of the dialogue, the text 
references different Amoraic and Tannaitic sages.  Conceptually, the argument meanders 
through discussions on abbreviated and inexplicit nazarite vows as well as divorce 
declarations that are also inexplicit or abbreviated. 
 
The first aspect of this sugya I wish to address is the manner in which Abaye is 
presented and with which traditions are attributed to him.  The sugya is a rather typical 
one reflecting a dispute between Abaye and Rava.  As in other sugyot, the shaqla v’tarya 
presents the possibility that the dispute between Abaye and Rava is in fact a reiteration of 
a Tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis; thus there is no need to repeat 
the dispute in its Amoraic incarnation.  This part of the sugya focuses on the defense of 
the inclusion of the Abaye-Rava dispute, and explains that this dispute is not reflective of 
the older Tannaitic dispute.  In the first part of the sugya, the shaqla v’tarya creates a 
theoretical conversation where Abaye and Rava both are presented as potential 
respondents, and the language used is subjunctive, “Rava could say to you,” and “Abaye 
could say to you.”  In the next part – on 6a – the text presents Abaye as actually having 
stated what was attributed to a theoretical Abaye on 5b.  The more ‘real’ Abaye and Rava 
are made to appear in the text, the more authority that can be associated with the words – 
and the traditions they reflect – attributed to Abaye and Rava.  In order to elucidate this 
further, I go through the Aramaic/Hebrew version of the text in order to parse the 
Stammaitic elements from the elements received by the crafters of the shaqla v’tarya (i.e. 
                                                                                                                                            
14 The tractate Yadayim deals with a different matter, and is not at all relevant here.  Tractate Yadayim 
addresses actual hands and their purity or lack thereof. 
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the Stammaitic elements).  As will be shown, the shaqla v’tarya becomes murky in the 
part of the sugya on 6a in terms of what was actually expressed by Abaye and what is the 
creation of the anonymous creators of the shaqla v’tarya.  Because there are no known 
significant variations found, I am sticking to the traditional words and letters of the sugya 
as it is in the Vilna edition and providing my analysis based on them. 
 
רמתא – “It is stated” – This is an anonymous element that introduces the concept 
to be discussed, which is the partial or abbreviated declaration.  It should not be viewed 
as part of the shaqla v’tarya.  Generally, itmar introduces a concept about which there is 
an Amoraic dispute.  In our part of the sugya, the dispute is between Abaye and Rava.  It 
is also possible that other Amoraim may have disputed the matter earlier, and the רמתא 
and its introduction of the concept at hand is a construct that could refer to other sages, 
more ancient than Abaye and Rava; perhaps there is a sugya discussing this same issue, 
lost to us, which opens with itmar and introduces earlier Amoraim.  This becomes even 
more likely when considering two factors: (1) as the sugya progresses, the narrative 
stretches the internal logic of the sugya so that the dispute between Abaye and Rava 
appear reasonable and thus ‘admissible,’ as it were, into the sugya at hand; quite possibly, 
the anonymous narrators of older Amoraic traditions were unable to see the distinctions 
created by the authors of the Stammaitic elements here; and (2) that Abaye and Rava are 
more authoritative than a lesser-known Amora from a previous generation and authority 
is best infused into the position through them. 
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תוחיכומ ןיאש םידי – “Inexplicit abbreviated declarations” – These words comprise – 
in Hebrew and not Aramaic – the concept of inexplicit abbreviated vows addressed in this 
sugya.  The concept and the words reflecting them can be dated as early as Shmuel, and 
might even be Tannaitic – as this sugya tries to demonstrate.  The placement here of the 
concept and associated phrase is the work of anonymous narrators who post-date Abaye 
and Rava, although it is not clear by how much.  Are they fifth generation Amoraic 
narrators or editors?  Are they post-Amoraic (Stammaim)?  The text obviously does not 
stop here, and the narrator is setting up the sugya so that it absorbs different opinions 
regarding inexplicit abbreviated declarations, and thus offers greater multiplicity.  There 
is a definitive effort in the text to associate more rather than fewer sages with this 
relatively rare rabbinic concept.  The matter – as with many in the BT – could have been 
settled apodictically and with just two sources associated with the tradition and the 
dispute surrounding it. 
 
What cannot be certain is whether the actual author of the word itmar is also the 
same person to add these words to the sugya in this way.  It is possible that there were 
earlier traditions that may have used another word or no word at all when introducing the 
concept in this sugya.  Clearly at some point the words and the concept acquire a degree 
of canonicity, which makes the words nearly impossible to change.  Variant texts support 
this, as the concept is phrased precisely the same way in all the manuscripts.15  Within the 
Halivni paradigm, the concept and the words associated there are not Stammaitic and are 
certainly Amoraic or earlier, but the itmar is Stammaitic; the Halivni school would 
                                                
15 The only difference of note is one ‘vav’ instead of two in the word “ןיווה”. 
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concede that the Hebrew words comprising the concept conveyed by ‘yadayim sh’eyn 
mokhihot’ predate his post-Amoraic Stammaim.  In terms of Amoraic chronology, they 
first appear in association with Shmuel and thus one would be hard-pressed to place these 
words’ origins with a post-Amoraic actor; by the time of the later Amoraic generations, I 
argue, they achieved a degree of canonicity, which makes them impermeable.  The 
memra and its attribution to Shmuel would have been fixed. 
 
Regardless of when they were combined, once put together the two – ‘itmar’ and  
‘yadayim sh’eyn mokhihot’ – become equally canonical linguistic elements within the 
extant version of the text.  Even if it was the final editors who added itmar and it was first 
generation Amoraim who deployed yadayim mokhihot, this is still the case.  As a 
concept, inexplicit abbreviated declarations predate the word itmar as part of the halachic 
canon.16  In this sugya, they are presented so that they are read as equally canonical 
components of the same text.  Layered, however, only slightly beneath the surface is the 
reverence that itmar pays to the concepts as definitively archaic, and thus definitively one 
commanding authoritative reflection.  The itmar is clearly of later provenance, and the 
canonical intent of the author is unknown; yet because of the authority it infuses in the 
                                                
16 I would like to address the use of the word ‘canon’ again in this context of words within a sugya and the 
laws they reflect.  I am specifically not discussing notions of canon related to works comprising a ‘canon of 
something’ such as the Biblical Canon or the ‘canon of western thought’ etc.  (While I address that type of 
canon, it is not a major factor in how I read the text.)  While there is a place to discuss macro notions of 
canon and canonicity, here I am dealing with canon and canonicity in a more micro manner.  When I speak 
of canons, there are two aspect to canons (and canonicity). The first is the notion of the words and phrases 
that ultimately acquire a degree of canonicity which allows it to be incorporated in the Babylonian 
Talmudic canon.  The second is the idea that there is an actual canon of laws and ideas upon which laws are 
based that are not necessarily related to fixed word-structures.  This is reasonable in an environment where 
traditions and their sources are passed orally, and thus there is an inherent discrepancy which must emerge 
as the legal concepts gain currency and spread among more people.  While the language used might be 
similar, exactness was not possible.  But the concepts addressed and adjudicated and legislated would have 
been almost the same. 
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forthcoming Amoraic dispute, the itmar itself then acquires the authority it infused into 
the tradition, and is ultimately possessive of a degree of canonicity which allows for its 
inclusion as part of the text of this sugya.  This method of transmission sets up the 
authoritative pedigree of what follows in the text. 
 
Another version of the text17 omits the entire introduction, “itmar yadayim sh’eyn 
mokhihot.”  Because it is the only such variant, we can operate under the assumption that 
it is also the mistaken one.  Nevertheless, it points to something that may very well be 
possible, and which is not fully addressed above: (a) these words are introducing a 
concept that should be apparent to most readers at this point in the tractate and sugya; and 
(b) while these words serve to introduce a concept, they also serve to break up the earlier 
part of the sugya from this one.  They therefore also highlight the different parts of the 
sugya and how they canonically reflect different Amoraic layers which emerge from 
different Amoraic periods.  The entirety of this sugya that deals with inexplicit 
declarations generally begins on 4b, where Shmuel is presenting a clarification – and a 
narrowing of the scope – of the Mishna’s words,   ינא  הרדומ ורבחל רמואה  (I am precluded 
[from benefiting] from you).  The discussion then focuses on inexplicit abbreviated 
declarations on 5b, prior to our section of the sugya,   אל תוחיכומ ןיאש םידי לאומש רבסק אמיל
.ןיא ?םידי ןיוה “Shall we say that Shmuel thinks that inexplicit abbreviated oaths are not 
[valid] abbreviated oaths? Yes!” This is the first time the phrase appears in this sugya.  
Additionally, the entire sugya until a few lines before our itmar centers on Shmuel, and 
the concept of inexplicit abbreviated declarations is imposed upon him.  At no point in 
the text is he stating a position on it; it is all based on inference and reflected in 
                                                
17 MS Vatican 130. 
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speculative language that is subjunctive in mood, such as “leyma.”  And it is all language 
crafted and assembled by authors and editors who post-date Shmuel. 
 
The section starting on 4b ends with Rava mentioning that this particular 
Mishnaic element is difficult for Shmuel.  Aside from Shmuel, only Tannaitic sages are 
named in this part of the sugya.  It can be said that it reflects a purely early Amoraic 
discussion within the sugya; this is based on the fact that until the last piece, which could 
be a later addition, the entirety of the sugya focuses on Shmuel, a first generation Amora.  
This section does not need to post-date the first generation by too much; it can even be 
the product of the second generation of Amoraim.    The next part of the sugya revolves 
primarily around the narrated discussion between Abaye and Rava specifically regarding 
inexplicit abbreviated declarations, yadayim mokhihot, which is the section that I analyze.  
Because Abaye and Rava are third/fourth generation Amoraim, this middle part can be 
described as middle-Amoraic.  Aside from Abaye and Rava, the only sages it references 
are Tannaitic ones, similar to the first section where it is an amalgam of Shmuel and 
Tannaitic figures.  The section, which follows the second part that we analyze and that 
begins on 6b, discusses two more issues, charity (  הקדצ ) and betrothal (ןישודיק), as well as 
the degree to which declarations related thereto can be abbreviated and inexplicit.  The 
case of charity revolves around Rav Pappa, who was a student of Abaye and Rava, and 
the case of betrothal revolves primarily around Ravina, a sixth generation Amora.  These 
two sections are both later Amoraic, with the last section about betrothal the later of the 
two.  These sections also do not include any Tannaitic sages by name, and briefly refer to 
Abaye and Shmuel when putting Rav Pappa in dialogue with Abaye:  אפפ ברל היל יעבימ ימו
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רמאדמ אהו  אפפ ברל היל אריבסד ללכמ םידי ןייוה תוחיכומ ןיאש םידי לאומש רבס ימ ייבאל אפפ בר היל
ןישודיקל די שיד - “But is R. Papa really in doubt? But since he said to Abaye. Does Samuel 
hold that inexplicit abbreviated declarations are valid?  it follows that he [R. Papa] holds 
that abbreviations are valid in the case of kiddushin?” 
 
In sum, while the version from Vatican MS 130 is alone in having this omission, 
it does point to a break in the text, which also seems to follow the chronology of the 
sages mentioned.  The parts appear to break down smoothly into early, middle, and late 
(and even latest) Amoraic layers.  While not introduced in the same way with itmar, the 
third (and fourth) parts use the word bai to introduce the statements made by Rav Pappa 
and Ravina, a word not used in the first two parts to introduce an Amoraic statement.  On 
the whole this appears to support – at least at some level – the theory of continuing 
redaction in the BT;18 there are three distinct components, relatively easily dated to three 
specific periods within the Amoraic timeline.  These components, in the paradigm of 
continuing redaction, would have been added one to the next over time during the 
Amoraic period; this would be separate from any final editorial work that was done to the 
text, an example of which is the itmar. 
 
 רמא ייבא - “Abaye states” – As in all cases where the word amar is used, the 
element cannot be attributable to Abaye himself; only a third party can speak of someone 
in the third person.  In this case, it is difficult to know if the formulation is that of the 
tanna who worked with Abaye in his school, or if this is a later formulation by someone 
                                                
18 As discussed, there are different methods scholars use when approaching the issue of redaction in the BT, 
one of which is a theory of continuing redaction.  Scholars such as Chanoch Albeck in “sof hahora’ah 
v’siyyum hatalmud” in Sinai: Sefer Yovel (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1958): 73-78.  
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who received the tradition with a looser (and less canonical) language formulation.  What 
is known is that at some point the positions of Abaye and Rava were coupled,19 and the 
coupler could not have constructed the text without using the word amar in this particular 
way.  It is also the coupler who injects a canonical dose of multiplicity into a halachic 
concept by recording and transmitting two opinions regarding a specific matter.  He could 
have just picked sides.  Instead, the coupler is compelled to present two opinions, 
presumably of the most authoritative sages to have a position; in this case it is Abaye and 
Rava.  That is not to say that lesser known Amoraim did not have a position regarding the 
validity of inexplicit abbreviated declarations, or to say that the status of Abaye and Rava 
was elevated precisely because of how the transmission of the tradition is associated with 
Abaye and Rava.  Nevertheless, their two positions are presented reflecting two different 
sages whose reaches were very broad both in their lives and thereafter. 
 
On a separate note, the word amar also allows us to explore how, when analyzing 
sugyot in the BT, it is often difficult to discern whether the origin of the halacha is 
legislative or adjudicative in nature.20  There is no way to know whether Abaye in this 
case was originally recorded adjudicating a specific case from which he then inferred a 
position on the more macro concept of inexplicit abbreviated declarations.  In its essence, 
                                                
19 The coupling of sources and traditions is something that occurs throughout the Amoraic period.  Every 
generation of Amoraim is presented in this way.  While Halivni often speaks of a metzaref, what he is 
really speaking of is tziruf, in the sense that there wasn’t a single metzaref who coupled all couplets in the 
BT.  Just as he shifted his language from Stam to Stammaim, so too can we discuss metzarfim and not just a 
metzaref.  Tziruf is a very old convention – as we see in much tannaitic material as well – and it is not 
confined to a single moment or person. 
 
20 I allude to this in my Introduction. In analyzing any given sugya, it is essential to recognize that the BT, 
in its final form, is meant to read as a legislative work.  Yet, when breaking down the different parts, it 
becomes clear that certain memrot were originally adjudicative.  When transmitted in a formal form, such 
memrot eventually acquire a legislative quality. 
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a position on a concept such as this does not necessarily have to fall into the legislative or 
adjudicative categories since it is not dealing with a specific halachic issue.  However, 
amar gives the halachic position far greater resemblance to legislation than to 
adjudication.  As mentioned, we cannot know if Abaye was even responding to a 
question, or was in fact apodictically offering a halachic position following a debate.  
‘Amar’ without any accompanying information masks any context. 
 
םידי ןיווה – “are [valid] abbreviated declarations” – The language shifts into 
Aramaic, thus indicating a shift from a formal and existing canonical concept to less 
formal and not yet fully established canonical positions related to that concept.  This will 
be borne out by the way the sugya progresses and questions whether the positions of 
Abaye and Rava are not actually the same as those of the Rabbis and Rabbi Judah 
regarding explicit language in divorce agreements.   
 
Even though the word yadayim is in Hebrew, it is only so because the concept is 
directly associated with this specific word.  This is the word used when discussing 
abbreviated declarations; thus when formulating phrases in either Hebrew or Aramaic, 
the same word will be used.  This is common throughout the BT, and other examples 
arise in other sugyot.  Further, the two words combined also comprise a fixed linguistic 
structure for an accepted – and canonized – response to the concept of inexplicit 
abbreviated declarations.  As we shall see in a few words with Rava’s opinion of the 
concept, there is a positive and a negative reaction which both employ the same 
formulation for the concept: one in the positive, and one in the negative.  When we first 
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see the words brought up with Shmuel earlier in the sugya, only the negative option,  אל 
םידי ןיווה, is mentioned.  It is in this part of the sugya, with Abaye, that a positive 
formulation emerges.  This formulation holds up for centuries after the BT is sealed (and 
is still used by traditional students).  The BT contains many other examples where 
concepts are associated with a linguistically fixed set of word(s).21 
 
I would like also to argue that the phrase yadayim mokhihot is older than hevvyan 
yadayim, and that the two did not emerge simultaneously in terms of their degrees of 
canonicity in the formal transmission.   While in the final version of the text, they evolve 
into the same canonical status in the sugya, as part of the transmission during the 
Amoraic period it was yadayim mokhihot that carried the greater canonical weight.  
While yadayim mokhihot is in Hebrew, thus indicating a greater degree of formality, 
hevvyan yadayim is in the more informal Aramaic.  This is the same informal Aramaic 
used to transmit the informal shaqla v’tarya, according to those who see the text 
emerging primarily from a purely post-Amoraic milieu.  While on the whole, I do not 
accept that the formal transmission of the shaqla v’tarya and other Stammaitic elements 
commenced with post-Amoraic Stammaim, I do accept that there were informal 
transmissions during the Amoraic period that could have been formalized at a later time, 
although still during the Amoraic period. 
 
 םידי ןיווה אל רמא אברו v’rava amar la hevvyan yadayim – The discussion of these 
words is similar to the ones conveying the tradition of Abaye.  In the typical format of 
                                                
21 Two examples are   היאר קזיה “sight damage” (e.g. Bava Batra 2a) and  אתוכלמד אניד אניד (“the law of the 
state is the law”) (e.g. Bava Kama 113b). 
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any two sources coupled by a metzaref, the positions of Abaye and Rava are juxtaposed 
with parallel language.  While Abaye’s opinion is expressed in the positive, Rava’s is 
expressed in the negative.  In both instances it should be noted that the word amar 
precedes the name of the sage.  An anonymous thread weaves the two sets of a source 
and a tradition.  Until this point in the text of the sugya, it could have stood alone and is 
understandable to those familiar with the basic concepts related to this halacha; it is 
possible that only later were the next few elements of the sugya added.  In this type of 
apodictic form – a form definitively Babylonian and post-Tannaitic – the presentation 
makes sense and clarification can be deemed unnecessary.  Further, the sugya, to this 
point, could have been assembled even during the lives of Abaye and Rava.  It could then 
have been adjusted considering other traditions that may not have been transmitted with 
this one, but which are relevant and which can be incorporated into an elongated version 
of this core element of the sugya. 
 
There are some mild variances in the phrase conveying the opinions of Abaye and 
Rava as a couplet, םידי ןייווה אל רמא אברו םידי ןייווה רמא ייבא “abaye amar hevvyan yadayim 
v’rava amar la hevvyan yadayim.”  They primarily are omissions of the “v” conjunction 
before Rava’s name.22  A less mild variant inverts the statements, and has it “abaye amar 
la hevvyan yadayim v’rava amar hevvyan yadayim.”23  Another variance is the use of one 
“v” instead of two in the word hevvyan, and the use of the word hevvu instead of 
hevvyan.  While not critical, they do open the door to the possibility that the concept in 
                                                
22 Cf. Ms Munich 95, Ms Moscow 1134, and Ms Vatican 487. 
 
23 See Nazir 62a, Tosfot.  
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close association with this set of words may not have been as strong as I believe it was, 
and to which I ascribe a certain degree of canonicity.24 
 
אבר רמא – “Rava states” – is used to introduce an opinion expressed by Rabbi Idi.  
They are conveyed as a direct quote of Rava telling about how Rabbi Idi once 
“explained” something to him.  As we shall see in the entirety of the sugya, there are 
elements which appear to convey a historical statement or situation and which are then 
found to be theoretical legal machinations formulated by the authors of the Stammaitic 
material and attributed to an older source.  Therefore, the historicity of Rabbi Idi 
conveying this to Rava cannot be considered and is not relevant to how one reads the 
sugya.  What can be considered is that it was presented as a true story, and that it is all 
introduced with amar rava with the verb preceding the noun, as opposed to the above.  
This is also how the authors set forth the groundwork so that the narrative can attempt to 
conflate the dispute between Abaye and Rava with a Tannaitic dispute between the 
Rabbis and Rabbi Judah; even if it does not work out when we reach the end of the 
sugya. 
 
 הרבסא ידיא יבר יל  “Rabbi Idi explained to me” 25 – The story about Rabbi Idi 
attributed to Rava is presented as an accurate recollection of the words stated by Rava in 
                                                
24 For our purposes, I am assuming that these milder variances are not telling and that I can analyze the text 
without considering them, and I only mention the possible implication – as long a shot as it is – so that it 
not be ignored. 
 
25 There are variances where the word Rabbi is not spelled out and only the letter R’ is presented as the title 
of Rabbi Idi.  This matters because it is unclear exactly who this Rabbi Idi is, and whether he in fact is from 
Palestine or is Tannaitic and worthy of the title.  In the way the text is read here, all that matters is that 
Rabbi Idi is in possession of greater authority than Rava, and that Rava references him precisely because of 
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conveying the event.  However, the manner in which Rava conveys Rabbi Idi’s legal 
opinion leaves the impression that Rava is clearly paraphrasing.  Rava uses the word  
asbera instead of one which could convey a direct quote.  Still, the explanation carries 
the same degree of canonicity as if it were a direct quote; at no point is Rava questioned 
about the accuracy of his recollection, either anonymously or attributively.  Rava is also 
presented speaking in Aramaic when conveying the introduction to his story.  
Interestingly, it is not clear who this Rabbi Idi is; we can speculate that it is the Rabbi Idi 
mentioned in the PT who moved from Babylonia to Palestine and thus took on the 
moniker of rabbi.26  It certainly cannot be the second Rav Idi bar Avin, since he operated 
after Abaye and Rava.  The first Rav Idi can be seen as a mildly older contemporary of 
Abaye and Rava, but he also would not carry the title of Rabbi, since he operated in 
Babylonia.  Therefore, it could possibly be this Idi as well, and the moniker of rabbi is a 
mistake.  The inclusion of Rabbi Idi is an example of the inclusion of multiple sources in 
a sugya.  Further, it is not the anonymous authors who are including Rabbi Idi in the flow 
of the sugya; it is Rava and the greater authority he carries as compared to the anonymous 
narrative and the authors who crafted it. 
 
It is still unusual that the narrative would have Rava relying upon a near 
contemporary to lend authority to his position in a dispute; one would think that Rava, or 
those narrating Rava, would not need to rely on a contemporary in this way.  Regardless 
of why, it is clear that Rabbi Idi possesses the kind of authority that allows Rava to draw 
                                                                                                                                            
this increased level of authority that he brings to the text.  The variances appear in Ms Vatican 130, Ms 
Munich 95, Ms Vatican 487 and Venice 1522. 
 
26 Chanoch Albeck, mevo l’talmudim, (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1969), 318-319.  
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upon a tradition attributed to Rabbi Idi in order to demonstrate the validity of his own 
position.  Rava is mentioning this story in order to show that he is not alone in requiring 
abbreviated declarations to be explicit, and he draws upon Rabbi Idi’s position regarding 
Nazarite vows to prove it.  His not being alone is also a mechanism for the narrator to 
expand further the number of authorities who lend their authority to this dispute.  
Regardless of how they position themselves within the dispute, the dispute itself is further 
validated as a legitimate dispute worthy of transmission, and ultimately worthy of 
inclusion in the final canon of the BT. 
 
 ארק רמא  “The Bible states” – This is an introduction to a verse in the Bible from 
which Rabbi Idi will infer a legal maneuver, according to Rava (who himself is being 
narrated).  In a sense, this can be seen as the beginning of a quote within a quote. 
 
 ריזהל ריזנ  “…Nazarite, to become a Nazarite”- This is a quote from Numbers 7:2.  
The use of the second verb lehazir in Numbers is apparently extraneous, and Rabbi Idi 
uses the extra word in order to elucidate a nuance in the text; specifically, that the second 
verb is there so that the verse applies to abbreviated Nazarite vows just as it does to 
ordinary Nazarite vows. 
 
 תוריזנל תוריזנ תודי שיקמ   “he compares abbreviated declarations of Nazarite vows 
to Nazarite vows”27 – Based upon the verse cited, Rabbi Idi provided a comparison of 
                                                
27 Variances of this include Vatican MS 130 where there is an omission of the word ‘nezirut’, implying that 
the object of ‘maqish’ is the word ‘ydot,’ which is unusual since ‘ydot’ appears to be in the construct.  
Ignoring the grammatical matter, without the word nezirut the idea of ydot broadens from just Nazarite 
vows and declarations but to all vows and declarations.   
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Nazarite vows with abbreviated Nazarite vows.  Again, within the context of the sugya, 
these are not the exact words of Rabbi Idi; rather, they are Rava’s paraphrase of what 
Rabbi Idi once explained to him.  Rabbi Idi clearly possesses the authority to engage a 
verse from the Bible in this way, and a variation is not offered by Rava. 
 
- האלפהב תוריזנ תודי ףא האלפהב תוריזנ המ  "Just as a Nazarite vow must be [made] 
explicitly, so too must abbreviated declarations of the Nazarite vow be [made] 
explicitly". – This phrase sets up the possibility for inferring a position on inexplicit 
abbreviated declarations from inexplicit declarations of abbreviated Nazarite vows.  
Ostensibly, this is the source for Rava’s mandating that abbreviated declarations be 
explicit.  The formulation of ma…af (“just…so too”) is a standard convention, and may 
be an older tradition whose original sources were lost.28  It is also worth noting that this 
terminology is Tannaitic, and appears often in the Mishna, Sifra, and Sifrei.  Often, there 
is little or nothing in the biblical text – beyond the extraneous word or phrase, or even 
letter – that hints to the law drawn from that specific text from the Bible.  Once an 
extraneous word is isolated, a sage can learn different laws from it, and it is not unusual 
for sages to disagree about what an extraneous word is teaching the student of halacha. 
 
This phrase also echoes similar language used in discussing the same concept 
earlier in the tractate, on Nedarim 3a:  רדנ ףא תוריזנכ תוריזנ תודי וב השע תוריזנ המ םהב השע םי  
 םירדנכ םירדנ תודי “Just as in Nazarite vows, abbreviated declarations of Nazarite vows are 
like Nazarite vows so too by [other] vows abbreviated declarations of vows are like 
                                                
28 Other examples can be found throughout the BT see for example Ketuvot 42a and Nazir 56b. 
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vows”. This formulation is listed along with other language which essentially reflects the 
idea that abbreviated declarations for standard vows and Nazarite vows are the same as 
the vows themselves.  The formulation is introduced by v’tanya, thereby indicating that it 
is Tannaitic, although the Tannaitic source behind the tradition is not named.  The notion 
of an inexplicit abbreviated declaration is not yet introduced here, on 3a.  It only first 
appears with Shmuel on 5b.  This may serve as evidence that the concept did not fully 
develop as an isolated one in the Tannaitic period.  Citing the same verse in Numbers, the 
Tannaitic source equates abbreviated Nazarite vows with standard Nazarite vows.  He 
goes further and also equates and compares the whole idea of parity between abbreviated 
declarations and standard declarations with respect to Nazarite vows to abbreviated and 
standard declarations with respect to ordinary vows. 
 
As is the case whenever sages infer a specific law from the text of the Bible, the 
reader is (almost) forced to accept this method of inference, regardless of how reasonable 
it might seem at face value.  The more critical the reader, the less likely he is to accept 
such inferences, but to the intended readers of the sugya, such inferences are treated with 
a certain reverence.  This is also true of Amoraic sages transmitting Tannaitic inferences, 
such as the case with Rabbi Idi.  It is worth noting that Amoraic sages or the anonymous 
authors who preserve their traditions, at times, do question the validity of such inferences.  
In this case with Rabbi Idi, the inference is not as far-fetched as it is in other cases where 
halacha is inferred from a verse in the Bible.29 
                                                
29 David Kraemer discusses this matter at much greater length in his article, “The Intended Reader as a Key 
to Interpreting the Bavli,” Prooftexts 13,2 (1993): 125-140. Kraemer differentiates between different types 
of readers of the text, and asserts that the intended audience would be an elite one steeped in the traditional 
rabbinical tradition, with all the knowledge and sensitivities associated therewith.  Such an audience, he 
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The manner in which Rabbi Idi is presented lends itself to the perception that 
Rabbi Idi was explaining a specific halacha based upon a verse.  He does not appear to be 
adjudicating a specific case.  As above with Abaye, it is always possible that Rabbi Idi 
did in fact adjudicate a specific case.  Only afterwards, during the formal recording and 
transmission of this tradition was the language set up so as to appear as legislative and 
not adjudicative. 
 
  יגילפימק ןנברו הדוהי 'רד אתגולפב אמיל  “Shall we say that [Abaye and Rava] are 
disputing [the same] dispute of Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis?” – This formulation is 
common in the BT, and there are two general structures where leyma (“shall we say”) and 
ka’mifligei (“are disputing”) are put together in this way. The first, which is more 
common, involves a refocusing of the precise topic of dispute.30  The second – of which 
our case is an example – is where a dispute between two authorities had already been 
disputed by earlier authorities.  In the BT, there are more examples where the older 
authorities are Tannaitic, but there are several examples where the older authorities are 
Amoraic.31  They also include all the generations of the Amoraim.  Because the dispute 
may be an archaic one, there is no need to for it to be transmitted again in the names of 
Abaye and Rava.  The Tannaitic dispute carries greater authority than the Amoraic one 
could. This is the case even if the dispute is inferred from a seemingly unrelated legal 
                                                                                                                                            
asserts, might question such inferences, but would still possess significant reverence for them and would 
not feel that it is in their right to adjust them.  This would be especially the case for late or post-Amoraic 
authors with respect to tannaitic inferences such as Rabbi Idi’s who is not taken to task for this inference 
regarding Nazarite vows and their relationship to inexplicit abbreviated Nazarite vows. 
 
30 The best example of this is in Bava Batra 59b with    היאר קזיה (sight damage)  הב אמיל יגלפימק היאר קזי (shall 
we say that they are arguing about “sight damage”)   
 
31 Examples of Tannaitic disputes referenced in this way with this language include Bava Kama. 
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situation, such as divorce laws in our case.  This statement is typical of Stammaitic 
activity; however, it is not necessarily post-Amoraic, and it could date to as early as the 
fifth generation.32  The introduction of a dispute, even one which is ultimately proven to 
be less relevant, is another example of the pursuit of multiplicity within the law.  
Authorities are introduced, and legal positions spliced; all are transmitted, even those 
mentioned tangentially and those in dissent. 
 
The inclusion of Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis further serves to validate the dispute 
itself as authoritative and worthy of consideration, and transmission.  Despite the query in 
the text, the reader is well aware that the dispute of the Rabbis and Rabbi Judah will turn 
out to be not the same as the one between Abaye and Rava.  The anonymous author is 
telegraphing the next element in the sugya where it is determined that the dispute 
between Abaye and Rava is original (and worthy of mention). 
 
 - ןנתד The precise translation is ‘we learn from a Tannaitic (source; i.e. the 
Mishna).’  At face value, this element postdates Abaye and Rava and the fourth 
generation of Amoraim.  But it is not necessarily of the same layer as the part in between.  
It is possible that the sugya from itmar until yadayim (the second one, above) was 
connected to this d’tnan and that they were transmitted together, and without what is in 
between.  While not perfectly congruous, the formal part of the transmission included 
less formal elements, which were then formally included within the transmission.  This 
                                                
32 As discussed, above, there are no sages mentioned who would necessitate a late dating. 
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could have taken place either in the last two generations of the Amoraic period, or in the 
post-Amoraic period.33 
 
 -   תא ירה טג לש ופוגלכל תרתומ םדא  “the essence of a divorce document (get) is [the 
phrase]: ‘thus you are permitted to every man.’ ”  – This is a purely Tannaitic element.  It 
is in Hebrew, and it stands alone apodictically.  It reflects the position that this statement 
is sufficiently clear and is valid, per the Rabbis.  The word gufo refers to the essence of 
something, in this case the divorce document.  It does not necessarily exclude other 
elements that can also be included in the divorce agreement or process; it is meant to 
include words which are essential and without which the divorce agreement cannot be 
valid. 
 
A nearly identical  ןנתד formulation appears in the part of the sugya before this one 
which relates Shmuel’s position on inexplicit abbreviated declarations.  The versions 
diverge in the element where Rabbi Yehudah insists that the language be explicit and 
delineates with precision the nature of the divorce agreement in Aramaic. 
 
This part of the Tannaitic element is the position of the Rabbis, and also the 
normative and accepted position.  Rabbi Judah’s position, which follows, represents a 
dissenting opinion.  Beyond the two positions, the tradition of the dispute between the 
                                                
33 Differentiating between formal and informal transmissions is a crucial piece of Halivni’s paradigm.  As I 
detail in Chapter I, Halivni needs the existence of informal transmissions, the bulk of which is the informal 
transmission of the shaqla v’tarya.  Without the informal transmission, there is no need to emphasize the 
contributions of the post-Amoraic Stammaim.  The Stammaim, as per Halivni, were primarily tasked with 
creating the shaqla v’tarya because the informal nature of its transmission required it to be reconstructed, 
and occasionally written from scratch. 
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Rabbis and Rabbi Judah does not include any shaqla v’tarya, regardless of whether it was 
transmitted formally or informally.  The anonymous authors make no attempt to recreate 
any shaqla v’tarya within the Tannaitic element in the sugya; instead, the splicing of the 
positions is attributed to Abaye and Rava, and the shaqla v’tarya is woven around them.  
The Tannaitic element is canonical, and was probably received by the authors of the 
Stammaitic material in more or less the form it is presented here. 
 
 רמוא הדוהי 'ר  “Rabbi Judah states” – This is the second part of the Tannaitic 
element introduced by d’tnan.  Instead of the amar, the narrator chooses omer, which is 
far more common among the Tannaitic authorities.  Rabbi Judah introduces the idea of 
greater explicitness in a divorce agreement.  The author of the word omer is unknown; it 
is reasonable to posit that this author was of a Tannaitic provenance, or at least of a 
provenance where recording and assembling Tannaitic material was still subject to some 
emendation.  When recording Rabbi Judah’s position alone, more language would have 
been required for his position to be clear if it were not preceded by the position of the 
Rabbis.  In the text Rabbi Judah is reacting to the position of the Rabbis; in actuality, this 
position may have been generated by Rabbi Judah separately from the position of the 
Rabbis, and only later were the two put together as primary and dissenting positions. 
 
ןיקובש תרגיאו ןיכורית רפס יאנימ יכיל יוהיד ןידו “and, from me to you, this will be a 
book of divorce and a declaration of freedom and a decree of release.”34 – While this is in 
                                                
34 There are mild variances with respect to the order of things at the end of the phrase, and with the spelling 
of  הינימ and other words, which are not of significance.  See Ms Vatican 130, Ms Vatican 487 and Ms 
Munich 95. 
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Aramaic, it is not meant to be read as a post-Tannaitic interpretation of an earlier 
Tannaitic manner of expression.  Rather, like a marriage document, a divorce document 
is written in Aramaic specifically so that it is understood, since Aramaic was the common 
language.  While the essence of the divorce can be expressed in formal Hebrew, the 
actual document must be explicit and understood.  Therefore, using the informal 
Aramaic, Rabbi Judah is recorded as presenting nearly the same legal idea in three 
different, slightly nuanced, expressions.  As mentioned, this part of the  ןנתד d’tnan 
formulation differs from the one above in that it includes  ןירוטיפ טגו v’get piturin, and the 
one above omits this language.  This formulation more closely follows the one in the 
corresponding Mishna in Gittin, although here  ןירוטיפ טג get piturin precedes  ןיקובש תרגא 
iggeret shvuqin, and in the Mishna the order is the inverse of this one.35  Also notable is 
that the  ןנתד d’tnan formulation here and above both omit the last five Aramaic words 
that Rabbi Judah, in the Mishna, requires in a divorce:  ןייבצתיד רבג לכל אבסנתהל ךהמל (“so 
that you can go and marry any man you wish”). 
 
הדוהי יברכ רמאד אברו ןנברכ רמאד ייבא “Abaye states like the Rabbis and Rava states 
like Rabbi Judah” – Here the text reverts back to the anonymous narrator, and the 
suggestion that the dispute is older than this Amoraic version.  He does so by equating 
Abaye’s position that inexplicit declarations are valid with the Rabbis’ position that 
stating the essence of a divorce alone is valid; and by equating Rava’s position that 
inexplicit declarations are invalid with Rabbi Judah’s position that a divorce document 
requires clear and explicit definition.  This is also typical Stammaitic activity; as with    
 יגילפימק...אמיל leyma… qamiflegi, we can only relatively date this after the fourth 
                                                
35 Gittin 85a-85b. 
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generation.  It is not necessarily post-Amoraic.  It is also the springboard from which 
greater multiplicity enters into the dispute regarding the divorce agreement. 
 
  ייבא ךל רמא amar lakh abaye – Grammatically, this is in the subjunctive mood, 
and is not portrayed as an actual statement by Abaye.  Rather, this is something Abaye 
could say in response to the idea that his opinion is not according to Rabbi Judah.  This is 
important, since the part of the sugya on 6a is far murkier about whether Abaye is the 
source of certain statements or whether they are the creation of the anonymous author 
who presents them in Abaye’s voice. 
 
  ירמאד אנא  “That which I stated…” – These are still words projected by the 
anonymous author onto a theoretical Abaye.  This is the beginning of what Abaye could 
have retorted (or would have if he could have, as the narrator would have us believe).  It 
is also self-contained, does not necessarily add to the previous elements in the sugya, and 
does not reference Abaye’s actual position.  It is reasonably assumed that the reader still 
has it on his mind.  It can therefore also be inferred that this Stammaitic activity is part of 
the latest (or one of the latest) adjustments to the sugya.  It is also worth noting that when 
read as a single phrase,  ירמאד אנא ייבא ךל רמא forms a chiasmus: the two verbs are at the 
ends; the pronouns follow and precede the verbs, respectively; and the proper noun, 
Abaye, is in the center.  While this can be chalked up to accident, it is also reasonable to 
suggest that this is purposeful, and the anonymous narrator is conflating a theoretical 
statement by Abaye with one he actually made.  The phrase  ירמאד אנא  (“that which I 
stated”) also validates the earlier statement by Abaye, even though it is all done by the 
  278 
anonymous author whose narrative relies on the premise that the sources mentioned are 
in fact behind the traditions attributed to them.  In the text, it is the source that infuses 
authority into a tradition and not the other way around.  Hence, the authority associated 
with a statement increases when it evolves from one that is attributed to a theoretical 
Abaye into a statement from which Abaye must distance himself, and which he retracts.  
As is discussed later, Abaye appears to retract a statement he never made. 
 
   אכילו תותירכ ןניעבד טג יבג אלא תוחיכומ םידי ןניעב הדוהי יבר רמאק אל ןאכ דע הדוהי 'רל 'יפא
  36 “Until now Rabbi Judah did not speak of inexplicit abbreviated declarations, but 
rather [he speaks] about a divorce document, where a strong separation [of the couple is 
required].  Here [a strong separation] is not [required].”    – Interestingly, the narrator 
attributes the somewhat obvious query to the theoretical Abaye.  Framed as a question: 
Why is Rabbi Judah’s position regarding divorce agreements relevant to our case of 
abbreviated declarations?  The last three words convey a reason for why they are 
different; one involves a real separation (divorce) and one does not (other instances 
where a declaration is required, such as the Nazarite vow).  The statement of Abaye 
works without the last three words, and they could be the work of an author operating 
after the one who originally crafted the statement attributed to the theoretical Abaye.  
Specifically, the three words are אכילו תותירכ ןניעבד (“we need a strong separation and it is 
not”), serve only as a possible explanation for why one cannot infer Rabbi Judah’s 
position regarding inexplicit declarations from Rabbi Judah’s position regarding divorce 
agreements.  While the explanation is helpful, the rest of the statement from  'יפא (even) 
                                                
36 Vatican MS 130 is missing ‘l’rabbi yehuda’ which must be a mistaken variant, since the sentence loses 
sense without it. 
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through  טג יבג (about a divorce document) can stand on its own, and a reader could read 
through the sugya without it.  These words can be the work of a later anonymous author, 
though not necessarily a post-Amoraic one. 
 
Even within Halivni’s paradigm, where the Stammaim handle most of the heavy 
lifting in the creation of the text, there is room for earlier Stammaim to put together 
nearly complete sugyot, and for later Stammaim to make minor adjustments or additions 
for clarity’s sake.  This could be an example of where a relatively later author or editor 
felt that some reasoning is appropriate; this, despite that here it is sufficient simply to 
point out that Rabbi Judah is not discussing abbreviated declarations but is discussing 
divorce agreements.  Thus, Halivni would see all this as the work of post-Amoraic 
Stammaim, regardless how it might be layered; there is nothing in the text that forces it to 
be much later than the last sages mentioned.  In terms of the literary contribution of the 
Stammaitic elements, the absolute dating is not as important as the relative dating of the 
different elements.  Also ambiguous – whether or not this was added after the original 
sugya was crafted – is whether these words were meant to be part of Abaye’s comment or 
if they are inserted as an explanation of Abaye’s statement; whether this is a later 
anonymous actor or the same one who created the theoretical Abaye, is he explaining the 
words of the theoretical Abaye outside of Abaye’s voice or within it?  There is no way to 
know if the text is multilayered to this extent, but it is clear that the larger sugya is crafted 
with layers that can be discerned.  Some are between and among different sages and/or 
different generations, as with Rava’s recollection of Rabbi Idi, and some are about a 
single person, as is the case here with Abaye and a theoretical statement. 
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 Without the anonymous Stammaitic elements, there would be no reason for the 
positions of the Rabbis and Rabbi Judah to be adjusted in scope.  Not only are the Rabbis 
and Rabbi Judah included in the sugya, but they are also at the center of a digression in 
the text, which has potential halachic implications.  Regardless of how they are included 
in the sugya, the inclusion of the Rabbis and Rabbi Judah serves to enhance the authority 
and hence the canonicity of the sugya.  With the digression, the authors of the Stammaitic 
elements have blurred some of the authoritative lines between the Tannaim and the 
Amoraim.  The Stammaitic elements carefully place all halachic opinions not implicit in 
the traditions they received in the theoretical mouths of Abaye and Rava, and to a lesser 
extent, to Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis.  In this sugya, the Stammaitic elements do not 
offer an opinion anonymously.  They merely weave the received traditions in such a way 
that it exudes authority; specifically by keeping their contributions anonymous.  And they 
weave it in such a way that there is room to add digressions which reflect theoretical 
conjecture and not actual events; and these are the creation of the anonymous authors of 
the Stammaitic elements.  Often, they are contextualized in order to mask this fact.  These 
digressions then carry a similar, if not identical, authority to the actual traditions that the 
authors of the Stammaitic elements received. 
 
In terms of the evolving text of the BT, the entirety of the sugya acquires the 
necessary canonicity to be included in the sealed BT.  At that point, regarding their 
degree of canonicity, the Stammaitic elements meld into and become one with the 
traditions they received; some of those elements are as benign as  אבר רמא ‘Rava said,’ and 
some are as impactful as  הדוהי יברל 'יפא ‘even according to Rabbi Yehuda.’  The 
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anonymous and attributed elements are both essential in the flow of the BT, and it is 
difficult to conceive of a BT without both.  The authors could not have crafted the text 
without some existing traditions and sources.  The traditions and their sources could not 
have been narrated in this way without the authors.  A differentiation in degree of 
canonicity can result more from the manner of expression than from the substance of the 
expression itself.  The traditions expressed as part of the anonymous narrative of the BT 
survive, as opposed to those not included within the narrative.37 
 
Even if the text is multilayered in this way, it is still possible for the sugya to date 
to the Amoraic period.  The fact that the style is Stammaitic does not necessitate that it is 
post-Amoraic.  In terms of the authority conveyed, there are three layers of authority: 
Rabbi Judah, Abaye, and the narrator.  The narrator wants the reader to believe that there 
are only two layers, Rabbi Judah and Abaye.  It is difficult, however, not to consider the 
narrator when parsing the text word for word.  Even if we could go back in time, sit the 
author down and convince them that we must consider that narrator as a layer on the 
metaphorical cake of authority, he would place himself and his narrative well below both 
Rabbi Judah and Abaye with respect to the degree of authority possessed.  Yet it is the 
narrator who is putting it all together; comparing laws that are questionably related, 
postulating on behalf of Abaye, and suggesting that some disputes are not necessary. 
 
                                                
37 As I address in Chapter II, where I discuss the concept of anonymity, the BT was written in a time where 
the scribal culture was an essential part of the transmission process.  Quite similar to scribal in meaning is 
the term tannaim which we use to describe those individuals who recorded the teachings of the sages of 
their yeshivot.  In a time where the amount of traditions which could be recorded and transmitted formally 
was very limited, there was an advantage in being included in a broader corpus of traditions.  The greater 
the number of authorities included in such a corpus, the greater the number of those who might have an 
interest in preserving the entirety of the corpus and not just the tradition of the sources they follow or who 
are interesting to them.   
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באהיל תעמש ימ אמלעב ל  “But, in general, who heard him?” – Because the language 
of Abaye is the same as the shaqla v’tarya, it is not clear whether this is a continuation of 
Abaye’s previous statement, or part of the narration.  This could also be a later addition in 
the way that  אכילו תותירכ ןניעבד (we need a strong separation and it is not) might have 
been.  The question, “who heard Rabbi Judah say this?” is rhetorical, and the obvious 
answer is nobody, because Rabbi Judah could not possibly have had a position on this 
matter.  If he did, then there would be no reason for Abaye to have one, nor for the earlier 
attempts to infer a position from divorce agreements; he could follow Rabbi Judah or the 
Rabbis or another dissenting Tannaitic source.  It is the absence of a Tannaitic precedent 
to this dispute that authorizes the Amora Abaye to have a position.  The question can also 
be seen as not only a question about Rabbi Judah’s position within the dispute, but about 
the dispute itself, “who heard about this dispute before now?”  Tannaitic precedent is not 
needed to authorize the dispute; precedent merely would have obviated its Amoraic 
incarnation.  The narrator (i.e. shaqla v’tarya, the narrative, the author) is infusing 
authority into the dispute itself.  With the validity of the dispute not in question, and with 
its originality confirmed, Abaye and Rava are on different sides of the dispute.  And no 
authority preceding them with a position on this matter is recorded, and anyone 
succeeding them must defer to them.  A dispute between Abaye and Rava carries that sort 
of weight, and the author is quite aware of this, as is reflected in the sugya. 
 
It is worth noting that the question is “who heard him say…?” and not “who heard 
that he said…?”  The narrative goes beyond putting Abaye and later Rava in close 
theoretical interaction with the Tannaim; it presents them as potentially being around 
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those who might have actually heard the Rabbis or Rabbi Judah utter their positions 
regarding abbreviated declarations.  Why else would they be asking such a question?  
The implication also is that Abaye and Rava did not hear Rabbi Judah or the Rabbis state 
anything on this matter, respectively.  This literary illusion also blurs the actual 
chronology and the authoritative lines among the Tannaitic, Amoraic, and Stammaitic 
elements in the sugya.  This serves to level the contours of authority that exist when each 
element stands on its own. 
 
  רמא אברו ”and Rava [could] state”– In introducing the theoretical statement 
attributed to Abaye, the author uses a verb clearly signifying the subjunctive mood.  
Here, as per the Vilna edition and Vatican 110, the language itself is not subjunctive in its 
nature, as is Abaye’s. As in the versions of Moscow 1134, Vatican 487, and Munich 95, 
Rava and his statement could be similarly subjunctive and entirely the work of the 
narrator, like Abaye.  Or the narrator is actually asserting that Rava did in fact state what 
follows, and it is not in a subjunctive mood.  When relying on Vatican 110, the ambiguity 
might appear strange at first glance, especially the lack of balance in language between 
Abaye and Rava; the author could have used the  אבר ךל רמאו  (“Rava could say to you”) 
formulation, as was the case with Abaye.  It is possible, per Vatican 110, that the narrator 
wants the text to read as close to Abaye and Rava as possible, and thus to reap the benefit 
of the authority they infuse into the dispute.  An actual statement by Abaye or Rava is 
more authoritative than one projected upon them theoretically by an author.  The 
ambiguity is therefore more authoritative than if it is clear that this is the projection of a 
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statement by the narrator upon Rava.  “Maybe Rava said…” carries more weight than 
“Rava definitely did not say, but he could have said…”  
 
 שרגמ םדא ןיאד טג יבג אלא תוחיכומ םידי ןניעב אלד ןנבר ירמאק אל כ"ע ןנברל 'יפא ירמאד אנא
וריבח תשא - “that which I stated can even follow the Rabbis.  Until now the Rabbis did not 
speak of inexplicit abbreviated declarations; but rather about a divorce document, where 
a man does not chase away (divorce) the wife of his friend…”– The formulation for Rava 
follows very closely that of Abaye.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that the two 
elements in the text were constructed together, even if the traditions may not have been 
transmitted as a coupled unit.  It is the language that most signifies that they are coupled 
in the narrative.  First Rava asserts that the Rabbis were not discussing abbreviated 
declarations but rather they were discussing divorce agreements.  Then there is an 
explanation: a man does not divorce the wife of his friend, and therefore explicitness with 
a divorce agreement is not as necessary as with an abbreviated declaration related to other 
halachot, such as sacrificial offerings, where one might bring it on behalf of his friend.  
The two matters are not related.  Like Abaye, Rava is not looking to discredit the Rabbis’ 
position.  The narrator has him looking for a way to have his position still be in accord 
with Tannaitic ones, specifically those that might not be so obviously in line with his.  
Again, there is a force driving greater multiplicity relative to where the sugya was before 
Rava expanded the scope of the Rabbis’ position in order that it accord with his. 
 
Regarding the internal layering among the different Stammaitic elements, what 
was discussed regarding Abaye’s statement is relevant here.  Any layering there would be 
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reflected in Rava’s statement as well.  The parallel nature of the elements, regardless of 
whether they were emendations or were all constructed at the same time, further enhances 
the canonicity of the specific language that conveys the traditions; and therefore the 
traditions themselves. 
 
  והל תעמש ימ אמלעב לבא  “But, in general, who heard them?” – Because the Rabbis 
are more than one, there is a switch in number in the final pronoun from ‘leyh’ to ‘lehu;’ 
otherwise, this element exactly parallels the one above.  The same ambiguity exists here 
as above, whether this query is meant to be part of Rava’s statement, or is part of the 
anonymous narrative. 
 
  םימייק וירבד ...אוה ירה יביתימ  “It is a refutation….his words stand” – I am not 
including the next part of the sugya, which is similarly structured.  It is focused on 
language formulations used when bringing certain types of sacrifices, and the degree to 
which they – like the declarations we are discussing – must be explicit.  I move on to the 
part of the sugya on the continuation of Nedarim 6a, where the theoretical suggestions by 
Abaye and Rava continue.  As the sugya progresses at this point, the Stammaitic actors 
successfully blur the line between the theoretical Abaye and the real one.  Because of the 
way the sugya progresses, there must be a retraction of the statements created by the 
anonymous Stammaitic actors and attributed to a theoretical Abaye.  The retraction is 
attributed to Abaye himself, with little hint that he did not make the initial comments.  
The same holds true for the elements preceding the retraction.  
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  ייבאד אתבוית  “It is a refutation of Abaye!” – In this sequence of the sugya, this is 
the second אתבוית tyuvta and refutation of Abaye and his position that inexplicit 
abbreviated declarations are valid.  This again follows up on a Beraita in which it is 
inferred from another halachic dispute that inexplicit abbreviated declarations are invalid.  
Specifically, when bringing a chatat or asham sacrificial offering, it must be explicitly 
stated on behalf of whom the offering is brought.  If it is not explicitly stated, then the 
individual must bring another offering if he was required to do so.  If one were to utter      
םשא וז ירה (this is an asham) or  תאטח וז ירה  (this is a chatat), it would not be sufficient, 
and it is as though the person “didn’t say anything.”  One must specifically state   וז ירה
יתאטח (this is my chatat) or   ימשא וז ירה (this is my asham) in order for the sacrifice to be 
valid. 
 
 It is the anonymous author who is determining that it is possible to infer a 
halachic position regarding the principle of inexplicit abbreviated declarations from 
inexplicitness in declaring one’s intention for a sacrifice.  The narrative presents this 
matter-of-factly, and this even slips past the keen eyes of later, post-Genoic 
commentaries on the BT.  A connection between the cases of divorce agreements and 
Nazarite vows with inexplicit abbreviated declarations appears elsewhere in the BT,38 
thus strengthening the connection in the sense that this is not the only place where it 
appears.  This is not the case with sacrifices, where this is the only place in the BT where 
it is juxtaposed with the concept of  yadayim sh’eyn mokhihot. 
 
                                                
38 See Gittin 85b for divorce agreements and Nazir 2b for Nazarite vows. 
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  ייבא ךל רמא  “Abaye could say to you” – The anonymous Stammaitic actors refer 
to the theoretical Abaye who will attempt to defend his position by inquiring further into 
the source behind the tradition in the Baraita.  It turns out to be Rabbi Judah, which 
creates a problem for Abaye in relation to what was stated before. 
 
  ינמ אה  “Who is this?”– These two words are the creations of the anonymous 
Stammaitic actors and attributed to a theoretical Abaye as he defends his position.  Abaye 
is inquiring as to who is the source of this Baraita, since Abaye is already aware that there 
are different Tannaitic sages with different opinions on the issue of explicitness in 
language, and that not all are in alignment with his position on the matter.  The author 
presumably knows the answer to this question, yet asks it as part of the rhetoric. 
 
  איה הדוהי 'ר  “It is [according to] Rabbi Judah”  – This is the response to Abaye’s 
question.  The Stammaitic actors are responding to the question, thus putting them in 
dialogue with the theoretical Abaye.  This is still plausible in terms of the potential 
historicity of the text.  What follows is rhetorical sleight of hand which blurs the lines 
between the theoretical and real Abayes. 
 
  רמאד אוה ייבא אהו  “And was it not Abaye who stated: ‘that which I stated can even 
[follow] Rabbi Judah[‘s position].’ ” – The Stammaitic actors continue by quoting Abaye 
from the first part of the sugya, above.  Yet, they are not quoting Abaye; they are quoting 
the statements that were attributed to the theoretical Abaye.  Generously, we can suggest 
that the Stammaitic actors who are making this statement are different from the ones who 
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attributed the earlier one to Abaye.39  Either way, to the reader of a sealed BT, the 
distinction between the theoretical Abaye and the real one is diminished, if not absolutely 
dismissed, in this part of the sugya.  The authoritative value of the real Abaye is now 
conflated with the authoritative value of the theoretical Abaye.  Once part of the sealed 
BT, the narrative is set up so that the degree of canonicity of both Abayes and the literary 
elements that convey them are equal.  Interestingly, in the actual phrasing of these words, 
variances persist to the extent they can with just four words: 'אד ייבא אהו 40 ייבא אהו 41  אהו 
'מא ייבא 42 and  .ייבאאהו 43  It conjures images of catching a child in a lie, and each time they 
repeat it, they repeat the same story but with different language. 
 
  הדוהי יברל 'יפא ירמאד אנא “that which I stated can even [follow] Rabbi Judah[‘s 
position].” – This is a direct quote from the first part of the sugya.  In another 
manipulation of the original context of this statement, it is presented as a definitive aspect 
of Abaye’s position; specifically, that Abaye aligned his position with Rabbi Judah’s 
position, and therefore there can be no contradiction between the two.  This would be 
instead a case of Abaye relying on another Tanna, in which case this would be a 
reiteration of a Tannaitic dispute, and therefore extraneous, per the initial suggestion in 
the sugya.  This alignment of Abaye’s position with Rabbi Judah’s originates not with 
                                                
39 An important component of my dissertation revolves around the different layers of Stammaitic activity 
that exist.  I go beyond Halivni and others in terms of my willingness to parse different layers of 
Stammaitic activity, even between adjacent sStammaitic elements in the same sugya. 
 
40 Ms Munich 95. 
 
41 Ms Vatican 130. 
 
42 Ms Vatican 487. 
 
43 Ms Moscow 1134. 
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Abaye, but with anonymous actors – more than likely the authors of the Stammaitic 
elements, although the tradition of this alignment can predate its formal transmission and 
the words crafted for it. 
 
 More important to my analysis is how the authors attribute to the (‘real’) Abaye a 
Stammaitic creation that was initially attributed to a theoretical Abaye.  As we read 
earlier,  הדוהי יברל 'יפא ירמאד אנא ייבא ךל רמא  (“Abaye could say to you ‘that which I stated 
can even follow Rabbi Judah’s position’”).  What Abaye could have said is not 
something that Abaye did in fact say.  This is according to the theoretical Abaye, who 
himself is the creation of Stammaitic actors who create the rhetoric.  It is because they are 
operating anonymously that the authors who assembled the sugya can make this move, 
which adjusts the authority of the specific element in the sugya – from a theoretical 
statement by a theoretical Abaye, it is now Abaye’s statement with all the authority 
associated with it.  
 
  היב רדה  “he recanted” – These two words are typically Stammaitic, and are part of 
the guiding and descriptive narration of the sugya.  Here the narrative has Abaye 
recanting something he never really said.  The retraction of a statement – in its own ironic 
way in our case – serves to legitimate it as a position that was once in fact real.  What is 
more important to the narrative is not so much that the reader accept that the position is 
‘out there,’ so to speak, but that the reader accept that the sage associated with the 
position is also the correct one.  This is because a position associated with the author(s) 
of the anonymous narrative – whoever they might have been – is less authoritative than 
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when it is associated with an Amora.  It is even more authoritative when it is associated 
with an Amora of Abaye’s stature.  By remaining anonymous on the sugya level, as is the 
case here, the authors keep themselves and the potentially murkier nature of their 
authority out of the mix.  They maintain the spotlight on the named sources such as 
Abaye and Rava, and also Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis as part of the digression in the 
sugya; and one can even add Rabbi Idi to the mix. 
 
 It is important to note that it is possible that the ‘real’ Abaye had little issue with 
disagreeing with Rabbi Judah so long as he had the Rabbis upon whom to lean to validate 
his position.  The origin of the alignment of Rabbi Judah’s position is the conjecture on 
the part of the theoretical Abaye on 5b; therefore, as mentioned above, it is the work of 
the anonymous author who created the theoretical Abaye.  Even in the language of Abaye 
there, no indication is given that Abaye and Rabbi Judah must be in accord and that the 
alignment is absolute; at that point in the narrative, all that is raised is the possibility that 
Abaye’s position could be like Rabbi Judah’s, but not that it definitively must be.  The 
absolute alignment is only first presented at this point in the narrative of the sugya.  This 
is the point at which it becomes clear to the reader that the Amoraic dispute between 
Abaye and Rava is in fact a close enough reflection of the Tannaitic dispute between 
Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis.  Thus, this part of the sugya is actually unnecessary and all 
that is really resolved is that it might have been unnecessary to record and transmit the 
dispute between Abaye and Rava.  Nevertheless, it was recorded, transmitted, and set up 
with a high degree of canonicity.  This was accomplished anonymously.  In the sealed 
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and extant BT, we are left with a single degree of canonicity; all the elements blend to 
form a single narrative with a nearly equal degree of canonicity throughout. 
 
  When Abaye (and Rava for that matter) formulated their positions, there was still 
no issue regarding whether to include their positions, and the dispute it spawned, in the 
text of the sugya.  This is a problem created only when traditions reflected by these 
positions are recorded and then transmitted, and subsequently when the enterprise of 
creating a text is underway.  It is then an issue to be addressed by the authors of the 
sugya, and the rules that they impose on the text and its transmission.  Abaye and Rava 
may have been content following and advocating for existing Tannaitic positions on the 
matters of abbreviated language in vows, marriage, and sacrifices as separate matters.  
They may have been less interested in isolating a broad position regarding the concept of 
inexplicit abbreviated declarations.  They certainly were interested in practical law 
relevant to the day-to-day lives of their constituents.  While they may not have 
contributed anything original to the position, as a pragmatic matter they needed to take a 
position, specifically on divorce documents.44  One could argue that there is no reason for 
an Amora to take a position on Nazarite vows or language associated with sacrificial 
offerings, since it was no longer a practical manner; there was no Temple which was 
required both for sacrifices and for Nazarite vows.  The only reason would be for the 
purposes of maintaining a position on a theoretical level as part of one’s study.  With 
marriage vows and divorce agreements, however, there was a practical reason for Abaye 
                                                
44 This applies to other laws as well, such as marriage laws and peah, which are discussed on the next 
couple of pages of the Tractate Nedarim. 
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and Rava to take a position: people were still getting married and divorced in accordance 
with halacha. 
 
 While in our case, it seems that Abaye never actually made the initial statement 
that he ‘retracted,’ there are instances where a statement is attributed in one place, and 
unattributed in another context, and this has been discussed by Robert Brody.45  Our case 
goes beyond what Brody is discussing in that it is the narrator – possibly the same 
individual – who creates the words, but crafts them in the voice of Abaye and then later 
actually attributes them to Abaye.  Our case is a clear manipulation of attribution, while 
Brody does not go as far as to suggest that attribution is manipulated in this way.  While 
it is not clear from his article, it appears that he is attributing such misattribution to 
breakdowns in transmission or simple carelessness. 
 
Setting aside the differences in the nature of the misattribution, it is worth looking 
more carefully at Brody’s arguments regarding attribution, and the methods he utilizes in 
creating them.  This is particularly true in terms of our discussions regarding attribution 
versus anonymity; further, it is important to cast Brody in the light of Halivni’s 
discussions regarding attribution.  It is also important because Brody relies on this sort of 
misattribution to demonstrate that at least some anonymous Stammaitic elements are 
                                                
45  Robert Brody, “stam hatalmud v’divrey ha’amoraim” in Iggud: mivhar ma’amarim b’mada’ey 
ha’yahadut – krakh aleph; ha’miqra v’olamo, sifrut hazal u’mishpat ivri u’mahshevt yisrael eds. B. 
Schwartz, A. Melamed and A. Shemesh (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2008), 213-232. 
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firmly dated to the Amoraic period, often contrary to how Halivni might read the 
particular sugya.46 
 
  הדוהי יברכ רמאד אבר אמיל אלא  “Rather, can we say that Rava stated according to 
Rabbi Judah?” – Here the narrative suggests that Rava, too, ought retract his earlier 
statements and align his position only with Rabbi Judah’s position that unabbreviated 
declarations are invalid, following Rabbi Judah’s position that a divorce agreement be 
explicit.  Again, the authors of the Stammaitic material are setting up the dialogue so that 
Rava will be able to eliminate this possibility, and allow for his position to be in accord 
with both the Rabbis’ and Rabbi Judah’s divergent positions.  Therefore, unlike Abaye, 
the narrative does not have Rava retract his earlier statement in the same explicit manner. 
 
  אבר ךל רמא  “Rava could state to you” – The narrative now provides balance to 
Abaye’s theoretical and subjunctive statement by offering one on behalf of a theoretical 
Rava.  Here the language reflects this type of intent on the part of the narrators because of 
the verb employed and the phraseology surrounding it.  This is unlike the earlier part of 
the sugya, per Vatican 110 and the Vilna edition, where the language was in the past 
tense, and the subjunctive nature of the statement by Rava is understood from context; 
specifically it is understood from the manner in which Rava’s statement are set up as 
balancing those made by Abaye.  It is worth noting that this type of balance is a feature of 
                                                
46 Brody, “stam hatalmud,” 226.  Brody then relies on this in order to date other Stammaitic elements, such 
as kushyot and ukimtot (within the Amoraic period).  This is quite contrary to Halivni’s perception that this 
type of activity is a distinct Stammaitic one dateable only to the Stammaitic period and not the Amoraic 
period.  In less chronologically stratified parlance, Brody and Halivni are debating the degree to which 
stammaitic literary elements can be dated to the amoraic period.  I deal with this in Chapter I.  
 
  294 
canonicity in the sense that it is more easily memorized and thus more easily recorded 
and transmitted through multiple generations.47 
 
  םדא ןיאד טג יבג אלא תוחיכומ םידי ןניעב אלד ןנבר ירמאק אל ןאכ דע ןנברל וליפא ירמאד אנא
תוחיכומ םידי ןניעב אמלעב לבא וריבח תשא תא שרגמ “that which I stated can even [follow] the 
[position of] the Rabbis.  Until now the Rabbis did not state that we do not need [for] 
abbreviated declarations [to be] explicit; rather respect to a divorce document, where a 
man does not chase away his friends wife; but in general, we do need [for] abbreviated 
declarations [to be] explicit.”48 – This is the last element of this part of the sugya.  The 
authors of this element present us with a theoretical Rava suggesting that this position of 
the Rabbis regarding abbreviated language – that a divorce agreement can be inexplicit 
and still valid – is relevant only to divorce agreements and not necessarily to vows or 
other matters where explicit language in an abbreviated declaration is required.  Echoing 
what was stated earlier in 5b/6a, a man would only divorce his own wife and not another 
man’s wife, thus negating the need to be explicit in divorce agreements but not 
elsewhere.  As is anticipated in the element preceding it, Rava does not retract his earlier 
statement and successfully aligns his position with that of the Rabbis, in addition to 
having already aligned his with Rabbi Judah’s.  However weakly, this obviates the 
suggestion that the dispute between Abaye and Rava is redundant in light of the Tannaitic 
dispute between Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis.  The dispute is not an exact match because 
                                                
47 Quite a bit of Talmud scholarship is dedicated to uncovering meta structures of sugyot, and specifically 
to isolating elements that are in balance with other elements in the sugya.  Shamma Friedman has done 
extensive work of this nature. See “Some Structural Patterns of Talmudic Sugyot” (Hebrew), Proceedings 
of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies III (1977), 384-402. 
 
48 Ms Vatican 130, Ms Vatican 487 and Ms Moscow 1134 convey the same idea, but do so in the negative, 
“(ןניאש MS Vatican 130) ומ ןיאש םידי אמלעב לבאםידי ןיווה אל תוחיכ .” 
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Rava’s position can be in accord with both Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis, according to the 
logic presented here.  This legitimizes the formal transmission of the dispute between 
Abaye and Rava and the need for it to be included in the final version of the sugya. 
 
 I would like to argue that this formalization of the dispute was also reflected in 
the language used to convey the tradition of the dispute.  Not only is the dispute part of 
the formal transmission, but so is the attendant argumentation in the form of the shaqla 
v’tarya and other accompanying Stammaitic elements.  This part of the sugya becomes 
sealed, while obviously the parts containing later authorities can only begin the process of 
acquiring canonicity and ultimately becoming a tradition whose substance and language 
is sealed at a later time. 
 
 While this is a dissertation, and still a work in progress, I have done my best in 
my analysis of this part of the sugya in Nedarim to demonstrate two things.  The first is 
that the hyper-focus on chronology and the traditional notions of chronology that go 
along with it cloud one’s ability to read the BT as a comprehensive narrative where 
layering is only one factor in the understanding of the text.  The second is my offering the 
matrices of anonymity, multiplicity, and canonicity on which to map the different parts of 
the text as they present themselves to the reader.  On the whole, this sugya also serves to 
demonstrate how the mapping of the matrices can offer the reader a greater sense of 
where authority actually lies within the sugyot of the BT.  Without specifically pointing it 
out overtly at every turn, I read the Stammaitic elements as possessing the greatest 
authority in the text.  While the sages’ names carry great authority, both to the 
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contemporary reader as well as to the Amoraic transmitter, it is their deployment by the 
authors of the Stammaitic elements that most directly impacts their degree of authority.  
They were clearly crafted in such a way so as to convey the necessary degree of 
canonicity to be not only transmitted once or twice, but also to be included in the broader 
BT corpus. 
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Chapter VII 




The ninth chapter of Gittin commences on folio 82a, and the text discussed here 
begins with the Mishna and continues into 82b.  The sugya as a whole continues until 
85a.  The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate further the thesis that Stammaitic 
elements are not necessarily the product of the latest Amoraim, or earliest Saboraim, or 
Stammaim.  Rather, Stammaitic activity is a unique narrative style independent from a 
chronological paradigm.  As I argue throughout this dissertation, I suggest “a shift away 
from historical and social evaluations and toward the stylistic and textual characteristics 
which might be located in various times or groups of figures.”1  One can read them as 
pivoting the trajectory of how we can create meaning out of the sources and traditions, 
and out of the anonymous Stammaitic elements that weave them.  More significant a 
contributor to this pivot is the manner in which the Stammaitic elements and the sources 
and traditions they present become a single and cohesive narrative.  It is a narrative that 
seeks to convey a collective and unified authority.  In this sugya, there are elements that 
have been viewed as the work of post-Amoraic Stammaim.  I argue that some of these 
elements are in fact the work of Amoraim or those transmitters (tannaim) contemporary 
                                                
1 The language is that provided to me by Daniel Abrams in reviewing my draft. 
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with them – both early and late Amoraic generations.  Additionally, I note how reliance 
upon traditional rabbinic chronologies is in tension with reading the text critically.2 
 
Beyond the effects of anonymity, I also discuss the other three features – 
canonicity, pluralism, and multiplicity – as they can serve as characteristics through 
which to find meaning in the text.  While I do not offer an overview of each feature as 
they relate to the sugya, I do address the matter of pluralism and the pluralistic potential 
of this sugya.  Regarding anonymity, canonicity, and multiplicity, I address those in the 
context of my analysis of the sugya as a whole and of the different elements in the text 
and the words contained therein. 
 
 In addressing the matter of Stammaitic activity versus Stammaim in this sugya, I 
look to the analysis offered by Shamma Friedman3 and David Halivni.4  I have chosen 
this text in part is because it is has been sufficiently analyzed by both Friedman and 
Halivni, who read all texts in the BT under the assumption of a post-Amoraic class of 
Stammaim bound – at least to a certain degree – to a specific chronological place.  While 
Halivni offers a more cursory analysis of the sugya, it is worth noting the aspects of the 
sugya he focuses on.  Friedman, on the other hand, offers a comprehensive analysis of the 
sugya, and offers the student of this sugya sufficient information from which to spring 
                                                
2 Specifically, I refer both to the chronologically bound Stammaim and also, in this case, to the way the 
demarcated line between Amoraim and Tannaim prevent positing this first element of the sugya, its 
introduction, as late Tannaitic.  Contextually, this might be an even better way to read the text, as I explain 
later. 
 
3 Shamma Friedman, chamesh sugyot min hatalmud habavli (Jerusalem: ha’igud l’parshanut ha’talmud, 
2002), 123 – 148. 
 
4 David Halivni, meqorot u’mesorot: seder nashim (Toronoto: Otzrenu), 604-606.  
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into a counter-analysis of the text.  I also address the sources and/or commentaries upon 
which Friedman and Halivni rely to advance their positions. 
 
 This sugya focuses on the reasoning behind Rabbi Eliezer’s position that 
exclusions are permitted within a get (divorce agreement).  The Mishna states that “if one 
divorces his wife and states to her ‘you are hereby permitted to all men but (ela) ploni,’ ” 
then Rabbi Eliezer considers such a get valid.  In my translation, below, I have translated 
the word ela as ‘but’ even while the intuitive meaning is ‘except.’5  If I were translating 
only the Mishna, without requiring the translation to make sense with the associated 
sugya in the BT, I might have translated it as ‘except.’  The BT opens up the sugya by 
offering two possible meanings for the word ela: hutz (except) and al menat (on 
condition).  In order to capture the ambiguity infused into the Mishna, first by Rabbi Jose, 
son of Rabbi Judah, and later by the anonymous author of the introductory statement to 
the sugya, I translate the word ela as ‘but.’  This ambiguity is the primary focus of the 
sugya.   
 
Specifically, I would like to argue that the first part of the text of the BT after the 
Mishna (טגב הל רייש אהד ...והל איעביא) is necessarily archaic.  An early dating is even more 
reasonable to posit for the first question, ending in   אוה תנמ לע .  Reading it as archaic and 
dating it as early as late Tannaitic or early Amoraic offers us an insight into how the 
authors of the Stammaitic elements pivoted the meaning of a set of sources and traditions.  
Because of the obvious problem with exclusions in a divorce agreement, this pivot in 
                                                
5 As I discuss later, Friedman specifically articulates this, and also points to the parallel Tosefta, where hutz 
is deployed.  See Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 123-124. 
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meaning necessarily occurs early chronologically on account of the Tanna associated 
with it – in our case Rabbi Eliezer.  Further, because it drives the first few folios of this 
chapter in Gittin, meaning in the sugya is better culled when reading this first element as 
earlier than any Amoraic tradition in the sugya.6  The evidence points to the problem of 
exclusion and Rabbi Eliezer’s position on get as one that is very early.  Before 
approaching meaning, the internal history of the BT and other rabbinic texts, such as the 
Mishna and Tosefta, it is essential to demonstrate that the concept in this first part of the 
sugya is Tannaitic. 
 
The position of Rabbi Eliezer is problematic since it appears to undermine the 
whole idea of divorce.  This is the gut reaction of those who lived contemporaneously 
with and soon after Rabbi Eliezer, and specifically the Tannaitic sages.  This gut reaction 
becomes part of the way the Mishna had to have been read, and it is difficult to accept 
that it took six or seven generations of Amoraim – and let us not forget one or two 
generations of Tannaim – before this reaction becomes a formal part of the transmission 
of the text of the Mishna. The idea of the hutz/al-menat oqimta and the language used to 
convey it in the introduction of the sugya were not separated by centuries.  A concept – 
and this concept specifically – requires language for transmission.  The concept and the 
phraseology possess a similar degree of successful transmission.  By this I mean that the 
language used to convey the concept became fixed at some point, and was at the center of 
how later Amoraim read the Mishna, as the next part of the sugya evidences; Ravina’s 
                                                
6 While in some instances, it is possible to state that both ways of reading the text are adequate and work, 
the importance of this introductory element in the sugya is that it is better to read this definitively 
Stammaitic element as early Amoraic or even pre-Amoraic. 
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reaction operates within the parameters of the oqimta.  What is unclear is whether it was 
transmitted and received by Ravina, fixed formally or informally,7 and how this might 
impact its degree of canonicity. 
 
It is worth noting here that the concept must come first, and later is committed to 
ever greater degrees of canonicity of language.  In our sugya, the idea that the position of 
Rabbi Eliezer is problematic is chronologically first attributed to the four elders, who 
appear later in the sugya.  The deployment of the oqimta is first associated with a specific 
source, Rabbi Jose.  At some point after Rabbi Jose’s interpretation of the Mishna is 
formally recorded, the essence of Rabbi Jose’s position is decoupled from Rabbi Jose.  It 
then turns up in the form of anonymous Stammaitic activity at the beginning of the sugya.  
The introduction’s anonymity is reflective of a unanimous acknowledgement of Rabbi 
Jose’s approach to the problem with Rabbi Eliezer’s position.  It is an acknowledgement 
of the hutz versus al menat debate advanced by Rabbi Jose.  Not only is the problem 
acknowledged in the introduction, so too are the options of Rabbi Jose regarding the 
meaning of ela.  It is Rabbi Jose’s approach that provides the pivot to how later Amoraim 
and the narrative of the BT in this sugya develops.  And it is the introduction that 





                                                
7 As I discuss in Chapter I and below, discerning the distinction between what Halivni means by formal 
versus informal transmission clues the reader into the degree to which Stammaitic activity is ‘Stammaitic’ 
chronologically or merely stylistically. 
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Halivni, Informal Recordings, and Stammaitic Reconstruction 
Among Halivni’s innovations is the notion of an informal transmission of 
Stammaitic activity throughout the Amoraic generations; he posits that the Stammaim 
often reconstructed it because it was not as closely guarded as the formally transmitted 
Amoraic apodictic statements.8  Therefore, conceptually, even those firmly in the Halivni 
camp – including Halivni himself – would agree that the issue raised in the first part of 
the sugya is Tannaitic, since it is attributed to Rabbi Jose.  As a concept, the oqimta was 
known that early.  The debate centers on when the anonymous language conveying the 
essence of the oqimta was crafted and the degree to which it was preserved thereafter and 
until it reached the Stammaim.  Even if the first Amoraim did not craft it, it could not 
have been too many generations thereafter. 
 
This case highlights the importance of how the Stammaim were reconstructing 
rather than creating from scratch.  If it was a reconstruction, then we must assume that 
they were reconstructing – or at least faithfully attempting to reconstruct – the language 
associated with the concept and not just the concept itself.9  In this case, the language is 
simple enough that one can assume that a complete reconstruction was not necessary 
here, and that the language is almost as old – if not as old – as Rabbi Jose, the Tanna who 
first raised the issue regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s position.  And certainly, it is most 
reasonable that first and second generation Amoraim, well versed with Rabbi Jose’s 
oqimta, were also familiar with a canonical set of words and phrases associated with it 
                                                
8 David Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot: iyyunim b’hithavut hatalmud (Magnes Press, Jerusalem 
2009), 19. 
 
9 David Halivni, mevo’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot, 20 – 30.  
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beyond just Rabbi Jose’s Braita.  The question to be asked is, what is the degree of 
formal canonicity that can be ascribed to anonymous Stammaitic activity that was 
preserved from the earliest Amoraic generations and – within Halivni’s paradigm – 
required little or no reconstruction?  The answer to this question impacts the meaning of 
the sugya, and most specifically, the introduction to the sugya where the oqimta of Rabbi 
Jose is first raised, albeit unattributed. 
 
 In his commentary on this sugya, Halivni commences his quote of the text with 
א"רד אמעט יאמ– “what is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer.”  In his analysis, Halivni opens with 
a reference to Tosfot’s elucidation of one view of Rabbi Eliezer’s position, the result of 
which is that just as a woman’s divorce only from her husband and without her having 
become permitted to anyone else precludes her from marrying into the priesthood, so too 
does a woman who is divorced from the whole world except from one man become 
permitted to an Israelite (non-priest).10  This is in contrast with Rabbi Yannai’s view of 
Rabbi Eliezer’s position.  Further, Halivni points out the practical halachic consequences: 
Rabbi Yannai validates a get where she is permitted only to one person, as opposed to 
Rabbi Yohanan, who interprets Rabbi Eliezer as not validating such a get.  It is also 
notable that Halivni does not mention Rabbi Yohanan by name; rather, Halivni only 
refers to the actual tradition (in our case, the interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer’s position) 
and not the source; he opens his analysis with the following words, “Tosfot and others 
already elucidated that he who states the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer…”11  This sets up the 
                                                
10 Halivni, meqorot u’mesorot:seder nashim, 605. 
 
11 As Friedman points out, chamesh sugyot, 144, Rabbi Yohanan often reflected traditions that originated in 
Palestine where the provenance is unknown.  I also address this in the detailed analysis, later. 
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next part of his analysis, where he will demonstrate that Rabbi Akiba was unaware of this 
interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer’s position. 
 
Halivni then moves on to a later part of the sugya, on page 83a, where Rabbi 
Akiba is offering an alternative interpretation for Rabbi Eliezer’s position.12  He is doing 
so within the context of the Braita where the four Tannaitic elders came together to 
‘undo’ the position of Rabbi Eliezer – in addition to Rabbi Akiba, there were Rabbi Jose 
Haglili (the Galilean), Rabbi Tarfon, and Rabbi Elazar, son of Azaria.  In building upon 
the analysis of the first part of the sugya involving Rabbi Yannai and Rabbi Yohanan’s 
interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer, Halivni demonstrates that Rabbi Akiba probably was not 
aware of the position attributed to Rabbi Yohanan.  Rabbi Akiba’s position is convoluted 
and requires imagination (at least relative to the position of Rabbi Yohanan).  Had Rabbi 
Akiba known of this tradition, he could have drawn upon it and conveyed his 
interpretation in much simpler terms.  Halivni then concludes that the author of the Braita 
with the story of the four elders would have been aware of the interpretation of Rabbi 
Akiba.  Halivni’s assertion is based upon the fact that this Braita is also quoted elsewhere 
in rabbinic literature.13 
 
                                                
12 For this part of the sugya, I do not provide a phrase-by-phrase analysis later in this chapter.  I mention 
and refer to it because of its importance more to the evolution of the approach to Rabbi Eliezer’s tradition 
and less to this sugya as a whole and as it evolved in Babylonia centuries later. 
 
13 Halivni cites the corresponding Tosefta at the beginning of Chapter 9, the Sifri Dvarim. 
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Halivni’s assertion, when put under the historical microscope, is even more 
convincing.  While it is unclear which Rabbi Yohanan is referred to here,14 it is likely that 
it is Rabbi Yohanan Nafha or Rabbi Yohanan Hasandlar, since they are the two Rabbi 
Yohanans who followed Rabbi Akiba chronologically and thus could have recorded a 
tradition of which Rabbi Akiba would have been unaware.15  Nafha was removed enough 
from Akiba that he could not have recorded a tradition known to Akiba in his name, and 
if it were an original concept Akiba could not have known it at all.  Hasandlar, however, 
lived chronologically closer to Rabbi Akiba, and therefore it is less likely that Rabbi 
Akiba would have been unaware of a tradition attributed to him, but it is still a 
possibility.  Further, Rabbi Yohanan Nafha is the more prominent of the two.  Both Rabbi 
Yohanans were contemporaries or near contemporaries of Rabbi Yannai, and therefore it 
is sensible that either would have been paired with him.  The three were all first 
generation Palestinian Amoraim. 
 
The way Halivni sets up his analysis highlights how the Tannaitic and earliest 
Amoraic sources operate as the backbone of this sugya.  They offer the first and most 
significant pivots in the understanding of the position of Rabbi Eliezer, as they are 
associated with our Mishna.  It is difficult to speculate why the author(s) of the Mishna 
(Rabbi Judah the Prince) elected to include Rabbi Eliezer’s position in his corpus.  At the 
time of the compilation of the Mishna it was already quite dubious, as is evidenced by the 
                                                
14 As mentioned earlier, Halivni’s language clearly demonstrates an ambivalence regarding the accuracy of 
an attribution to Rabbi Yohanan.  I am entertaining the possibility, while recognizing that it might be just 
an exercise. 
 
15 Yohanan ben Zakai, Yohanan ben Nuri, and Johanan ben Bag Bag all preceded Rabbi Akiba, and would 
not make sense within Halivni’s argument.  This would have been especially true for ben Zakai and ben 
Nuri, who were prominent in the period immediately preceding Rabbi Akiba’s.   
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number of Tannaitic sources who are apologetic about it, and specifically the story about 
the four elders who had to find a way to retract the plain meaning of the words conveying 
Rabbi Eliezer’s position.  The author of this Mishna does not use the language of hutz 
which was available to him, as it is in the Tosefta, and may have circulated elsewhere in 
the general rabbinic corpus of his time.  While not the topic of the dissertation, in 
analyzing this sugya, it is worth noting that the Mishna is actually more canonical when 
certain language is (purposely) left ambiguous.  One could argue that this is a mechanism 
for dealing with rogue traditions of otherwise reliable sources. 
 
Despite their falling squarely into the Amoraic camp, the positions of Rabbi 
Yohanan (regardless of which one or if neither) and Rabbi Yannai are presented as part 
of the narrative in a manner which is no different than the manner in which the Tannaitic 
positions are presented within the Braita earlier in the sugya.  Unless one possessed 
knowledge regarding how one adjudicates from the text, and was aware of the 
Tannaitic/Amoraic periodization, the narrative presents Rabbi Jose, Rabbi Yohanan, and 
Rabbi Yannai as contributing sequentially to the debate.  All the Tannaitic and first 
generation Amoraic material could have been associated with the Mishna quite early.  
Specifically, the story of the four elders, the dispute with Rabbi Yohanan, and the Braita 
presenting Rabbi Jose’s interpretation could have been firmly associated with the Mishna 
by the second generation of Amoraim.  Halivni’s emphasis on these parts of the sugya 
highlight how central they are to the sugya.  If one were to parse out the later Amoraic 
material that is included in the sugya, the Tannaitic material that is left would flow well.  
The Tannaitic and first generation elements also follow the Mishna logically.  It is not a 
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stretch to place not only the sources and traditions regarding Rabbi Eliezer’s position and 
their association with the Mishna as early as the first generation, but also the language 
used to convey them. 
 
This is particularly important in the case of Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Yannai as 
they are both first generation Palestinian Amoraim.  The assumption is that they would 
have had access to much Tannaitic material in a form possessing a high degree of 
canonicity, both linguistic and conceptual.  This would include, per Halivni, the material 
in our sugya.  However, less clear is whether they would have been aware of the basic 
Stammaitic material which introduces the sugya.  Yet, the Stammaitic material, which 
binds the different Tannaitic and first generation Amoraic elements, is reasonably 
understood as a highly canonical part of the text around and within which later material 
was weaved, both anonymously and attributively. 16   Without this first generation 
Amoraic and Tannaitic material, the other material could not be added, and could not 
make sense.17  The exception is the introductory statement, as well as the ‘mai ta’ama 
d’rabbi eliezer’ formulations.  One question that must be asked is about the degree of 
canonicity associated with the language of the introductory statement and its shaqla 
v’tarya at the time it was recorded.  Clearly, the sources in the sugya are aware of and 
reacting to the concept behind the introduction and to the ‘mai ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer’ 
formulations.   
                                                
16 This Stammaitic material may have only been informally recorded and I deal with this later. 
 
17 As I point out later, the reference by Ravina to the Mishna in Negaim is an example of this.  If it were 
removed from the sugya, the text would read just as, if not more, coherently.  Ravina is responding to the 
oqimta of Rabbi Jose and more like he is responding to the anonymous Stammaitic material with which the 
Mishna was associated for centuries.  Hence, his placement in the sugya.  Associating Ravina’s “ta shma” 
with the Mishna as the first element only confuse the reader. 
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The concept regarding the problematic nature of Rabbi Eliezer’s position 
possesses a high degree of canonicity; how formally was it recorded?  And if it was 
recorded informally, to what degree did the language hold up over the next seven 
Amoraic generations?  Here, I emphasize the importance of the early sources and 
traditions in this sugya and, in general and as Halivni has emphasized, the distinction 
between the formal and informal recording of them and how the Stammaim reconstructed, 
as faithfully as they could, this informally recorded material.  Conceptually there is little, 
if any, doubt that the concept conveyed in the introduction was formally associated with 
the Mishna.  The way Halivni analyzes sugyot in general leaves open the door in our case 
to the possibility that at least the language of the introduction, and the shaqla v’tarya 
therein required little, if any, reconstruction by the Stammaim.  That then leaves us with 
an archaic piece of Stammaitic activity, and we are only left to determine if it was 
formally or informally recorded.  Its chronology is not in question. 
 
Shamma Friedman’s Analysis 
 Friedman’s analysis of the text is as detailed a critical analysis as is available for 
this sugya.  He goes into greater detail regarding medieval commentators and their issues 
with the text.  He also discusses variances among the manuscripts.  He presents the reader 
with an etymology of the word ela, and different possible meanings for it.  He even offers 
a definition from the dictionary of Ben-Yehudah.18  Beyond the technical aspects of his 
analysis, Friedman also offers insights regarding the way the Braita of Rabbi Jose and his 
oqimta operate in the sugya.  He also directly relates Rabbi Jose’s oqimta to the 
introduction of the sugya and the oqimta there. 
                                                
18 Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 129. 
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 One aspect of Friedman’s presentation of the text is the chronological order of its 
different parts.  In his own words, Friedman states that he is opening “our topic not 
according to the order of the sugya, but with the braita of R’ Jose b”r [son of R’] Judah, 
because it is the oldest foundation (דוסי) in the sugya.”19 (Italics are mine.)  While they 
preceded him, none of the four elders who are quoted later in a Braita produce an 
approach toward Rabbi Eliezer’s position that was satisfactory enough around which to 
build a counter-interpretation, a sugya, or both.  Friedman is adept at recognizing the 
importance of Rabbi Jose’s parsing of Rabbi Eliezer’s tradition in the Mishna. 20  
Freidman further states that Rabbi Jose’s tradition is the basis for the oqimta in the 
anonymous introduction to the sugya. 21   As discussed, correlating the sugya’s 
introduction to Rabbi Jose’s tradition opens the possibility for an early Amoraic – or late 
Tannaitic – provenance for the language of the introduction and its earliest (informal) 
transmissions.  This establishes a basis through which to disconnect the anonymous 
Stammaitic language of the introduction from historical considerations and to view it as a 
literary tool that preserves a generally accepted approach to the Mishna.22 
 
 In discussing the tradition of Rabbi Jose, Friedman argues that Rabbi Jose’s 
agenda is to uphold the tradition of Rabbi Eliezer in some way, and therefore he must 
                                                
19 Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 123 
 
20 Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 123.  Additionally, it is worth noting that one ought be careful about how we 
speak about Rabbi Jose’s relationship with the Mishna since he was a contemporary of Rabbi Judah the 
Prince.  He may have been aware of and reacted to the tradition before its inclusion in the corpus of the 
Mishna.  We can only speculate about this, and thus careful with how definitively we discuss Rabbi Jose’s 
relationship to the Mishna. 
 
21 Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 124. 
 
22 As I discuss, Halivni’s notion of formal versus informal transmission is relevant to this part of the 
discussion.  While I don’t go into detail here, it is important to be mindful of this distinction when thinking 
about how such early concepts were transmitted textually at such a nascent stage. 
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assert that Rabbi Eliezer would invalidate a divorce agreement which contains a hutz 
formulation.23  According to Friedman, it was Rabbi Jose who “established that even 
Rabbi Eliezer himself would not validate ‘hutz.’ ”24  Instead, Rabbi Jose derives al menat 
(on condition) from the Mishna’s use of ela.  Friedman puts into relief the absolute 
contrast between Rabbi Eliezer’s position in the Tosefta, where he validates hutz, and 
Rabbi Jose’s oqimta, the result of which is Rabbi Eliezer’s prohibiting hutz and 
permitting al menat, which is first suggested more than a century later by Rabbi Jose.  
This also highlights the importance of this oqimta throughout the Amoraic generations, as 
well as the archaic nature of its association with Mishna.  However we define its 
transmission, the concept is transmitted (informally?) along with the Mishna and the 
other traditions already associated with it. 
 
GITTIN 82a – 82b  
 
'ינתמ םירסוא םימכחו ריתמ רזעילא 'ר ינולפל אלא םדא לכל תרתומ תא ירה הל רמאו ותשא תא שרגמה :
ו רזחש פ"עא וכותב ובתכ םדא לכל תרתומ תא ירה הל רמאיו הל וננתיו רוזחיו הנמיה ונלטי השעי דציכ וקחמ
.לוספ  
 
'מג אהד רזעילא 'רד הילע ןנבר יגילפד אוה ץוחבו אוה ץוח אוה תנמ לע וא אוה ץוח אלא יאה והל איעביא :
 'ר גילפד אוה מ"עבו אוה תנמ לע אמלד וא אמלעד יאנת לכא הוהד ידימ היל ודומ תנמ לעב לבא טגב הל רייש
.טגב הל רייש אהד הדומ ץוחב לבא ןנברדא רזעילא  
 
                                                
23 Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 130. 
 
24 Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 132.   
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רבינא ת"ש כל הבתים מטמאין בנגעים אלא של עובדי כוכבים אי אמרת בשלמא חוץ הוא שפיר אלא אי אמר 
אמרת על מנת הוא על מנת דלא מיטמו בתי עובדי כוכבים  הוא דמיטמו בתי ישראל הא מיטמו בתי עובדי 
תי נגע צרעת בבית כוכבים לא מטמאי בתי ישראל ועוד בתי עובדי כוכבים מי מטמאי והתניא )ויקרא יד( ונת
ארץ אחוזתכם ארץ אחוזתכם מטמאה בנגעים ואין בתי עובדי כוכבים גוים מטמאין בנגעים אלא שמע מינה 
  חוץ הוא ש"מ.
 
מתני' דלא כי האי תנא דתניא אמר ר' יוסי בר' יהודה לא נחלקו רבי אליעזר וחכמים על המגרש את אשתו 
אינה מגורשת על מה נחלקו על המגרש אשתו ואמר לה הרי ואמר לה הרי את מותרת לכל אדם חוץ מפלוני ש
  את מותרת לכל אדם על מנת שלא תנשאי לפלוני 
  שר"א מתיר לכל אדם חוץ מאותו האיש וחכמים אוסרים. 
 
מאי טעמא דר"א מידי דהוה אכל תנאי דעלמא ורבנן כל תנאי דעלמא לא שייר ליה בגט הכא שייר לה בגט 
י טעמא דר"א א"ר ינאי משום זקן אחד אמר קרא )דברים כד( ויצאה מביתו והלכה ומתני' דאוקימנא בחוץ מא
האי איש לכל  והיתה לאיש אחר אפילו לא התירה אלא לאיש אחר הרי זו מגורשת ורבנן >אמרי טעמא דר"א<
איש ואיש ורבי יוחנן אמר טעמא דר"א מהכא )ויקרא כא( ואשה גרושה מאישה לא יקחו אפילו לא נתגרשה 
  א מאישה נפסלה מן הכהונה אלמא הוי גיטא ורבנן איסור כהונה שאני.אל
 
 ot dettimrep ybereh era uoy“ ,reh ot syas dna ,efiw sih secrovid ohw eno ehT :ANHSIM
 ecrovid eht fo ycamitigel eht rof[ swolla rezeilE ibbaR  ”.inolp )ale( tub nem lla
 eht[ ti ekat lliw eH  ?ti tuoba og eh seod woH  .tibihorp sibbaR eht dna ]tnemeerga
 era uoy“ ,yas lliw eh dna reh ot ti evig dna nruter dna ,reh morf ]tnemeerga ecrovid
 ti ,]tnemeerga ecrovid eht[ ti nihtiw ]…tub[ ti etorw eh fI  ”.nem lla ot dettimrep ybereh
 .ti esare dna revo og ot erew eh fi neve dilavni si
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GEMARA: It was asked of them: this ‘but’ (ela) means ‘except’ (huz) or ‘on condition’ 
(al menat)?  [If it is] ‘except’ then it is regarding ‘except’ that the Rabbis differ from the 
words of Rabbi Eliezer, since he excluded [someone] from her divorce agreement (get); 
but [if it is to mean] ‘on condition’ they [the Rabbis] concede to him [Rabbi Eliezer that 
the divorce agreement is invalid], as it is with any other condition.  Or perhaps, it [the 
Mishna] is [referring to] ‘on condition’, and it is regarding ‘on condition’ that Rabbi 
Eliezer is in dispute with the Rabbis; however, regarding ‘except’ Rabbi Eliezer concedes 
[to the Rabbis that the divorce agreement is invalid], because he excluded [someone] 
from her get. 
 
Said Ravina: “Come listen: ‘all houses can become impure with leprosy but those of 
gentiles.’ ”  If you say that it’[s meaning] is ‘except’, then it makes sense.  If you are to 
say that it’[s meaning] is ‘on condition’ [then this follows:] ‘on condition’ that the houses 
of gentiles do not become impure, therefore the houses of Jews can become impure; 
however, if the houses of gentiles become impure, then the houses of Jews cannot 
become impure!  And, further, can the houses of gentiles become impure?  We learned in 
a braita: “ ‘and I shall place an impurity of leprosy in the house of the land of your 
possession;’ ‘the land of your possession’ becomes impure with a defilement [of leprosy], 
but the houses of gentiles cannot become impure with a defilement [of leprosy].  Thus, 
we infer from the above that it[s correct meaning] is ‘except’, [and that is what] we infer 
from this. 
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[This] Mishna is not in accord with the [following] Tanna: we learn in a braita: said 
Rabbi Jose, son of Rabbi Judah: Rabbi Eliezer and the sages were not in dispute 
regarding the one who divorces his wife and says to her, “you are permitted to everyone 
except (hutz) from ploni.”  She is not divorced.  Regarding what were they disputing?  
Regarding the one who divorces his wife and says to her, “you are hereby permitted to 
every man on condition (al menat) that you do not marry ploni.”  For Rabbi Eliezer 
permits [betrothal] to every man except (hutz) for that particular man, and the sages 
prohibit [it]. 
 
What is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer?  He [and his position here] is consistent with [his 
position regarding] conditions in general.  And [what is the reasoning of] the Rabbis?  
Conditions in general do not create exclusions to the divorce agreement; here it creates 
exclusions in the divorce agreement.  And [regarding this] Mishna, [when the meaning of 
the word ela is] upheld as ‘except,’ what is the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer[‘s position that 
the get is valid even though it’s not a pure and total separation]?  Rabbi Yannai said in 
the name of one old man: “The Scripture states: ‘and she leaves his home, moves on, and 
is with another man.’  Even if he did not free her [to any man] but only to another 
[specific] man, she is divorced.”  [With respect to the] reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer, the 
Rabbis state: “this [that is stated by the Scripture] is ‘man,’ [referring] to [her being 
permissible] each and every man.”  And Rabbi Yohanan said: “the reasoning of Rabbi 
Eliezer [is learned] from this [verse in the Scripture]: “and a woman divorced from her 
man they [the priests] shall not take.”  Even if she is only divorced from her husband [and 
not free to others], she is ineligible for [marriage into] the priesthood.  From here [it is 
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demonstrated that] it is a get.  And the Rabbis [would have it that] the prohibition of 
[divorced women marrying into] the priesthood is different. 
 
Analysis 
[For this sugya, I am breaking down the analysis into what can be described as ‘stand-
alone’ elements within the sugya; meaning that even on their own they still have meaning 
removed from context.  This is not to minimize how context impacts our understanding 
of these elements, and this is thoroughly addressed below.  In the analysis of the sugya in 
Nedarim, I break down the sugyot into far smaller pieces consisting of a phrase of several 
words; these, on their own, would not possess meaning in the same way as the elements 
as broken down here.] 
 
טגב הל רייש אהד ...אמלעד ינאת לכא ...אוה תנמ לע ...והל איעביא – This is the introduction 
to which I refer throughout this chapter.  It can be broken down into two parts: (a) the 
basic question addressing the most essential aspects of the oqimta, the hutz/al menat 
distinction in defining ela; and (b) the nature of the dispute between the Rabbis and 
Rabbi Eliezer considering both possible definitions for ela.  The value of breaking down 
the introduction in this way is realized when assessing the degree to which the 
anonymous author(s) of this Stammaitic activity veered from the Braita of Rabbi Jose.  In 
this sugya, it is also realized in defining Stammaitic activity as a stylistic tool that 
impacted the way the Mishna and the developing sugya were studied throughout the 
Amoraic generations. 
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The Braita of Rabbi Jose could have seamlessly followed the first part of the 
introduction.  He is essentially answering this question, although the critical reader is 
aware that Rabbi Jose actually predates the formulation of this question.25  The question 
is in line with Rabbi Jose’s Braita.  The second part of the introduction does not answer 
the question.  Rather, the author offers the two possibilities for the dispute: (a) that the 
dispute is about al menat, and the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer agree that hutz is invalid; and 
(b) that the dispute is about hutz, and that both agree that al menat is valid.  Rabbi Jose’s 
agenda is to negate the possibility that Rabbi Eliezer’s intent was hutz, and therefore he 
reflects only the possibility provided in (a).  However, (b) is a step back conceptually 
from Rabbi Jose.  Instead of conveying Rabbi Jose’s position – or something like it – as a 
response to the question, the author parses further the possible interpretations for how to 
understand the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer.  Rabbi Jose can still appear 
to be responding to the entirety of the introduction.  As the sugya is arranged he appears 
to be doing so. 
 
The introduction, however, represents a time at which the problem of hutz was 
more muted and offered far less practical concern than it did to the four elders and to 
Rabbi Jose.  The author of the introduction is less concerned, if at all, with attributing 
hutz to Rabbi Eliezer.26  The impact of the expanded scope of the dispute is an expanded 
roster of sages who can be mentioned in the sugya – an increased multiplicity of voices.  
                                                
25 As I discuss above, see Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 123 – 124.  Friedman argues that the oqimta 
originates with Rabbi Jose. 
 
26 As is evidenced later, particularly with Ravina, Rabbi Eliezer’s position moves more and more into the 
abstract world of Talmudic discourse, and away from the practical world of adjudicative law.  At a certain 
point in time, Rabbi Eliezer’s tradition becomes arcane.  While it might be at the center of this intellectual 
limbo dance, it was far from the Jewish courts which presided over divorces. 
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Once hutz is a possible reading of the Mishna, there is greater room for deliberation on 
the matter, and broader incorporation of Amoraic sages, such as Ravina, whose 
conclusion could not be reached without the re-entry of hutz into the range of possible 
interpretations of ela. 
 
The introduction is a stylistic mechanism through which to set up the sugya, and 
the mai ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer questions that come later.  This is in contrast to Rabbi 
Jose’s tradition, which is not a literary mechanism but a recorded tradition attributed to a 
source.  Rabbi Jose was concerned with preserving Rabbi Eliezer’s tradition, while at the 
same time defining it in such a way that it was acceptable, hence shunning hutz as 
possibly valid.  The author of the introduction was no longer concerned with making 
Rabbi Eliezer’s position tenable.  For the author of the introduction, Rabbi Eliezer’s 
position was fully canonized, both conceptually and linguistically to the degree that hutz 
was no longer a threat to the credibility of the tradition nor to pragmatic adjudication.  
The author of the introduction inverts Rabbi Jose’s position and offers an explanation of 
how the dispute could also be about hutz; within that broader scope, Rabbi Jose’s Braita 
is one element.  The introduction veers from Rabbi Jose in the broadness of its 
interpretive scope of ela and serves as the literary tool which makes the sugya possible. 
 
As discussed, the oqimta of Rabbi Jose as distilled in the introduction is nearly as 
old as the Braita of Rabbi Jose.  The distilled introduction broadens the scope and is thus 
distinct from Rabbi Jose, and therefore is also a conceptual component unto itself.  It had 
to be incorporated into the traditions and language surrounding the Mishna.  The 
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language of the introduction, and particularly the first half, is basic and concisely reflects 
the oqimta.  While transmitted in some form, it is unclear if the form in the extant text is 
the same as the one associated with the Mishna during the first, second, or third 
generation of Amoraim.  The question asked above regarding formal versus informal 
transmission is relevant here.  Within the Halivni paradigm of informally transmitted 
Stammaitic material being reconstructed by the Stammaim as necessary, it is difficult to 
isolate any part of the first half of the introduction as requiring any reconstruction.  While 
informally transmitted, it was still transmitted, and when the time came for it to become 
formally transmitted its form did not require reconstruction or change.  There is little 
reason to doubt its archaic provenance. 
 
 עמש ...אינתהו ...לארשי יתב יאמטמ אל ...אמלשב תרמא יא ,םיוג לש אלא ...עמש את אניבר רמא
ימהנימ עמש ,אוה ץוח הנ  – Because of its association with Ravina, this element of the sugya 
is necessarily chronologically late.  While it is possible that the text from Negaim was 
already associated with the Mishna prior to Ravina, there is no evidence among the 
manuscripts or other sources to support such an assertion,27 and therefore we must accept 
the attribution to Ravina.28  It is also not clear how much of this part of the sugya is 
attributable to Ravina, if any.  He is certainly the voice behind ‘ta shma’ introducing the 
text from Negaim.  The Stammaitic activity from ‘i amrat b’shlama’ until ‘shma mina’ 
could also be attributable to Ravina.   Or it can be ordinary anonymous Stammaitic 
                                                
27 Ravina appears in all the manuscripts.   
 
28 This is directly related to Halivni’s notion that unless there is reason to doubt the authenticity of 
attribution, it is reasonable to accept it. In the case of Rabbi Yohanan, clearly Halivni feels that the 
attribution is dubious. 
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activity.  Regardless of its attribution, it is also necessarily late, because it reacts to 
Ravina or is attributable to him. 
 
It is important to note how the Stammaitic activity in this section of the sugya 
serves as the literary mechanism through which Ravina’s ta shma interacts with other 
elements in the sugya.  The Stammaitic activity serves to pivot the meaning of the text 
from Negaim within this section, and the implications of Ravina’s ta shma within the 
sugya as a whole. 
 
The chronological provenance of the Stammaitic activity – whether it is the work 
of Ravina or his tannaim or the work of the post-Amoraic Stammaim – does not impact 
our understanding either of the sugya or of Ravina.  The Stammaitic activity that follows 
the quote from Negaim is not only necessarily later than the Stammaitic activity that 
introduces the sugya, it is also more complex than the Stammaitic activity from the 
introduction.  This is especially true for the opening question, which is in as basic a form 
as possible.  While the Stammaitic activity here might have been subject to greater 
reconstruction by the Stammaim because of its complexity, the opening question in the 
introduction is far simpler and would have required relatively less reconstruction.  
 
If we were to remove the entirety of this part of the sugya, it still flows seamlessly 
from the introductory question to the Braita of Rabbi Jose.29  It does not require great 
imagination to envision this (evolving) sugya at a time predating Ravina and the section 
                                                
29 In order for this to work, the phrase ‘matnitin d’la ki hai tanna’ would need to be dropped.   I address this 
in the next part of my analysis of the sugya. 
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that is either attributed to him or is reacting to the Mishna from Negaim that he inserts 
into the sugya.  Whether it was a sugya or merely traditions associated with the Mishna, 
imagining the sugya without this section offers insight into how the traditions 
surrounding the Mishna evolved into the final, canonized sugya. 
 
Without this section, the sugya would flow directly into the position of Rabbi Jose 
and the Tannaitic approach to Rabbi Eliezer’s tradition, which necessarily precludes hutz.  
Within the narrative, Ravina along with the Mishna from Negaim – and not the Braita of 
Rabbi Jose – are first to respond to the introduction and the question it presents.  As much 
as the Tannaitic sources appear to be running from hutz, the narrative matter-of-factly 
presents hutz with the definitive ‘shma mina hutz hu shma mina’ formulation to end the 
section.  A few centuries removed from Rabbi Jose and his oqimta, Ravina is able to 
explain ela for what it is: hutz, which is intuitively, historically, and contextually the 
intended meaning.  Ravina is going one step beyond the introduction and its formulation 
of the oqimta in the degree to which he presents hutz as the correct interpretation of ela. 
 
Ravina’s position is the fourth step in a process that commenced when Rabbi 
Eliezer’s tradition was first recorded.  The steps are as follows: (a) the original recording 
of the tradition attributed to Rabbi Eliezer, where hutz is the understood meaning; (b) the 
Tannaitic reaction to the tradition of Rabbi Eliezer on the part of the four elders and 
Rabbi Jose, their effort to distance Rabbi Eliezer from hutz, and the introduction of the al 
menat/hutz oqimta; (c) the reformulation of the oqimta by the author of the introduction, 
and the re-introduction of hutz as a possible interpretation of ela; and (d) Ravina and his 
  320 
interpretation of ela as hutz based upon the Mishna in Negaim.  The manner in which the 
interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer comes full circle from hutz to al menat and back to hutz 
represents the way a tradition makes its way from a lived reality to a recorded tradition to 
a theoretical position found only in a text.  As it is for the author of the introduction, for 
Ravina hutz is not necessarily an adjudicative option to the same degree that it is a 
theoretical position attributed to a long-gone Tanna. 
 
 ,אנת יאה יכ אלד ןיתינתמ   ...ינולפל יאשנת אלש ...ינולפמ ץוח ...הדוהי יברב יסוי יבר רמא אינתד
םירסוא םימכחהו  - Per Friedman, this Braita is the original provenance of the hutz/al menat 
oqimta.30  Its association with the Mishna – or the tradition of Rabbi Eliezer prior to the 
creation of the Mishna – predates the Amoraic period.  Its content is reacting directly to 
Ravina and the hutz definition of ela.  It is also a reaction to Rabbi Eliezer as he is 
understood both in the Tosefta and by the four elders in a Braita later in the sugya.  In a 
way, Ravina serves as a surrogate for the tradition of Rabbi Eliezer as his contemporaries 
and other Tannaim, such as Rabbi Jose, understood him.  The sugya does not place Rabbi 
Jose ahead of Ravina in the narrative, with Rabbi Jose responding to the introduction and 
its open-ended question.  Instead, Rabbi Jose is juxtaposed with the same hutz 
interpretation to which he was reacting during his time.  The narrative and the way the 
different elements of the sugya are arranged simulate in the text the conditions within 
which Rabbi Jose first suggested his oqimta.  It would not be strange for Rabbi Jose to be 
placed ahead of Ravina in the sugya.  Rabbi Jose and Rabbi Eliezer in this context are not 
tangentially related, as is the text from Negaim with the Mishna here; the relationship is 
                                                
30 Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 123.  
  321 
direct.  Nevertheless, Ravina is placed first with the Braita of Rabbi Jose reacting to hutz 
in this narrative again and in some way still for the first time. 
 
The language of the Stammaitic activity which serves as the hook between the 
two sections supports this reading of the text.  The phrase introducing the Braita, 
‘matnitin d’la ki hai tanna,’ is a reaction to the previous section, which includes the text 
from Negaim as introduced by Ravina, and where the conclusion in that section is that ela 
means hutz.  Because it is reacting to Ravina, this Stammaitic activity is likely late, and 
the original work of late Amoraim or the Stammaim.  If the Stammaim, it would be their 
original work as opposed to their reconstructions of existing informal Amoraic traditions 
and the language used to convey them.  The ‘matnitin d’la ki hai tanna’ introduces Rabbi 
Jose and his assertion that al menat is the correct interpretation of ela. 
 
Unlike Ravina, who appears to be choosing from among two possible 
interpretations, Rabbi Jose, and later in the sugya the four elders, are not selecting from 
two options; they are eschewing the obvious meaning of ela as it is deployed in the 
tradition of Rabbi Eliezer.  They are looking for mechanisms through which to ameliorate 
the severity of Rabbi Eliezer’s position, which requires the marginalization of hutz, and 
the justification of an alternative interpretation.  They only need to come up with one 
acceptable alternative to hutz.  As the interpretations advanced by the four elders 
demonstrate, they were not bound to al menat as the only possibly alternative.  They can 
be described as operating at a time when the alternative(s) were still being sorted out in 
the transmission of the traditions surrounding what eventually becomes the first Mishna 
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in the ninth chapter of Gittin.  Ultimately, it is the interpretation of Rabbi Jose as 
presented in the Braita which most contributes to the development of the sugya and the 
final form it takes in its most canonical state. 
 
 יאני ר"א ?א"רד אמעט אמ ץוחב אנמיקואד ןיתינתמו .טגב הל רייש אכה ...ןנברו ...א"רד אמעט יאמ
תשרוגמ וז ירה ...דחא ןקז םושמ– An essential question of this sugya centers on the reasoning 
of Rabbi Eliezer.  It is first asked here, and then raised twice more in varying forms in 
short succession as the sugya progresses.  Anonymous Stammaitic activity responds to 
the first ‘mai ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer’ and the first generation Palestinian Amora Rabbi 
Yannai is presented in the narrative responding to the second one.  Rabbi Yannai himself 
is quoting an older, presumably Tannaitic source.31 
 
Conceptually, the interest in the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is later than the 
oqimta of Rabbi Jose, and the introduction of the sugya – conceptually if not 
phraseologically.  It is post-Tannaitic.  Regardless of how it is legislated and later 
adjudicated, for the Amoraim, the question begs to be asked: mai ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer.  
What was Rabbi Eliezer thinking?  Did he not realize that he was breaking down an 
essential aspect of divorce – the complete separation, kritut?  The Amoraim developed an 
interest in Rabbi Eliezer’s position and the logic behind it.  The Tannaim are more 
concerned with the practical realities that might emerge from such a tradition regarding 
so important a matter as divorce.  In the narrative – and likely in their realities as well – 
the Tannaim are presented as attempting to undo the obvious meaning of Rabbi Eliezer’s 
                                                
31 As a first generation Amora, anyone considered ‘old’ must have been a Tanna. I treat this matter is more 
detail below. 
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tradition.  For them, and especially for the four elders who were near contemporaries of 
Rabbi Eliezer, the tradition of Rabbi Eliezer was not merely theoretical; it is presumably 
the way in which Rabbi Eliezer would adjudicate if such a case were to come before him.  
It is how he is presented as legislating this particular halachic matter.  Regardless, the 
Tannaim are presented as shunning the most extreme interpretation of ela, hutz.  The 
Amoraim accept that Rabbi Eliezer once held such a position, and the final expression of 
this chronologically is Ravina’s conclusion of hutz.  For them exploring the reasoning of 
Rabbi Eliezer does not have the adverse effect of validating an untenable position; rather, 
it is the exploration of what evolved into a theoretical position which had been rejected.  
Nevertheless, it was worthy of transmission and even inclusion in the Mishna. 
 
The response of Rabbi Yannai to mai ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer, in the name of one 
old man, is Amoraic to the extent that Rabbi Yannai forwards it; it is Tannaitic to the 
extent that it is quote from a man who almost certainly was of the Tannaitic period.  This 
association between a first generation Palestinian Amora and a tradition he received from 
the Tannaitic generation preceding him can serve to highlight the somewhat arbitrary 
nature of rabbinic periodization.  Here it manifests in the grey area in which this tradition 
is attributed to one old man by Rabbi Yannai.  It is unlikely that Rabbi Yannai – nor the 
one old man for that matter – was aware of how they would come to be ‘periodized’ 
centuries later in the epistle of Rav Sherira.  In his introducing the one old man, Rabbi 
Yannai does not convey anything in his language or in his style that the one old man 
possessed any greater authority than he (maybe only other than he was older and worthy 
of the respect of an elder) as were the traditions he may have taught.  If notions of 
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periodization even entered his head, or the head of the person who recorded his traditions, 
Rabbi Yannai would not have seen himself as periodized differently from the one old 
man. 
 
Rabbi Yannai is operating ‘Amoraically’ in that he is addressing the reasoning of 
Rabbi Eliezer under the assumption of hutz.  Quite differently, the Tannaim in no way 
entertain hutz as an option.  If, however, this is the tradition of one who was old with 
respect to a first generation Amora, then we are more than likely dealing with a Tannaitic 
tradition; one possibly contemporaneous with Rabbi Jose.  This indicates that at the same 
historical moment – or very close – two divergent approaches to dealing with Rabbi 
Eliezer were in effect.  They are reflective of the Tannaitic versus the Amoraic.  The first 
is ignorance – or a feigned ignorance – of the possibility of hutz as the correct 
interpretation.  The second is the acceptance of hutz functioning at least as an option for 
the interpretation of ela.  The one old man’s tradition is the interpretation of a verse 
which would presumably validate a divorce where a man allows his wife to marry only 
one specific man.  This interpretation of the verse is certainly far narrower than the way 
we might understand hutz.  It is not exclusive of this or that person; it is inclusive of 
potentially only one person.  This attempt to validate a divorce according to the hutz 
interpretation of Rabbi Eliezer is more absurd, and fraught with more potential pragmatic 
pitfalls, than the plain meaning of Rabbi Eliezer and ela as hutz.  Nevertheless, Rabbi 
Yannai’s one old man is similar to Ravina in that he is accepting of the possibility of 
hutz.  He differs from the Tannaim for the same reason.  The one old man is 
chronologically Tannaitic, and operationally Amoraic. 
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רו הנוהכ רוסא ...הנוהכה ןמ הלספנ ...אכהמ א"רד אמעט רמא ןנחוי יברו ...א"רד אמעט ירמא ןנב
ינש – Unlike the previous ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer formulations, here it takes on a tone that 
is not interrogatory.  Instead of ‘mai’ the ‘…ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer’ is preceded by forms 
of the verb amr: amar and amri.  They both are responding to the hutz interpretation of 
Rabbi Eliezer as well as to the question in the narrative above, ‘u’matnitin d’oqimna hutz, 
mai ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer.’  The traditions attributed to the Rabbis32 and to Rabbi 
Yohanan both emerge from a milieu where hutz is at least worthy of consideration when 
discussing Rabbi Eliezer’s tradition regarding divorce. 
 
The traditions attributed to the Rabbis and to Rabbi Yohanan33 are narrated in 
Aramaic.  This is in contrast to the position of the one old man as told by Rabbi Yannai, 
which is narrated in Hebrew.  The actual statement in both cases is in Hebrew.  The verb 
amr is in Aramaic when introducing the Rabbis and Rabbi Yohanan, and in Hebrew 
when introducing Rabbi Yannai.  The statement of Rabbi Yannai directly parallels the 
introduction to the ninth chapter of the Palestinian Talmud.34  In the PT, it is Rabbi Ili, 
and not Rabbi Yannai quoting one old man, who presents this position: “amar rabbi ili 
ta’ama d’rabbi eliezer v’yaza mi’beito v’halkha vhayta l;ish aher afilu lo hitira ela 
l’adam ehad.”  The language is almost identical.  The first difference is the use of ‘adam’ 
instead of ‘ish’ and the second is the absence of ‘harei zo megoreshet.’  The phrase ‘harei 
zo megoreshet’ (this one is divorced) could also be part of the narrative, and not part of 
                                                
32 These are the Amoraic rabanan, and are not to be confused with the hakhamim of the Mishna. 
 
33 As mentioned above, attribution to Rabbi Yohanan is often a mechanism for conveying a Palestinian 
tradition of unknown provenance in the BT. 
 
34 PT Gittin 50a.  
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the statement attributed to the one old man by Rabbi Yannai.  It is in the same Hebrew as 
the rest of the narrative.  In a way it parallels the ‘alma havei gita’ (it is a valid get) 
phrase, which completes the narration of the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer according to 
Rabbi Yohanan. 
 
The reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer attributed to Rabbi Yohanan echoes the second 
opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as one of the four elders.  Here, it draws upon the unique 
betrothal laws applicable to priests in order to create a scenario by which Rabbi Eliezer 
might be understood.  In the case of Rabbi Akiva, the opposite is taking place; Rabbi 
Akiva, like the other four elders, is seeking to get to the conclusion of ‘eyn zeh critut’ (it 
is not complete separation) and therefore it is not a valid divorce.  There is no interest in 
understanding Rabbi Eliezer.  Beyond drawing upon betrothal laws unique to priests, 
distinct are the cases of priestly betrothal deployed by the two sources.  Rabbi Yohanan 
speaks of a case where a woman is divorced only from her husband, but is not available 
to all others.  Rabbi Akiva is addressing a case where a priest is the person excluded 
based upon hutz, and where the husband then dies after granting this divorce with the 
exclusion.  Rabbi Akiva arrives at a scenario where the woman is a widow with respect to 
the priest and divorced with respect to all other men.  Rabbi Yohanan’s interpretation 
finds that divorce with exclusions is valid because such a divorce precludes the marriage 




  327 
Pluralism 
Our Sugya 
 From among anonymity, canonicity, multiplicity and pluralism, it is only 
pluralism that requires specific attention separate from the analysis of the text or the 
discussions of the critical scholarship surrounding it.  Unlike the other three, pluralism is 
unique in that it specifically requires considerations outside of the text and the world 
within which the text operates.  We look to the text only to the extent that we can analyze 
how it relates to an existing dominant legal system, or speculate about an imagined 
dominant legal system and/or its real-world manifestation.  Because of the importance of 
betrothal and divorce laws in most legal systems, it is a worthy law around which to 
assess the tendency toward the potentially subordinate status of the BT, and specifically 
this tradition regarding divorce, in a legally pluralistic milieu.  Pluralistic potential offers 
survival to legal systems which are no longer dominant, or were never meant to be.  Does 
the sugya, and its mistrust of hutz, possess that ‘survival instinct’?  Does it allow for the 
sugya and its traditions and sources to survive within the evolving BT corpus?  How does 
it fit into the paradigm of traditions and laws that can operate as subordinate to a tolerant, 
dominant legal system?  The answers to all these are positive, and put into relief how the 
individual traditions of legislation and adjudication in the BT can at least sometimes 
operate outside the purview and authority of the dominant or state law and at the same 
time not upset it. 
 
Matters of betrothal and divorce are at the center of the fabric of family and 
community life.  So long as certain conditions are met regarding certain laws – and these 
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can differ from culture to culture – a minority group can adhere to a tradition or law from 
a subordinate legal system.  The arbiters of the dominant system, as well as those who 
back them or otherwise represent the state, might have certain expectations, such as a 
degree of general complicity on the part of the minority group.  In order to remain within 
the bounds of the values of the dominant system, there might also be an expectation of 
some flexibility in the adjudication of matters regarding their adherence to this or that law 
from the subordinate system. 
 
It is worth noting that divorce and betrothal are also among matters that would be 
of relatively little interest to the arbiters of a dominant legal system, where other systems 
are also tolerated; this as compared to laws regarding land purchases and murder. This is 
particularly true in the case of minority groups bound to non-dominant legal systems 
which adequately address divorce.  There is little reason to believe that the Jewish 
communities of Babylonia during the Amoraic period did not manage their own betrothal 
affairs with little interference from the state, which at the time was operating under some 
form of a dominant Sassanian law.  While we can only speculate about the degree of the 
state’s involvement in the affairs of the Jews in Amoraic Babylonia, there is also little in 
the Sassanian legal texts available to us that would lead one to believe that the state 
would have a significant interest in the betrothal or divorce of foreigners who were not 
marrying into their faith. 
 
Regardless of how it might have related to Sassanian law specifically, with 
respect to dominant legal systems more generally, there is little in this sugya which 
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would be offensive to the overseers of a dominant legal system or one administered by 
the state.  Further, the ability to control betrothal and divorce while still maintaining good 
standing within the dominant legal system of the state further strengthens the standing of 
the minority group bound to the non-dominant legal system.  The BT successfully 
navigates the terrain between talking the dominant talk and walking the subordinate walk.  
When possible, the betrothal and divorce mechanisms of the BT must possess the 
capacity to function separately from the authority of the state.  At the same time, where 
state law requires adherence to state laws regarding betrothal and divorce, or where social 
pressures mandate adherence to state laws for betrothal and divorce, there is nothing in 
the BT that precludes such adherence.35  As mentioned above, there is little about this 
sugya that would be detrimentally contradictory within a dominant legal system, and this 
would even include systems where such exclusions in divorce would be acceptable. 
 
Conclusion 
 Demonstrating that the introduction is as archaic as the earliest Amoraic 
generation also demonstrates how early the trajectory of the meaning of Rabbi Eliezer’s 
tradition was pivoted.  Ultimately, the introduction of the idea that becomes this pivot is 
                                                
35 David M. Engel, in his article, “Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil 
Trial Court” (American Bar Foundation Research Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, pages 425-454, 1980), offers a 
discussion of the pluralistic nature of laws that govern divorce in Sander County, Illinois.  In it, he 
demonstrates how there exist entrenched local customs regarding how divorce is understood.  There is also 
a language used to express them.  This language must be re-crafted – or crafted from scratch – so that they 
can be accepted by the court and comply with Illinois state law.  The local customs and the language used 
to convey them were in stark contrast to the laws of the state and the language required to comply 
therewith.  Nevertheless, the local customs were as such that it was possible to convey them in the language 
of the state.  As they stand and have been and still are by many currently understood, there exist legal 
systems whose customs and laws regarding divorce would not be as compatible with the laws of Sander 
County.  With a conclusion of hutz, the traditions from this sugya would not be compatible with the laws of 
Sander County.  Marginalizing Rabbi Eliezer and both hutz and al menat serves to make divorce laws of 
the BT compatible with the laws of Sander County.  And they are contemporarily interpreted in such a way 
by modern adjudicators of halacha. 
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the result of a manipulation of the plain meaning of the text; in our case, the word ela.  
The four elders were still operating under the plain meaning of the text, and 
understanding ela as ‘except.’  They do not attempt to manipulate the plain language of 
the text.  It is also possible that the textual tradition available to them, and possibly the 
original Rabbi Eliezer tradition, deployed the word hutz, and quite possibly they were 
operating before the formulation using the word ela.  While the four elders were sages of 
note and while this story about the retraction of Rabbi Eliezer’s legislation was recorded 
in a way that it too was canonized, the story about them does not serve as this pivot.  As 
Friedman asserts, the foundation of the sugya is Rabbi Jose,36 and not the four elders; it is 
none of their interpretations that drive the sugya, and they are tangential to the primary 
narrative of the sugya. 
 
As opposed to the four elders, Rabbi Jose offers the text far greater charity.37  As 
mentioned, the elders may not even have been aware of the ela formulation.  Rabbi Jose 
reads into the meaning of ela, and therefore does not need to retract Rabbi Eliezer’s 
position.  The tradition stands because the tradition is, for Rabbi Jose, the language 
conveying the tradition, where for the four elders the tradition was the ‘tradition’; 
regardless of whether they were exposed to the ela formulation or not, they knew exactly 
what Rabbi Eliezer meant.  Because of his chronological distance from Rabbi Eliezer, it 
probably never crossed Rabbi Jose’s mind to retract the tradition.  Retraction after so 
long was no longer possible.  The only mechanism that was available to him was to read 
into the language and interpret it in such a way so that it no longer conveyed its obvious 
                                                
36 Friedman, chamesh sugyot, 123. 
 
37 See Chapter 3. 
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meaning.  This is in contrast to the four elders.  Nearly a century separated the four elders 
from Rabbi Jose, who lived at the end of the second century and was of the last 
generation of Tannaim.  The elders, who all had to wait for Rabbi Eliezer to die to retract 
his words and might have known him personally and what he said, could not reasonably 
alter the concept of Rabbi Eliezer’s tradition because of an ambiguity in the language, if 
it even existed.  For Rabbi Jose, this is not a problem.  After the passing of a hundred 
years, the language associated with the concept acquires a canonical degree of canonicity; 
its inclusion in the Mishna evidences this.  For Rabbi Jose, the language supersedes the 
obvious meaning of the contemporary listener who can immediately clarify the meaning 
(something the four elders were able to do). 
 
In unpacking this further, one can isolate a distinction between what the four 
elders are doing in their Braita and what Rabbi Jose is doing in his.  While the four elders 
were able to retract a recorded tradition, they had no mechanism by which to maintain the 
tradition while reinterpreting its language.  Conversely, Rabbi Jose was unable to retract 
a tradition attributed to Rabbi Eliezer, especially one recorded in the Mishna, but he was 
able to read into the language of the tradition as presented in the Mishna.  They both 
achieve the same result, which is minimizing the practical impact of Rabbi Eliezer’s 
tradition on divorce.38 
 
                                                
38 As I discuss, this is related to the notion of pluralism and how betrothal laws would often be something 
within the authority of the rabbis, and thus the stakes are much higher here than they might be elsewhere, 
such as in a discussion regarding Temple rituals. 
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As the BT was compiled around this Mishna, it was not the apparently more 
authoritative retraction of the four elders with which the sugya opens, but rather with the 
essence of Rabbi Jose’s oqimta in introducing ‘hutz’ and ‘al menat’ as possible ways to 
read the Mishna.  Further, by the time it is formulated in this way, it is done so 
anonymously and in the Aramaic Stammaitic style; a style that, I argue, is reflective of 
the pervading perspective on the Mishna and the traditions surrounding it.  The essence 
of Rabbi Jose’s tradition as recorded in the Braita is distilled into the purer form it takes 
in the introduction to the sugya.  In our case, this form – anonymous Stammaitic style – is 
divorced from any historical or chronological constraints.  It is a style with its own 
requisite set of analytical tools. 
 
The tradition of Rabbi Eliezer was canonical to the four elders at some level, but 
the language and the tradition were still vulnerable to emendation and even outright 
retraction.  A century later, it is the greater canonicity of the text of that tradition that 
opens the door for the charitable reading of Rabbi Jose.39  That charitable reading and 
interpretation – and not those of the four elders – serves as the basis for the introductory 
question and the pivot for the entirety of the sugya.  As discussed earlier, this pivot is 
definitively part of the tradition in the first Amoraic generation, and definitively 
canonized when the Braita of Rabbi Jose was recorded.  Thus the distilled concept – in 
our case the oqimta – as presented in the introduction was a central part of the tradition of 
the Mishna during the first Amoraic generation.  This was not the case regarding the 
                                                
39 While not the subject here, this highlights the difference between a canonical text and canonical 
behavior.  Behavior is just behavior, but a text prescribing actions or laws can be interpreted as many 
possible behaviors. 
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tradition of this oqimta before the closure of the Mishna and certainly not at the time of 
the four elders, who were unaware of it. 
 
While still speculative in its essence, establishing chronologies serves the reader 
of the BT and this sugya in two ways.  It helps in extracting meaning where historical 
considerations might be applicable.  More important to this project, it chronologically 
places the Stammaitic activity,  as well as the traditions and sources relative to one 
another.  This better guides the reader to the intent of the source and the later re-working 
and interpretation of the source’s tradition.  Positing all Stammaitic activity at the end of 
the Amoraic period and during the periods that follow it deflates the possibility of finding 
meaning in the sources and traditions when considering that the sources of the traditions 
and those who recorded and transmitted them (i.e. the traditions in the names of the 
sources) interacted – at least conceptually – with the substance of the Stammaitic activity.  
This is especially the case regarding simplistic Stammaitic activity where there does not 
exist the potential for divergent forms of expression and where there would be little need 
for reworking or reconstructing this activity. 
 
The canonicity of the language can only be considered after a degree of 
conceptual canonicity can be established.  In this sugya, the conceptual canonicity of the 
introduction is easily established as late Tannaitic.  The problem with Rabbi Eliezer more 
generally dates to Rabbi Eliezer himself.  The reactions of the Tannaim indicate 
knowledge of the problem with Rabbi Eliezer (by the four elders) and the reactions of the 
Amoraim indicate knowledge of the essentialized, non-partial oqimta of the introduction.  
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Conceptually, there is a degree of canonicity regarding a tradition that has problems with 
Rabbi Eliezer as soon as the four elders came together (if they in fact did).  
Linguistically, this begins to occur (and quite possibly finished) when the story and their 
statements were recorded and transmitted.  Similarly, the canonicity of Rabbi Jose’s 
oqimta acquires a degree of conceptual canonicity when he first suggested it.  It acquired 
linguistic canonicity as soon as it was first recorded and transmitted.  At this point, the 
oqimta – in its one-dimensional, ‘pro-al menat,’ Rabbi Jose form – is in possession of 
both linguistic and conceptual canonicity.  By the time of Rabbi Yannai (and Rabbi 
Yohanan), both first generation Palestinian Amoraim, the oqimta as synthesized by the 
authors of the introduction’s Stammaitic activity (which is all of it), was ‘out there’ even 
if it was not yet formulated as it is in our sugya. 
 
The narrative makes sense only if the concept of the oqimta was actually known 
to those who are presented as reacting to it.  It is not a reach to establish that the language 
associated with the oqimta as it is presented in the introduction also contributed to the 
reaction of the Amoraim, and specifically the first generation Amoraim.  Because a 
concept needs language, there must have been some language associated with it even 
before it was formalized as it is in the introduction.  Whether formally or informally 
recorded, it was recorded.  The simpler the language, the less reconstruction was required 
before making the Stammaitic activity part of the formal tradition.  Formalizing the 
Stammaitic activity may have been the purview of the Stammaim; even its reconstruction 
may have fallen to these same Stammaim.  But their original authorship is difficult to 
place chronologically.  This, as opposed to its literary contribution, which is difficult to 
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ignore, especially where the Stammaitic activity – and the concepts that first inspire their 
crafting – pivot interpretation for generations.  I stand by my argument that the text reads 
better when the language and not only the concept are fixed in the degree of canonicity. 
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Chapter VIII 
v’la Pligi Structures 
 
In this chapter, I look at a specific language formulation, what I call the v’la pligi 
structure, which appears throughout the BT in different legal contexts.  In the last two 
chapters, I worked in a sugya-centered manner.  As opposed to analyzing an entire sugya, 
I look at the formulation in all its contexts and cover much more topical ground.  I also 
establish a data set from which patterns emerge and which can point to subtle 
understandings unavailable when looking at a single sugya.  Additionally, this study is 
strictly focused on linguistic parallels.  This is in contrast to those studies where the 
emphasis is on the traditions and their sources, regardless if their emphasis is on the 
literary, the chronological, both or neither.  In looking at the v’la pligi structures, I 
assume that the crafters of the structure were aware of its fixed nature and knew that they 
were in fact crafting a specific structure with a specific formula for its creation, similar to 
other poetic forms (such as a sixteenth century English sonnet). 
 
The analysis of the v’la pligi structures yield fruit in a range of literary 
approaches.  The analysis highlights the balancing act of viewing the text through a 
literary prism while still considering chronologies.  It also further clarifies the 
malleability possible in dating different elements of the v’la pligi structure.  Further, in 
terms of considering the BT as historical, some of the v’la pligi structures are an 
opportunity to test for ‘lived traditions’ and how they might relate to the structures and 
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their specific elements.  This peak into the relevance of lived traditions could also bolster 
the notion that the BT is a monological work operating beneath a veneer of multiplicity 
and that the BT as a cohesive work is strongly suggestive of a culturally legislated 
lifestyle, if not a legally binding one.  The v’la pligi structures show how the multiplicity 
of voices is used to set bounds of accepted behavior; the range of accepted behavior in 
the v’la pligi structures is narrow and further points to its monological potential. 
 
As a literary form, I argue that the v’la pligi structures are highly canonical.  They 
possess a high degree of canonicity.  I break down the different elements with respect to 
the manner in which they might infuse canonicity into the v’la pligi structure, which is 
essentially addressing the matter of how and why was this particular v’la pligi structure 
authored.  Breaking down the text in this way also allows for the isolation of what can be 
called Stammaitic from a literary perspective, rather than from a historical or 
chronological one.  This further cements them as a literary phenonomenon, separate from 
a discussion about their periodization.  As I discuss, Halivni relies on the concept of the 
metzaref (the coupler of sources) as a historical figure(s) who needed to operate prior to 
the chronological Stammaim because of the function he plays in the formulation of any 
sugya where sources are coupled.  This metzaref is engaged in Stammaitic activity yet is 
not necessarily chronologically Stammaitic. 
 
I analyze six different v’la pligi structures, which are representative of the two 
different general types of resolutions provided in v’la pligi structures.  (As I explain 
below, there is (a) the geographical, which allows for the dispute to stand and which 
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provides no resolutions, and (b) the creation of a distinction that allows the divergent 
halachic positions to stand.)  In discussing the theory behind how I approach the text, I 
use the v’la pligi structure in Berachot 38a as an example of a text with which to explain 
v’la pligi structures in general.  Therefore, I will offer that text and a brief explanation of 
that text, here; a more detailed analysis of the v’la pligi structure on Berachot 38a is 
below, alongside the other five v’la pligi sugyot that are analyzed. 
 
ה יגילפ אלו אדסח בר רמא תונוזמ ינימ ארוב רמא לאומשו ורבדב היהנ לכהש רמא בר אתיתש אה הבעב א
הל ידבע אק האופרל הכר הל ידבע הליכאל הבע הכרב  
 
With regard to shatita, Rab said that the blessing is 'by whose word all things were 
made', while Samuel said that it is 'who createst various kinds of foods'. Said R. Hisda: 
They do not differ: the latter is said over the thick variety, the former over the thin. The 
thick is made for eating, the thin for a medicine. 
 
In this sugya, the question is raised, which blessing is made on shatita.  Rav states 
that when eating shatita one blesses with a shehakol nihyeh b’dvaro, and Shmuel states 
that one blesses with a boreh minei mezonot.  Rav Hisda introduces the v’la pligi, and 
attributes the resolution of the dispute to the nature of the shatita – one is avah (thick) 
and one is raqah (thin).  While one speaks of a thick shatita, requiring a boreh minei 
mezonot, the other is referring to a thin shatita, requiring a shehakol nihye b’dvaro.  
Stammaitic authors then elaborate that one shatita is designed as a food, while the other 
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is designed for consumption as a medicine.  This distinction is not necessarily part of Rav 
Hisda’s statement. 
 
Recording and Transmission 
The v’la pligi structures demonstrate how, after a source is recorded, it also can 
acquire a linguistic canonicity, after which it becomes a linguistic element and a 
recognizable layer in the text.  Degrees of canonicity, in the case of v’la pligi structures 
as well as many different sugyot in the BT, are ultimately defined by the form the text 
takes in its final and linguistically fixed manifestation.  While the halachic position can 
remain the same, the words used to convey it evolve until they reach this final fixed form.  
The v’la pligi structures in some ways reflect this process in their final, and most 
canonical, form.  This forces us to question the assumption that when a tanna recorded 
and transmitted a statement of an Amora, that he did so faithfully and that he maintained 
the language conveyed to him.  This assumption is not only prevalent in traditional 
circles such as Yeshivot, but also in large parts of the ‘academic’ study of the BT.1 
 
In this sugya, Rav and Shmuel are both first generation Amoraic sources whose 
opinions were recorded and transmitted separately during or soon after their lives, which 
is also the first century following the codification of the Mishna.  Transmission is the first 
step in the process of acquiring canonicity, and by virtue of recording and transmitting a 
                                                
1 See for example David Halivni, mev’ot l’meqorot u’mesorot (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2009), 4 and 111. 
Here is another instance in this dissertation where I can point to premises within the academic profession of 
Talmud study that are highly dubious and which have not been put to grindstone of a humanities-style 
inquisition, let alone one more rooted in the physical sciences.  This is not to say that the assumptions are 
necessarily wrong. And I certainly do not wish to imply that we cannot work within the parameters of these 
assumptions.  I do so myself.  I only wish to point out a weak part of the underbelly of BT study in the 
academy where significant deconstruction is still in order. 
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halachic statement it acquires authority.  At the point of their initial transmission, by 
virtue of being recorded the traditions of Rav and Shmuel acquired a degree of 
canonicity.  Originally, the substance of the legislation itself – the actual halachic 
position, separate from the linguistic formulation – acquired as much a degree of 
canonicity as, if not more than, its linguistic formulation.  Again, we are looking at the 
final linguistic form as the one possessing the highest degree of canonicity in the text.  
Before the linguistic form can achieve the degree of canonicity approaching the one in 
the final form of the text, the behavior associated with that position must also find its 
place in the ‘canon’ of lived traditions. 
 
Essentially, we must assume that different halachic positions in the BT reflect 
actual variances in the lived halachic traditions of the Amoraim.  This is true even in 
some cases where the narrative attempts to reconcile them.  Over time, the linguistic or 
narrative treatments imposed on the text by (different) attributed and anonymous authors 
and editors, such as the reconciliation of divergent positions (in our case using v’la pligi), 
becomes more fixed. 
 
In the case in Berachot 38a, the students of Rav and Shmuel, and/or the 
transmitters of their statements, did not think of their transmission as textually canonical, 
but only halachically canonical.2  Thereafter, Rav and Shmuel’s statements are coupled, 
thus forcing the coupler to adjust the language so that the two sources and traditions can 
be best narrated.  The exact wording of either Rav or Shmuel was not recorded by the 
                                                
2 As is discussed later, and as mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, this is a reference to the “canon of 
behavior”. 
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coupler (Halivni’s metzaref), but was adjusted.3  The coupler then injected a greater 
degree of canonicity into each individual source by coupling them, and subsequently by 
abbreviating them.  Both at this stage, and in the later ones, the abbreviations more than 
likely served a mnemonic purpose, which demonstrates both a desire to record a source 
and a desire to infuse it with the authority of something worth memorizing and 
transmitting.  A third generation source, Rav Hisda, further increases the canonicity of 
what appears to be an emerging Talmudic formulation – one which is closer to its final 
form – while attempting to alleviate the state of contradiction between the coupled 
sources.4  By mentioning Hisda by name, the later anonymous transmitter narrative 
allows for further multiplicity of halachic voices.  Another transmitter, one who postdates 
Rav Hisda, reworked the sources and their narration in order to include Rav Hisda and to 
produce the sub-canonical narrative quoted here.  This transmitter, like the final editors of 
the narrative, is operating anonymously; his identity is not of interest to the final editors, 
as only the positions he attributed, and the persons to whom they were attributed, are of 
interest.  Further, his anonymity – whether an anonymity of intent or not – can be seen as 
a contributing factor to its acceptability, since there are names we can plug in which 
could potentially lessen its acceptability, such as the name of a student of one of the two 
original rabbinic authorities of this structure.  At this point, the sugya acquires a greater 
degree of canonicity, as it relates to the fixed language found in the Talmudic corpus.  
                                                
 
3 Halivni mentions this point on more than one occasion; that when there are two sources, the second 
source’s position can be abbreviated where it is understood from the language conveying the position of the 
first source.  The following argument is primarily based upon Halivni’s introduction to Bava Metzia. 
 
4 While not directly related to this paper, it is important to note that at the same time, underway is a sort of 
federalization of the halacha and the text representing it.  To this end, contradictory sources are reconciled 
in order to minimize contradiction.  This parallels Michael Fishbane’s argument regarding the redaction of 
the Bible as taking place toward the end of eliminating contradiction.  Michael Fishbane, Biblical 
Interpretaion in Ancient Israel (Oxford 1985), 20. 
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The form is very close to the final form it takes in the fixed and accepted version of the 
BT, and does not change much.   
 
It is unclear how to date the v’la pligi form in its entirety; although the players in 
this narrative are all from the first half of the Amoraic period and the Stammaitic element 
could be as early as the third generation, if we attribute it to Hisda or a contemporary.  
Regarding the v’la pligi structure on Berachot 38a, it is reasonable to posit that the 
structure as a form is not later than the fourth generation.  By that time at least three 
voices were included within this structure, and while we do not have evidence in this 
particular case, it is possible that an attribution may have been recorded and then 
excluded during the latest edits of the narrative, as most v’la pligi structures carry no 
attribution but this example plugs Rav Hisda into that spot. 
 
Before its inclusion in the narrative that becomes the BT, this structure remained 
intact for as many as three Amoraic generations, thus indicating that a degree of 
canonicity is reached in the BT far earlier than the chronological Stammaim.  Further, 
within the structure, and as mentioned above, there exists an array of anonymous 
contributors; there exist a range of Stammaitic activity separate from the chronological 
period of the Stammaim as established by Halivni.  As will be discussed later, these 
contributors can be seen as having laid the foundation for the style of anonymous 
narration undertaken in the final form of the BT.  Such narratives illustrate how the 
canonicity of halachic form can be as important as the canonicity of halachic substance.  
While this sub-canonical residue is intentionally made evident as part of the narrative in 
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the BT in its final form, it is lost to us in other halachic works, as is the case with the 
highly codified and apodictic Mishna. 
 
Another result of mentioning Hisda by name is the attribution of what appears to 
be Stammaitic activity to an Amora.  Aside from this example, there are an additional 
eight examples where the v’la pligi is attributed to an Amora.  There are 68 structures 
that fit the v’la pligi paradigm.  Therefore, there are 59 cases where the v’la pligi is both 
anonymous and Stammaitic; but there are nine where they are just Stammaitic and not 
anonymous.  This serves to support the idea that Stammaitic activity is not bound to a 
chronology.  It even supports the notion that Stammaitic activity need not always be 
anonymous. 
 
V’la pligi Resolution 
 There are several ways in which the v’la pligi structures are resolved 
linguistically.  Conceptually, however, they can be broken down into two groups.  The 
first is where the dispute is resolved by the creation of a distinction whereby the original 
sources are said to have been referring to different situations in formulating their 
positions.  The second is where the dispute is resolved because of geographical 
differences.  Because the positions come from two different locations, they are not 
considered a dispute, and therefore get the v’la pligi resolution.  In actuality, it is not 
resolution.  Within this second category the two primary ways in which it manifests are: 
(1) והל אהו ןל אה which mean that “this law refers to here (Babylonia), and this one to 
there (Palestine);” and (2) הירתא יכ רמו הירתא יכ רמ, which means “this man according to 
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his location, and this man according to his location.”  For the first category, there are 
more linguistic formulations than for the first.  However, they are not conveying nearly 
the type of difference as is conveyed between and among them as is the case in the 
second category involving geography. 
 
 Practically, the resolution is merely a linguistic one.  In the realm of lived 
behavior, there will be no resolution; one person will say this blessing, and the other 
person will recite that blessing, but on a linguistic level there is no dispute, or so the 
narrator says.  The transmitter of the v’la pligi pursues the idea of resolution and even 
forces it linguistically where he cannot do so substantively.  In the first type of v’la pligi 
structures there at least is an attempt to actually reconcile the dispute by creating a 
difference that may not have been apparent to the original sages; if it was, then the 
question needs to be asked: why did the sages not articulate this distinction?  Why did 
Rav and Shmuel, in the case in Berachot 38a, not articulate the distinction between thick 
and thin farinas?  The obvious answer is that they actually disagreed about what blessing 
to make on shatita, and this dispute was recorded and transmitted.  Only later was the 
idea that Rav and Shmuel agreed injected into the tradition.  This appears to be a 
maintenance of a multiplicity of voices, but split between created halachic categories 
which were unknown to Rav and Shmuel when they actually expressed an opinion on this 
halachic matter. 
 
In the second type of v’la pligi structure, where the distinction is dismissed on 
geographical grounds, no attempt is made at all to reconcile the dispute.  The dispute is 
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left standing.  Yet an author at some point still injected the language of “no dispute” 
where he could have just as easily not stated “no dispute.”  This indicates a certain 
pursuit of dispute resolution while maintaining the value of allowing for a multiplicity of 
voices to be available for potential adjudication of specific halachic matters.  While the 
BT is full of unresolved disputes, what is interesting about the v’la pligi structures is that 
it almost unnecessarily offers the “no dispute” resolution, where it is not truly resolved.  
The narrator seeks to have it both ways; on the one hand he is maintaining the 
multiplicity of voices regarding the halachic issue, and on the other hand he is conveying 
a sense of unity between and among the sages whose traditions he is narrating and 
transmitting. 
 
The significance of the multiplicity of voices resonates particularly well when 
looking at the how later, Genoic and post-Genoic rabbinic sages deal with the halachic 
matters dealt with in the v’la pligi formulations.   
 
Berachot 38a 
 (The text and the translation of the text is above.) 
 
This is the only instance in which Rav Hisda introduces a v’la pligi.  This is 
demonstrative of what is usually anonymous Stammaitic activity being attributed to a 
named Amora.  More interesting is the fact that Hisda is a third generation Amora, and he 
is engaging in this type of Stammaitic activity.  Thus, this v’la pligi structure can be dated 
to as early as the fourth generation.   The structure following the v’la pligi is the ha b’… 
ha b’.  This example of v’la pligi is deceptive in its appearing first in the Talmud Bavli. 
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In terms of anonymity, and its relation to Stammaitic activity, it is worth asking 
the question: what is the impact of the v’la pligi being introduced by Hisda as opposed to 
being introduced anonymously?  Or conversely, we can phrase the question as follows: 
what would have been the impact had the v’la pligi been introduced anonymously and not 
by Rav Hisda?  Rav Hisda was a student of Rav.  This should be a factor in how we 
approach the text.  If this were anonymous, absent would be the dynamic of the 
introducer of the v’la pligi also being a student of one of the parties in the dispute.  
Clearly, it is the position of Rav that is more difficult.  It seems more natural that the 
shatita would require the blessing of borei minei mezonot, because it is a grain-based 
product.  Possibly in an attempt to justify what may have been a difficult position, Hisda 
comes up with the distinction between thick and thin.  Presumably, the thinner the farina, 
the less it is made of grain and the more it is made of water thus allowing for the 
distinction to have some merit.  As I discuss below, it is not necessarily clear from the 
text that Hisda authored the next part of the distinction involving medicinal versus non-
medicinal.  Nevertheless, that distinction further shows that the difficult position is Rav’s, 
and it is the one that requires the unique circumstance of medicinal use; for ordinary use, 
Hisda (or whomever anonymous contributor added the medicinal distinction) will have us 
believe that Rav himself agreed that the farina normally requires the borei minei mezonot 
blessing. 
 
Later Rabbinic authorities elaborate upon and legitimate this distinction.  
Rambam, in the Mishneh Torah, expounds on the notion and introduces the concept of 
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chewing, and sets up the distinction as being between achilah (eating) and shtiyah 
(drinking) – as opposed to the achilah and refuah (healing) language used in the 
Gemara.5 Additionally, he broadens the notion of shatita rakah (thin shatita) to include a 
drinkable food product – a sort of farina or hot oatmeal.  This is a reasonable thing to 
feed an ill person, and this fits in well with the original logic of the original Gemara 
following the v’la pligi.  The Shulchan Aruch maintains Rambam’s chewing and drinking 
factors, and keeps the achila and shtiyah language.6 Ironically, a recent source, the 
Mishnah Berurah, reintroduces the language of avah (thick) in order to broaden the 
degree to which the shatita must be thick (and firm) before it is considered l’shtiyah.7  R’ 
Eliezer b. R’ Yoel Halevi, in referring to this Gemara, states that shatita avah requires the 
boreh minei mezonot blessing.  In the following sentence, he elaborates that if it was 
rakkah, then one should bless a shehaqol nihyeh b’dvaro.8  The reactions of the Rishonim 
show how a multiplicity of voices allows for the later rabbinic sages to adjudicate within 
the bounds of what is offered within the sugya.  The bounds of available behavioral 
options with respect to this particular halachic issue is that a blessing must be made; one 
who would argue that no blessing is required is out of bounds. 
 
This v’la pligi is an example of where the dispute, in its concept, is sensible, and 
where the tradition of dispute between Rav and Shmuel on this matter may still have been 
legitimate.  Rav Hisda successfully parses the tradition, and the later authorities leave the 
                                                
5 Rambam, Perush ha’mishnayot, Berachot 3:3.  
 
6 Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, 208:6. 
 
7 Mishna Berura 208:22. 
 
8 Berachot, 104.  
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final result of the v’la pligi intact.  Essentially, Rav Hisda is dismissing the tradition of a 
dispute between Rav and Shmuel, but he is doing so while preserving the canonized 
language of the coupler or metzaref.  Thus, the language reflects dispute, but the 
legislation strives for unanimity.  Similarly, the later authorities view the entirety of the 
sugya as linguistically canonical, but draw upon different aspects of the sugya to arrive at 
different halachic outcomes.  Therefore, it can be said that the treatment of the authors of 
the v’la pligi – in this sugya, Rav Hisda – treat their received traditions with a canonical 
quality similar to the one with which Rishonim treat the BT. 
 
Berachot 44a 
 ר"א תוריפה לעו ץראה לע רמא ןנחוי 'רו היתוריפ לעו ץראה לע רמא אדסח בר יאמ אכה אה יגילפ אלו םרמע
 לעו ץראה לע רמא אדסח בר ךופיא אלא ןיכרבמ ןנאו ילכא והניא קחצי רב נ"ר הל ףיקתמ והל אהו ןל
היתוריפ לעו ץראה לע רמא ןנחוי 'ר תוריפה  
 
What do we say in this case [over fruit]? — R. Hisda said: 'For the land and for its 
fruits'; R. Johanan said: 'For the land and for the fruits'. R. Amram said: They do not 
differ. The one blessing is for us [in Babylon], and the other for them [in Palestine].  R. 
Nahman b. Isaac demurred to this: Shall they eat and we bless?21  You must therefore 
reverse the names, thus: R. Hisda said: For the land and for the fruits; R. Johanan said, 
For the land and for its fruits. 
 
In this sugya Rav Chisda states that one recites the words al haaretz v’al hapeirot 
as the conclusion to the beracha acharonah (a blessing following the consumption of 
  349 
food or drinks) for fruits, while Rav Yochanan states that one concludes this blessing 
with the words al haaretz v’al peiroteha.  Rav Amram introduces the la pligi, resolving 
the dispute, followed by the ha lan ha lehu (“this is for us this is for them”) breakdown.  
The resolution of the dispute is based upon the divergence in practice between Babylonia, 
where the words היתוריפ לעו ץראה לע (“for the land and for its fruit”) were recited, and 
Israel, where the words תוריפה לעו ץראה לע (“for the land and for the fruit”) were recited.  
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak then questions why residents of Babylonia used the term 
היתוריפ, (“its fruit”) referring to the land of Israel, when the residents of Israel are the ones 
eating its fruits.  He reverses attribution in order to reflect geographic reality.  In terms of 
dating, the elements up to and including Rav Amram’s introduction of the v’la pligi can 
be dated as early as the third generation.  Rav Nachman’s ‘correction’ of the sources 
could have been added to the sugya later, yet still as early as the fifth generation of 
Amoraim. 
  
Regardless of the permutations regarding where each blessing was made, this is a 
situation where the dispute exists only on the face of the issue.  For people in Babylonia 
and Israel to recite different blessings based upon language suitable for their location is 
reasonable.  The nature of the קחצי רב ןמחנ בר הל ףיקתמ (“Rav Nachman son of Yitzchak 
demurred to this”) demonstrates that the dispute between Babylonia and Israel in this 
case was probably immaterial at the time when Rav Yochanan made his statement, as he 
is basing his conception of the dispute on logic and not tradition.  Essentially, as with 
other ha lan ha lehu breakdowns of v’la pligi, there is no reason to believe that the two 
sources – Rav Chisda and R’ Yohanan, in this case – are in a state of dispute with respect 
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to the custom in the other’s land.  The use of the word pligi in the context of the ha lan ha 
lehu breakdowns may offer insight into the mutual perception of those who resided in 
Babylonia and of those who resided in Israel.  This is reflective of a declaration of ‘no 
dispute’ when in fact the dispute is not resolved on a behavioral level, but only a 
geographic one.  It also reflects the high value placed on multiplicity while striving for 
resolution. 
 
This sugya highlights the manner in which accepted disputes can evolve into no 
dispute at all without any reconciliation of position.  The solution to the problem of the 
tradition of dispute is to state ha lan ha lehu, which is in fact an acknowledgement of 
dispute.  Because we must assume that there was a tradition of dispute in a case where the 
two positions reflect Babylonia and Palestine, the resolution of ha lan ha lehu can also be 
viewed as a broad dismissal of the idea that there can be a dispute between a Palestinian 
sage and a Babylonian one.  In some ways, it is the ultimate nod to multiplicity; not only 
are all sides of a dispute recorded and transmitted, we are taught that there is no dispute 
even though the practices in Babylonia and Palestine are different. 
 
Berachot 45b 
 אה יגילפ אלו ןמא הנוע רמא אפפ בר ךרובמו ךורב רמא דיבז בר םהירחא רמוא והמ םיכרבמ ןהשכ ןאצמו אב
 ךרובמו ךורב רמוא ךרבנ ירמא אקד והניחכשא ךורב ירמא אקד והניחכשאד אהו ךרבנ ירמא אקד והניחכשאד
ןמא הנוע ךורב ירמא אקד והניחכשא  
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If one came and found three persons saying grace, what does he say after them? — R. 
Zebid says: Blessed and to be blessed [be His Name]. R. Papa said: He answers, Amen. 
They do not differ; the one speaks of the case where he found them saying 'Let us say 
grace', and the other where he found them saying 'Blessed'. If he found them saying 'Let 
us say grace', he answers 'Blessed and to be blessed'; if he found them saying 'Blessed', 
he answers 'Amen'. 
 
In this sugya, the Gemara deals with how a person must respond if he enters a 
room and finds people participating in a zimmun (communal blessing) following a meal.  
Rav Zevid states that he should say the words baruch u’mevorach (Blessed and to be 
blessed [be His Name]) and while Rav Papa states that he simply says amen.  The 
anonymous v’la pligi resolves the dispute by offering the breakdown that if the leader of 
the zimmun had said the word nevarech, (let us bless) then the one who enters responds 
with the words baruch u’mevorach; if the leader had said baruch, (blessed) then the one 
who enters responds with amen.   
 
The v’la pligi breakdown, to an extent, relies upon a linguistic play in order to 
alleviate the tradition of dispute.  Rav Zevid refers to a case where the person enters the 
room, and finds the leader of the group uttering, “nevarech;” and that Rav Pappa refers to 
case where the person enters the room and the finds the respondents uttering, “baruch.”  
Rashi reads the text in this way, and adds the word hamezamen, (the leader of the 
communal blessing) “ךרבנ ןמזמה רמאקד” (that the leader of the blessing said “let us 
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bless”).9  In order to arrive at this reading, Rashi changed the number of the most critical 
words in the resolution offered by the v’la pligi, from the plural  ירמא (they said) to the 
singular רמא (he said).  Tosafot offers an elaboration involving a person who enters a 
room and finds more than ten people participating in a zimmun.  Rambam reads the text 
in the same manner as Rashi, and offers a halachic rendering based upon such a reading – 
that when one enters and hears the leader uttering “nevarech,” one should respond with 
baruch u’mevorach; and that when one enters and hears the respondents uttering 
“baruch,” one should respond with amen.10 The Shulchan Aruch offers the same halachic 
rendering as Rambam, and adds the words sh’lo achal – an addition of the concept of 
entering the room, and not having eaten.11 Later sources commenting on the Shulchan 
Aruch offer a distinction between those who did not eat, but who drank.12   
 
There is no clue in the words of the two original sources, Rav Zevid and Rav 
Pappa, that one is speaking of a case where the leader is uttering words, and the other 
where the respondents are uttering words.  The distinction, as created by the v’la pligi, 
almost needs the elaborations of the later sources in order to maintain the distinction 
which resolves the original tradition of mahloqet. 
 
Stylistically, the parallelism in this v’la pligi, ha d’… ha d’… is worth noting.  
The language almost resonates poetically, “ha d’ashkechinhu d’qa amri nevarech, ha 
                                                
9 Rashi, Berachot 45b “ha d’q’amar baruch u’mevorach”. 
10 Berachot 5:17.  
 
11 Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 198:1. 
 
12 Mishnah Berurah, Magen Avraham. 
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d’ashkechinhu d’qa amri baruch.”  Again, the resolution is similar to the one in the 
previous sugya with ha lan ha lehu in that it also affirms multiplicity not only within a 
dispute.  This type of resolution articulates specifically that what appears to be a dispute 
is not a dispute, thus allowing for both positions to stand without the tension of an 
opposing position and the stigma of dispute.  
 
Shabbat 9b 
והל אהו ןל אה יגילפ אלו הרוגח ריתישמ רמא אנינח 'רו וידי לוטישמ רמא בר הליכא תלחתה יתמיאמו  
 
And when is the beginning of eating? Rab said: When one washes his hands; R. Hanina 
said: When he loosens his girdle. And they do not differ: the one refers to us 
[Babylonians]: the other to them [Palestinians]. 
 
Because of prohibitions related to eating food before the time for Mincha, this 
Gemara is attempting to establish the point at which a meal commences.  While Rav 
states that the meal commences when one has washed one’s hands, R. Chanina states that 
the meal commences when one has loosened one’s belt.  An anonymous v’la pligi is 
introduced in order to break down the tradition of dispute, using the ha-lan v’ha-lehu 
response.  The source of the v’la pligi presumes that Rav’s opinion is based upon the 
prevailing view in Babylonia, while the view of R. Hanina is based upon the prevailing 
view in Israel.  The sugya can be dated as early as the third generation of Amoraim based 
upon the sages mentioned. 
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Rambam directly echoes this resolution, and offers one halachic rendering for  ינב
לבב (Babylonians), and one for לארשי ץרא ינב (Residents of the Land of Israel).13  The 
Shulchan Aruch offers only the tradition relevant to Rambam’s “Babylonians,” and states 
that the meal commences at the time one washes one’s hands.14  The Mishnah Berurah, 
commenting on the above, reintroduces the idea that a meal commences when one 
loosens one’s belt. Specifically, the Mishnah Berurah states that if one is accustomed to 
loosening one’s belt prior to washing one’s hands, then for such a person, the meal 
commences at the time at which the belt is loosened.   
 
Stylistically, the v’la pligi fits the standard ha lan v’ha l’hu structure.  It is 
interesting to note the manner in which the later rabbinic authorities omit and reintroduce 
the traditions related to the commencement of the meal based upon washing hands or 
loosening the belt – ostensibly, on the basis of the practice in their own lands. 
 
Shabbat 10b 
ניד ילעב וחתפישמ רמא דחו ןיניידה ופטעתישמ רמא דח הנוי יברו הימרי יבר ןיד תלחתה יתמיאמ אלו םי
אנידב ותאו יקסע אלד אה אנידב ותאו יקסעד אה יגילפ  
 
When is the beginning of a lawsuit? R. Jeremiah and R. Jonah one maintains: When the 
judges wrap themselves round; and the other says: When the litigants commence [their 
pleas]. And they do not differ: the latter means when they are already engaged in 
judging; the former, when they are not already engaged in judging. 
                                                
13 Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Tefillah 6:6. 
 
14 Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 232:2.  
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In this sugya, an attempt is made to determine the point at which a court hearing 
commences.  As with the previous case, the concern is whether one must say Mincha, 
(afternoon prayer) or continue, since one is not required to cease from participation in a 
court hearing in order to say Mincha. 
 
The participants in this dispute are R. Yirmiah and R. Yonah, although the text 
does not record who says what.  One believes that the court hearing commences when the 
judges wrap themselves in their garments, while the other believes that commencement 
occurs when the litigants begin their claims.  The Stammaitic elements rely upon the v’la 
pligi to demonstrate that if the judges have just come from another court case, then the 
beginning of this case is signified by the litigants' opening claims.  If, however, they are 
just beginning to judge cases now (meaning that this is the first case of the session), then 
the beginning of the case is when they first wrap themselves in their garments.  
 
In this case, the deployment of v’la pligi serves to emphasize the importance and 
severity of judges who hold court, and not to break down an existing tradition.  The sugya 
later discusses whether Moshe Rabeinu really spent his time “ ברעה דע רקבה ןמ ” (from 
dawn to dusk) holding court.  Even the thought of this minimizes the nature of the dispute 
in this case.  It is not unreasonable to assume that the author is reacting to a petty debate 
of his time by dealing an emotional strike shrouded in a halachic framework and 
language structure. 
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Bava Metzia 40a 
 
:הנשמ שמוח רמוא י"ר ןייל תותש ול איצוי ... :'מג ופח רמד הירתאב הירתא יכ רמו הירתא יכ רמ יגילפ אלו
ץיימ אלו אריקב  אהו יפט אציימ אה אתשיגרג םושמ אמיא תיעביא יפט ץיימו ארפוכב ופח רמד הירתאב יפט
יפט אציימ אל  
 
Mishnah: HE MAY DEDUCT A SIXTH IN THE CASE OF WINE. R. JUDAH SAID: A 
FIFTH… Gemara: And they do not differ; each master rules in accordance with his 
region. In the locality of the first master they covered [the inside of the wine barrels] with 
wax, so there was not much absorption; whilst in that of the other [sc. R. Judah] they 
covered [them] with pitch; hence they absorbed more.  Alternatively, it is on account of 
the clay [used in making the barrels]; the one quality absorbed more, the other less. 
 
In this Mishnah, the question of how much wine can be deducted from the amount 
given to a bailee is discussed (it is assumed that some wine has been absorbed by the 
barrel and therefore the bailee need not give back as much wine as was given to him).  
The Tanna Kamma says that 1/6 of the original amount of wine is deducted; Rabbi 
Yehudah says 1/5 of the original amount is deducted.  The Gemara then says that they 
don't argue, but the Tanna Kamma refers to his town where barrels were covered with 
wax and there is less absorption, while Rabbi Yehudah refers to his town where barrels 
were covered with pitch and there is more absorption, and therefore more wine can be 
deducted from the amount to be returned. 
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The anonymous narrator here uses a practical consideration to resolve the 
apparent dispute.  It is apparent that both the Tanna Kamma and R’Yehudah agree to the 
general principal that some amount of wine should be deducted due to evaporation; the 
only question is in what quantity.  Having said this, it is a logical possibility that the 
dispute was only reflective of different methods of covering barrels in different locales. 
 
This is the only instance in the BT where the v’la pligi is relating directly to a 
Mishna.  The v’la pligi is introduced anonymously and no Amoraic sages are mentioned.  
Based on content alone, it is possible to date this v’la pligi structure to the second or even 
the first generation of Amoraim. 
 
Once it has been established that the BT contains fixed textual/linguistic 
structures predating its final compilation and redaction, it is also possible to establish that 
a later generation Amoraic authority would view such a textual structure with special 
reverence and would not manipulate the actual words comprising the structure.  This later 
authority would be more likely to manipulate its interpretation, thus adding another voice 
to the sphere of sources and traditions regarding a particular halachic matter.  At some 
point, even this interpretation can become incorporated into the fixed structure by an even 
later generation Amoraic authority.  The v’la pligi structures evidence this phenomenon 
with their consistently fixed components, each of which refer to authorities of different 
generations.  As mentioned, it is difficult to determine with certainty whether such 
elements were recorded/published orally or in writing; it is safe to assume that there was 
an attempt at efficiency in language and at least creating the appearance of pure orality to 
  358 
the elements within the v’la pligi structure.  It is also safe to assume that the rabbinic 
authority of each generation was merely acting as a transmitter when dealing with 
received sources and traditions; when working with a pre-existing textual element, they 
would view that element as possessing a canonical weight such that the rabbinic authority 
in his capacity as a transmitter and in his temporal moment could not ascribe his own 
contribution to the structure.  This can only happen by a later transmitter.  Transmissions 
of this sort – where even mild or benign adjustments are made – are a form of Stammaitic 
activity and thus could have taken place throughout the range of Amoraic generations.  
The passage of time and the preservation of a particular rabbinic authority’s memra are 
what offer the text status as canonical, and ultimately a degree of canonicity which allows 
for inclusion in the final fixed corpus of the BT.  It is difficult to determine the status of 
such a memra in this interim stage, except to surmise that it was less than absolutely 
canonical, but more canonical than individual memrot which were not ultimately 
included in the final corpus of the BT.  In analyzing the v’la pligi sugyot, I also seek to 
posit as early a dating as is possible based upon the content of the text and not its style.  
The v’la pligi structures demonstrate this. 
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Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I attempted to accomplish two primary goals.  The first was to 
demonstrate the over-emphasis on chronology in the way scholars read the BT.  The 
second was to provide potential new ways of reading the text without the deep 
consideration of chronology when doing so.  In terms of overall structure, I can look back 
and view the dissertation as a sketch for a comprehensive approach to understanding the 
BT and mechanisms for reading the text to achieve those understandings.  Parts of the 
sketch are more fully drawn out, and others are still relatively empty.  As a result, the 
dissertation can be legitimately criticized for swimming in too many waters at once.  I 
can also justifiably accept criticism regarding my inability to more precisely define 
certain terms, even critical ones such as canonicity.  Further, legitimate is criticism 
regarding my ‘reader(s) of the text’ and my constant reference to this reader or group of 
readers without proper identification and/or construction of who they might be.  
Nevertheless, I accomplished enough in some parts of the dissertation so that I can reflect 
upon those parts that I have dealt with successfully to the extent that I can continue my 
work where I left it.  At the same time, I am also in a position to reflect hypercritically 
upon those parts that require reworking and clarification before moving forward with my 
work in those particular areas. 
 
Stammaitic 
 I have expended the greatest amount of energy and time in dealing with the issue 
of Stammaitic activity versus Stammaitic chronology.  In the dissertation I have failed to 
articulate that my proposal regarding Stammaitic activity versus chronology is not a 
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necessary step in order to look at the text from a literary or non-historical perspective.  
My suggestion is more about degrees to which we might want to expend energy in this or 
that pursuit of an understanding of the text.  Where we expend less energy addressing 
histories and chronologies regarding a text that is neither historical nor verifiably 
chronological based upon normative standards in the humanities, we can invest more 
energy addressing the matter of why the text ‘works.’  While there is little contemporary 
extra-talmudic evidence for the formation of the BT beyond Sherira, from Sherira 
forward there is a historical record of a relationship with the BT as a text of importance.  
Why it has the influence that it does?  Without the best of articulations within the 
dissertation, here I can ask: How does Stammaitic activity infuse authority into sources 
and excavate power from traditions? 
 
 Taken a step further, worthy of further exploration is the notion that Stammaitic 
activity can manipulate existing traditions and their attribution to sources.  Beyond the 
anonymous Stammaitic activity in the BT, Stammaitic activity or something similar also 
operates in other halachic works which comprise the rabbinic canon of which the BT is a 
central component.  Exploring this common theme throughout rabbinic or halachic 
literature may yield a more refined definition of what it means for an element in the text 
to be Stammaitic.  Peeled from chronologies, Stammaitic can also be a concept only first 
isolated in the BT, but a concept worthy of application in other rabbinic texts.  Are there 
Stammaitic elements in medieval rabbinic commentaries on the BT?  What is the 
relationship between anonymity and the Stammaitic outside of the BT as a text and away 
from the historical milieu in which we place the BT? 
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 As a concept, we can begin to ask in a far broader way what it means for a textual 
element to be Stammaitic.  Before asking this question, one can also ask if textuality is a 
necessary quality in order for an expression to be defined as Stammaitic.  Tempting as it 
is to present the poor reader on page three-hundred-whatever with examples, one is free 
to muse about the possibilities of seeking the Stammaitic elsewhere in that which one 
wishes to define as rabbinic.  One can also look outside of rabbinic texts, and ask if 
Stammaitic is a Jewish feature; or if it is one which can reach into other cultures and 
academic disciplines.  Is there anything about the Honglou Meng that can be defined as  
Stammaitic?  Is there something Stammaitic about a newscast where the reporter’s names 
are known, but knowledge about the producers and writers are not as easily accessible?  
Are the unseen producers Stammaim of a modern form, attempting to ‘honestly’ present 
sources and their words?  I ask these questions as a way to stimulate the discussion and to 
demonstrate the distance we can leap when stripping concepts from their historical and 
cultural provenances.  Such is the goal with idea of the Stammaitic. 
 
Chapters II-V 
 Beyond the criticism of the emphasis on chronologies among contemporary BT 
scholars, the four chapters dealing with the four variables will also require a great deal of 
work and research in order to move forward properly.  As of this moment, the section on 
anonymity is most coherently developed and most likely to be ready for ‘prime time.’  
While not as polished as the work of many of my esteemed colleagues in the field, I still 
believe that there is something in the chapter that can be of value for someone reading it 
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today or tomorrow.  While I plan to improve significantly upon both the research and the 
presentation of conceptions of anonymity and how they impact the BT and how it is read, 
valuable and progressive is the idea that anonymity is a concept with consistency among 
and between its deployment in different cultural contexts.  In preparing the chapter for 
publication, I expect to offer further clarity on the meaning of anonymity.  Specifically, I 
will look to unpack further the idea of anonymity as neutral, divine and scribal. 
 
The chapters on canonicity, pluralism and multiplicity require more work before I 
can consider them for publication.  With all three, I would commence any re-crafting of 
the chapter with a thorough analysis of how each word is used in BT scholarship.  I will 
also look to the fields of law and literary criticism in order to better define and flush out 
potential meaning from these terms as they might impact a reading of the BT.  I have 
juxtaposed the concepts of pluralism and multiplicity, and even discuss them one as the 
inverse of the other.  Canonicity stands more on its own, and I was left parsing notions of 
canon and canonical in order to arrive at a working understanding of canonicity as a word 
and concept. 
 
On a most basic level, there is a failure in how I have crafted the chapter on 
canonicity because of the still too fluid and potentially broad conceptual space 
represented by the word ‘canonicity.’  While ‘fixity’ may serve as a quick-draw 
synonym, textual fixity does not capture all that I am after.  As I explain in the chapter, 
canonicity can commence with verbal utterances in the most informal of settings.  
Important as the text is, there is all that goes into the text that also influence the breadth 
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with which we can define canonicity in the text.  While the words themselves and their 
contexts and insinuations are a big part of it, it is hard to ignore that part of how the BT is 
read (by at least some readers) is with consideration of a history that stands behind the 
text.  This deeper analysis of canonicity will further highlight how the tension between 
the literary and the historical is at play when thinking about the BT as reflective of formal 
(and informal) (historical) pronouncements and the verbal communication that must have 
preceded them.  My failure to unpack this interesting tension will be rectified in the next 
iteration of my work on canonicity and the Talmud.  In the future, I may even broaden 
the scope to think about canonicity, history and contemporary readers, rabbis and 
academicians. 
 
 In all four chapters I routinely refer to the literary without any clear definition of 
the term.  At no point do I offer a definition, and in thinking about doing so after the fact, 
I realized that such a definition is a project in itself.  There are the more traditional uses 
of literary, such as ‘literary criticism’ which does not help us unless we are prepared to 
unpack the discipline of literary criticism and its relevance to the BT.  Such a pursuit has 
its merits, and enough work on the BT has been written which utilizes the word ‘literary’ 
and which places itself in the discipline of ‘literary criticism.’  Utilizing simple search 
technologies can yield much data on how the word ‘literary’ has been deployed in BT 
scholarship.  Then one can conduct an analysis of these contexts and the professors who 
wrote them and the possible agendas of the writers when crafting the articles and books 
which turn up in the data sets. 
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Sugyot 
 In the dissertation I analyze a number of sugyot and attempt both to peel away the 
chronological undertones one takes to the text and to define the texts through the prisms 
of canonicity, multiplicity, pluralism and anonymity.  Again, because of my deeper 
concern for what is Stammaitic, I did the best job of exposing the text to anonymity as a 
concept.  For the others, I achieved some success, but at times the analysis reads too 
generically.  Work must be done, and the manner in which I undertake this work is my 
focus as I think about reading texts while drawing upon conclusions I reach in analyzing 
the four concepts further. 
 
 In the dissertation, for reasons of expedience, I worked traditionally in terms of 
the process of analyzing a text and expressing it.  I read the texts, looked for secondary 
sources related to them, found manuscript variances, took notes on all of it, crafted the 
notes into sentences and paragraphs and then into something more coherent and finally I 
edited the text I created into a more or less final version for this dissertation.  This 
approach is not necessarily unique to the academic study of the BT or to how texts are 
read elsewhere, such as the church or otherwise outside of the academy.  For most texts, 
there is little at stake in performing such proverbial autopsies on a text.  For some texts, 
however, an autopsy is not possible in the same way.  Some texts are still alive.  The US 
Constitution.  The Talmud.  Living texts are not in a pure word vacuum.  They represent 
an element of the lived, and when reading the texts, there is value in considering those to 
whom the text is alive and how their approach might be reflective of how the text was 
perceived historically and through the ages. 
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The Reader 
 Often, I refer to the reader of the text or to how the text is read.  I do not identify a 
reader, and I am not certain of how to address this ambiguity.  I am uncertain whether I 
can consider this criticism or commentary.  The reader of the dissertation can be left to 
imagine who is the reader of the BT.  By and large, I assume that the reader of the 
dissertation would see themselves as also the reader of the BT.  In retrospect, I make 
many assumptions about who is the reader of the BT.  And in retrospect, I realize that the 
reader could be me.  I also realized that I might be representative of something.  If I can 
articulate what that something is, then I might be able to create a construct of the reader.  
At the same time, I recognize that there are many different types of readers of the BT, 
both in actuality and in potential. 
 
Beyond the consideration of me as the reader, there is the consideration of what is 
the reader and how the reader relates to the text.  Are there people who relate to the text 
who do not actually read it?  Essentially, in thinking about the reader, we can also think 
about how one relates to the text; is it a literary relationship, a legal one, a sociological 
one, some other relationship or some combination of all these?  Is it possible for me to 
take myself out of the equation when I am the one formulating the construct of a 
theoretical reader of the BT?  In attempting to answer these questions, I will be able to 
think about how to articulate in words what are now just feelings and intuitions about 
who the reader might be. 
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 Attempting to address the matter of “who is the reader of the Talmud?” is a 
daunting prospect, and can be a subject of multiple articles, dissertations, and books.  As 
I mention, there are different disciplines through which one can approach such a study.  It 
is in this area where the burgeoning discipline of Religion may be best suited to handle 
such a question.  Because we as students of Religion are not coming at the text from the 
perspective of a Rabbi or literary critic or sociologist or legal theorist, we are able to 
approach the BT in drawing upon terms from all the above disciplines while also bending 
their meaning to fit our purpose.  Because the BT is more than just a text to some of those 
who associate with it, such a pursuit can yield more fruit than approaching the text 
utilizing the tools of any one discipline alone. 
 
 In sum, addressing the matter of the reader of the BT is major undertaking and 
one which I look forward to engaging at some point in the future.  Such a project might 
best be served as a group effort comprised of experts from all the relevant disciplines.  It 
is my strong belief that the ideal manager of such a project should be a scholar trained in 
the discipline of Religion with its open-ended and less than strict rules about what it 
means to be a scholar of Religion, and what tools are at their disposal. 
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